though his capacity was afterward fully proved to be of the most comprehensive and splendid character, as it was not then drawn out and brought into action, he appeared in early life to be but little above an idiot. In this situation he was taken under the care of the benevolent Sicard, who was able, after great labour and ingenuity, to quicken by degrees the slumbering power of thought into developement and activity. Did his instructer suppose that Massieu was acquainted with the notion of a God?Far from it; he had abundant evidence to the contrary; nor did he even undertake to teach him that vast idea for some time. He directed his attention at first to knowledge more obvious and accessible in its origin; he led him, in perfect consistency with what is required by the nature and laws of the mind, by easy steps from one degree of knowledge to another, till he supposed him capable of embracing the glorious conception of a First Cause. Then he contrived to arouse his attention and anxiety; he introduced him to a train of thought which would naturally bring him to the desired result; he had previously taught him the relation of cause and effect; and on this occasion he showed him his watch, and, by signs, gave him to understand that it implied a designer and maker; and the same of a picture, a piece of statuary, a book, a building, and other objects indicative of design. Then he held up before him a chain, showing him how one link was connected with, and dependant on, another; in this way he introduced into the mind of Massieu the complex notion of the mutual dependance and concatenation of causes. At last the full idea, the conception of a primary, self-existent, and self-energetic cause, the notion of a God, came like light from Heaven into his astonished and rejoicing soul. He trembled, says his historian; he was deeply affected, prostrated himself, and gave signs of reverence and adoration. And when he arose, he uttered by signs also, for he had no other language, these beautiful words, which his instructer declared he should never forget: Ah! let me go to my father, to my mother, to my brothers, to tell them of a God; they know Him not.*

* See the work of Sicard, entitled Cours d'Instruction d'un SourdMuet de Naissance, chap. xxv.

Such facts and instances settle this question; they prove that the doctrine of inborn and connatural knowledge is unfounded; and may we not add, that they are in perfect accordance with a well-known passage of the Apostle Paul: "The invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead.”

46. The discussion of this subject superseded and unnecessary. It is an additional reason for not entering with more fullness and particularity into this inquiry, that the doctrine of innate or connatural knowledge has been frequently discussed at length and refuted, particularly by Gassendi and Locke, and more recently by De Gerando. This being the case, and public sentiment at the same time decidedly rejecting it, it cannot be supposed that every writer on the human mind is called upon to introduce the subject anew, to go over a train of argument, and slay a victim already thrice slain. Let us ask, Are we called upon at the present day to consider and refute every wild notion which has ever been proposed? On that ground we should not stop here; we must follow Locke further, and undertake a confutation of the doctrine of Malebranche, that we see all things in God; we must follow Reid in his laboured and conclusive overthrow of the long-established opinion, that we know nothing of the material world except by means of filmy images or pictures, actually thrown off from outward objects, and 'lodged in the sensorium. But such a course will be purposely avoided; it would be alike toilsome and unsatisfactory; it would be as unreasonable as to require from every author in Natural Philosophy a new confutation of the Alchemists, and to exact from every modern astronomer a like renewed discomfiture of the long-since exploded theories of the heavenly motions. Mr. Locke himself seems willing to admit, that the discussion does not naturally and necessarily make a part of Mental Philosophy; and gives us clearly to understand that it holds so conspicuous a place in his Essay, merely from the accidental circumstance of the prevalence in his own time of the error which he confuted. Accordingly, when he prepared an VOL. L-G

abstract or abridgment of that work for Le Clerc's Bibliotheque Universelle, he omitted the whole of the Book on innate ideas.

Furthermore, the whole system of Mr. Locke (and the same may be said of the views of Reid, Stewart, De Gerando, and Brown, who cannot be considered in the prominent outlines of their doctrines as essentially differing from him) is an indirect, but conclusive argument against connatural knowledge. If the principles which they advance be right, the doctrine of connatural knowledge is, of course, wrong, and requires no direct refutation.

§ 47. Further remarks on the rise of knowledge by means of the senses. Considering it, therefore, as settled that there is no connatural knowledge, we recur with increased confidence to the principle which has been laid down in this chapter, that the mind is first brought into action by the intermediation of the senses, and that the greater part of its earliest knowledge is from an external source. The considerations that have been adduced in support of this doctrine are obvious and weighty; they account with much probability for the beginnings of thought and feeling, and are entirely decisive of the character of our early acquisitions in general. The subject, however, is still open to reflection, and, if it were needful, might be placed in other lights.

Let us, then, suppose a man entirely cut off from all outward material impressions, or, what is the same thing, with his senses entirely closed. It is very obvious, and the instances already brought forward clearly prove, that he would be entirely deprived of that vast amount of knowledge which has an immediate connexion with the senses. But this is not all; there are other ideas, whose connexion with the senses is less immediate, of which he would not fail to be deprived, by being placed in the circumstances supposed. Even if he should possess the idea of existence, and of himself as a thinking and sentient being (although we cannot well imagine how this should be, independently of some impression on the senses), still we have no reason to believe that he would know anything of space, of motion, of the place of objects, of time, &c.

Now it will be noticed that these are elementary thoughts of great importance; such as are rightly considered essential to the appropriate action of the mind, and to its advancement in knowledge. What could he know of time without a knowledge of day and night, the rising and setting sun, the changes of the seasons, or some other of its measurements! What could he know of motion while utterly unable to form the idea of place! And what could he know of place without the aid of the senses! And, under such circumstances, what reasoning would he be capable of, further than to form the single proposition, that his feelings, whatever they might be, belonged to himself!

Look at the subject as we will, we must at last come to the conclusion, that the connexion of the mind with the material world by means of the senses is the basis, to a great extent at least, of our early mental history, and the only key that can unlock its explanation. A sketch of that part of the mind's history, without a reference to its relation to matter, would infallibly be found vague, imperfect, and false.-Let it suffice, then, to add here, that man is what he is in fact, and what he is designed to be in the present life, only by means of this connexion. He cannot free himself from it if he would; and if he should succeed in the attempt, it would only result in self-prostration and imbecility. The forms of matter, operating through the senses, press, as it were, on the soul's secret power of harmony, and it sends forth the answer of its thought and feeling. The material creation, where Providence has fixed our dwelling-place, and this earthly tenement of our bodies, form the first scene of the mind's developement, the first theatre of its exercises, where it puts forth and enacts the incipient part in the great drama of its struggles, growth, and triumphs.

CHAPTER II

SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.

48. Sensation a simple mental state originating in the senses. IN tracing the history of that portion of human thought which is of external origin, we have frequent occasion to make use of the words Sensation and Perception. The term SENSATION is not of so general a nature as to include every variety of mental state, but is limited to such as answer to a particular description. It does not appear that the usage of language would forbid our speaking of the feelings of warmth, and coldness, and hardness, as well as of the feelings of love, and benevolence, and anger, but it would clearly forbid our using the term SENSATION with an application equally extensive. Its application is not only limited, but is fixed with a considerable degree of precision.

Sensation, being a simple act or state of the mind, is unsusceptible of definition; and this is one of its characteristics. As this alone, however, would not separate it from many other mental states, it has this peculiarity to distinguish it, that it is immediately successive to a change in some organ of sense, or, at least, to a bodily change of some kind. But it is evident that, in respect to numerous other feelings, this statement does not hold good. They are immediately subsequent, not to bodily impressions, but to other states of the soul itself. Hence it is, that while we speak of the sensations of heat and cold, hardness, extension, and the like, we do not commonly apply this term to joy and sorrow, hatred and love, and other emotions and passions.

§ 49. All sensation is properly and truly in the mind.

Sensation is often regarded as something having a position, and as taking place in the body, and particularly in the organ of sense. The sensation of touch, as we seem to imagine, is in the hand, which is the organ of touch,