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CHAPTER I.

ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL.

36. Connexion of the mind with the material world.

THE human mind has a nature and principles of its own; but, at the same time, it cannot properly be said that it is entirely independent in its action; that is to say, it undoubtedly has a connexion, more or less intimate and important, with other things. An entire separation of the soul and its action from everything else is merely a supposition, an hypothesis, which is not realized in our present state of being. What the soul will be in a future state of existence, is, of course, another inquiry. It is possible that it may be disburdened, more than it is in this life, of connexions and dependencies, and will possess more freedom and energy; but it seems to be our appropriate business at present to examine it as we find it here.

Whatever Providence may have in reserve for us in a future state, it is obvious that in our present existence it has designed and established an intimate connexion between the soul and the material world. We have a witness of this in the mere fact of the existence of an external creation. Was all this visible creation made for nothing? Are the flowers, not only of the wilderness, but of the cultivated place, formed merely to waste their sweetness on the air? Are all those varieties of pleasing sound, that come forth from animate and inanimate nature, uttered and breathed out in vain? Can we permit ourselves to suppose, that the symmetry of form everywhere existing in the outward world, the relations and aptitudes, the beauties of proportion, and the decorations of colours, exist without any object? And yet this must be so, if there be no connexion between the soul of man and outward objects. What would be proportion, what would be colour, what would be harmony of sound without the soul, to which they are addressed, and from which they are acknowledged to derive their efficacy? Where there is no

soul, where there is a deprivation and want of the conscious spirit, there is no sight, no hearing, no touch, no sense of beauty. Everything depends on the mind; the senses are merely the medium of communication, the conditions and helps of the perceptions, and not the perceptions themselves. With such considerations we justify what has been said, that Providence designed, and that it has established an intimate connexion between the soul and the material world.

And there is another train of thought which leads to the same conclusion. On any other supposition than the existence of such a connexion, we cannot account for that nice and costly apparatus of the nerves and organs of sense with which we are furnished. Although we behold on every side abundant marks of the Creator's goodness, we may safely say he does nothing in vain. The question, then, immediately recurs, What is the meaning of the expenditure of the Divine goodness in the formation of the eye, in the windings and ingenious construction of the ear, and in the diffusion of the sense of touch? We cannot give a satisfactory answer to this question, except on the ground that there is a designed and established connexion between the mind and the material world. If we admit the existence of this connexion, everything is at once explained.

37. Of the origin or beginnings of knowledge.

The Creator, therefore, established the relation between mind and matter; and it is a striking and important fact, that, in this connexion of the mental and material world, we are probably to look for the commencement of the mind's activity, and for the beginnings of knowledge. The soul, considered in its relationship to external nature, may be compared to a stringed instrument. Regarded in itself, it is an invisible existence, having the capacity and elements of harmony. The nerves, the eye, and the senses generally are the chords and artificial framework which God has woven round its unseen and unsearchable essence. This living and curious instrument, which was before voiceless and silent, sends forth its sounds of harmony as soon as it is swept by outward influences. But this, it will be noticed, is a general statement; the mean

ing may not be perfectly obvious, and it will be necessary to descend to some particulars.

There are certain elementary notions, which seem to be involved in, and inseparable from, our very existence, such as self, identity, &c. The supposition would be highly unreasonable that we can exist for any length of time without possessing them. It is certain that these notions are among the earliest which men form; and yet cautious and judicious inquirers into the mind have expressed the opinion, that even these do not arise except subsequently to an impression on the organs of sense.

Speaking of a being, whom, for the sake of illustration, he supposes to be possessed of merely the two senses of hearing and smelling, Mr. Stewart makes this remark: "Let us suppose, then, a particular sensation to be excited in the mind of such a being. The moment this happens, he must necessarily acquire the knowledge of two facts at once; that of the existence of the sensation, and that of his own existence as a sentient being." This language clearly implies, that the notions of existence and of person or self are attendant upon, and subsequent to, an affection of the mind, caused by an impression on the senses. In his Essays he still more clearly and decisively advances the opinion, that the mind is originally brought into action through the medium of the senses, and that human knowledge has its origin in this way." All our simple notions," he says (Essay iii.)," or, in other words, all the primary elements of our knowledge, are either presented to the mind immediately by the powers of consciousness and perception, or they are gradually unfolded in the exercise of the various faculties which characterize the human understanding. According to this view of the subject, the sum total of our knowledge may undoubtedly be said to originate in sensation, inasmuch as it is by impressions from without that consciousness is first awakened, and the different faculties of the understanding put in action."+

*

Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. i., ch. i.-See also ◊ 5 of this Work.

Views similar to those of Mr. Stewart are maintained by De Gerando, in a Memoir entitled, De la Generation des Connoisances Humaines. VOL. I.-F