time, that when he spoke, the words he uttered were not the words he wished to utter. When he recovered, he found that in his attempt to write the check, he had, instead of the words 'fifty dollars, being one half year's rate,' put down fifty dollars through the salvation of Bra.'

354. Of the power of reasoning in the partially insane.

It will be noticed, so far as we have gone in the examination of the subject of insanity, that we have considered the powers of the mind separately. Probably every power of the mind, but particularly those of the intellect, may become more or less disordered. Having considered sensation, perception, original suggestion, consciousness, judgment, association, and memory, we propose, as coming next in order, to examine the subject in its connexion with the reasoning power.-In some cases of insanity there is a total inability of reasoning. There is no power of attention, no power of comparison; and, of course, no ability in the mind to pass from the premises of an argument to the conclusion. We have already had occasion to refer to the power of relative suggestion, by means of which comparisons are instituted. Whenever this power is disordered and fails to perform its office, such is the close connexion between it and reasoning, the operations of the latter are disturbed also. In such cases the inability to reason is total; that is to say, it extends to all subjects alike. But it is more frequently the case, that the alienation of reasoning is not so extensive, but exists chiefly in relation to certain subjects, in respect to which the belief is affected. When the train of reasoning leads the person within the range of those particular subjects, whatever they are, we at once discover that the intellect is disordered. And this view has led to the common remark, which is obviously well founded, that the more common form of insane or alienated reason does not consist so much in the mode of connecting propositions, and in the conclusions drawn from them, as in the premises. The insane person believes, for instance, that he is a king. Accordingly, he reasons correctly in requiring for himself the homage suited to a king, and in

expressing dissatisfaction on account of its being withheld; but he commits an essential error in the premises, which assume that he actually possesses that station.

355. Instance of the above form of disordered reasoning.

We have an instance of the form of insanity just mentioned in the character of Don Quixote. Cervantes represents the hero of this work as having his naturally good understanding perverted by the perusal of certain foolish, romantic stories, falsely purporting to be a true record of knights and deeds of chivalry. These books, containing the history of dwarfs, giants, necromancers, and other preternatural extravagance, were zealously perused, until the head of Don Quixote was effectually turned by them. Although he was thus brought into a state of real mental derangement, it was limited to the extravagances which have been mentioned. We are expressly informed, that in all his conversations and replies, he gave evident proofs of a most excellent understanding, and never "lost the stirrups" except on the subject of chivalry. On this subject he "was crazed."-Accordingly, when the barber and curate visited him on a certain occasion, the conversation happened to turn on what are termed reasons of state, and on modes of administration; and Don Quixote spoke so well on every topic as to convince them that he was quite sound, and had recovered the right exercise of his judgment. But something being unadvisedly said about the Turkish war, the knight at once remarked, with much solemnity and seriousness, that his majesty had nothing to do but to issue a proclamation, commanding all the knights-errant in Spain to assemble at his court on a certain day; and although not more than half a dozen should come, among these one would be found who would alone be sufficient to overthrow the whole Turkish power.

When the subject of conversation turned upon war, which had so near a connexion with shields, and lances, and all the associations of chivalry, it came within the range of his malady, and led to the absurd remark, which showed at once the unsoundness of his mind, notwithstanding the sobriety and good sense which he had just before exhibited.

356. Of readiness of reasoning in the partially insane. Those who have been personally acquainted with the intellectual condition of the partially insane, have sometimes observed in them great quickness of thought in some little emergencies, and an unusual degree of cunning. When, for instance, an attempt has been made to seize and confine them, they steadily and promptly mark the motions of their pursuers; they rapidly decipher their intentions from their countenance, and cause them no small degree of perplexity. In particular, it has been observed in some instances that they discover more fluency of expression and rapidity of deduction than others of a perfectly sound mind, or than themselves could have exhibited before their derangement. This singular fact is to be briefly explained.

The unusual quickness of deduction and of expression which has sometimes been noticed in partially insane persons, may be referred to two causes: First, an uncommon excitation of the attention, and of all the intellectual powers; and, secondly, a removal of those checks which attend the sober and the rational in their reasonings.

Some of the checks which retard the process of reasoning in the case of men whose powers are in a good state, are these.-(1.) There is a distrust of phraseology, a fear of mistakes from the ambiguity and vageness of language. The object of a rational man is supposed to be to arrive at truth, and not merely to gain a victory. He therefore feels anxious not only to employ terms which appear to himself proper, but which shall be rightly understood by his opponent. But the irrational man, as might be expected, does not find himself embarrassed with considerations of this nature.-(2.) A second obstruction to facility and promptness in argumentation, in the case of the sober-minded and rational, is this: They fear that they may not be in possession of all those premises on which the solution will be found in the event to depend. Many disputes are carried on without previously forming an acquaintance with those facts which are necessarily and prominently involved. While disputants of sound minds have any suspicion on this point, and know not but it will be labour lost, they of course feel

their interest in the dispute very much diminished.-(3.) The third circumstance to which reference was had is this: The influence of certain feelings of propriety and of good sense, which ordinarily govern men in the full exercise of their powers.

The disputant feels himself under obligations to profess a deference for his opponent; it is due to the customary forms of society. He is sometimes restrained and embarrassed by what he considers due to those who are present to hear the argument. He is particularly careful to say nothing foolish, absurd, or uncharitable.-All these things weigh nothing with the insane person. He is not troubled about exactness of expression, or the observance of ceremonies, but strangely rushes, as it were, upon the main points of the controversy, regardless of all minor considerations.*

357. Partial mental alienation by means of the imagination.

Men of sensibility and genius, by giving way to the suggestions of a melancholy imagination, sometimes become mentally disordered. Not that we are authorized to include these cases as among the more striking forms of insanity; they in general attract but little notice, although sources of exquisite misery to the subjects of them. But such are the extravagant dreams in which these persons indulge; such are the wrong views of the character and actions of men, which their busy and melancholy imaginations are apt to form, that they cannot be reckoned persons of truly sound minds. These instances, which are not rare, it is difficult fully to describe; but their most distinguishing traits will be recognised in the following sketch from Madame de Staël's Reflections on the Character and Writings of Rousseau.

After remarking that he discovered no sudden emotions, but that his feelings grew upon reflection, and that he became impassioned in consequence of his own meditations, she adds as follows: "Sometimes he would part with you with all his former affection; but if an expression had escaped you which might bear an unfavourable construction, he would recollect it, examine it, exagger

* See Stewart's Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. ii., ch. iii.

ate it, perhaps dwell upon it for a month, and conclude by a total breach with you. Hence it was that there was scarce a possibility of undeceiving him; for the light, which broke in upon him at once, was not sufficient to efface the wrong impressions which had taken place so gradually in his mind. It was extremely difficult, too, to continue long on an intimate footing with him. A word, a gesture, furnished him with matter of profound meditation; he connected the most trifling circumstances like so many mathematical propositions, and conceived his conclusions to be supported by the evidence of de

monstration.

"I believe," she further remarks, "that imagination was the strongest of his faculties, and that it had almost absorbed all the rest. He dreamed rather than existed; and the events of his life might be said more properly to have passed in his mind than without him: a mode of being, one should have thought, that ought to have secured him from distrust, as it prevented him from observation; but the truth was, it did not hinder him from attempting to observe; it only rendered his observations erroneous. That his soul was tender no one can doubt after having read his works; but his imagination sometimes interposed between his reason and his affections, and destroyed their influence; he appeared sometimes void of sensibility, but it was because he did not perceive objects such as they were. Had he seen them with our eyes, his heart would have been more affected than ours."

358. Insanity or alienation of the power of belief.

The action of the various intellectual powers which have been brought to view in this chapter, terminates in the causation or production of Belief. In regard to that particular state of the intellect which is denominated belief, it is obvious that in a sound mind it has a natural and determinate relation to all the various intellectual susceptibilities, both External and Internal. This relation is sometimes disturbed; and the belief exists in a position altogether unsustained by the evidence which is presented. There are three classes of persons in whom this state of mind, or, in other words, the faculty or susceptibility