tion. Accordingly, it has been observed, that a bird which has always been confined in a cage will build, when suitable materials are furnished it, a nest precisely similar to those of its own kind in the woods. It places with the greatest ingenuity the sticks, leaves, and clay of its frail dwelling, without going through a long process of previous training, and without incurring a debt to others for their assistance. But the instinct in this and other analogous cases is limited to its one definite object; it discovers an utter inflexibility, neither varying the mode of its action, nor extending its range so as to include other objects. But the reasoning faculty, altogether different in this particular, applies itself to almost everything. It is not easy to designate and limit the vast number of objects in nature, in events, and individual conduct, where it furnishes its aid, and secures the most beneficial results. It is an instrument equally fitted to investigate things that are most diverse; the mysteries of the mechanical arts, and the problems of political philosophy; the growth of a plant or flower, and the obscurities of the human intellect. (2.) The excellency of the reasoning power is seen also in its expansion and growth.-Instinct appears to be full and perfect at the very first opportunity of its exercise; but there are no such restricted bounds to reasoning. Though weak at first, it is endlessly progressive. It is seen distinctly at work in the child, that frames his miniature house of small sticks and blocks; and in the architect, whose scientific views and exquisite labours have resulted in forming edifices that attract a nation's admiration. It is discovered, in its incipient efforts, in the regulation of the sports of childhood; but, without changing the elements of its nature, it gradually enlarges itself to the capability of administering the affairs of an empire. § 271. Definition of reasoning, and of propositions. Reasoning may be defined the mental process or operation whereby we deduce conclusions from two or more propositions premised.-A train of reasoning may be re garded, therefore, as a whole; and, as such, it is made up of separate and subordinate parts. These elementary parts are usually termed PROPOSITIONS; and before we can proceed with advantage in the further consideration of reasoning, it is necessary to go into a brief explanation of them. A PROPOSITION has been defined to be a verbal representation of some perception, act, or affection of the mind. Accordingly, when we speak of a Proposition, we are usually understood to mean some mental perception or combination of perceptions, expressed and laid out before us in words. Although such seems to be the ordinary meaning of the term, we may admit the possibility of propositions existing wholly in the mind without being expressed in words. Mr. Locke expressly speaks of mental propositions, or those states of mind where two or more ideas are combined together previous to their being imbodied and set forth in the forms of language. The parts of the proposition are, (1.) The SUBJECT, or that concerning which something is either asserted or denied, commanded or inquired; (2.) The PREDICATE, or that which is asserted, denied, commanded, or inquired concerning the subject; (3.) The COPULA, by which the two other parts are connected.-In these two propositions, Cæsar was brave, - Men and Cæsar are the subjects; fallible and brave are the predicates; are and was are the copulas. Propositions have been divided, (1.) Into SIMPLE, or those whose subject and predicate are composed of single words, as in this, Benevolence is commendable; (2.) Into COMPLEX, or those where the subject and predicate consist of a number of words, as in this, Faithfulness in religion is followed by peace of mind; (3.) Into modal, where the copula is qualified by some word or words, representing the manner or possibility of the agreement or discrepance between the subject and predicate, as in these, Men of learning can exert an influence; PROPOSITIONS, more or less involved, are necessary parts in every process of reasoning. They may be compared to the separate and disjointed blocks of marble, which are destined to enter into the formation of some edifice; the completed process of reasoning is the edifice; the propositions are the materials. 272. Process of the mind in all cases of reasoning. Leaving the consideration of its subordinate parts or elements, we are further to consider the general nature of reasoning in other words, we are to examine the character of the complex mental process involved in that term. The definition given of reasoning, it will be remembered, was, That it is the mental process by which we deduce conclusions from two or more propositions premised. Hence there will be in every such process a succession of propositions, never less than two, and often a much greater number. The propositions often follow each other with much regularity; and hence, not unfrequently, we consider the arrangement of them as entirely arbitrary. But this is a mistaken supposition. It is true, when a number of ideas or propositions are presented nearly at the same time, the mind puts forth a volition, or exercises choice, in selecting one idea or proposition in preference to another. But the ideas or propositions from which the choice is made, and without the presence of which it could not be made, are not brought into existence by a direct volition, and, therefore, mere arbitrary creations, but are suggested by the laws of association. As an illustration, we will suppose an argument on the justice and expediency of capital punishments in ordinary cases. The disputant first denies in general terms the right which social combinations have assumed of capitally punishing offences of a slight nature. But, before considering the cases he has particularly in view, he remarks on the right of capital punishment for murder; and admits, we will suppose, that the principle of self-defence gives such a right. He then takes up the case of stealing, and contends that we have no right to punish the thief with death, because no such right is given by the laws of nature; for, before the formation of the civil compact, the institution of property, as a matter of civil and judicial regulation, was not known. He then considers the nature of civil society, and contends that, in the formation of the social compact, no such extraordinary power as that of putting to death for stealing, or other crimes of similar aggravation, could have been implied in that compact, because it never was possessed by those who formed it, &c. Here is an argument made up of a number of propositions, and carried on, as may be supposed, to a very considerable length. And in this argument, as in all others, every proposition is in the first instance suggested by the laws of association; it is not at all a matter of arbitrary volition. The disputant first states the inquiry in general terms; he then considers the particular case of murder; the crime of theft is next considered; and this is examined, first, in reference to natural law, and afterward in reference to civil law. And this consecution of propositions takes place in essentially the same way as when the sight of a stranger in the crowd suggests the image of an old friend, and the friend suggests the village of his residence, and the village suggests an ancient ruin in its neighbourhood, and the ruin suggests warriors and battles of other days.-It is true that other propositions may have been suggested at the same time, and the disputant may have had his choice between them, but this was all the direct voluntary power which he possessed. § 273. Grounds of the selection of propositions. A number of propositions are presented to the mind by the principles of association; the person who carries on the process of reasoning makes his selection among them. But it is reasonable to inquire, How it happens that there is such a suitableness or agreement in the propositions, as they are successively adopted into the train of reasoning? And this seems to be no other than to inquire into the circumstances under which the choice of them is made, or the grounds of the selection. Let it be considered, then, that in all arguments, whether moral or demonstrative, there is some general subject on which the evidence is made to bear; there is some point in particular to be examined. In reference to these general outlines, we have a prevailing and permanent desire. This desire is not only a great help in giving quickness and strength to the laws of association, but exercises also a very considerable indirect influence in giving an appropriate character to the thoughts which are suggested by those laws. Hence the great body of the propositions which are at such times brought up will be found to have a greater or less reference to the general subject. These are all very rapidly compared by the mind with those outlines, in regard to which its feelings of desire are exercised, or with what we usually term the point to be proved. Here the mind, in the exercise of that susceptibility of feelings of relation which we have already seen it to possess, immediately discovers the suitableness or want of suitableness, the agreement or want of agreement of the propositions presented to it, to the general subject. This perception of agreement or disagreement, which is one of those relative feelings of which the mind is from its very nature held to be susceptible, exists as an ultimate fact in our mental constitution. All that can profitably be said in relation to it is the mere statement of the fact, and of the circumstances under which it is found to exist.-Those propositions which are judged by the mind, in the exercise of that capacity which its Creator has given it, to possess a congruity or agreement with the general subject or point to be proved, are permitted by it to enter in, as continuous parts of the argument. And in this way a series of propositions rises up, all having reference to one ultimate purpose, regular, appropriate, and in their issue laying the foundation of the different degrees of assent. This explanation will apply not only to the supposed argument in the last section, which is an instance of moral reasoning, but will hold good essentially of all other instances of whatever kind. The difference in the various kinds of reasoning consists less in the mental process than in the nature of the subjects compared together, and in the conditions attending them. |