While we delay upon it, a variety of series of ideas occurs. At one moment we think of eminent mathematicians and astronomers, for he himself was one; at another, we think of those contemporaries who were his particular friends, whatever their rank in science, because they lived at the same time; a moment after, our minds dwell upon some striking incidents in his life, or some marked features in his social or intellectual character; and again, we may be led to think, almost in the same instant, of some proposition or demonstration which had once exercised his patience and skill. In consequence of delaying a few moments on the name, or, rather, on the general idea of the man, these different trains of thought are presented. And this is not all. When these various trains of thought are brought before the mind, we can evidently fix our meditations upon one of them, if we have a desire to do it and choose to do it, in such a way and with such intensity as to result in the dismission and absence of others.-This is one way in which, by an act of volition, we are able to exercise a considerable indirect power in calling up associations, besides a power in regard to them, both direct and indirect, when they are thus brought into existence.

244. Further illustrations of indirect voluntary power.

(2.) We acquire, in the second place, great power over our associations by HABIT; and as no man ordinarily forms such habit without choosing and determining to form it, we have here another instance of the indirect power of volition. By the term Habit, when it is applied to our mental operations, we mean, in particular, that facility or readiness which they acquire by being frequently repeated. The consequence of repetition or fre quent practice is, that certain associations are soon very much strengthened, or that a facility in them is acquired. (See $98.)

Striking instances of the effect of habit have been given in the course of this chapter, although it might perhaps be said, in respect to the results involved in these cases, that they were forced upon us by our particular situation rather than brought about by positive desire

and choice. But there are other instances to which this remark is not equally applicable. It is a well-known fact, that almost any person may become a punster or rhymer by taking the pains to form a habit, that is, by increasing the facility of certain associations by frequent repetition. If a person, for instance, makes it a practice to recall words which have a similar sound, this particular form of association will by degrees be so strengthened, that in the end it will be by no means difficult to secure the recurrence of such words. This is the true explanation of the power of rhyming. It is well known that most persons, whether they possess poetical genius or not, may acquire this power by continuing for a length of time their search after words of a like termination.Again, if a public speaker has taken the pains to fix in his mind certain permanent principles, which are to guide him in the division and subdivision of his discourse, he acquires by practice a great readiness in respect to them, and immediately applies them to every subject of debate. By means of the habit which he has formed, he is not only enabled to resolve a subject into suitable parts, but to pass without hesitation or danger of mistake from one part of it to another; whereas a person who has not formed this habit is perpetually at a loss; he advances and retreats, goes over the ground again and again, and involves himself in inextricable confusion.

These are instances, among many others, of power acquired by Habit; and these habits are formed in obedience to an act of the Will; in other words, in conformity with a purely voluntary determination.-(See, in connexion with this subject, Stewart's Elements, vol. i., ch. vi., pt. 2; Historical Dissertation, pt. i., § ii., ch. 2; Brown's Lectures, xli., xlii., xlix., &c.)

CHAPTER VIII.

MEMORY.

244. Remarks on the general nature of memory.

In the further prosecution of our subject, we naturally proceed from association to the examination of the Memory, inasmuch as the latter necessarily implies the antecedent existence of the former, and in its very nature is closely allied to it. In reference to the great question of the Origin of human Knowledge, the Memory, as has already been intimated, is to be considered a source of knowledge rather in its connexion with other mental susceptibilities than in itself. It does not appear how we could form any abstract ideas, based upon a knowledge of objects and classes of objects, without the aid of memory; and it is well known that its presence and action is essentially involved in all the exercises of the reasoning power and of the imagination. Without delaying, however, on its connexion with the origin of knowledge, we shall proceed to consider the susceptibility itself, both in its general nature and in some of its peculiarities.

Memory is that power or susceptibility of the mind by which those conceptions are originated which are modified by a perception of the relation of past time. Accordingly, it is not a simple, but complex action of the intellectual principle, implying, (1.) a conception of the object, (2.) a perception of the relation of priority in its existence. That is, we not only have a conception of the object, but this conception is attended with the conviction that it underwent the examination of our senses, or was in some way perceived by us at some former period.

When we imagine that we stand in the midst of a forest or on the top of a mountain, but remain safe all the while at our own fireside, these pleasing ideas of woods, and of skies painted over us, and of plains under our feet, are mere conceptions. But when with these insu

lated conceptions we connect the relation of time, and they gleam upon our souls as the woods, plains, and mountains of our youthful days, then those intellectual states, which were before mere conceptions, become REMEMBRANCES. And the power which the mind possesses of originating these latter complex states, is what usually goes under the name of the power or faculty of

MEMORY.

§ 246. Of memory as a ground or law of belief.

Memory, as explained in the preceding section, is a ground or law of Belief. So far as we have no particular reason to doubt that the sensations and perceptions in any given case are correctly reported in the remembrance, the latter controls our belief and actions not less than those antecedent states of mind on which it is founded. Such is the constitution of the human mind. (See § 26.) It will be noticed that, in asserting the natural dependence of belief on memory, we guard it by an express limitation. It is only when we have no reason to doubt of our antecedent experiences being correctly reported in the remembrances, that our reliance on them is of the highest kind. It is the same here as in respect to the Senses and Testimony; we confidently rely on the memory, but are not exempt from some degree of exposure to error from it, although, as in those cases, it is an exposure which we are able to guard against with suitable care and pains. (See § 27, 89.)

In what way and in what particulars this caution and pains are to be exerted, it is not necessary minutely to detail here. One thing, however, seems to be in general certain, that we are not led into error by means of the memory ignorantly, and without the ability to guard against it. Every man knows, from a species of internal feeling, whether there be grounds for doubting his memory in any particular case or not; for the same Consciousness which gives him a knowledge of the fact of memory, gives him a knowledge of the degree also in which it exists; viz., whether in a high degree or low, whether distinct or obscure. If it be the fact that he finds reason for suspecting his reports, his reliance will

either be diminished in proportion to this suspicion, or he will take means, if he be able to, to remove the grounds of such suspicion.

It cannot reasonably be anticipated that any objection will be made to the doctrine of a reliance on memory, with the limitation which has now been mentioned. Without such reliance, our situation would be no better at least than if we had been framed with an utter inability to rely on the Senses or on Testimony; we could hardly sustain an existence; we certainly could not derive anything in aid of that existence from the experience of the past.

247. Of differences in the strength of memory.

The ability to remember is the common privilege of all, and, generally speaking, it is possessed in nearly equal degrees. To each one there is given a sufficient readiness in this respect; his power of remembrance is such as to answer all the ordinary purposes of life. But, although there is in general a nearly equal distribution of power, we find a few instances of great weakness, and other instances of great strength of memory.

this

It is related by Seneca of the Roman orator Hortensius, that, after sitting a whole day at a public sale, he gave an account from memory, in the evening, of all things sold, with the prices and the names of the purchasers; and this account, when compared with what had been taken in writing by a notary, was found to be exact in every particular.

The following is an instance of strength of memory somewhat remarkable.-An Englishman, at a certain time, came to Frederic the Great of Prussia for the express purpose of giving him an exhibition of his power of recollection. Frederic sent for Voltaire, who read to the king a pretty long poem which he had just finished. The Englishman was present, and was in such a position that he could hear every word of the poem, but was concealed from Voltaire's notice. After the reading of the poem was finished, Frederic observed to the author that the production could not be an original one, as there was a foreign gentleman present who could recite every word