what is conceived to be the truth; our inquiries are to be directed by such general outline so far as can be done consistently with the often involved and complicated nature of the mental operations; but, after all, the value of our investigations will depend essentially and chiefly on the accuracy of the details.

We make these remarks here, because some who assent to the general arrangement may perhaps imagine that they see reason for an alteration in the disposition of the subordinate parts. And we readily admit that cases are to be found where it is somewhat difficult to determine under what general head particular thoughts are to be placed, and particular mental exercises and associations are to be arranged. But if, as before intimated, the outlines of the system be generally correct or nearly so, and the details, although they may sometimes be wrongly placed relatively to such outlines, be given with accuracy, not much will be found which there will be occasion to object to.

CHAPTER II.

ORIGINAL SUGGESTION.

§ 177. Import of suggestion, and its application in Reid and Stewart. SOME of the cases of thought and knowledge, which the mind becomes possessed of in itself, without the direct aid of the senses, are to be ascribed to Suggestion. This word, in its application here, is used merely to express a simple but important fact, viz., That the mind, by its own activity and vigour, gives rise to certain thoughts. Without any mixture of hypothesis, or any qualifying intimation whatever, it gives the fact, and that is all. The use of this word, as applicable to the origin of a portion of human knowledge, is distinctly proposed by Dr. Reid. In his Inquiry into the Human Mind (chap. ii., § 7), he speaks of certain notions (for instance, those of existence, mind, person, &c.) as the "judgments of

nature, judgments not got by comparing ideas, and perceiving agreements and disagreements, but immediately inspired by our constitution." Pursuing this train of thought, he further remarks: "It is incumbent on those who think that these are not natural principles [that is, notions called forth within us, independently of reasoning], to show how we can otherwise get the notion of mind and its faculties." Again, immediately after, he ascribes those notions which cannot be attributed directly to the senses on the one hand, nor to the reasoning power on the other, to an internal or mental Suggestion, as follows. "I beg leave to make use of the word SUGGESTION, ` because I know not one more proper, to express a power of the mind, which seems entirely to have escaped the notice of philosophers, and to which we owe many of our simple notions, which are neither impressions nor ideas, as well as many original principles of belief. I shall endeavour to illustrate by example what I understand by this word. We all know that a certain kind of sound suggests immediately to the mind a coach passing in the street; and not only produces the imagination, but the belief, that a coach is passing. Yet there is here no comparing of ideas, no perception of agreements or disagreements, to produce this belief; nor is there the least similitude between the sound we hear, and the coach we imagine and believe to be passing.

"It is true that this suggestion," referring to the illustration he had just given," is not natural and original; it is the result of experience and habit. But I think it appears, from what hath been said, that there are NATURAL SUGGESTIONS; particularly that sensation suggests the notion of present existence, and the belief that what we perceive or feel does now exist; that memory suggests the notion of past existence, and the belief that what we remember did exist in time past; and that our sensations and thoughts do also suggest the notion of a mind, and the belief of its existence, and of its relation to our thoughts. By a like natural principle it is that a beginning of existence, or any change in nature, suggests to us the notion of a cause, and compels our belief of its exist-ence. And, in like manner, as shall be shown when we

come to the sense of touch, certain sensations of touch, by the constitution of our nature, suggest to us extension, solidity, and motion, which are nowise like to sensations, although they have hitherto been confounded with them." -We find similar sentiments in various other places.

Mr. Stewart also, in his Philosophical Essays, speaks of certain mental phenomena as attendant upon the objects of our consciousness, and as SUGGESTED by them. The notions of time, number, motion, memory, sameness, personal identity, present existence, &c., he ascribes neither to the external world on the one hand, nor to the internal mental operations, of which we are conscious, on the other; except so far as they are the occasions, on which the mind brings them out, or SUGGESTS them from its own inherent energy. Of the notion of DURATION, for instance, he would say, I do not see it, nor hear it, nor feel it, nor become acquainted with it by means of any other of the senses; nor am I conscious of it, as I am of believing, reasoning, imagining, &c., but it is SUGGESTED by the mind itself; it is an intimation absolutely essential to the mind's nature and action.

It will be noticed that Dr. Reid has not limited the use of the word Suggestion exclusively to those ideas, the occasions of which are purely internal. Nor was this necessary. Those cases, however, where suggestion is brought into exercise by occasions chiefly external (as, for instance, in forming the notions of externality, space, and motion), are comparatively few in number. As a general statement, the occasions of its exercise are either wholly of an interior nature, or with only a slight mixture of outward circumstances.

§ 178. Ideas of existence, mind, self-existence, and personal identity. We shall now mention a few ideas which have this origin, without undertaking to give a complete enumeration of them. (I.) EXISTENCE. Among the various notions, the origin of which naturally requires to be considered under the head of Suggestion, is that of Existence. What existence is in itself (that is to say, independently of any existent being), it would be useless to inquire. Using the word as expressive of a mental state, it is the

name of a purely simple idea, and cannot be defined. The history of its rise is briefly this: Such is our nature that we cannot exist without having the notion of existence. So that the origin of the idea of existence is inseparable from the mere fact that we have a percipient and sentient nature. An insentient being may exist without having any such idea. But man, being constituted with powers of perception, cannot help perceiving that he is what he is. If we think, then there is something which has this capability of thought; if we feel, then there is not only the mere act of feeling, but something also which puts forth the act.

(II.) MIND. The origin of the notion of Mind is similar to that of existence. Neither of them can be strictly and properly referred to the senses. We do not see the mind, nor is it an object of touch, or of taste, or of any other sense. Nor, on the other hand, is the notion of mind a direct object of the memory, or of reasoning, or of imagination. The notion arises naturally, or is SUGGESTED from the mere fact, that the mind actually exists, and is susceptible of various feelings and operations.-The same may be said of all the distinct powers of the mind, such as the power of perception, of memory, of association, of imagination, of the will; not of the acts or exercises of these powers, it will be noticed, but of the powers themselves. That is to say, they are made known to us, considered abstractly and as distinct subjects of thought, not by direct perception, either inward or outward, but by spontaneity or suggestion. We say not by direct perception, because there is something intermediate between the power and the knowledge of it, viz., the act or exercise of the power, which is the occasion of the knowledge of the power itself. The principle of Original Suggestion, availing itself of this occasion, gives us a knowledge of the distinct susceptibilities of the mind, just as it does of the mind as a whole.

(III.) Similar remarks, as far as spontaneity is concerned, will apply to the notions (whether we consider them as simple or complex) of SELF-EXISTENCE and perSONAL IDENTITY. At the very earliest period they flow out, as it were, from the mind itself; not resulting from

any prolonged and laborious process, but freely and spontaneously suggested by it. This is so true, that no one is able to designate either the precise time, or the precise circumstances under which they originate; for they spring into being under all circumstances. We cannot look, or touch, or breathe, or move, or think without them. These are products of our mental nature too essential and important to be withheld, or to be given only on rare and doubtful occasions; but are brought into existence in all times and places, and under all the varieties of action and feeling. (See, in connexion with this section, § 4, 5, 6.)

$179. Origin of the idea of externality.

In giving an account of the origin of ideas, it is proper, in this connexion, to refer to the notion of outwardness or externality. Outwardness, although it is involved in everything which the senses have a connexion with, is, nevertheless, not a direct subject of the senses. As in other cases of ideas of internal origin, we do not, in strictness of speech, smell it, or taste it, or see it, or hear it, or touch it; and yet there is nothing which we see, taste, hear, or touch, of which externality is not predicable. The simple fact is, that the senses (or, rather, in this case one of them, that of TOUCH) furnish the occasion (not the thing itself, but simply the occasion) on which the Intellect, in virtue of its own spontaneity of action, gives us a knowledge of it. We have already had opportunity (870) to speak of this idea as a most important one; as the connecting thought, which introduces us to a new manifestation of existence, different from that interior existence, which we variously call by the names spirit, mind, or soul. It is evident, if we could not form the idea of externality, everything which is the subject of mental experience would seem to be wholly internal, mere modifications of the inward or mental being. It is this idea, taken in connexion with the circumstances of its origin, which solves what has sometimes been considered a great mystery. The question is often asked, How is it possible that the mind should pass over from the circle of its own existence, the limits of its own actual personality, into the region and the knowledge of things