race, he finds himself a novice wherever he goes), objects so numerous, so various in kind, so novel and interesting, crowd upon his attention, that, attempting to direct himself to all at the same time, he loses sight of their specifical differences, and blends them together more than a calm and accurate examination would justify. And hence it is not to be wondered at that our earliest classifications, the primitive genera and species, are sometimes incorrectly made.

Subsequently, when knowledge has been in some measure amassed, and reasoning and observation have been brought to a greater maturity, these errors are attended to; individuals are rejected from species where they do not properly belong, and species from genera. The most savage and ignorant tribes will in due season correct their mistakes and be led into the truth.

142. Illustrations of our earliest classifications.

We are naturally led to introduce some circumstances here which throw light on this part of our subject. What we wish to illustrate is the simple fact, that men readily perceive the resemblances of objects, and exhibit a disposition to classify them in reference to such resemblance. The first case which we shall mention in illustration of this, is that of Caspar Hauser. The principal objects which Caspar had to amuse himself with in his prison were two little wooden horses, which, in his entire ignorance, he believed to be possessed of life and sensibility. After the termination of his imprisonment, his biographer informs us, that to " every animal he met with, whether quadruped or biped, dog, cat, goose, or fowl, he gave the name of horse."

In the year 1814, Pitcairn's Island, a solitary spot in the Pacific Ocean, was visited by two English cruisers. Two of the young men that belonged on the island, and whose knowledge was, of course, exceedingly limited, came on board one of the vessels. "The youths," says the Narrative," were greatly surprised at the sight of so many novel objects; the size of the ship, the guns, and everything around them. Observing a cow, they were at first alarmed, and expressed a doubt whether it was a

huge goat or a horned hog, these being the only two species of quadrupeds they had ever seen."

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The English navigator Cook, in going from New-Zealand to the Friendly Islands, lighted on an island called Wateeoo." The inhabitants," he says, were afraid to come near our cows and horses, nor did they form the least conception of their nature. But the sheep and goats did not surpass the limits of their ideas, for they gave us to understand they knew them to be birds."

Captain Cook informs us that these people were acquainted with only three sorts of animals, viz., dogs, hogs, and birds. Of hogs and dogs they had probably never known more than one variety or class, and had never been led to suspect that there was, or could be, any other. But, having noticed a great variety of birds in their forests and waters, they had undoubtedly found it necessary, before this period, not only to give a general name expressive of all birds, but also to classify some of the subordinate varieties. This people, therefore, not unnaturally, although we do not pretend to say with much discrimination, applied the term BIRDS to the sheep and goats of the English. They knew not but there might be some new class of birds which they had not hitherto noticed; and they saw no insuperable objection in the size of the sheep and goats to this disposition of them, whatever other objection they might, on a further examination, have subsequently found.

§ 143. Of the nature of general abstract ideas.

The notions which are thus formed in all cases of classification, are commonly known, in the Treatises having relation to these subjects, as General Abstract ideas. And they are no less numerous than the multiplied varieties of objects which are found to exist everywhere around us. It is thus that we form the general notions of animal and of all the subordinate species of animals; of tree and its numerous varieties; of earths and minerals, and whatever else is capable of being arranged into classes.

We

may apply these views not only to natural objects, but to forms and relations of a very different character.

The word Triangle is the name of a general abstract idea. Great exceptions, however, have been taken to certain incautious expressions of Mr. Locke on this point. He asserts that it requires some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle, and gives the following reason: "for it must neither be oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once," &c. This language is undoubtedly open to criticism, and, in truth, has not failed to receive a full share. The correct view seems to be this. The word TRIANGLE is not only the name of a class, but of a very general class; it is the name of a Genus, embracing all those figures which agree in the circumstance of being bounded by three straight lines meeting one another so as to form three angles. A figure having any other form (in other words, not exhibiting a resemblance or similarity in this respect) is excluded from the Genus; but it is still so extensive, taken in the sense just now mentioned, as to include all figures whatever of that name. Now there are embraced within the genus, as in numerous other cases, subordinate classes, which are distinguished by their appropriate names, viz., the class of acute-angled triangles, that of right-angled triangles, of obtuse-angled triangles, &c.

But it is to be noticed, that the general idea, whatever objects it may be founded upon, does not embrace every particular which makes a part of such objects. When we look at a number of men, we find them all differing in some respects, in height, size, colour, tone of voice, and in other particulars. The mind fixes only upon those traits or properties with which it can combine the notion of resemblance; that is to say, those traits, qualities, or properties in which the individuals are perceived to be alike, or to resemble each other. The complex mental state, which embraces these qualities and properties, and nothing more (with the exception of the superadded notion of other bodies having resembling qualities), is a General Abstract idea.

And hence the name, Such notions are called ABSTRACT, because, while embracing many individuals in certain respects, they detach and leave out altogether a

variety of particulars in which those individuals disagree. If there were not this discrimination and leaving out of certain parts, we never could consider these notions, regarded as wholes, as otherwise than individual or particular. They are called GENERAL, because, in consequence of the discrimination and selection which has just been mentioned, they embrace such qualities and properties as exist not in one merely, but in many.

The difference, therefore, between the complex notion which we form of any particular object, and the general complex feeling now under consideration, is truly this: the latter combines together fewer particulars, but unites with such as it does combine together the additional notion of resemblance, which implies as its basis the comparison of a number of objects, and is, perhaps, the distinguishing circumstance. Hence it must be allowed, that there is no outward object precisely corresponding to the GENERAL NOTION which we form. The mind takes into view only a division or part of any one object, combining with this select view the notion of other objects, and the relation of resemblance in respect to such division or part.

If it should be asked, By virtue of what principle is this discovery of a resembling relation made? the answer is (and it is the only one which can be given), that there is in the mind an original tendency or susceptibility, by means of which, whenever we perceive different objects together, we are instantly, without the intervention of any other mental process, sensible of their relation in certain respects.

§ 144. Objection sometimes made to the existence of general notions. It is proper briefly to notice an objection sometimes made, viz., that it is not possible for us to have such general notion at all, because there is nothing outward which the general notion or idea precisely corresponds to. This objection goes too far. It would seem even to lead to the conclusion that we can have no complex idea of any kind, neither particular nor general. It cannot be pretended that even our complex notions of particular objects correspond precisely to those objects. The ideas

which we form of a particular house, tree, or plant, or any other individual object, are often erroneous in some respects, and probably always imperfect. But they are not, for that reason, to be regarded as false and chimerical, and to be rejected as having no foundation in nature. We will suppose ourselves to have been acquainted in former years with a particular elm; we have looked upon it a thousand times, and it is familiar to us as any of our most cherished remembrances. At this great distance of time and place we form an idea, a conception, a notion of it, but it cannot be presumed to be a perfect or complete one. It cannot be pretended that we have a notion not only of the trunk, but of every leaf and of the form of every leaf, and of every branch and its intertwinings with every other branch; that it exists in our minds precisely, and in every respect, the same as it exists on the spot where it grows. If, therefore, general abstract ideas are to be rejected because they embrace only parts of those objects which are ranked under them, we must on the same grounds reject and deny also our complex notions of individual objects; but this probably no one is prepared to do.

§ 145. The power of general abstraction in connexion with numbers, &c. The ability which the mind possesses of forming general abstract ideas is of much practical importance; but whether it be the characteristical attribute of a rational nature or not, as some have supposed, it is not necessary now to inquire. It is not easy to estimate the increase of power which is thus given to the action of the human mind, particularly in reasoning. By means of general abstract propositions, we are able to state volumes in a few sentences; that is to say, the truths, stated and illustrated in a few general propositions, would fill volumes in their particular applications. But it is enough here to refer to a single circumstance in illustration of the uses of this

power.

Without the ability of forming general notions, we should not be able to number, even in the smallest degree. Before we can consider objects as forming a multitude, or are able to number them, it seems necessary to