tension, of brightness and heat, of roundness and regularity of motion?-All the ideas, therefore, which we form of external objects considered as wholes, are complex; and all such complex notions are composed of those which are simple.

◊ 132. Something more in external objects than mere attributes or

qualities.

But it is to be anticipated that we shall expose ourselves here to be pressed by certain inquiries. It will be said, perhaps, that this makes the whole visible creation a mere congregation (susceptible undoubtedly of being arranged into classes, but, after all, a mere congregation) of attributes, qualities, or properties. What we behold yonder, it will perhaps be alleged as an illustration of the objection, is mere greenness, resistance, hardness, form, &c., but nothing more; it is not a TREE. In the firmament there is brightness, and heat, and roundness, and uniformity of motion, but that is all; we mistake when we suppose there is a reality, an actual SUN. word, this view of external objects brings us back to one of the fundamental doctrines of Pyrrho, that there is nothing external to us but certain uniform appearances, which are mistaken for existences and realities without being so.

In a

It is, perhaps, enough to say in regard to this objection, that we reject the idea of its being rightfully applied to ourselves, because we do not hesitate to admit and assert the truth of an existence (however difficult it may be to the mind fully to conceive of it) independently of these qualities; in other words, that there is something more, in point of fact, than what is outwardly exhibited. On a careful examination of our feelings, we shall probably find it impossible even to conceive of a quality without a subject, or an attribute without some object to which it belongs. We believe (and we cannot help believing) that there must necessarily be some foundation, some basis, which is the support of such attributes and qualities. We may not be able to tell precisely what it is; we may not have it in our power to describe or define it; but still it exists. The quality, therefore, and the existence to

which it belongs; the outward accessible presentation and the subjective nature or essence, are not, in the view of the mind, identical. (See § 93–96.)

It will, then, perhaps be asked, Why do we not direct our attention at once to the true subjective existence, to matter itself, and not delay upon its appendages? The answer is, we cannot; the mind has its limits. It might be asked, with the same reason, Why we do not look directly into the existence and essence of the Deity, instead of studying Him in his works and intermediate manifestations? It might be asked, Why we do not directly contemplate the existence and essence of the mind, instead of studying it in its attributes and operations? The answer in all these cases is the same, viz., that we are unable to do it. And yet we believe in the existence and reality of a God, although we know him only through his manifestations and attributes. We believe in the existence and reality of the human mind, although the direct subject of our knowledge is not the mind itself, but merely its attributes and operations. It is the same in regard to the material world. The qualities and properties of bodies are the signs or marks which are immediately presented to our notice. They form the occasion on which the mind, by its power of ORIGINAL SUGGESTION, assures us of something more than the signs which immediately fall under our notice. This something, which we cannot help regarding as an actual and independent reality, we call variously a material subject, material existence, matter, &c. Nor is the idea which we form of matter to be regarded as an indistinct one, although, being simple, each one must depend for the clearness of his perception of it on himself.

133. Imperfections of our complex notions of external objects. Although the mind of man is to be regarded, in the great ordering and constitution of things, as in some important sense the representative of the material universe, it must still be acknowledged to be a very imperfect one. It is as true in nature as in religion, that we know only in part. Men have no doubt been always advancing in knowledge, but when we compare our present acquisi

tions with our former ignorance, we may well anticipate that the progress of the future will lay the foundation of another comparison, not so flattering to the present generation. This view will not only apply to knowledge in the mass, but will hold good on a smaller scale, of every complex notion which we form.-Take, for instance, the complex idea of Gold. The thought is understood to be the representative of the thing. But is it in this case a true one? If we should admit it to be so as far as it goes, still it is evidently not a full or perfect one; nor can we regard it as such without suffering ourselves to be led into error. In the complicated notion to which men agree in giving that name, we combine the simple ideas of yellowness, weight, hardness, malleability, and perhaps others; but it is only reasonable to suppose that no person combines, in his conception of it, all its properties.

Philosophy may justly boast of her achievements, without pretending that nature has made a revelation of all her secrets. Can any man explain the mode of the connexion between mind and matter? This connexion is

obviously a secret not yet cleared up. Can any man assert positively what that cohesion or attraction is which holds together the parts of gold, iron, and other material bodies? That is a subject also on which nature has reserved to herself something farther to say. One body impinging upon another puts it in motion; and in our wisdom we give it a name; we call it motion by impulse. But can any man tell what motion is? Still more, can he point out how motion passes from one body to another, when the particles of those bodies come in contact, if, indeed, there can be any actual contact ?-Such are the doubts that press upon us wherever we turn our eyes. But this is not said to discourage inquiry. The first step in laying a good and broad foundation is to be fully sensible of our ignorance and of the mind's limits.

CHAPTER XII.

ABSTRACTION.

§ 134. Abstraction implied in the analysis of complex ideas. THE remarks which have been made in the course of the foregoing chapter, on the analysis and examination of our Complex Intellectual states, naturally lead to the consideration of another subject, in some respects intimately connected with that topic. When we have once formed a complex notion (no matter at what period, in what way, or of what kind), it not unfrequently happens that we desire, for various reasons, to examine more particularly some of its parts. Very frequently this is absolutely necessary to the full understanding of it. Although undoubtedly its elementary parts once came under review, that time is now long past; it has become important to institute a new inspection, to take each simple notion involved in it, and examine it by itself. And this is done by means of the process of ABSTRACTION, and in no other way.

By the aid of that process, our complex notions, however comprehensive they may be, are susceptible, if one may be allowed so to speak, of being taken to pieces, and the elementary parts may be abstracted or separated from each other; that is, they are made subjects of consideration apart from other ideas, with which they are ordinarily found to be associated. And hence, whenever this is the case in respect to the states of the mind, they are sometimes called ABSTRACTIONS, and still more frequently are known by the name of ABSTRACT IDEAS.

For the purpose of distinctness in what we have to say, they may be divided into the two classes of Particular and General; that is to say, in some cases the abstraction relates only to a single idea or element, in others it includes more.-General Abstract Ideas (or the notions which we form of Genera and Species) will form a distinct subject of consideration.

§ 135. Instances of particular abstract ideas.

We shall proceed, therefore, to remark here on Particular abstractions. Of this class, the notions which we form of the different kinds of colours may be regarded as instances. For example, we hold in our hand a rose; it has extension, colour, form, fragrance. The mind is so deeply occupied with the colour as almost wholly to neglect the other qualities. This is a species of abstraction, although perhaps an imperfect one, because, when an object is before us, it is difficult, in our most attentive consideration of any particular quality or property, to withdraw the mind wholly from the others. When, on the contrary, any absent object of perception occurs to us, when we think of or form a conception of it, our thoughts will readily fix upon the colour of such object, and make that the subject of consideration, without particularly regarding its other qualities, such as weight, hardness, taste, form, &c. We may also distinguish in any body (either when present or still more perfectly when absent) its solidity from its extension, or we may direct our attention to its weight, or its length, or breadth, or thickness, and make any one of these a distinct object in our thoughts.

be con

And hence, as it is a well-known fact that the properties of any body may be separated in the view and examination of the mind, however closely they may nected in their appropriate subjects, we may lay down this statement in respect to the states of the mind before us, viz.: When any quality or attribute of an object, which does not exist by itself, but in a state of combination, is detached by our minds from its customary associates, and is considered separately, the notion we form of it becomes a particular abstract idea. The distinctive mark of this class is, that the abstraction is limited to one quality. It should, perhaps, be particularly added, that the abstraction or separation may exist mentally, when it cannot take place in the object itself. For instance, the size, the figure, length, breadth, colour, &c., of a building may each of them be made subjects of separate mental consideration, although there can be no real or actual separation of these things in the building itself. If there VOL. I.-Q