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giving origin, consistency, and strength to this belief. The resistance which bodies present to the touch when that sense is impressed upon them by the agency of the muscles, gives occasion for the distinct and important idea of externality; and with this idea the senses soon enable us to associate others, as extension, colour, form, and all material qualities and properties. In this way we become acquainted with what is called the outward world. And we are now prepared to assert explicitly, that this supposed outward world has an actual and independent ex

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But an objection is made here. It may be said that the mere fact of our having sensations or ideas of externality, extension, colour, and the like, does not necessarily involve and imply the true and actual existence of those things which they represent, or of which they are supposed and believed to be the effect. In other words, we may possess certain internal affections, and attribute them to something external and material as their cause; and we may truly and sincerely believe the reality of such a cause, while, in point of fact, it does not exist; and, consequently, our conviction of a truly existing material world may be a self-imposition and delusion.-On this view of our exclusion from any satisfactory knowledge of a material world, which is not so singular as not to have had some acute advocates, a few remarks are to be offered.

95. Doctrine of the non-existence of matter considered. The first remark which we have to make concerns the mere fact of belief. We have already made the declaration with confidence, that no man who has the ordinary constitution of a man can doubt of the reality of external, material things. It is no presumption to assert, that the belief of the reality of an external cause of our sensations is universal. This is the common feeling, the common language of all mankind.-Those who deny the propriety of relying on the evidence of the senses for the existence of the material world, and who deny such existence, should explain this belief. That such a belief exists cannot be denied; that it is a false belief, an unfounded conviction, ought not to be lightly asserted. It

wars too much, as even a slight examination would suffice to show, with the sentiments of man's moral and religious constitution.

It is to be acknowledged with gratitude, that the great mass of mankind fully believe in the existence of the Deity, a being of perfect truth as well as benevolence. But to create man so that he should be irresistibly led to believe in the existence of a material world when it did not exist, to create him with high capacities of thought, feeling, and action, and then to surround him with mere illusive and imaginary appearances, does not agree with that notion of God which we are wont to entertain. Mr. Stewart, in speaking of the metaphysical inquiries of Des Cartes, observes, that his reasonings led him to conclude, that God cannot possibly be supposed to deceive his creatures; and, therefore, that the intimations of our senses and the decisions of our reason are to be trusted to with entire confidence, wherever they afford us clear and distinct ideas of their respective objects.

In the second place, it will undoubtedly be admitted, that the sensations which have been spoken of have an existence. This existence, it is true, is wholly internal ; but still the simple fact remains that they exist; our consciousness most decisively teaches us so. But it has been laid down as a primary truth, a first principle, that there is no beginning or change of existence without a cause. This is an elementary principle, placed as far above all objection and skepticism as any one can be, and evidently preliminary to the full exercise of reasoning.

And where, then, is the cause of these internal effects? What man, who denies the existence of the material world, is able to indicate the origin of these results? If, yielding to the suggestions of our nature and the requisitions of our belief, we seek for a cause external to ourselves, we find a satisfactory explanation; otherwise we may expect to find none of any kind.

96. The senses as much grounds of belief as other parts of our constitution.

Furthermore, it must be admitted, as has already been particularly stated and shown, that there are certain oriVOL. I.-M

ginal sources or grounds of belief in our constitution. To say otherwise would be to loosen and destroy the foundations of all knowledge, whether that knowledge has relation to matter or mind. But what evidence is there that there are such original sources of belief, or that any one thing in particular is the foundation of such belief more than any other thing? The answer is, our own internal consciousness and conviction, and this merely; we are conscious of belief, and are able to trace it to the occasions which give it rise.

Now if we carefully examine our minds, we shall find that the intimations of the senses as effectually cause belief as any other source of evidence whatever. Our consciousness, our internal conviction tells us, that our belief is as decisively regulated by the perceptions, derived through the senses, as by our intuitive or inductive perceptions; and that they are as much a ground of knowledge. We assert this with confidence; therefore, if the senses are not a ground of belief and knowledge, the way is fairly open for unlimited skepticism on all subjects. It will in this case be impossible to fix upon anything whatever which is to be received as evidence, and men must give up all knowledge of intellect as well as matter, and will be at once released from all moral obligation.

97. Opinions of Locke on the testimony of the senses.

As the satisfactory understanding of this subject is of much practical importance, we shall close what has been said upon it by some passages from Mr. Locke.—“ If, after all this," he says, in the Fourth Book of his Essay, "any one will be so skeptical as to distrust his senses, and to affirm that all we see and hear, feel and taste, think and do, during our whole being, is but the series and deluding appearances of a long dream, whereof there is no reality; and, therefore, will question the existence of all things, or our knowledge of anything; I must desire him to consider that, if all be a dream, then he doth but dream that he makes the question; and so it is not much matter that a waking man should answer him. But yet, if he pleases, he may dream that I make him this answer, that the certainty of things existing in rerum natura,

when we have the testimony of our senses for it, is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs. For our faculties being suited not to the full extent of being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive knowledge of things, free from all doubt and scruple, but to the preservation of us in whom they are, and accommodated to the use of life, they serve to our purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of those things which are convenient or inconvenient to us. For he that sees a candle burning, and hath experimented the force of its flame by putting his finger in it, will little doubt that this is something existing without him, which does him harm, and puts him to great pain; which is assurance enough, when no man requires greater certainty to govern his actions by than what is as certain as his actions themselves. And if our dreamer pleases to try whether the glowing heat of a glass furnace be barely a wandering imagination in a drowsy man's fancy, by putting his hand into it he may perhaps be wakened into a certainty greater than he could wish, that it is something more than bare imagination. So that this evidence is as great as we can desire, being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain, i. e., happiness or misery, beyond which we have no concernment, either of knowing or being. Such an assurance of the existence of things without us is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the good and avoiding the evil which is caused by them, which is the important concernment we have of being made acquainted with them."

CHAPTER VIII.

HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.

98. General view of the law of habit and of its applications. THERE is an important law of the mental constitution, known as the law of Habit, which may be described in general terms as follows: That the mental action acquires

facility and strength from repetition or practice. The fact that the facility and the increase of strength implied in HABIT is owing to mere repetition, or what is more frequently termed practice, we learn, as we do other facts and principles in relation to the mind, from the observation of men around us, and from our own personal experience. And as it has hitherto been found wholly impracticable to resolve it into any general fact or principle more elementary, it may justly be regarded as something ultimate and essential in our nature.

The term Habit, by the use of language, indicates the facility and strength acquired in the way which has been mentioned, including both the result and the manner of it. As the law of habit has reference to the whole mind of man, the application of the term which expresses it is of course very extensive. We apply it to the dexterity of workmen in the different manual arts, to the rapidity of the accountant, to the coup d'œil or eye-glance of the military engineer, to the tact and fluency of the extemporaneous speaker, and in other like instances.We apply it also in cases where the mere exercise of emotion and desire is concerned; to the avaricious man's love of wealth, the ambitious man's passion for distinction, the wakeful suspicions of the jealous, and the confirmed and substantial benevolence of the philanthropist.

It is remarkable, that the law under consideration holds good in respect to the body as well as the mind. In the mechanical arts, and in all cases where there is a corporeal as well as mental effort, the effect of practice will be found to extend to both. Not only the acts of the mind are quickened and strengthened, but all those muscles which are at such times employed, become stronger and more obedient to the will. Indeed, the submission of the muscular effort to the volition is oftentimes rendered so prompt by habit, that we are unable distinctly to recollect any exercise of volition previous to the active or muscular exertion. It is habit which is the basis of those characteristic peculiarities that distinguish one man's handwriting from another's; it is habit which causes that peculiarity of attitude and motion, so easily discoverable in most persons, termed their gait; it is habit also

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