that it has been at war—and, in effect, still is at war-with us, does not in my opinion go to the heart of the matter. I oppose its admission because it has violated the very fundamental principles on which the United Nations was founded. It has been found guilty of aggression by the United Nations General Assembly. It is today guilty of aiding and abetting aggression against Laos and Cambodia. Unless and until Communist China has given concrete evidence of its intention to behave in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter, and has given this evidence over a period of years, it most certainly should not be admitted to the United Nations, or any of its agen

cies.

All of us are agreed on this matter. But, Mr. President, in saying this I am not in the same breath saying that if our views are disregarded by two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly we must at once seek to destroy the United Nations itself.

Although the United Nations is by no means as perfect an instrument for world peace as we desire, if two-thirds of its members wish to take steps which we consider violative of the spirit of the charter, it is certainly not the fault of the charter or of the principles set forth therein. The principles and the charter were good enough to receive the overwhelming endorsement of the Senate of the United States in 1945. If those principles were good then, they are good today.

They will be good tomorrow, even if other governments may act in such a way as to violate them. Why should the United States abandon those principles, and the organization which embodies them, simply because others are not, in our opinion, living up to them?

The failure of the United States to enter the League of Nations led ultimately to the downfall of that first international effort at world security against aggression. Do we now propose to assume responsibility before history and before our children and grandchildren for having scuttled the United Nations, the second attempt since the beginning of time to erect a structure for preservation of world peace and security?

Rarely, Mr. President, in all the years I have served in the Congress, have I heard a more unjustified, and at the same time a more dangerous proposition advanced by a Member of either House. It is tantamount to saying petulantly that if we cannot win a given game we will pick up our marbles and go home. It is dangerous because it not only lets the game be won by somebody else, but also permits all the succeeding games to be played without us and to be won without our opposition. It is almost puerile in its thoughtless petulance.

It is dangerous for other reasons, far more serious reasons. If the proposal contained even a single positive contribution to the welfare and security of the United States of America, it would have some merit. As it is, the proposal is one whose only possible effects would be harmful, probably disastrous, to the best interests of our own country.

In simplest terms, what this proposal means is the abandonment of the United

Nations to the other great power belonging to it, the Soviet Union. It means the elimination of any American influence in the councils of the only existing world organization.

It provides the handiest possible means for the capture and domination of the United Nations by our Communist enemies. It closes off one of our best avenues to combating Communist influence throughout the world.

If I were in the Kremlin reading reports of this proposal, I would be rubbing my hands in gleeful anticipation. I would, if I were in that fortress of Soviet power, look out on the world with real gratitude for the errors of the other side. What mightier push to hesitant, neutralist-inclined nations toward the Soviet camp could the Communists themselves have devised?

Finally, beyond all these contributions to Soviet success, the proposal offers absolutely nothing of any advantage to the United States.

These are the short-range effects one can expect from such a fantastic proposition. I have not been able to conduct any scientific poll of public opinion, so I am unable to express with certainty precisely what the attitude of the American people would or would not be if Red China were admitted to the United Nations. All I can do as a Member of the Senate is to point out the probable consequences of adoption of any such rash proposal as one requiring withdrawal from the United Nations.

The longer range effect of its adoption would undoubtedly be the transformation of the United Nations-the United States no longer being there to defend its interests-into nothing but a Sovietoriented instrumentality aimed at the United States, leading sooner or later to world war III with its possible total destruction of all human, animal, and even plant life on the face of this planet.

Those who favor this proposal either want an isolated America or they want war. They will have both if their proposal is accepted. If the views of this new Senate bloc should prevail in the United States, the Soviet bloc would be handed the means of prevailing in the world.

This Nation has had leadership thrust on it-world eminence and world responsibility it did not seek but cannot now escape. Let us grow up, let us become mature adults living in an adult world, let us put aside childish playthings, childish moods and tempers. Our enemies are playing for the highest stakes, control of the world. They are playing hard, ruthlessly, intelligently. They use every instrument available and invent new ones where needed. We cannot do less if we are to live up to our own beliefs, if, indeed, we are to survive. It would be madness, utter midsummer be madness, utter midsummer madness, to hand over the United Nations to the Communist bloc. Let us coolly and realistically determine to defend our Nation and our liberties wherever and whenever they are challenged. Let us not run away from the fight, just because it seems to be going against us at a given moment. The principles we stand for are eternal. They shall prevail, but not unless we are willing and

able to defend them in the United Nations, outside the United Nations, or wherever the threat appears.

GENEVA: FAILURE OF A POLICY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the war in Indochina appears on the verge of ending in a truce. The bloodletting of the past 8 years will probably come to a close very shortly. There will be no more Dien Bien Phus, at least for the present. The danger of armed involvement of American forces in Indochina, once so close, has receded.

These are welcome byproducts of the Geneva Conference. There is little else. The situation in Korea, presumably the principal reason for our participation in the Conference, remains unchanged; thousands of American soldiers are still

committed there on the mainland of

Asia.

With respect to Indochina, a serious defeat has been inflicted on American diplomacy. And in the process vast new areas have been opened for potential conquest by Communist totalitarianism.

Last spring, Mr. President, in two speeches in the Senate, I expressed the view that our consent to participate in the Geneva proceedings was a mistake. I did so because it was clear at the time that the Communists would enter the Conference, for all practical purposes, as a bloc; that the Communists, whether from the Soviet Union, Korea, China, or Indochina would possess a singleness of outlook. It was not clear that the nonCommunist nations shared any such unity of objective. The British wanted to stay out of Indochina; the French wanted to get out of Indochina, and for a while it seemed that we were on the verge of getting into Indochina.

In these circumstances, how could negotiations lead to anything but failure for the non-Communist powers?

These were the consequences which I felt might flow from a failure at Geneva, as I stated them last April 14 on the floor of the Senate. At that time I said:

Patterns may be set which might influence the entire political fabric of the French Republic and touch on every aspect of Western European unity. Patterns may be set which will determine whether aggression shall again gather force on the shores of the south China seas to be hurled at this Nation from across the Pacific.

Certain of these results are already apparent. The Geneva Conference has served to increase vastly the stature of the Chinese Communists in Asia and throughout the world. Their influence now takes firm root in northern Indochina. All the rest of southeast Asia lies before this totalitarian wave which has spilled over the borders of south China. The path of advance to the west unfolds through small nations and points ultimately to India. Southward and eastward, over the intervening islands of the Pacific, the path stretches toward New Zealand, Australia, and the Americas.

These grim prospects are not likely to materialize tomorrow or next month. It may be years or decades before the full effects of the loss of Indochina will be fully felt or understood.

Political waves are pulsating forces, not unlike those of the sea. They change

shape and form, and their power ebbs and flows as they move through history.

This may be the case with the new totalitarian wave which has surged out of China to the south. It may undergo profound changes as it moves outward. It may lose or gather momentum as it mixes with the political crosscurrents of southeast Asia.

For the present, however, the inescapable fact is that totalitarianism and not freedom has emerged triumphant from the murky waters of the war of the deltas. Its triumph has been confirmed by Geneva and the pattern for a further advance in the Far East is set.

Nor are the consequences of Geneva confined to Asia and the Pacific area. Europe, too, will feel the impact of this conference. Until Geneva, there was a chance that the great peoples of Western Europe would continue to move their national heritages in the direction of a united Europe.

Thanks to the courage, and the wisdom of a sincere American and a great Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, and thanks to the financial sacrifices of the American people who bore the cost of the Marshall plan willingly and generously, Western Europe had been able to lift itself out of the mire of a disastrous war. It had begun the long slow ascent toward unity. It was on the verge

of reaching the most elusive goal of all,

the formation of a common European army. Had this goal been achieved France and Germany would have ceased to revolve in age-old, separate, and suicidal orbits. The intelligence, the skills, the strengths of these and other great nations of Europe would no longer have been pitted against each other in senseless destructive rivalry. They would have been united for mutual benefit and for the benefit of the entire world.

This was a dream worth having, and it was shared by great and small alike in Europe and in America. It was the hope of a century and it stood on the very edge of achievement in the proposed creation of the European Defense Community, the common European army. But now the dream is fading; the hope is dimming.

These results were not expected when the Secretary of State, at the Berlin Conference last February announced that this Nation had been committed to the Geneva meeting. I say this without reflecting on the intentions or the capacities of the Secretary of State. The Secretary is an able and devoted public servant. Some have even waxed lyrical in their appreciation of his exceptional qualities. It has been said, for example, that it is "wonderful" to have at last "a Secretary of State who is not taken in by the Communists, who stands up to them."

I cannot hope to match such eloquence in the expression of my regard for the Secretary. That he did stand up to the Communists, however, is beyond doubt. The Secretary refused to participate in the Geneva Conference unless Mr. Molotov agreed that the Conference would in no way constitute American recognition of Communist China. He refused quite correctly even to accept Mr. Molotov's

word in this matter. He insisted that Mr. Molotov sign a piece of paper making clear that the Geneva meeting would in no way constitute recognition of Communist China. The Secretary fought munist China. The Secretary fought Mr. Molotov day after day at Berlin on this issue of the piece of paper. And finally, because he had refused to be taken in by the Communists, because he had stood up to them, the Secretary triumphed. Mr. Molotov capitulated. And in a climax worthy of the best of our current television dramas, Mr. Molotov signed the piece of paper.

The Secretary is to be commended for not being taken in by the Communists, for standing up to them, for obtaining this piece of paper.

We still have the piece of paper in our archives, I presume, and meanwhile the Communists have obtained at Geneva all they set out to acquire at Berlin a few months ago.

The Secretary of State was hopeful of the possible results of Geneva when he returned from Berlin to prepare for the conference. "Berlin," the Secretary of State said on his return, "cleared the way for other things to happen."

These were prophetic words.

Berlin cleared the way for Geneva and a failure of American policy. At Geneva, international communism obtained by diplomacy what it had failed up to then to obtain by threats, bluster, propaganda, to obtain by threats, bluster, propaganda, intimidation and aggression.

It obtained international stature for the Chinese Communist regime. It obtained a firm and perhaps decisive foothold in southeast Asia. It obtained the

undermining of the cooperation of the free nations in Europe and the West. These are the visible consequences of Geneva. Beyond them are others, still only dimly seen. The repercussions of the Geneva Conference will echo throughout the world, in events in Germany, Japan, France, North Africa, and many other areas, in less-audible ways for years to come.

Geneva was a mistake; and the result is a failure of American policy. It is a profoundly humiliating result.

I do not call attention to the mistake without an appreciation of the many difficulties which confronted the Secretary of State at Berlin and Geneva. He had to deal with reluctant allies and obstinate enemies. He had to stand in the forefront and seek to negotiate a settlement for peace while others in this administration beat the drums for war behind his back.

The job of the Secretary of State is an extraordinarily difficult one at this time. It is not made easier by those in high official positions who, by offering public statements at inappropriate moments in effect tell him how it should be conducted. Nor is the job made easier by those who in contemplating his "wonderful" qualities-and he does have them-do so in a partisan framework which tends to encourage disunity on foreign policy at a time when the Secretary should have the widest possible support in Congress and the country.

Geneva is even now fast receding into history. Before it disappears and becomes a mere name, it is essential that we grasp the full implications of this

conference because it leaves behind, in dangerous disorder, the foreign policy of the United States.

We cannot conceal this disturbing fact by a repetition of the clichés of past years. Even Yalta, which for so long has served as a substitute for facing living realities, cannot be stretched and pulled far enough out of the dim past to conceal the impact of Geneva. The attempt to do so-and such an attempt is being made today-if I may paraphrase a lucid expression from the rich anthology of the distinguished and able majority leader [Mr. KNOWLAND], is like "trying to cover an elephant with a donkey."

Even a visit from the Prime Minister of Britain and the issuance of cordial joint statements, and a later statement by Churchill that "the conference was not an utter failure," cannot conceal the fact that the policy of the United States has been gravely damaged by Geneva.

Much less can this fact be concealed by glib phrases. The dominoes are falling. The cork in the bottle has popped. The parlor-game era of foreign policy is over. Either we face this reality, or we risk the commission of other errors even graver than Geneva.

All that has been done at Geneva cannot be undone. We are not, however, even at this late date, without resources. We can still have a foreign policy that will keep this Nation safe and free and at peace. But we can have it only if we recognize the errors that have been made and act to correct them.

We can do nothing-and will do worse

than nothing—if we cling to the illusion that television performances are a substitute for sound foreign policies; that 11th hour flights to foreign capitals are a substitute for carefully cultivated, carefully maintained cooperation with friendly nations; and that strong words, even massive words, equate with a strong policy, can take the place of genuine strength and conviction.

The Secretary of State used an eloquent phrase some time ago when he spoke of an "agonizing reappraisal." Reappraisals of foreign policy should go on continuously. The world changes, and policies must be adjusted to fit the changes. There can be only one fixed constellation in the foreign policy of the United States: The welfare of the Nation under God; the preservation of the free institutions which give us the promise of a meaningful life.

Beneath this constellation, it is entirely proper and necessary that reappraisals of foreign policy should go on continuously. This is a function which normally pertains to the executive branch of the Government. If, however, the time has come for something extraordinary, for an “agonizing reappraisal," then the Senate of the United States should participate fully in it. We have a sworn constitutional duty to do From this body can comes guides which may assist the President in extricating our policies from the bog of confusion in which they now flounder.

So.

This "agonizing reappraisal" of policy seems already to have begun. In my opinion, it has begun on a note of irresponsible partisanship. A few weeks

ago, the Postmaster General of the General of the United States, a member of the President's Cabinet, found time from his duties of delivering the mails to deliver some political remarks in Indiana on the subject of foreign policy. He began his reappraisal by going back a decade or more in search of the causes of the loss of Indochina. He discovered these causes, like long-lost letters, in such places as Yalta, Teheran, and Potsdam.

As I recall, resolutions were introduced in Congress last year to repudiate the Yalta and other wartime agreements. The administration, however, has never sought repudiation, only condemnation of the violations; nothing has ever come of these resolutions. Unless the administration has changed its position, unless it now proposes to seek repudiation of these agreements, I cannot see any value in beginning a reappraisal with them. If we are to have a meaningful review of the situation in which we now find ourselves it can hardly start in the remote past. Much less can it begin with place-names like Yalta, Teheran, and Potsdam, pulled out of a mailbag.

A few days ago, in a different vein, in a responsible vein, the able majority leader [Mr. KNOWLAND] raised the question of seating Communist China in the United Nations. He made clear his opposition to any such attempt with all the vehemence and eloquence of which he is capable. I have the highest regard for the sincerity and the consistency of the distinguished majority leader and I can appreciate his sentiments in this matter.

But, with all due respect to the distinguished majority leader, I do not believe that a reappraisal of policy ought to begin with an event that has not hap

pened. The President has not indicated, so far as I am aware, that he is about to change the policy pursued by the previous administration, the policy of opposing the seating of Communist China in the United Nations. That policy has kept the Peking government of Communist China from gaining a seat in the United Nations.

Does the President plan to change this policy? Is the distinguished majority

If

leader aware of such an intention? so, it would be most helpful if he would enlighten the Senate on this matter.

It seems to me that this agonizing reappraisal, if it is to be useful to the Nation, can only begin, not in the past, not in the future, but in the present. To be sure, it may lead us step by step to events in the past and it may point the way into the future. We live, however, not in the world of yesterday or the world of tomorrow, but in the world of today. If we wish to survive in that world, we will do well to deal with its problems. In the realm of foreign policy, this can only mean that the "agonizing reappraisal" should begin with the failure of policy on Indochina and its implications.

We have got to find out what went wrong with this policy or its administration and determine the ways to prevent a repetition of the errors in the future. If we fail to do so, if we lose ourselves in the past or the future, we shall go on collecting pieces of paper signed by the

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Communists while they continue to fatten their influence throughout the world.

I should like to address myself first to the role of the Senate in the Indochinese situation. So far as I am aware, the Senate cooperated fully with the administration from the very beginning of the gathering crisis. Not a single request in connection with Indochina was made by the administration which was denied by this body or, for that matter, by the Congress.

The administration did make requests. It made repeated requests for military and economic assistance to Indochina. These were all honored by the Senate, perhaps more liberally and more promptly than they should have been. In fiscal 1954 alone, more than a billion dollars in aid was provided for Indochina on the plea of the administration that such assistance was vital to the interests of the United States.

It is true that some Members of the Senate differed on one point with the administration. They would have preferred that the United States avoid participation in the Geneva proceedings, and said so in debate. Those of us who took this position-and there were a number of Senators on both sides of the aisle who did so-were not necessarily opposed to negotiations as such. Some of us were aware, however, that the free nations were divided and confused on the issue of Indochina. Before the United States participated in a confer

ence with the cohesive forces of communism, we wanted the division and the confusion on our side eliminated.

said on February 10. On that date, he had told a conference of newsmen that—

No one could be more bitterly opposed to ever getting the United States involved in a hot war in that region [meaning Indochina] than I am.

But a short time thereafter, some of the leading figures in the administration began to act as though they had not heard the President. It fell to Members of the Senate to inform them of what he had said. As I recall, there were many crosscurrents of opinion in the debate which took place in the Senate prior to the opening of the Geneva Conference. Almost all opinions, however, converged on one point: The United States should not become involved alone in a shooting war in Indochina.

Was that an erroneous position to take? Who would quarrel with it now? Should the Members of the Senate have urged the administration, instead, to add to the unsettled conflict in Korea still another in southeast Asia? Should the Senate have sat in silence while the administration stumbled into the war in Indochina-into a war without preparation, without popular support, without any concept of where it would take us or where it would end?

How many combat divisions would this Nation have had to use to carry an involvement in Indochina to a decisive conclusion, even assuming that it did not lead to the atomic holocaust of world war III? I have seen one estimate, which was published in U. S. News & World Report some weeks ago. should be a reliable estimate since it is attributed to the Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway.

It

In this estimate, it is calculated that to have won the war in Indochina would

combat divisions at the outset, and more divisions had the French reduced their forces, or had the Chinese Communists entered the conflict in force.

The Senate, however, was not consulted on the decision to participate in the Conference. We were not, again to borrow a lucid expression from the distinguished majority leader, "in on the takeoff," even though all of us and the entire Nation are inevitably "in on the crash landing." Had this body been properly consulted from the outset and not simply at the last moment, it is possible that the error of participation

might never have occurred.

As it was, the debate in the Senate which preceded the Geneva Conference may have helped to prevent a compounding of the error. It may have helped to prevent what, in my opinion, would have been a far more serious mistake-armed involvement of the United States in Indochina.

Just prior to the opening of the Geneva Conference, it became apparent that persons close to the administration had forgotten what the President had had forgotten what the President had

Where would those divisions have come from? They were not available then; nor are they available now. We have a new look in the Armed Forces, but we do not have new divisions. We do not even have some of the old ones. To have obtained the necessary manpower for use in Indochina would have involved, according to the estimate I have just summarized, an increase in draft calls from 25,000 to 100,000 men a month, and these men would have been sent into a conflict

for which even the French were not, and are not, drafting men.

I do not know whether the President himself ever seriously considered committing this Nation to an armed involve

ment in Indochina. Nevertheless, the air around him was full of military sound and fury just prior to Geneva. There was much talk of involvement, even though Indochina would have been in every sense a nibbling war.

The terrain of the Indochinese conflict the flooded deltas, the thousands of scattered villages, the jungles-is made to order for the nibbling of mechanized forces. The French have been nibbled and chewed for 8 years.

Nibbling wars, however, we have been told, are worse than atomic wars. Yet

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those who have laid down this principle carried this country to the brink of engagement in the nibbling war in Indochina.

It may be that those who were seriously considering this course and publicly hinting at its adoption had not seen the terrain in Indochina. Perhaps they believe that the United States could have easily obtained a victory in Indochina. Perhaps they felt that Indochina was a bargain-rate war and that the cost could be calculated, not in men's lives, but in painless-sounding abstractions like naval power and airpower.

But surely they must remember what happened in Korea. In Korea we were able to bring to bear the massive retaliation of naval and air power in circumstances far more favorable than those which exist in Indochina. after, we have no victory in Korea. We have a tenuous temporary truce.

Four years

Even that truce was not achieved with the painless-sounding abstractions of naval and air power alone. Those forces played their part, but the enemy was convinced of the futility of his aggression only after hundreds of thousands of Americans and others had struggled back and forth in the mud, the snow, and the blood of a war-battered land.

The truce did not come until after a grueling, bitter conflict. It did not come until thousands-in the air and on the sea, as well as on the land-had given their lives.

We

I do not say the administration should refrain from considering the military aspects of any international crisis with which we are confronted. Such considerations are absolutely essential in a world from which war, unfortunately, has not been banished. The administration, however, ought not to pursue these considerations in public. ought to be spared the ludicrous spectacle of this great Nation being led to the brink of war in public statements and actions on 1 day and backed away from it the next. If this diplomacy of bluster and retreat is designed to confuse the enemy, it succeeds only in confusing the American people. This country has not achieved greatness under the guidance of bluffers and blusterers. We can lose our supremacy if we cease to say what we mean and mean what we say in foreign policy.

In the debate on Indochina, the Senate thought through soberly and fully the implications of involvement in Indochina. If the debate helped to turn the administration from the course of involvement which at least at one time in the crisis, it appeared bent upon, then the debate, in my opinion, was a useful

one.

Had the administration undertaken adequate, proper, and timely consultation with the Senate in this matter, it is entirely possible that a consistent American policy could have been obtained before the Indochinese situation reached the stage of crisis. In my remarks of April 14, however, a few days before the opening of the Geneva Conference, I found it necessary to call attention to the fact that

The administration has not yet seen fit to include the chairman and the ranking

minority members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in its trust [on Indochina policy].

Other Members of Congress were consulted shortly before that time; but, for some unexplained reason, these distinguished Members were overlooked. Several days later the error was rectified, and, subsequently, consultation improved markedly. But by then, the damage had been done.

The administration, and presumably those who spoke for it, had already scattered to the four winds such diplomatic resources as we possessed to deal with the situation. They had spoken bold, but futile, words. The administration had already staked our diplomacy on the hasty creation of an ill-conceived alliance for southeast Asia which refused to be born. The Nation, in short, had already been gambled into an untenable position on Indochina. When the withdrawal from this position came, it left the Vietnamese and French resistance in Indochina exposed, undercut, and ready for the collapse.

The consequences were inevitable. A French Government which had staked its life on military aid from this country to rescue Dien Bien Phu, was forced to resign. The French began to draw in their forces in the northern delta. Vietnamese nationalist troops supplied with weapons and equipment paid for by the American people began to go over to the enemy in increasing numbers, taking their equipment with them. The truce which now is being negotiated is only the last act in this tragic drama.

How did this sequence of events develop? Why were the policies of this Nation gambled into virtual bankruptcy in Indochina? There is a background to this tragedy, and it began about a year ago in Indochina.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield, or does he prefer not to be interrupted? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield for a ques

tion.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I have listened

with interest to the Senator's statement about promising military aid. On that point I had some information, and certainly everything the Secretary of Defense told me in my capacity as a member of the Armed Services Committee, and its present chairman, was that no military aid of a manpower nature was ever promised in the Indochina affair.

The Senator from Montana will recall that there was considerable discussion on the floor of the Senate regarding the number of men who would go to Indonumber of men who would go to Indochina for the purpose of repairing airplanes; and at that time it was made clear that there were not to be more than 200 of our men at any time in Indochina; they might be changed, but there were not to be more than that number for that purpose. However, as I listened to the remarks of the Senator from Montana, for whom I have the utmost respect, that was not quite the impresrespect, that was not quite the impression I received from his statements.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I am delighted that the senior Senator from Massachusetts, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has made that comment. I hope he will

return to that subject when I conclude my speech, because I wish to remind him that the promise was made that the technicians and mechanics would be withdrawn from Indochina on June 12. However, to the best of my knowledge, a good many of them are still there.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield further to me?

Certainly.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator from Montana is entirely correct in that respect. The statement has been made that not the same men will stay there, but that some men will stay there to repair airplanes, for otherwise we would lose a great deal of valuable property which we have sent there, inasmuch as an airplane that cannot leave the ground is of no use.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator from Massachusetts, and later we shall refer again to that matter.

Mr. President, a year ago the French devised a plan for a solution to the stalemated war of the deltas. This was the Navarre plan. It was designed to eliminate the Communist threat in Indochina and to insure the independence of the three Indochinese States of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

The Navarre plan involved certain changes in military strategy to make possible offensive action, rather than defensive action, against the Communistled forces of the Viet Minh under Ho Chi

Minh. It involved a massive training Nationalist armed forces, notably those and equipment program for the local

of Vietnam. It involved a continued French military effort in Indochina until such time as the local Nationalists could

themselves carry the burden of the conflict. It involved vastly expanded military and other aid for Indochina from this country.

Beyond these essential elements, the key to the plan lay in the political realm. The key upon which success or failure turned was the finalizing of the grant of

independence from France to the three

Indochinese States.

For years, the French who had gone a long way in granting independence, hesitated to turn this key. Last summer, in conjunction with the request for additional aid for Indochina, we were assured that the moment of full independence was at hand. If that had been the case, then the Navarre plan offered prospects for a successful solution to the Indochinese situation. However, as I pointed out in a report to the Foreign Relations Committee, on my return from Indochina, last fall, the plan could not succeed unless all parts were effectively carried out; and, further, I pointed out that lasting success depended on still another factor, which at that time had not been noted in official statements. It seemed to me that the nationalist governments of the 3 Indochinese states, and especially that of Vietnam, had to put down firm roots in their own peoples. Only by so doing could they expect to win away the active support or at least the benevolent or fearful neutrality which at that time was held by the Communists masquerading as nationalists.

The Navarre plan failed, but not because the change in military strategy which it involved was necessarily ill conceived, not because the French shirked their military responsibilities, not because American aid was inadequate. The plan failed because the principal nationalist leaders of Vietnam were unable or unwilling to make the effort necessary to rally the peoples of Indochina against the Communists. It failed because the French were unable or unwilling to take the decisive political steps which would have made the independence of Vietnam clear cut and unequivocal. Instead, negotiations for this purpose dragged on interminably, and the precious hours which were needed to galvanize the struggle for independence slipped away. These negotiations began last year; and by the time the Geneva Conference began, they were still going on inconclusively.

Mr. President, I think it is of the greatest significance that in the truce which now is being arranged, Laos and Cambodia will probably manage to retain their independence, even though they possessed, relatively speaking, the smallest military establishments in the area. Vietnam, whose defense forces numbered several hundred thousands-yesterday the figure was 300,000-and included skilled troops of the French Union, has passed partially into Communist control. The answer to this apparent paradox may be found in part, perhaps, in the fact that the finalizing of the independence of Laos and Cambodia was not delayed as in the case of Vietnam. It may also be found, perhaps, in the fact that the rulers of these two countries stayed in their homelands and led their people.

Certainly, evidence that the nationalist leaders in Vietnam were not developing roots in the populace must have been visible months ago. Certainly the failure of the French to move decisively to grant independence to this state was evident months ago. What action did the administration take to counter these failures? Did officials in the administration receive accurate reports on developments in the field? Did they know what was happening? If they did know, why was there no report to the Senate and the American people on the true situation? If they knew, how is it possible to account for the optimism that seemed to prevail almost until the last hour before the crisis? If they knew, how could the Secretary of Defense be quoted as late as February 9 as saying, "I would think that a military victory would be perhaps both possible and probable."

If they knew that a failure was impending, as they should have known, why did responsible officials go on piling up military supplies and equipment in the warehouses of Indochina? Part of these supplies are now going to the Communists by defection of troops or abandonment, and may very well be turned against American forces at some time in the future.

The Navarre plan, if I may reiterate, died not from military weakness, but from political causes. At no time until the battle of Dien Bien Phu did the

French or the Vietnamese indicate in any way that the military aid being supplied by this country was inadequate. They were opposed, I believe, even to the sending of a training mission from this country.

At all times, at least until Dien Bien Phu, the Franco-Vietnamese forces far Phu, the Franco-Vietnamese forces far outnumbered the Viet Minh divisions. The non-Communists had absolute control of the air and, by far, a superiority in naval craft and heavy equipment. In in naval craft and heavy equipment. In these circumstances how can the failure of the Navarre plan be attributed to anything other than political causes?

But in what fashion did the administration react when it finally realized that the Navarre plan was failing? It reacted as though the causes of the failure were military. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces on March 22 still insisted, in his words: "The French are going to win. It is a fight that is going to be finished with our help." This was a military answer to a political problem.

At the same time, the Secretary of State set out to seek united action in the form of the ill-fated southeast Asia alliance. This, too, had he been successful, would have been a military answer to a political problem.

The nations which the Secretary tried to bring into the alliance were the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, France, Thailand, Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the Indochinese states. Had the alliance been established, its power would have rested largely on non-Asian states. It was an ill-conceived alliance. It was based on the premise that the defense of Asian nations against Communist tyranny rests in the first instance on the West. That, in my opinion, is a false premise. Asian freedom must be defended primarily by Asians.

A people, whether in Asia or in the Americas, can preserve their independence only if they have it in the first place and if they are willing to fight to keep it. Beyond this initial responsibility, which every nation must accept, nations can combine among themselves for a joint defense of freedom. If they are threatened by aggression, singly or jointly, they can seek recourse through the United Nations. But from the beginning to the end of this process of defense, the key factor is the determination of the people of each nation to defend their freedom. This factor was lacking in the Secretary of State's 11thhour attempt to set up an alliance to save Indochina.

His attempt failed and the wreckage of American policy in Southeast Asia now lies among the ruins of the war of urgent necessity of raising up a new, a the deltas. We are confronted with the sounder, and more durable policy for

that area.

Southeast Asia today is no less important to the security and welfare of free nations than it was a few months ago,

when the Secretary of State said:

Under the conditions of today, the impotem of Communist Russia and its Chinese sition on southeast Asia of the political sysCommunist ally, by whatever means would be a grave threat to the whole free community.

So long as the threat of totalitarian aggression remains in southeast Asia the danger to the United States and other free nations will also remain. The loss of part of Indochina does not diminish this danger; rather, it increases it.

But in remaining alert to the danger in southeast Asia we cannot ignore other areas of great importance to our security. Southeast Asia is only one front in the many-fronted struggle between freedom and tyranny. All of them have a bearing on the security of the United States. States. We can use our strength effectively in this many-sided conflict only if we deploy it within this broad context. In determining policies for southeast Asia its relative significance must be weighed against that of other fronts.

The primary decisions in such matters. rest with the President. It is his responsibility to reconstruct policies in southeast Asia within the world-wide framework, which will serve to safeguard the Nation. It seems to me, however, that if such policies are to prove more durable than those which have been pursued in the past, they need to be constructed on certain principles. These are principles which can be found in the fundamental values of our own society, as well as in the values of an awakened Asia.

I am led to make certain suggestions along these lines. I claim no originality. in these suggestions. I am stating them only because I believe there is a need to consider a clear-cut course of action to end the weak, aimless drift and the futile expediency into which our foreign policy for southeast Asia appears to have slipped. If we are to avoid precipitate action or a blind retreat in Asia, either of which might be disastrous, we must somehow reestablish guideposts to action in that area.

I make the following suggestions without in any sense regarding them as immutable. I make them with a full awareness of their imperfections and their inadequacies. I hope they will be challenged, debated, discussed, and improved, but I make them now in the hope that they may help to put up the guideposts that are so urgently needed.

First. Colonialism-Chinese Communist or any other has no place in Asia; and the policies of the United States should in no way act to perpetuate it.

Second. The United States should

look with favor on governments in Asia which are representative of their people and responsive to their needs; but this Nation should not intervene in the internal affairs of any peaceful country.

Third. The defense of freedom in Asia must rest in the first instance on the will and determination of the free peoples of that region.

Fourth. Systems of alliances for the defense of free nations in Asia against aggression must draw their primary and preponderant strength from the Asian countries; the association of the United States, if at all, with such alliances should be indirect, through the machinery of ANZUS or similar combinations of non-Asian countries.

Fifth. The United Nations Nations should serve as the only worldwide marshalling