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I supported this amount by a voice vote. There was no record vote.

Now, since there are always some people who are more interested in politics than they are in the farmers, I want to quote what I said with reference to the

REA bill when we were considering it on April 5, 1949, 5 years ago. You will find my remarks in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Volume 95, part 3, page 3921. My comments then reflect the support I have always given REA loan funds throughout my service in Congress. This is what I said:

Mr. Chairman, I had occasion to appear before the subcommittee handling this bill. They have brought out a very good bill. It appeals to me in almost every section.

Particularly do I appreciate and favor that provision with reference to REA, which not only provides for an appropriation of $350 million, but has a proviso that the administrator of REA, Mr. Wickard, if he finds he is running short of funds may go to the Secretary of Agriculture and borrow in amounts of $50 million, if he can so justify, until an additional $150 million has been exhausted.

I am glad this provision is worded so that the administrator does not have to come back to Congress, if more funds are needed for the year 1949. The Congress by this provision has given REA full opportunity for the extension of its services, so much needed by the people of the Nation.

SOIL CONSERVATION

I am also interested in the provision with reference to soil conservation. The greatest contribution we can make to the posterity of this country, as well as for the immediate future is that we try to leave the soil in a better condition than we found it, more fertile, and more productive, for those who follow after us. If we have done that, then we have really rendered a service to the country, not only for the present and the near future, but for the years to come.

The RECORD further reads as follows: Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman [Congressman VURSELL] yield? Mr. VURSELL. I yield.

Mr. RANKIN. This bill appropriates $350 million for rural electrification, and makes $150 million additional available if necessary. That is right, is it not?

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I urged the subcommittee to increase the amount to $100 million, and we approved it on a voice vote. There was no record vote. The Senate raised the amount to $135 million. Inasmuch as I could not be present when the conference report came back to the House, I made the following statement, which I quote from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of June 22, 1954, page 8658:

Mr. Speaker, since it will be impossible for me to be present tomorrow when the conference committee reports on the agriculture appropriation bill, I should like for the RECORD to show that I favor the report, and if it were possible for me to be present, I would vote for the additional Senate $35million loan authorization carried in the report for REA.

When the above bill was before the House, the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of April 12, 1954, page 5036, carried my remarks, as follows:

REA FUNDS

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to note that our committee has provided additional loan funds for rural electrification in the amount of $100 million in this bill. I would like to point out that the Appropriations Committee has increased the budget request of $55 million by $45 million, which will bring the loan fund for the coming year up to $100 million.

FOR REA TELEPHONE SERVICE

I would also like to say that I voted for the original Telephone Act and to point out that we have provided the full budget request of $75 million loan fund to be used in the extension of the REA telephone service, which is an increase of $7,500,000 over

the appropriations made for telephone service over the recent year.

COMMITTEE REPORT

The committee has had reported to it many instances where private power sources are placing more and more restrictions on the activities of REA cooperatives as condition to negotiating contracts to supply the necessary power. Many times contracts offered by the private power companies are on a year-to-year basis. In the opinion of the committee, REA cooperatives are entitled to a firm source of power at reasonable rates and on a dependable basis, with the full right to operate on a basis which will render maximum service to eligible consumers. The committee feels that the Administrator's authority to provide loans for power generation should be fully utilized, if necessary, in order to assure adequate power to REA cooperatives on a reasonable basis.

The committee report we wrote is important, and shows the Congress is determined to protect the REA as it grows in the future to the extent that they may build their own power-generation plants, when necessary, to assure them adequate power, at reasonable competitive rates. When they are not able to secure adequate power in an area without unreasonable rates, I want them to have this protection.

I further stated "that Congress is determined to protect the REA as it grows in the future to the extent that they may build their own power generating plants, when necessary, to assure them adequate power, at reasonable competitive rates."

Now, the above shows that I, with a majority of the Members of Congress, appropriated for the REA loan fund to bring light and power to the farmers of America a total of $2,649,000,000, which is $75 million more than was requested by the three Presidents under whom I have served during the past 12 years.

INTERIOR DEPARTMENT-RECLAMATION, ETC.

The following will show that I voted with a majority of the Members of Congress to reduce some amounts for administration expenses and construction Work, because the hearings held before the Appropriations Committee of 50 members showed these funds were not necessary, and would be a waste of the taxpayers' money.

ROLL CALL NO. 40, APRIL 25, 1947

A motion was made from the Democratic side to recommit the bill which would add funds to purchase 30 new automobiles for the Interior Department-mind you, not REA-and provide for $1,700,000 for administration of the Bonneville project, meaning they could employ more people who were not needed and spend more money.

The facts prove they had a carryover of $141 million in the Department that had not been spent. The Washington Post, the leading Democrat newspaper in Washington, published an editorial commending the action the committee had taken in reducing the Interior appropriation bill.

I voted against the waste of this amount of money because they already had too many automobiles and plenty of money for the administration of the project. I must have been right because 197, including Representative NIXON, now Vice President, and Representative William G. Stratton, now Governor of

Illinois, voted with me, while only 140 $6,856,000 to be spent on various convoted for the motion to recommit.

ROLL CALL NO 39, MAY 2, 1951 Mr. GARY, chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee, and a Democrat from Virginia, offered an amendment to

strike out $3,400,000 for the Southeastern Power Administration. I quote from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Volume 97, part 3, page 4282, what Mr. GARY said:

The purpose of this amendment is to prevent the useless expenditure of $3,400,000 to the Southeastern Power Administration for the construction of transmission lines to duplicate existing lines now in operation.

Mr. GARY has the respect of every Member of the House. His amendment carried on the roll call by 248 yeas to 149 nays. I was glad to vote with Mr. GARY to prevent this waste.

ROLL CALL NO. 40, MAY 2, 1951

Congressman HARRIS, an able and respected Democrat of Arkansas, offered the amendment to reduce SWPA by $550,000. In support of his amendment, I quote from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, volume 97, part 3, page 4295, his words, as follows:

Mr. Chairman, this amendment is an effort to reduce in some small way the burden-the load of the taxpayer. It does not handicap or adversely affect the program or service of the Southwestern Power Administration. *** If there ever was a time when Federal expenditures unrelated to our national defense should be reduced to the bone, it is now.

I was glad to help save this $550,000. The amendment carried by 222 yeas to 173 nays.

ROLL CALL NO. 41, MAY 2, 1951

Simply a vote for language to be inserted that no funds of the appropriation could be expended for the construction of facilities designated as comprising the western Missouri project. Yeas 247, nays 152.

ROLL CALL NO. 42, MAY 2, 1951

This motion was made to reduce the amount appropriated for Bonneville project by $52 million. However, that left $62 million for that project, more than they could or did spend for the coming year. Motion carried 225 to 167. I voted to save $52 million.

ROLLCALL NO. 44, MAY 2, 1951 This had to do with construction under the Bureau of Reclamation, Mr. TABER made a motion to reduce the amount from $207,190,000 to $197,000,000. That still left an enormous sum. I voted "yea" to slow down the spenders; 237 voted "yea" to only 160 "no." I voted against unnecessary waste.

ROLLCALL NO. 45, MAY 2, 1951

This was an attempt on the part of the spenders to duplicate transmission lines already rendering adequate service; 226 voted "yea," only 165 voted "nay." I voted with the 226.

ROLLCALL NO. 32, APRIL 28, 1953 This vote was on a motion to recommit the bill which had been considered for many weeks by the Appropriations Committee, and had been approved by that committee after long hearings. The motion would add to the bill about

struction projects in the Southwest, West, and Northwest parts of the United States.

The motion was voted down by a vote of 212 to 167. I voted to prevent spending $6,856,000, which was clearly un

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The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Speaker, I am glad we have a good attendance here preparing for the Republican conference, because I have something very serious to say to the House and it is a very fortuitous circumstance.

We have heard a lot pro and con about rules of congressional procedure for investigating committees in both this House and the other body.

There seems to be no practical way in which once an investigating committee is organized and endowed with an ap

propriation the House can recapture its control over it. We have in this body, in my opinion, a special committee which needs to have the recapture of control at least reviewed as far as the House is concerned. It is the Special Committee on Tax-Exempt Foundations.

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The case for action is clear. On July 2 after hearing 11 witnesses critical of the tax-exempt foundations and 1 witness favoring their activities, and before the foundations themselves were heard, the special committee abruptly ended further public hearings, saying statements could be submitted that could be made public. The predecessor Cox committee heard 40 though this present committee was said to be justified because its predecessor did not do a good enough job. Terminating public hearings when only one side has been heard is not the American way and the House should not tolerate it. It resulted in the New York Herald Tribune calling this particular inquiry a senseless investigation and the New York Times calling it another stupid inquiry. These are authoritative publications and such editorials are not conducive to the prestige the House seeks to, and should, sustain on a high level.

The whole investigation of foundations has been conducted upon the theory that the foundations have been engaged in some conspiracy to infiltrate socialism into American educational institutions

and social life. As against this, we have the findings of the predecessor Cox committee unqualifiedly to the contrary. The Cox committee said in their report:

It seems paradoxical that in a previous congressional investigation in 1915 the fear most frequently expressed was that the foundations would prove the instruments of vested wealth, privilege, and reaction, while today the fear most frequently expressed is that they have become the enemy of the capitalistic system. In our opinion neither of these fears are justified.

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Aside from the pressing needs of national security there are ever-widening and lengthening avenues of knowledge that require research and study of the type and kind best furnished or assisted by foundations. The foundation, once considered a boon to society, now seems to be a vital and essential factor in our progress.

The power of the whole House of Representatives being vested in any investigating committee the House should now assert the right to review that power with respect to its exercise by the Special Committee to Investigate TaxExempt Foundations. I am introducing the record of the foundations is good. It a resolution for that purpose today the text of which is as follows:

Resolved, That the Committee on Rules is hereby authorized and directed after inquiry to make recommendations to the House of Representatives respecting the activities of the Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations created pursuant to House Resolution 217, 83d Congress, and the termination thereof, the report thereof to the House of Representatives, the disposition of the papers and documents of the said special committee and such other measures relating thereto as may be appropriate.

It is high time that the House of Representatives asserted itself in one of these investigations that has gotten off the track, as the best answer to the danger of any loss of prestige which may be suffered by either House of the Con

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The committee believes that on balance believes that there was infiltration and that judgments were made which, in the light of hindsight, were mistakes, but it also believes that many of these mistakes were made without the knowledge of facts which, while later obtainable, could not have been readily ascertained at the time decisions were taken. It further believes that the foundations are aware of the ever-present danger and are exerting and will continue to exert diligence in averting further mistakes. While unwilling to say the foundations are blameless, the committee believes they were guilty principally of indulging the same gullibility which infected far too many of our loyal and patriotic citizens and that the mistakes they made are unlikely to be repeated. The committee does not want to imply that errors of judgment constitute malfeasance.

Nothing material has appeared before the present committee to alter the validity of these conclusions of its prede

cessor committee. I hope very much that my colleagues will very seriously think about this question of what control we do have and whether it is not vitally important that we have some residual control over these investigations as there is a possibility that they may go off the track.

give us an insight into the nature of the struggle of the free society in our day. In fact, this experience concerns all of us most intimately because what happened in Germany can happen anywhere in the world, at any time. Only a clear knowledge of what took place there, the will of those who believe in human dignity to make the sacrifice to preserve it, and eternal vigilance will spare

Mr. BUSBEY. Mr. Speaker, will the other countries the same ordeal and the same gentleman yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. BUSBEY. May I inform the gentleman that there are some of us in this body who do not take our evaluations of congressional committees from the New York Herald Tribune or from the New York Times. Some of us disagree violently with their position and I am one of them.

Mr. JAVITS. That is proper and the gentleman is entitled to his opinion. But the gentleman will notice that the first thing I spoke of was the cessation of any public hearings after one side was heard. I first gave the facts before I gave anybody's opinion.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. JACKSON. The House exercises its constant and continuing control over any investigating committee and at any time it is the consensus of the Members of the House that any committee has overstepped the bounds of decorum in the conduct of its operations it can cut off that appropriation.

Mr. JAVITS. I have suggested a means by the filing of this resolution by which the House can make its will felt. I think that some means to enable the Houses of the Congress to see to their own prestige is vitally needed here and in the other body.

TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ASSASSINATION OF THE GERMAN

ELITE

The SPEAKER. Under special order heretofore entered into, the gentleman from California [Mr. YoUNGER] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. YOUNGER. Mr. Speaker, today, July 20, marks the 10th anniversary of the assassination of the German elite. In memory of that occasion I would like to read from an address delivered by Prof. Karl Brandt, associate director of the Food Research Institute, Stanford University, before the World Affairs Council of Northern California on July 8, when he said as follows:

We are assembled here today to pay our tribute of respect and admiration to those German men and women who put their lives at stake in resisting the tyranny and lawlessness of the Hitler regime, and who were assassinated for doing so. In honoring the memory of those gallant martyrs for the cause of freedom and human dignity, we have a phase of contemporary events to ponder which, for the vivid contrast between man's most vicious and diabolical capacities on one side and his noblest emotions and acts on the other, constitutes one of the greatest tragedies in the history of the west. We are commemorating those past events in a distant country tonight because they

tragic loss. While the scene and the special emphasis may change, the nature of the basic human problems as well as the potential human reaction to them will remain the same in any country. Only those afflicted with racialism would deny this, and endeavor to indict whole nations or other collective groups. For this reason we may remind ourselves that our present quarrel temporary regime which rejects the basic is not with the Russian people, but with a tenets of the philosophy of freedom.

What happened in Germany from 1933 until this day is full of meaning to us in America, the more so since we are intimately concerned with that country. The American people have twice defeated the German armed might in battle, and have twice done their best to rebuild Germany. Today our

troops are protecting it and our Government still guides its course in domestic and foreign affairs. In 1933 Germany was 1 of the 3 leading and scientifically advanced industrial countries of the world; it had built a modern democracy and an orderly government by law. In that year it sank into totalitarianism, and almost perished.

runaway inflation, and the worldwide deUnder the impact of a lost war, a disastrous pression, the democratic German society of the Weimar Republic foundered, owing to the same sort of political deadlock which at this very moment brings France, even in the midst of prosperity, to the edge of revolution. To grasp the enormity of the events that culminated in the assassination of the German elite after July 20, 1944, we must trace the rise of the tyrant and his might-is-right regime of terror and plunder.

By 1933, one-third of the working population of Germany was unemployed and living on a meager handout from the tottering democratic state. The impractical constitution of the Weimar Republic contributed considerably to this impasse, just as her unworkable constitution is troubling France today. Not quite one-half of the German votes were cast for Hitler in 1933. He promised employment, economic recovery, and new security. This platform made a lot of sense to many despairing people. After having gone through the agony of a misconstrued and sabotaged political process in a multiparty democracy, the German citizen felt that discipline under a dictator would get him out of the mess. President Franklin Roosevelt and Hitler were inaugurated about the same time on similar economic and social platforms: to start up the idle wheels of industry, to create full

employment, to lift prices for the farmer, and to put planning and social reforms into the economic system. The two men were worlds apart in every sense, but it took Roosevelt until 1937 or 1938 fully to size up even the contours of Hitler's wickedness. The German people did not admire Hitler's looks, his harsh, rasping voice, his Austrian dialect, or his cheap, demagogic manners. But most of them felt that the deadlock in politics and economics had to be broken somehow, even if at the temporary cost of some liberties.

Late in March 1933 I asked farmers throughout the country why they had voted for Hitler. Their answer was: "How could you go on with such ruinous prices for wheat and rye and all the other products?" All they wanted was recovery-and this they got; Hitler rapidly gained more support.

Germany had had a long and honorable record along the lines of constitutional mon

archy, two-house parliament, labor unionism, free press, and guaranty of civil liberties ever since the abortive revolution of 1848 which sent waves of democratic Germans to this country. Germany had also emancipated the Jews earlier than any other country, and they had contributed their fair share to government by law, to science, and to the arts. It had too broad and educated and experienced an intelligentsia not to see the devil's horns and hoofs under the Führer's uniform, which he revealed almost immediately. When Reichspräsident von Hindenburg received Hitler in 1932 as a candidate for the position of Reichskanzler, and asked what his conditions were, Hitler said, "I need the right to destroy physically my political opponents." The old gentleman gasped, and, horror struck, inquired, "What did you say you wanted to do?" When Hitler stubbornly repeated his claim to the rank of overlord of gangsters, the field marshal snapped, "The audience is over."

Unfortunately for the Germans, the domestic political deadlock, the social distress, and the desolate international situation created such a crisis that a few months later Hitler acceded to power anyway. His and his henchmen's orders were plain: "Get tough, muss them up, spare nobody; crush any opposition physically-cow them all. This will change the situation and speed recovery." It actually did. But terror stalked the country from the day Hitler took over.

In December 1932 Ambassador Bullitt, special envoy of President-elect Roosevelt, visited with me in Berlin. Democracy and government by law were still in force under Chancellor Schleicher, and the worst of the depression had been passed 6 months before. When Philip LaFollette, Governor of Wisconsin, toured Berlin with me in the spring of 1933, the atmosphere of intimidation and arbitrary use of power and perversion of truth and justice were already all around us. Assured of immunity by Göring, the Storm Troops were waging a civil war against all whom they proscribed. In the sanctum of a private club an air force officer mimicked Hitler before a small group. Hitler heard of the episode and ordered the man shot. Göring pleaded clemency. The officer was slain just the same. Jews, Catholics, liberals, Social Democrats, Freemasons, and all conscientious dissenters of any philosophy or conviction were under persecution. The 6 million Communists promptly sided with the ruling brand of totalitarianism; only a handful of outstanding figures were jailed.

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By April 1933 storm troopers had taken over an abandoned brewery at Sachsenhausen near my family farm north of Berlin. white-painted sign over the gate read: "Concentration camp of the standard 202 of the SA." Soon two of my farm workers were taken to it for a week's education with rubber truncheons. Gradually the camp filled with inmates, and so did scores of others all over Germany.

In May 1933 I visited with my many Jewish friends during the first feeble boycott, and helped them plan how to get out from under it. On July 15, 1933, my late friend, Hubert Knickerbocker, and Edgar Ansel Mowrer-both courageous American journalists of renown-told me the shocking facts of the "bloody night of Koepenick," in which a score of Social Democrats were murdered by the SA. In Kiel, the police surrendered a prisoner to a lynch mob. The aged former president of the police, von Jagow, commented: "In 84 years this is the first time such a thing has happened in the Prussian police force. It takes decades to build a reliable law-enforcement body, but only a few days to despoil it."

Thus far the atrocities were a domestic concern, but on June 30, 1934, the Hitler gang demonstrated its nature before the

world. In throwing down the supposed revolt of Captain Röhm, an orgy of annihilation of opponents swept Germany. Ex-Chancellor Kurt von Schleicher, his wife, General von Bredow, State Secretary Klausener, Vice Chancellor von Papen's assistant, Edgar J. Jung, and scores of others were slain in gangland style by SS murder detachments. Ex-Chancellor Heinrich Brüning and my friend Minister Gottfried Treviranus, through the courageous aid of British friends, just escaped being shot. Open terror glowered from the eye sockets of the death's head on the caps of the SS. Soon the Germans no longer dared to utter aloud the name "Himmler" or "Heydrich" for fear the sound of the dreaded names might kill. Thousands of doctors, scholars, and other professional men left the country because they were persecuted or had been declared racially, religiously, or politically undesirable. From 1933 to 1937 Hitler gave Germany full employment and recovery, and rearmed it to the teeth, bent all the time on revenge for Versailles and on the conquest of Europe, if not more, consumed by a morbid lust for power and more power.

With the success of domestic recovery, and unlimited rearmament, Hitler was presented with diplomatic success on a platter, first by France and Great Britain, then by Russia. While the Western democracies delivered Czechoslovakia to Hitler, Stalin went one step further and, in cahoots with Hitler, divided Poland and Rumania and gobbled up the Baltic States. This at long last brought appeasement to an end. Molotov and von Ribbentrop ratified this carnivorous deal. The same Mr. Molotov, incidentally, who is still ready, upon occasion, to offer similar deals, though now the conditions are harder.

Hitler then went on the fatal warpath, and ultimately made the same error that Napoleon did he invaded Soviet Russia, while the United States and Great Britain prepared for the onslaught which led to his doom.

In all the years from 1937 up to this day it has been claimed that all of this perversion of everything Germany had stood for in a long history was accomplished without the slightest civic revolt or even objection. It is no exaggeration to say that even though it has available the most elaborate means of information through radio comment, journals and magazines, and a vast array of news-gathering agencies, the American public still holds the view that all Germans became 100 percent Nazi the moment that Hitler became Chancellor. They have also been led to believe that it was inherently the will of all the people that this hideous system of denying all basic civil rights reflected their innate desire. The popular argument goes that the Nazi system was constructed by the most prominent philosophers and statesmen of Germany, with names like Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Bismarck studding the list. Supposedly all their philosophy, their political creed, together with their alleged opportunism, their docility, their servility, and their congenital militarism ended logically in licking with gusto the boots of the tyrant. This theme has been stated in endless variation by the army of ex-post philosophers and the always pcpular discoverers of the politically obvious truths of yesterday. Only for the German Jews is an exception made, although they, too, by cultural background and centuries of belonging to the German community were in every sense of the word Germans, and for the most part exemplary citizens. On them one bestows by a contemptuous act of grace absolution from German sin by racial exemption. Fortunately enough, the values of human dignity, freedom, and truth—and faithfulness to them do not have any relation to race or color. The lack of knowledge in the American public about the

facts of the internal struggle against Hitler does not hurt the Germans, but it hurts us in our foreign policy and our understanding of history.

The truth is, indeed, radically different and much more complex. For many years, particularly so long as the emphasis was upon recovery, and again when it looked like success in war after the unexpected debacle of France, most of the German people went along with a national policy conducted by a totalitarian chancellor with antidemocratic means. There was a time in our own country when Anne Morrow Lindbergh's The Wave of the Future, which took it for granted that it did not make sense to swim against the current, was a best seller.

From the very outset there was a strong opposition to and a real resistance among the Germans against police-state rule in Hitler's regime. As I said before, it was in April 1933 that the Sachsenhausen brewery had been converted into a concentration camp. This evil punitive "educational” institution sprang up in many places all over Germany. The camps were soon overcrowded. Why? Because from the first days there was a determined resistance to the totalitarian state by individuals who could not stomach the arbitrariness and tyranny of the police state.

To resist the all-powerful, ruthless totalitarian police state of the 20th century and its psychiatric shrewdness in breaking man's personality and his will to resist is immeasurably more difficult than the ordinary citizen who has known nothing but government by law can possibly imagine, even nowdespite the fact that we know what happened to Cardinal Mindszenty, Robert Vogeler, General Dean, and scores of other sturdy men. If you decided you could not go along with every whim of the Nazi regime, you had, even in the first days of the 12 years of Nazi rule, only two choices: Either you could emigrate or you could stay and resist, passively or actively. I chose the easiest way, emigration, because I was not sure I could stand up under the ordeal of solitary confinement, and I had many good friends in this country, and thus an easy opportunity to go. If the decision was to stay, as most Germans had to, and you were not a moral contortionist, it meant that at any time you might literally have to put your life at stake, without any assurance that anyone would ever know why you disappeared or even how. I question the right of the smart critic and the glib talker to sit in self-righteous judgment on the unfortunate people who were caught in the totalitarian trap. These critics pat themselves on the back, sure they would be quite different from the German people— the perfect heroes, hard as nails, and unflinching defenders of the faith in the face of sure death. Every individual is not a born martyr, whether he is a German, a Russian, a Frenchman, an American, a Jew, or a Gentile. He has an innate urge to survive, even under most excruciating conditions. If he has relatives, dependents, and friends whom his resistance would jeopardize, his urge to survive is intensified manyfold.

The late Gestapo and its sister organizations, the GPU and MVD, or whatever letters this modern corps of assistants to the police state uses for camouflage, are a tough lot, scientifically equipped with the latest electronic devices and the techniques of psychoanalytic and psychosomatic torture. As in any area where totalitarianism takes over, Nazi Germany cast fear into the hearts of its people by the ridiculously simple yet most effective device of inviting anonymous information about others not only inviting it, but making it a criminal offense not to inform on others-even children on their parents and husbands on their wives.

You may sense from the following sample what it all amounted to. One of my late

friends, Secretary of Agriculture Dr. Hans Krüger, had this experience in 1935. The Gestapo notified him to appear before an inspector at headquarters 2 weeks after the date of the citation. When, slightly tattered by the waiting and the worry about the dreaded machine, Krüger appeared before the inspector, he was offered a cigar and requested to be at ease with, "Please relax and feel at home. You have recently been doing some unwise things. Oh, no? Would you like to read a little in your Gestapo file? Here it is-help yourself. No; take all the time you want to examine it; there's no hurry." My friend read and read and sweated blood as he read: here was an account of a private party he had given, attended by only three friends. Pieces of their conversation were on record-dangerous talk-revolt against the criminal regime, actual plans for sabotaging Nazi policies. The inspector signed letters and puffed on his cigar as my friend read. "Please don't feel rushed," he urged. Finally, he told Krüger: "Don't be afraid. We won't arrest you. Just be advised that we are watching you. You'd better go straight. I should deeply regret it if we had to hurt you, particularly since you have a wife and children. Watch your step. So long-have a good time."

All the men who revolted against the immorality of the whole hideous system knew that they were in a scientifically designed and efficiently operated trap. But a very large body of them went right ahead, and became accustomed to the always vigilant eyes and ears of the Gestapo and the presence of informers. It is beyond belief how this changes people who do not possess the strongest of nerves. I had a visit from my aged parents in 1937 in New Jersey. It took me about 10 days to persuade my father, at a lonely spot in the countryside, that it would be safe to have an open word with me about what was going on at home.

You may ask when did the resistance begin to amount to anything, and did it ever succeed in impeding the Nazi regime seriously? Did they perhaps begin to resist only when the jig was up and the American, British, and Soviet armies stood inside Germany? These are certainly legitimate questions, and they cannot be answered simply in a general statement. Yet today we have an almost complete record of what did happen, particularly owing to the fact that the captured documents now housed in Alexandria, Va., comprise most of the Gestapo records. Owing to the German habit of never throwing away a piece of paper with anything written on it, we also have the German police and jail records, and also a vast literature of memoirs. There are more than 340 books dealing with the German resistance against Hitler.

What actually happened reflected anything but a uniform attitude. Some of the most lucid minds had sense enough to realize before Hitler came to power that he was an insane force, possessed of a satanic combination of skills and gifts tied to a morbid personality. They also knew that he had a rare and mystical sort of appeal to the mass mind and a psychopathic clairvoyance. When at Teheran President Roosevelt made a remark about "this fool, Hitler," Stalin quickly countered, "You cannot call this man a fool; anyone who has achieved that much in history is certainly no fool."

The men who had to deal with him first as genuine and legitimate opponents were the core of generals of the army whom Hitler had inherited from the small Reichswehr of the Weimar Republic. They were truly conservative men of advanced years, with combat experience in World War I, who were brought up in the Prussian puritanical spirit. Particularly after the disastrous loss of World War I, they were skeptical observers of political democracy in troubled times, and unquestionably great patriots. Generals

von Hammerstein-Equord, Beck, von Fritsch, von Witzleben, Oster, Carl Heinrich von Stülpnagel, von Brauchitsch, and the chief of the counter intelligence Admiral Canaris, to name only a few-all men of extraordinary stature-had made up their minds about who the sergeant of World War I really was. They saw in him the greatest menace to their country, and in fact to the future of government by law in Europe. They were conscientious men of order. Hitler was to them a mountebank and an illbred brigand. But they did not consider it their task to take over the political leadership. Neither in the United States, Germany, nor England has it been the normal course for the generals and admirals to take over political responsibility from duly appointed civilian cabinet officers who have legitimate authority. Hitler, in turn, knew who his deadliest enemies were, and did not shrink from using the vilest and most vicous methods of intrigue, bribery, and character assassination to get rid of some of them and split the ranks. As the Nuremberg trials have proved, the German general staff was opposed to military adventures. It knew too well the limitations of German military and economic resources. Moreover, it had sense enough to realize that one could probably win battles, but never a war in which the United States and Great Britain would inevitably become involved. They distrusted Hitler on every ground-character, philosophy, maturity of judgment, and even more, political and military intuition. The assassination, underworld style, which Hitler administered to Generals von Schleicher and von Bredow, to Messrs. Klausener and Jung and scores of others was—if anything of that sort was needed-an eyeopener to the general officers. These men knew far more than the public about the cold-blooded gang of killers that had seized the German power of government. The proper question of course is, if they did know so much, why did they not act and remove Hitler? This is one of the most involved problems of the whole exasperating struggle between the resistence and the Hitler regime.

To begin with, these men actually did move all the time to achieve Hitler's elimination from power. But he surrounded himself with his own pretorian guards, the SS and the SD, and packed the Wehrmacht with young officers of his own choosing. Yet the military-resistance leaders joined with civilian protesters, at first particularly those of the conservative wing. Among these men who were willing to resist actively were the former mayor of Leipzig, Dr. Karl Goerdeler, State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker, and former Reichsbank president, Hjalmar Schacht. They planned for September 1938 a coup d'etat with troops prepared for the attack on Czechoslovakia. Exactly at that moment British Prime Minister Chamberlain, who had been advised of the conspiracy, told Hitler that he wanted to compromise on Czechoslovakia. On September 29 Hitler's victory at Munich was complete. It supposedly saved the peace but it deprived the generals of that opportunity to execute their coup.

One of the most fateful errors of the generals of the resistance was their failure to prevent the invasion of Poland; at that time they could still have changed the whole course of history. What they did later was to try to stop the extension of the war to the west. They organized a refusal by the top command to order the attack, but two in their ranks refused to commit mutiny. Hitler again had it his way. By that time, however, the political activities of civilian members of the whole conspiracy became stepped up. They negotiated via Norway through intermediaries in London and at the same time sent an emissary, Dr. Adam von Trott zu Solz by air via Gibraltar to Washington, D. C., where he negotiated on

behalf of the German resistance with leading political figures, among them Felix Morley, Justice Felix Frankfurter, and a number of diplomats. President Roosevelt, in close contact with London, turned down flat any attempt at negotiating with the German resistance. The same attitude prevailed in London. The leading idea already was: Unconditional surrender and nothing less. On his way back to Germany via Japan and Russia, Dr. von Trott stopped for a day at my home in Palo Alto. I bitterly criticized the leaders of the resistance for their fateful delays and hesitations, and ultimately said to my daring and well-shadowed guest that their failure to stop the attack on Poland would ultimately lead to the total destruction of Germany by the United States and his assassination and that of all his fellow conspirators by Hitler. Von Trott was one of the first to be murdered by Hitler's gang after July 20.

As the war went on, the activities in resistance circles began to coagulate, but this could never grow into a mass movement. All the work had to be underground by small groups of loyal friends. Men from all spheres of life took part. Many ran afoul of Gestapo agents posing as resisters. There were prominent and outstanding figures of labor, among them Dr. Julius Leber, Carlo Mierendorff, Theodor Haubach, and Wilhelm Leuschner in the civilian underground. (Kurt Schumacher had long since disappeared in a concentration camp.) Most powerful resistance centers were the Catholic and Protestant churches. Cardinals Faulhaber of Munich, Count von Galen of Münster, and Count von Preysing of Berlin fearlessly fought a running battle against the heathen creed, its racialism and inhuman traits, the killing of the insane, and the perversion of charity. They protected Jewish refugees and succeeded in saving a considerable number of them. Members of the confessional synod fought a pitched battle under the leadership of Pastors Niemoeller, Bonhoeffer, Lilje, Dibelius, Gerstenmaier, and a large number of outstanding laymen. handful of Seventh Day Adventists were indomitable opponents, and marched into the concentration camps. Other small sects also had resistance cells. Diplomats Otto Kiep, Von Hassel, Von Trott, Von Weizsnaecker, Count Bernstorff, and Count von der Schulenburg were joined by agricultural leaders in all parts of Germany, by industrialists, mayors, administrators, and professors particularly of the social sciences.

The

One of the most powerful spiritual centers of the resistance was the so-called Kreisaucircle under the leadership of Count Helmut James von Moltke. This circle did not work for the violent overthrow of the Hitler regime, but prepared spiritually and intellectually for the days to come after his downfall. This went so far that preparations were made for the structure of a new government and democratic representation of the people; a new constitution was written for a truly free society and government by law; and a roster of future political leaders and cabinet members was kept. The circle and their friends also prepared for bringing the Nazi leaders to trial in court for their crimes.

The philosophy of this circle offers the key to the thought of the Bonn government today. These men refused to interfere with the disaster which they saw coming, because they believed it vital for the restoration of a decent society that this time the wicked course of a ruthless power policy come to its logical end. They wanted no new legend about a betrayal of victory-certainly a momentous decision in view of the enormous disaster it involved. But these people felt that the scope of the catastrophe was no greater than was the disgrace and depravity which the Anti-Christ and his cohorts had brought upon the Germans in the West.

Aside from this circle, however, were increasing numbers of men, particularly among high-ranking officers of the Army, who believed that to prevent the total destruction of the country it was necessary to eliminate Hitler and his lieutenants. This conviction was deepened by the clear realization that Hitler, in his craze, was forcing these professional soldiers to commit more and more crimes against the rules of warfare and valid German and international law. Leaders of this group, aside from General Beck, were military leaders in the headquarters of Army group central inside Russia, men in the command in Paris, and in the Wehrmacht command in Berlin.

On March 13, 1943, Colonel von Schlabrendorff placed a time bomb in Hitler's plane. Despite several months of careful preparation, and hundreds of trials with the type of bomb selected for use, the mechanism failed in practice. General von Gersdorff carried in his overcoat pockets two time bombs in order to blast Hitler and himself to bits, but Hitler left the meeting a few minutes before the bombs were due to explode. In the winter of 1943-44 some officers met with Hitler to display new uniforms, and brought along dynamite with which to kill him. An air raid interrupted the whole demonstration. In December 1943 Count Stauffenberg manipulated a bomb through the guards of Hitler's headquarters on an occasion when Hitler was expected for a conference, but Hitler canceled his appointment. All told, 10 separate attempts to kill Hitler were made before the portentous final

one.

Finally, on July 20, 1944, Count Stauffenberg placed a bomb in a satchel beside Hitler's desk in his East Prussian field headquarters, "Wolfschanze," and the wooden shack blew up, wounding Hitler, but not killing him. The whole plot succeeded in Paris, and to some extent also in Berlin, where troop units went into action, but it succumbed to successful counteraction from Hitler's headquarters, and Hitler immediately began to liquidate the opponents who had revealed themselves.

From July 20 black terror raged throughout Germany and in all the German-occupied areas, just as the red terror gripped Soviet Russia after the attempt on Lenin's life. It reigned savagely for almost 10 fateful months, spurred by Hitler, the cornered power maniac, who now, in his doom, did what he had told Hindenburg he wanted to do. The Gestapo rounded up all known conspirators and by torturing the captives, brought many others to light. Until the very end, with foreign armies in Berlin, the assassinations went on. All of the men were tortured, and after drumhead trials by the notorious people's court, were condemned to die. In a large number of cases concerning his most illustrious enemies, Hitler insisted on having the victims tortured to death gradually rather than summarily executed. Our Army captured the motion pictures he ordered taken of these nauseating scenes and at which he gazed during the final days in his bunker in Berlin.

During

This macabre business actually blotted out the main body of what one correctly can call the finest flower of the German nation that had resisted the tyrant and belonged to the leadership of Christendom. the years 1933 to 1944 approximately 32,500 Germans were executed by so-called court procedure, not counting the vast number of victims who perished in concentration camps. Up to 1939 more than 1 million Germans had been sent to concentration camps; 300,000 of them were camp inmates in that year. The war cost the Germans, a nation of 67 million, 32 million soldiers and 500,000 civilians, but the assassination of the elite was definitely the greatest loss of all.

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