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Mr. FERGUSON. I knew that the idea was being batted around last spring, but I had never heard of this, and it had never been called to my attention. I have conferred with the second ranking member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and he informs me that he had never heard of it.

The Senator from Montana, instead of accepting what is supposed to be a direct quotation in a newspaper article, must have had an opportunity, on many occasions, to ascertain the facts when he was present with Secretary of State Dulles or Admiral Radford at various meetings before the Committee Foreign Relations.

on

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct. Mr. FERGUSON. The Senator could have found out whether or not the quotations were true or untrue and whether they could be relied upon.

Mr. MANSFIELD. But the Senator did not know about that until after it happened. I want the Senator to know that I have a great deal of confidence in Mr. Chalmers M. Roberts, who is usually pretty sure of his facts.

I also wish to make the observation that it will be noted on the list of those who were present that, outside of the Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND], who was there in his capacity as majority leader, I am sure there was no one present from the Foreign Relations Committee. That was one of the points I made yesterday, that the ranking minority member of the committee, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], and the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, have on occasions been ignored. When the Foreign Relations Committee is ignored, and there is concentration on the Armed Services Committee, the Department of Defense, and the leadership, then we are getting pretty close to something that looks like intervention.

Mr. FERGUSON. My reason for doubting the accuracy of Mr. Roberts in this respect is that I have never heard where he got his information. Someone could have told him what he wrote. However, I know that the senior Senator from Georgia, the senior Senator from Wisconsin, and the Senator from Michigan, the present speaker, have been present on occasions when the subject referred to in the article was discussed. It seems strange that the reporter should quote the information about a meeting where those Senators were not present. The Senator from Montana had the opportunity, on a number of occasions, in executive sessions of the Foreign Relations Committee to bring out what the facts actually were. I do not know of any occasion when I have attended such a meeting at which the Senator from Montana was present and brought up

the point. If he has any record of it, I wish he would state that he asked the Secretary of State, Admiral Radford, or anyone else in the Foreign Relations Committee about the truth of the Roberts statement that Congress was asked to make a declaration of war in advance.

Mr. MANSFIELD. If the Senator

from Vermont will again indulge me, in reply to the Senator from Michigan I should like to say that I did raise those two particular points in a Senate speech, and no Senator on the floor-and there were present at that time Members who were supposed to have been at the meeting-raised his voice.

With regard to the question of the senior Senator from Georgia and the chairman of the committee being at the meetings, I know some meetings were held at which they were not in attendance. I think when a question of foreign policy is being considered those two Senators ought to be in the meetings, certainly ahead of members of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. FERGUSON. I share that viewpoint.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I know the Senator from Michigan does.

Mr. FERGUSON. I share the view that the senior Senator from Georgia should be at the meetings. So far as I am personally aware, he has been at the meetings. Does the Senator now claim that France asked America to intervene in the war? Does the Senator contend that that is true?

Mr. MANSFIELD.

I cannot answer

that question categorically, because I do not know; but I have heard and read reports to the effect that the French were begging us for air assistance at the time the battle of Dien Bien Phu.

Mr. President, if I may, I should like to ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks a newspaper article which appeared in the Washington Post of June 7, 1954, entitled "United States Twice Proposed Indochina Air Strike,” and an article appearing in the New York Times of May 4, 1954, entitled "A Chronology of the Administration's Policy on Indochina."

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post of June 7, 1954] UNITED STATES TWICE PROPOSED INDOCHINA AIR

STRIKE

(By Chalmers M. Roberts)

The United States twice during April proposed using American Navy carrier planes and Air Force planes based in the Philippines to intervene in the Indochina war provided Congress and our allies agreed. But the British would not agree, and the plans fell through.

The Eisenhower administration even set a tentative date for an air strike to aid the then

besieged fortress of Dien Bien Phu. The date was April 28, 2 days after the opening of the Geneva Conference.

President Eisenhower was prepared to go to Congress Monday, April 26, to ask for passage of a joint resolution to permit American in

tervention.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Adm. Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, first broached the idea

at a secret meeting April 3 of the bipartisan leaders of Congress.

In neither instance was the use of American ground troops contemplated.

The President himself did not discuss the proposed intervention with either the bipartisan congressional leaders or the ambassadors of allied nations, leaving that to Dulles and Radford.

NOT BACKED BY JOINT CHIEFS

Radford told the congressional leaders on April 3 that the proposal did not have the backing of the other members of the Joint Chiefs.

It was these intervention proposals which divided the Anglo-American alliance, a division which continues to this day on what to do about the Indochina crisis.

With a major Communist assault by Viet Minh forces expected shortly on French Union forces in the Red River Delta of Indochina and with peace negotiations making little progress at Geneva, the Allies soon may once more be faced with the problem of whether to act militarily to hold back Communist aggression. This is the reason that the following chronology is of more than mere historical interest.

The chronology is based both on the scanty public record and on private information gathered by this reporter in London, Paris, at the Geneva Conference, and in Washington from American and allied officials.

This is the sequence of events thus far: Saturday, March 20: Gen. Paul Ely, French Chief of Staff who last week was made commander in Indochina, arrived in Washington

with reports on the Indochina war which gravely alarmed American officials. He conferred during several days with President Eisenhower, Dulles, Radford, and other officials. The sum of his message was that French Union forces could not win in Indochina without American military intervention. The American response indicated a

willingness to act.

Writers speech in New York, called for united

Monday, March 29: Dulles, in his Overseas

action though it might involve serious risks. He said that Communist China was backing aggression in Indochina with the goal of controlling all of southeast Asia and that the United States felt that, "that possibility should not be passively accepted but should be met by united action."

MEETING WITH HILL LEADERS

Saturday, April 3: Dulles and Radford met in secret session at the State Department with eight congressional leaders representing both parties and with the then Under Secretary of Defense, Roger Kyes, and the then Navy Secretary, Robert B. Anderson. Congressional leaders present were Senators KNOWLAND, MILLIKIN, LYNDON JOHNSON, RUSSELL, and CLEMENTS, and Representatives MARTIN, MCCORMACK, and PRIEST.

Dulles said the President had asked him to call the meeting. He said he felt that it was indispensable at this juncture that the leaders of Congress feel as the administration did on the Indochina crisis.

Radford said the administration was concerned with the rapidly deteriorating situation.

Dulles said that the President wanted him to take up with the congressional leaders action by Congress, but action short of a declaration of war or the use of ground troops. Dulles said that if Congress would permit the President to use air and naval power, then a way could be found to prevent broadening of the conflict. He said it was felt that the necessary air and naval power was already in the area and that Congress should shoulder its responsibility in the crisis.

Radford suggested that if Congress passed a joint resolution giving the President general power to act, it would be possible to make a single air strike to relieve the embattled fortress of Dien Bien Phu, then under siege for 3 weeks. Radford explained

the urgency by saying that he was not even certain, because of the 13-hour time difference between Washington and Indochina, whether the fortress was still holding out at that very moment.

FOLLOWUP CONTEMPLATED

Radford spoke of using the approximately 200 planes on two 27,000-ton United States Navy carriers, the Essex and the Boxer, then in the South China Sea. Radford said that land-based United States Air Force planes in the Philippines would join in such a strike.

Radford was asked whether such action would be war. He replied that we would be in the war. He was asked whether, if the strike did not succeed in relieving the fortress, we would follow up. He replied "Yes." He was asked whether land forces would then also have to be used. He did not give a definite answer.

Radford was asked whether he was speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said "No." He was asked what was the division in the Joint Chiefs. He replied that the other members did not agree with him on the idea of the air strike.

Dulles was asked why he did not go to the United Nations. He replied that it would take too long, that this was an immediate problem. Dulles was asked whether he had lined up the British or any other allies for a joint venture under the "united action" doctrine. He said he had not. The congressional leaders suggested that he should line up the allies before Congress take any action. The meeting broke up on this note.

Sunday, April 4, through Friday, April 9: Dulles consulted with diplomatic representatives in Washington of Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and the three Associated States of Indochina, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

During these talks there evolved on Dulles' part a proposal for positive military action along the lines discussed the previous Saturday with the congressional leaders and including planes from aircraft carriers to be supplied by Britain, France, and Australia. There also was discussed a statement or declaration of intent designed to explain to the world what action was being taken and why, and warning the Chinese Communists not to intervene.

The British reaction was negative. The other nations indicated they would go along with the plan provided everyone, especially the United Kingdom, joined in.

Dulles offered to go to London, if necessary, to make clear the urgency of the situation and the need for action. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill asked that Dulles fly over and a London-Paris trip was then arranged.

Saturday, April 10: Dulles left by air for London and Paris on what he called a mission of peace through strength and to pool allied strength "to create the conditions needed to assure that that conference [the coming Geneva Conference] will not lead to a loss of freedom to southeast Asia but will preserve that freedom in peace and justice." Monday and Tuesday, April 12 and 13: Dulles conferred with Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in London. The British urged caution and flatly opposed any military action at this time, saying that the monsoons soon would bring the fighting to a halt, perhaps in 2 weeks. Dulles dropped the idea of immediate military intervention and took up the idea of creating a southeast Asia defense alliance somewhat similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe.

Dulles felt he had won agreement to begin at once creating this united front in southeast Asia with the idea that this would lead to united action if necessary to save Indochina though not specifically to save Dien Bien Phu. Dulles agreed to soften the wording of the proposed communique at Churchill's insistence.

Tuesday, April 13: An Anglo-American communique said that the two nations were ready to take part in examining the possibilities of a southeast Asia defense pact. Eden, in announcing the communique in the House of Commons, said that the two nations "must await the reaction of the other interested countries before determining what steps we take next." He insisted that he had committed Britain to no specific action but only to examine the possibility of such action.

Dulles understood that a working group would be set up in Washington in a few days to begin drafting the pact. Dulles had argued that the Geneva Conference would be more apt to succeed if there were some strong alternative to a failure to get what the West wanted by negotiation. No ultimatum to Red China was intended, however, Dulles felt that the critical situation in Indochina in fact activated the pact.

Wednesday, April 14: Dulles flew from London to Paris where he discussed the proposed pact with French Premier Joseph Laniel and Foreign Minister Georges Bidault. A Franco-American communique closely followed the language of the London communique. The French understood that work on drafting the pact would begin at once.

Friday, April 16: Vice President NIXON told newspaper editors in Washington (his identity became known the next day) that the effect of the loss of Dien Bien Phu would be

almost catastrophic. He said if the French withdrew, Indochina would be Communistdominated within a month and that the United States, as a leader in the free world, could not afford further retreat in Asia. NIXON said that it was hoped that the United States would not have to send troops to Indochina but if the United States could not avoid it the administration must face up to the situation and dispatch forces.

Sunday, April 18: British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins told Dulles that he could not attend a meeting called by the United States for the following day to begin work on the southeast Asia pact. Sir Roger had been told by the State Department late the previous week about the meeting. At the time he had not received a report on the Dulles visit to London and hence he asked London for instructions. London referred him to the report of the Dulles-Churchill-Eden conference, by then received at the British Embassy here. Sir Roger thereupon told Dulles that his government was not prepared to take part in such discussions because of the possible repercussions on south Asian opinion of an announcement that such discussions were being held. Sir Roger said that he could only discuss the other topic scheduled for the Geneva Conference, that is Korea. The Monday meeting was thereupon turned into a discussion of Korea.

Dulles felt that the British had switched their position on going ahead with the southeast Asia pact. There is some question whether Sir Roger specifically told Dulles that Eden had forgotten about the coming Colombo Conference, due to open the following week, at Colombo, Ceylon. Dulles, at any rate, felt that the British switch was due to objections from Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who was to meet at Colombo with the Prime Ministers of Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, and Indonesia.

Monday, April 19: Dulles, after seeing the President at Augusta, Ga., told reporters it was unlikely that American troops would be sent to Indochina.

Tuesday, April 20: Dulles briefed bipartisan congressional leaders on his LondonParis trip and on his plans for Geneva, saying that American intervention in Indochina was not imminent or under active consideration at present. At the meeting were Senators KNOWLAND, MILLIKIN, FERGUSON, SALTONSTALL, WILEY, BRIDGES, HICKENLOOPER, LYNDON JOHNSON, CLEMENTS, RUSSELL, GREEN, and FULBRIGHT, and Repre

sentatives CHIPERFIELD, ARENDS, FULTON, and BROOKS HAYS.

Later that day, Dulles left by air for Paris and Geneva. The Paris stop was to attend a NATO meeting and to consult with Eden and Bidault on Geneva.

Friday, April 23: Bidault told Dulles that Gen. Henri Navarre, then French commander in Indochina, had just cabled that he would not be responsible for the fate of French Union forces in Indochina if Dien Bien Phu fell. Bidault, therefore, asked whether the United States were prepared to take military action to prevent fall of the fortress.

Saturday, April 24: Radford arrived in Paris. Dulles and Radford told Eden that the French were asking for military help. An allied air strike at the Vietminh positions surrounding the fort was discussed.

The discussion involved use of the same two United States Navy carriers and Philippine-based Air Force planes that had been considered on April 3. The carriers had been in the South China Sea since nearly March, the Navy said, for training. The nearest point from the Gulf of Tonkin to Dien Bien Phu was about 240 miles distant.

Bidault said that General Navarre had agreed that a strike by about 500 American planes would be sufficient to save the fort.

Dulles said that if the Allies agreed the President would go to Congress on Monday, April 26, and ask for a joint resolution authorizing such action and that this would permit a strike on Wednesday, April 28, assuming that Congress had acted in time.

The State Department had prepared a declaration on intentions-an outgrowth of the early April meetings in Washington-to be signed on Monday or Tuesday by ambassadors of the nations allied with the United States-Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The declaration spoke in general terms of the danger of Communist aggression and the allied recognition of the necessity of repulsing that agression by military means.

However, there were no British or Australian aircraft carriers close enough or available to join in the strike on the proposed day and the only French carrier was already fully occupied.

Eden told Dulles and Radford that this was a most serious proposal, amounting to war, and that he wanted to hear it from the French themselves. Eden and Dulles then conferred with Bidault, who confirmed the plea for aid.

Eden said he personally opposed such a move and that he felt that ground troops would be called for within 48 hours after an air strike as had been the case at the beginning of the Korean war.

Eden added, however, he would not want to give a final British judgment and that he, therefore, would go to London at once and confer with the British Cabinet.

At the end of the day, Eden flew to London. Dulles then told Bidault that (1) the proposed strike was beyond the President's constitutional powers without action by Congress, and (2) that no action could be taken except under the united action previously discussed but delayed by British unwillingness to act at once. Dulles also said that there was doubt in the minds of American military leaders thaat a single strike would, at this late date, save Dien Bien Phu. Dulles then flew off to Geneva.

Sunday, April 25: The British Cabinet met in extraordinary Sunday session and decided against participating in the united action air strike. The British Chiefs of Staff unanimously agreed thaat it would not be sufficient to save Dien Bien Phu.

Eden stopped in Paris Sunday evening en route to Geneva and told Bidault at Orly Airfield of the negative cabinet decision. Dulles was told by Eden late that night in Geneva. At this time Eden told Dulles that Britain had decided to wait and see what sort of

settlement the French could get from the Communists at the Geneva Conference before taking any action.

Monday, April 26: Radford arrived in London from Paris to talk with Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff.

On the same day, the Geneva Conference opened.

Also on Monday, Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith in Washington discussed Indochina in a conference with Senators H. ALEXANDER SMITH, HICKENLOOPER, LANGER, FULBRIGHT, GILLETTE, and MANSFIELD and Representatives CHIPERFIELD, ARENDS, FULTON, and BROOKS HAYS. Under Secretary Smith raised the question of unilateral American military action in Indochina but the Members of Congress strongly opposed such a course.

Tuesday, April 27: Churchill announced to a cheering House of Commons that the British Government was "not prepared to give any undertaking about United Kingdom military action in Indochina in advance of the results of Geneva."

Churchill went on to say that "we have not entered into any new political or military commitments" but he did not explain the background of his statements.

Thursday, April 29: President Eisenhower told his press conference that the United States was trying to steer a course between the unattainable and the unacceptable in the Indochina crisis. He repeated a statement of some time earlier that the United States would not get into a war except through constitutional processes which involved the declaration of war by Congress.

Wednesday, May 5: Dulles returned to Washington from Geneva and reported on the conference to Senators KNOWLAND, FERGUSON, MILLIKIN, SALTONSTALL, WILEY, H. ALEXANDER SMITH, BRIDGES, LYNDON JOHNSON, CLEMENTS, GEORGE, RUSSELL, and GREEN and Representatives MARTIN, HALLECK, CHIPERFIELD, VORYS, JUDD, SHORT, ARENDS, RAYBURN, MCCORMACK, GORDON, LANHAM, and VINSON. Dulles indicated that the United States had virtually abandoned all hope of effective united action in Vietnam and that he was now seeking a collective security system designed to seal off and protect Laos and Cambodia, the other Indochinese states.

Friday, May 7: Dien Bien Phu fell to the Communists.

Wednesday, May 19-President Eisenhower told his press conference that it might be possible to create a collective security system in southeast Asia without the British and that the United States might possibly work out something with Australia, New Zealand, and some Asian nations.

Thursday, May 20: New Zealand External Affairs Minister T. Clifton Webb, asked by reporters about the possibilities of a pact without Britain, said that "I can't conceive of a satisfactory alliance being made that would not include Britain" and that he felt "that any form of security pact for southeast Asia that it may be necessary to form will, in fact, include Britain."

Thursday, May 27: Adm. Richard B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations, and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in a New York speech that the United States is "approaching the fork in the road"; that the "choice could be a fateful one"; and that however grave are "today's alternatives," their "gravity may well be dwarfed by those which will confront us in a few years if our country fails to choose properly now." He said the question was, "Do we want to turn into the smooth dead-end or take the rougher road that offers us a good destination if we have got the guts and strength to manage it?”

Wednesday, June 2: President Eisenhower told his press conference that he had not, by any manner of means, reached any decision to ask Congress for authority to act in southeast Asia.

Thursday, June 3: Five-power military talks between high-ranking officers of the

United States, Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand opened in Washington. Admiral Carney was the United States representative. The talks, due to last a week, were military and not political in nature and were designed to explore military problems which might arise from a southeast Asia defense pact, among others.

Thursday, June 3: Gen. James A. Van Fleet, who had been sent to the Far East in May as a special envoy by President Eisenhower, gave what one Senator termed "a very alarming" report to the combined Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.

Friday, June 4: Dulles told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the situation in Indochina is grave but by no means hopeless and that it is "fraught with danger not only to the immediate area but to the security of the United States and its allies in the Pacific area." When Senator FULBRIGHT observed that recent witnesses before the committee had urged a go-it-alone policy Dulles replied that he would not want to make an answer which conceded that Britain had a veto on what we might want to do and that a situation might arise when the United States would have to act without the British.

Saturday, June 5: Senate Majority Leader KNOWLAND in an interview said that the free world has reached the jumping-off place, and if it does not force some kind of showdown with the Communists in Indochina within the next 30 days, all Asia may fall to the Communists. He added that the United States ought to face up to the fact that it may have to fight in Indochina.

Monday, June 7: Admiral Radford and General Van Fleet have an appointment with President Eisenhower at 10:30 this morning.

[From the New York Times of May 4, 1954] A CHRONOLOGY OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON INDOCHINA

WASHINGTON, May 3.-Following is a catalog of the Eisenhower administration's main statements of policy on Indochina:

April 16, 1953, President Eisenhower to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington:

"The free world

* knows that aggressions in Korea and southeast Asia are threats to the whole free community to be met only through united action. *

"With all who will work in good faith toward such a peace we are ready-with renewed resolve to strive to redeem the nearlost hopes of our day. The first great step along this way must be the conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea.

"This means the immediate cessation of hostilities and the prompt initiation of political discussions leading to the holding of free elections in a united Korea.

"It should mean no less importantly an end to the direct and indirect attacks upon the security of Indochina and Malaya, for any armistice in Korea that merely released aggressive armies to attack elsewhere would be a fraud. We seek throughout, as throughout the world, a peace that is true and total." August 4, 1953, President Eisenhower at the Governors' Conference:

"Now let us assume that we lost Indochina. If Indochina goes, several things happen right away. The peninsula, the last little bit of land hanging on down there, would be scarcely defensible. The tin and tungsten that we so greatly value from that area would cease coming, but all India would be outflanked.

"Burma would be in no position for defense. * *

"So when the United States votes $400 million to help that war, we are not voting a giveaway program. We are voting for the cheapest way that we can prevent the occurrence of something that would be of a most terrible significance to the United States of America our security, our power and ability to get certain things we need from the riches

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"We affirm, in the interest of world peace, that if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.

"Finally, we are of the opinion that the armistice must not result in jeopardizing the restoration or the safeguarding of peace in any other part of Asia."

September 2, 1953, Secretary Dulles to the American Legion convention:

"Communist China has been and now is training, equipping, and supplying the Communist forces in Indochina. There is the risk that, as in Korea, Red China might send its own army into Indochina. The Chinese regime should realize that such a second aggression could not occur without grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina. I say this soberly in the interest of peace and in the hope of preventing another aggression miscalculation."

February 9, 1954, Secretary of Defense Wilson to a news conference:

Question. "Do you think a military victory can be won in Indochina or that peace will have to be negotiated there?"

Answer. "I would think that a military victory would be perhaps both possible and probable."

February 10, 1954, President Eisenhower before his news conference: Question. "Mr.

President * * there

seems to be some uneasiness in Congress that sending these technicians to Indochina will lead eventually to our involvement in a hot war there. Would you comment on that?"

Answer (permitting direct quotation). "Well, I would just say this: No one could be more bitterly opposed to ever getting the United States involved in a hot war in that region than I am. Consequently, that every move that I authorize is calculated, so far as humans can do it, to make certain that that does not happen.”

Question. "Mr. President, should your remarks on Indochina be construed as meaning that you are determined not to become involved or, perhaps, more deeply involved in the war in Indochina, regardless of how that war may go?"

Answer. Mr. Eisenhower replied that he was not going to try to predict the drift of world events now or the course of world events over the next months.

He would say that he could not conceive of a greater tragedy for America than to get heavily involved now in an all-out war in any of those regions, particularly with large

units.

February 17, 1954, President Eisenhower at his news conference:

Question. "Is there any way to distinguish between aid to the anti-Communist forces in Indochina and support of colonialism?" Answer. The President replied that the questioner had asked the very question that was the crux of this whole thing. There was no colonialism in this battle at all.

France, he added, had announced several times, and most emphatically last July, that she was fighting to give the three Associated States their freedom, their liberty. He believed it had been agreed they would live inside the French Union, but as free and independent states.

March 10, 1954, President Eisenhower at his press and radio conference:

Question. "Mr. President, Senator STENNIS said yesterday that we were in danger of becoming involved in World War III in Indochina because of the Air Force technicians there. What will we do if one of those men is captured or killed?"

Answer. "I will say this: There is going to be no involvement of America in war unless it is a result of the constitutional process that is placed upon Congress to declare it. Now, let us have that clear. And that is the answer."

March 24, 1954, President Eisenhower at his news conference:

Question. "Mr. President, would you care to say anything, sir, about the conference at Geneva with reference to Indochina and Communist China?"

Answer. The President replied that he would say only a very few things: One, he didn't believe that it was necessary to argue the importance of all this great southeast Asian area, and the Southwest Pacific-its importance to the United States and to the free world. All that region was of the most transcendent importance.

Now, this fighting going on in Indochina, no matter how it started, had very manifestly become again one of the battlegrounds of the people that want to live their own lives against this encroachment of Communist aggression.

March 29, 1954, Secretary Dulles to the Overseas Press Club of America in New York:

"Under the conditions of today, the imposition on southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community. The United States feels that that possibility should not be passively accepted, but should be met by united action. This might have serious risks, but these risks are far less than would face us a few years from now if we dare not be resolute today."

April 15, 1954, Adm. W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the American Society of Newspaper Editors:

"The free nations cannot afford to permit a further extension of the power of militant communism in Asia. In the interests of preventing aggression, full advantage should be taken of the fact that non-Communist Asia has a considerable potential for development of defensive military forces *** it's (Indochina's) loss would be the prelude to the loss of all Southeast Asia and a threat to a far wider area."

April 16, 1954, Vice President NIXON in a background talk to the American Society of Newspaper Editors (this was not attributed to him at first but later published):

Question. "If the French pulled out of Indochina, what should the United States do?"

Answer. The Vice President replied that there was no reason why the French could not stay on and win, but on the assumption that they did withdraw-an assumption he did not accept-Indochina would become Communist in a month.

He added the United States, as a leader of the free world, could not afford further retreat in Asia. It was hoped that the United States would not have to send troops there, but if this Government could not avoid it, the administration must face up to the situation and dispatch forces.

Therefore, the United States must go to Geneva and take a positive stand for united action by the free world. Otherwise, it would have to take on the problem alone and try to sell it to the others.

This country was the only nation politically strong enough at home to take a position that would save Asia. Asia. Negotiations with the Communists to divide the territory in any form would result in Communist domination of a vital new area.

April 20, 1954, Vice President NIXON, in Cincinnati, at the 20th annual University of Cincinnati Day dinner:

"The aim of the United States is to hold Indochina without war involving the United States, if we can. We have learned that if you are weak and indecisive, you invite war. You don't keep Communists out of an area by telling them you won't do anything to save it."

April 21, 1954, Vice President NIXON in Des Moines, Iowa:

"The purpose of our policy is to avoid sending our boys to Indochina or anywhere else to fight. We believe a strong policy has the best chance to accomplish that purpose."

April 26, 1954, President Eisenhower to the United States Chamber of Commerce:

"I think each of us senses that when we meet, as you are meeting today, we are doing so in a time of great decisions. I think it is no longer necessary to enter into a long argument or exposition to show the importance to the United States of Indochina and of the struggle going on there.

"No matter how the struggle may have started, it has long since become one of the testing places between a free form of government and dictatorship. Its outcome is going to have the greatest significance for us, and possibly for a long time into the future. * **

"And then we turn our eyes to Geneva and we see representatives of great-and some antagonistic-powers meeting there, trying

to arrive at some situation that at least we could call a 'modus vivendi.' We do not hope, I think, very soon to have the type of understanding that we believe we can ultimately develop among ourselves as to great issues. But we would hope that the logic of today's situation would appeal to all peoples, so that they would see the futility of depending upon war, or the threat of a means of settling international difficulty." April 29, 1954, President Eisenhower to his news conference:

war as

Question. "Mr. President, in a recent speech you referred to the desirability of a modus vivendi in Indochina. Could you give us anything further on your thoughts, what is in your mind, by a modus vivendi?"

Answer. The President replied that we were steering a course between two extremes, one of which, he would say, would be unattainable, and the other would be unacceptable. It wouldn't be acceptable, he thought, to see the whole anticommunistic defense of that area crumble and disappear.

On the other hand, we certainly could not hope at the present state of our relations in the world for a completely satisfactory answer with the Communists. The most you can work out is a practical way of getting along. Question. "Mr. President, I would like to go back, sir, to what you said about modus vivendi. It is a question of interpretation. I may not have caught all you said, but I caught this much: That you want to get along on a practical basis, as we are not getting along in Europe."

The President replied that he didn't mean to endorse, even by indirection, any specific means of getting along. He pointed out that a completely trustworthy peace, one in which we could have confidence as between ourselves and the Communist world today, seems to be something over the horizon. We work toward it; we have not achieved it, and we would be foolish to think we could do this quickly.

On the other hand, he added, we also un

derstand what the loss of this region would mean to us. There is fighting going on, and,

of course, everybody would like to see fighting stopped, but he was merely talking about some solution that could be, that would be acceptable to us, and would stop the bloodletting.

Mr. FERGUSON. Does the Senator from Montana say to the Senate of the United States that he believes America should have gone into the Indochina war?

I

Mr. MANSFIELD. Oh, the Senator knows my attitude on that question. have been one who has been consistent in saying there should not have been intervention, because, in my opinion, it would have been suicidal. It would have brought about a resumption of the war in Korea, resulting in the launching of war against the Chinese mainland, and it would have turned this country into a dictatorship and a garrison state.

Mr. FERGUSON. I share the views of the Senator from Montana, but not for the same reasons.

Mr. MANSFIELD. What are my reasons?

Mr. FERGUSON. We were not asked for aid by the Associated States. As has been stated previously, if people do not want freedom, if they do not want to fight for freedom for themselves, if they do not ask for the cooperation of those who believe as they do in freedom, America cannot be "Mr. Fixit" all over the world and force itself into every dispute wherever it may be, whether the people affected want America to intervene or not. That is exactly

Mr. MANSFIELD. what I said yesterday. We could never get a request from the three Associated States, because they were not independent states.

Mr. FERGUSON. They had not received independence from France.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I wish to say on behalf of Mr. Dulles and the Department of State that they did their best to try to hurry up independence for the three Associated States, because that really was the ultimate and final answer.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FLANDERS. Mr. President, I should like to remind the Senator from New Jersey that I have the floor, but I yield.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I am amazed at the statement made by the Senator from Montana that there was apparently a secret meeting.

Mr. MANSFIELD. It was mentioned in the press.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I am a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and chairman of the Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator from New Jersey was not present.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I never heard of any such meeting.

Mr. MANSFIELD. But the meeting was held, I inform the Senator from New Jersey, although he was not there.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. The Senator from New Jersey was not invited to be there. I think if the meeting concerned such an important problem, I probably would have been invited to it, because I am chairman of the Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. I had discussed this matter with the Department. I never understood an attempt was made to pass such a resolution as has been mentioned.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The proposal was made and turned down, thank heaven, by the leadership.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I know nothing about it. I can confirm what the Senator from Michigan said, that we were not at the meeting.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct. Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I do not know the point the Senator is trying to emphasize.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That was one of the difficulties I had. Since some of us protested, thanks to the majority leader, there has been better liaison between the State Department, the Defense Department, and the committees.

In response to a question asked by the Senator from Michigan, let me read from the Washington Post of June 7, 1954:

Friday, April 23: Bidault told Dulles that Gen. Henri Navarre, then French commander in Indochina, had just cabled that he would not be responsible for the fate of French Union forces in Indochina if Dien Bien Phu fell. Bidault, therefore, asked whether the United States were prepared to take military action to prevent fall of the fortress.

Mr. FERGUSON. What is the Senator from Montana contending?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am answering a question asked by the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. FERGUSON. Is he contending that we should have gone into Indochina?

Mr. MANSFIELD. How many times do I have to say "No"? So far as I am concerned, I am opposed to that, for the reasons I have outlined.

Mr. FERGUSON. What is the point the Senator from Montana is making?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am answering a question the Senator from Michigan raised.

Mr. FERGUSON. I merely say I agree with the Senator from New Jersey. I never knew of the meeting. I never had heard from any official source, and from no other source than this article, that there was any such meeting. I come back to the proposition that, instead of the Senator from Montana relying upon a newspaper article, he should have asked the Secretary of State, during the meetings the Senator has attended, what the facts were.

Mr. MANSFIELD. When the time came to ask the questions, the Secretary was in Geneva or Berlin.

THE CHINESE PROBLEM Mr. FLANDERS. Mr. President, I find the colloquy extremely interesting, but we seem to have arrived again at the point where we came in.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont has the floor.

Mr. FLANDERS. I am not disposed to support the circumlocutionary discussion, which can be continued in the time of the Senators who have been speaking.

Mr. President, in theory and in practice a nation should be solidly behind its official foreign policy and the foreign policy should be one which all reasonable citizens can support. I am not sure that this is the case at the present time or that it has been for some years past.

I

am making this brief talk as a free lance. I am not on the Foreign Relations Committee, so have had no briefings in executive session. I have access to no secrets.

Let me first make it clear that I am opposed to the admission of Red China to the United Nations. I am also in support of declarations from the House and Senate on this matter at this time. The administration should be, and I believe is, appreciative of such support.

I have contributed toward the Committee for One Million, which is an organization opposed to the admission of Communist China. I may say I have noted in the newspapers of this morning and yesterday afternoon that the Committee has attained its membership of one million, so that it has reached its objective in that respect. Its honorary chairmen are former Ambassador to the United Nations, Warren R. Austin, who preceded me in the Senate; and the Honorable Joseph C. Grew, former Ambassador to Japan. In correspondence with these men, I suggested that it might be well for the Committee to make some such statement as the one that was made by the Republican floor leader, and was seconded by the Democratic floor leader, expressing legislative opposition to admission of Red China to the United Nations. If this were to be tied in with a statement that it would be difficult to get appropriations from the Congress for the United Nations if Red China were to be admitted, these esteemed elder statesmen felt that that would be in the nature of a threat, and would be an unwise thing to do. It has seemed to me, however, that there must be some way of informing our associates in the United Nations of the facts of life, and this question of continuing appropriations is one which does raise a question as to the facts of life which in some way should be made plain. I am, therefore, glad of the statements which have been made.

Let me call attention, however, to the fact that an expression of our determination in this matter is a purely negative thing. We shall not by this means be making any contribution to a positive solution of the problems which we face in Asia and on the other continents of the globe, where Soviet power is gaining position month by month and year by year. It is to make suggestions as to positive policy that I am now taking the floor.

The first point to be made is that every decision has to be made in the light of the future, rather than as meeting by temporary means a temporary situation. To emphasize this point, let me refer to the original endeavor to support Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist armies against the increasing strength of the Reds during and succeeding the last Reds during and succeeding the last years of World War II.

It is unwise for those of us who sought to support the Nationalist cause to forget that Chiang Kai-shek's organization was riddled with graft, that the Soong family was generally reported to have enriched itself at the expense of our assistance, and that the Generalissimo himsel: gradually lost the support of Nationalist ually lost the support of Nationalist groups who had once given him en

thusiastic support. These things have to be taken into account.

It was with these conditions in mind that on June 12, 1947, I wrote to General Marshall a letter, which I shall now read:

As a graduate member of the Business Advisory Council, I was privileged to attend the dinner last evening and listen to your satisfying frank discussion of the Chinese situation. Of course, the satisfying thing about it was your frankness. The situation itself is incredibly difficult.

I have the temerity, nevertheless, to pass on to you some vague thoughts which have been going through my mind.

Would it be possible to clear a restricted area of China of Communist military strength and mark off that area for assist

ance and reconstruction? It might be from the Yangtze River south or perhaps an area of 50 to 100 miles north of the Yangtze might be included. If transportation, supporting coal mines, and cotton textiles, for instance, could be reconstituted in that area, it would form a basis for reviving normal living for many millions of harassed people.

The difficulties are obvious. It would re

quire close supervision on our part to make military rathole. It would be difficult to get such supervision to be politically acceptable to the Chinese Government and it would be difficult to recruit and organize the necessary supervision. Recognizing these difficulties and others which your experience would suggest, it might still be considered as one of the faint hopes in the Chinese situation. To this letter the general replied, under date of June 24, 1947, as follows:

sure the assistance is not poured down the

Thank you for your kind letter of June 12, 1947, in regard to the problem of assistance to China.

The suggestions you make in regard to the demarcation of certain areas in China

where we could concentrate American assistance for purposes of reconstruction are very pertinent ones. The Department has had under consideration a program such as that outlined in your letter, but has found itself confronted with some very obvious difficulties, including those mentioned in your letter, which would be involved in carrying out a program of assistance of this kind.

Regardless of such difficulties, some of which are common to any program for assistance to China, your ideas on this subject merit the continuing attention and consideration of the Department. You may be assured that in our attempt to find some means of assisting China, they will not be overlooked.

In retrospect, this suggestion still seems to me the only one which could have been followed with any hope of success in arresting the Red conquest of China. Without doubt, it died for two reasons: First, the administration then in power was still obsessed with the notion that Mao Tse-tung was primarily an agrarian reformer, rather than a Communist; and, second, the scandalous graft in the Nationalist forces gave the administration a reasonable excuse for not pursuing the matter further. sumably the same considerations led to the sabotaging of the congressional endeavor to support the Nationalist side, although there was no excuse for using the indirect means which were employed, instead of coming out honestly with the real reasons.

Pre

This is a part of the background of the present situation which we must keep in mind if we are to act wisely. Another part of the background is to be

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