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steamship United States and in other maritime matters. By the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended by Reorganization Plan No. 21 of 1950, Government responsibility for the administration of merchant-marine subsidy contracts is confided to the Secretary of Commerce. Nevertheless Admiral Dennison saw fit to interest himself in the contract for the steamship United States. He held meetings on the subject to which the Department of Commerce was not invited. Letters appeared over the signature of the President of which the Department had no advance notice. It should be emphasized that in this instance, unlike the labor illustration, the Secretary of Commerce was actively handling the matter, and doing so with the knowledge and consent of the President. Admiral Dennison also concerned himself with maritime-tax policy, a subject long under consideration by the Departments of Commerce and Treasury. latter part of 1952, the President suddenly asked for elaborate reports of their positions, presumably at the instigation of Admiral Dennison. At that time the views of the incumbent Secretaries had become supremely unimportant, and it was hard to believe that the President was then taking personal interest in the problem. There was no statutory basis for Admiral Dennison's activity, but the magic words "White House" commanded attention. No particular harm resulted from Admiral Dennison's officiousness except that the time of high officers of the Government was unnecessarily occupied.

In the

It may be thought that these forebodings are a result of experience in the so-called messy Truman administration, that in future administrations the caliber of personnel will be so high that such evils will be avoided. Perhaps. It is not only in the Truman administration, however, but universally that men are prone to self-confidence, to think that they can handle problems better than those who have the responsibility for them, to enjoy getting in on the act, and to make use of a ready hearing by the boss. Nor are these failings, if they are to be called that, confined to incompetents. Admiral Dennison was a man of ability; the President's military aide enjoyed a higher reputation as an amusing companion than as a serious student of military affairs. Yet there were times when the problems of the merchant marine would have been far simpler if the naval aide had also been an officer of that type.

A remedy already proposed is regulations specifying the duties of the President's assistants in some detail. Insofar as such duties relate to matters within the jurisdiction of an executive department, the regulations should be worked out with the collaboration of the department head. Also, the regulations should be published in the Federal Register.

Underlying all remedies must be the attitude of the President. He must be conscious of the difficulties of overlapping jurisdictions, of the vast power which he grants merely by intimate association, of the extraordinary need for self-restraint. When the President concludes that a department head is not equal to the responsibilities of his office, as apparently happened in the case of Secretary Tobin, the President should dismiss him, painful as the episode may be to all concerned. If the fault of the department head is in no way a lack of earnestness or loyalty, the President can and undoubtedly would make the departure a graceful one. And the President should avoid the appointment of assistants who might be, or appear to be, or might try to become, rivals of department heads.

2. The Bureau of the Budget should be transferred to the Treasury Department or to Congress, or partly to each.

The Bureau is the largest unit of the Office of the President, and, with the ex

ception of the Division of Legislative Reference, the one that least deserves to be there.

That the recommendation in respect of this Bureau may be understood, it is necessary to review briefly both past and present practice in the handling of appropriations and also the factors of expense for which appropriations are made.

It is not disputed that only Congress may make appropriations. The Constitution expressly so provides.10 The problem relates rather to the proceedings leading up to their enactment. As has long been recognized, Congress requires proposals known as estimates, from the executive branch. Prior to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921,11 department heads sent their estimates to Congress through the Secretary of the Treasury who did not attempt to revise them. The act of 1921 directed the President to submit to Congress at the beginning of each regular session a budget setting forth, among other things, "Estimates of the expenditures and appropriations necessary in his judgment for the support of the Government for the ensuing fiscal year." To enable the President to comply with this direction, the act created the Bureau of the Budget as a unit of the Treasury Department and required each "department and establishment" to submit its estimates to the Bureau not later than September 15 in each year.

By Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1939,12 President Roosevelt transferred the Bureau to his own office. He said in his explanatory message to Congress, that he was thereby "keeping the tools of American democracy up to date." 13 Unfortunately President Roosevelt had a tendency to confuse democracy with his own personal power.

Now there are two basic factors represented in every estimate: (1) projects and functions, and (2) administrative cost. The cost of projects and functions may be reduced by modification or elimination; the administrative cost may be reduced by greater efficiency. Insofar as the total budget is concerned, the number and importance of the projects and functions is all-important; the efficiency with which they are administered makes relatively little difference.1 Undoubtedly efficient administration can save large sums expressed in absolute terms, but substantial saving to the taxpayer must be in respect of projects and functions.15 That is to say, what causes high taxes are armament, foreign aid, pensions to veterans, agricultural and other subsidies, dams, and the like, as distinguished from inefficiency in the administration of such programsnot that every effort should not be made to secure the greatest efficiency.

Now there is every reason for the President to review the projects proposed by his department heads. Generally such projects can be readily understood. If the President thinks his department head has proposed

The criticisms of this paper do not apply

to the Bureau of the Budget's Division of Legislative Reference, which supervises the expression of departmental comment on pending legislation. This Division has been well-run and should remain at the White House.

10 Art. 1, sec. 9 reads in part: "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law."

11 42 Stat. 20 (title 31, U. S. C., sec. 1, et seq.).

12 53 Stat. 1423 (title 5, U. S. C., sec. 133t). 13 Title 5, U. S. C., sec. 133t supp.

14 A number of high officials of the Eisenhower administration have learned this fact and other things-the hard way.

15 The worst feature of excessive personnel in program administration is the increased pressure thereby created to keep the program in effect after it has outlived its usefulness.

too many or too elaborate projects, by all means let the President trim them. Clearly, too, the President needs a subordinate to assist him in this task, someone who can familiarize himself with the various projects and advise the President.

On the other hand, it is as a practical matter impossible for the President, or any outsider, to form an intelligent opinion as to the number of personnel needed to administer a given project or function. Only the chief administrators can do so, and, as everyone ever connected with a large organization knows from experience, the best they can do in advance-that is, by way of estimate-is to make a good guess.

When the departmental estimates go to the Bureau a group of examiners attempts to appraise them as to both substance and administrative efficiency. The latter subject comes down in effect to the question of the number and rank of the personnel to be engaged in administration. If the Bureau reduces the estimates to more than a nominal extent the departments are resentful. They think that they best know their own business. The departments particularly dislike reductions by such lowly figures in the Government hierarchy as Bureau examiners. The reaction of the departments to the work of the Bureau is well illustrated by several passages in The Forrestal Diaries.

At page 237, Secretary Forrestal, writing of a Cabinet meeting, says that the Secretary of the Interior made "a protest against the methods by which the people down the line in the budget not much above the status of clerks make allocations within departments between various bureaus and offices of that Department." Secretary Forrestal continues: "With reference to the people in the budget, in my talk with the President yesterday I said that we had been quite uneasy under Harold Smith's administration of the Bureau, about the fact that a young man recently a seaman second class in the Navy, who had been a student of administration at the University of Colorado, had been making up our figures" (i. e., the budget figures of the Department of the Navy). At page 429 et seq. is depicted a controversy between Mr. Forrestal, who had meanwhile become Secretary of Defense, and the Bureau of the Budget, over the 1948-49 budget. The editor of the Diaries, Mr. Walter Millis, comments on a reduction proposed by the Bureau as follows, at page 430: "Suddenly it appeared that it was Mr. Webb (then the Director of the Bureau), who was in control of American military policy rather than the Secretary of Defense."


The picture of a seaman second class, who takes a college course in administration and is assigned the duty of revising the appropriation proposals made by the highest officers of the Navy, will strike a familiar note with making process as at present conducted.10 anyone who has participated in the budget

But even the director himself is not in a good position to overrule a department head; the director is of lower rank and without responsibility for the subject.

In consequence, the net result of the bureau activity is "sound and fury, signifying nothing." Whenever a substantial cut is made, it is the President himself who makes it. Obviously the President can act only with respect to good round numbers-he cannot spend time deciding how many grade 12 scientists there should be in the Bureau of Standards. And there should be better ways both of getting these major questions to the President for decision and of reviewing

16 This is an extreme example. The point is that the budget examiners have neither the rank nor the experience of the department officials who prepare the estimates.

the department estimates from the standpoint of efficiency.

In the writer's opinion, the Bureau of the Budget should be transferred back to the Department of the Treasury and confined to review of major projects and functions. If the Secretary of the Treasury tells a department head that the Government cannot afford a given proposal, that advice would probably be effective; it certainly would be taken with better grace and more seriousness than a ruling of the Bureau of the Budget. But if the department head was insistent, the President could decide between him and the Secretary of the Treasury. As is evident from the Forrestal diaries, a department head would be far more willing to be overruled in favor of the Secretary of the Treasury than in favor of the Bureau of the Budget.

An argument not without force could be made for transferring the Bureau to Congress or the General Accounting Office. Congress is the appropriating authority. department heads are the President's appointees in their respective areas of responsibility; they are his men, and not the representatives of a foreign power or even of another branch of the Federal Government. One would think that they could carry out his financial policies without the necessilty of a special screening officer, and that the screening should be done by the appropriation authority. A precedent is the transfer of the audit of expenditures from the Department of the Treasury to the General Accounting Office effected by the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921. The General Accounting Office functions as an arm of Congress. Limitations of space forbid discussion of possible objections to this proposal.

As for the detailed examination of such features of departmental estimates as relate to efficiency of administration, number of personnel and the like, this question can probably best be dealt with by strengthening

the authority of the departmental

budget officers-in other words, by more organizational emphasis on economy within the departments. The departmental budget officer should have more power to cut down administrative costs and should be less concerned with shepherding the department estimate through the Bureau of the Budget and Congress with the least possible damage. The conscientious departmental budget officer, such as the one at the Department of Commerce when the writer served there, could be more effective without the present reviewing process than he is with it.

3. When a project or problem cuts across departmental lines the President should establish an interdepartmental coordinating committee, and not a parallel organization within his own office.

It frequently happens that a given problem may come within the jurisdiction of two or more departments. Unfortunately the solution frequently adopted has been to create a large organization, or series of organizations, within the Office of the President-organizations sometimes called coordinating agencies which in fact parallel, duplicate, or supersede the departments supposedly coordinated. An example of this evil was the Office of Defense Mobilization, a unit of the Office of the President, and subordinate agencies as they existed in 1950-53. Another organizational monstrosity, run from the White House, although only in small part in the Office of the President, was the Economic Cooperation Administration, later known as the Mutual Security Administration, through which the United States had a double set of embassies throughout a large part of the world, and foreign aid was divorced from the negotiation of American objectives. In Paris there were four ambassadors. Because of the harmonious personal relations between Messrs. Acheson and Harriman, the results were not so bad as might have been expected.

An example of a parallel organization in the Office of the President is the Council of Economic Advisers. Probably the Department of Commerce is best qualified to advise the President on economic trends. The Office of Business Economics of that Department has long made economic studies with such success that it enjoys a high reputation. The same Department's Bureau of the Census has been engaged in statistical work since the creation of the Federal Government and is also highly regarded. On the other hand, the agricultural interests and the labor unions would, not without reason, resent having a department primarily concerned with the welfare of the business community as sole economic adviser to the President. Also the Bureau of Agricultural Economics of the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor are expert in their respective fields. Yet under the Truman administration none of these departments was represented in the formulation of economic advice to the President except insofar as the Council used their statistical studies.

The problem of economic advice to the President would more properly be handled by an interdepartmental committee of these departments and also the Department of the Treasury. In order to avoid an appearance of preferring any department or, what is perhaps more important, the economic interest represented by any department, there might be a single economic adviser from the Office of the President to act as Chairman. Such organization would reduce the personnel of the Office of the President, assure recognition of the departments with special responsibilities in the field of economics, and tend to prevent the proposal to the President of extreme advice or fanciful schemes, carrying with them possibilities of the most dangerous consequences.

An existing organization which should be problem is the air coordinating committee. a model for the handling of this type of This committee includes representatives of the departments having responsibilities in the field of aviation. The chairman is a departmental officer appointed by the President; the staff consists largely of employees of the interested agencies; these employees concern themselves with the work of the committee only when necessary. The small full-time staff is appointed by the entire committee, carried on the rolls of the Department of Commerce, but paid with money contributed by all departments represented on the committee. In this way there is no duplication of personnel; all agencies have a hearing; the President has available to him a single officer who is familiar with the combined thought of those in Government responsible for the subject.


The preceding discussion is, of course, not a complete catalog of the difficulties and dangers of the present organization nor of the possible solutions of the problem. The subject is complex and deserves more attention than could be given here.

Possible objections to the point of view which has been expressed are these: The President has responsibility for the executive branch; should he not be allowed to run it to suit himself? What reason is there to think that the department heads whom a President appoints will be better men than those whom he has in his immediate office?

The answers to these questions are several. The President must rule according to law; the alternative is dictatorship. The matter

17 Since this paper was originally written, a step has been taken in the suggested direction by the creation of an advisory board, including representatives of the departments.

is one of checks and balances. The Senate has consistently shown itself willing to confirm in the absence of clear, affirmative disqualification.18 It is true that the President is held responsible for administration, but he must play the game according to the rules.

Why Presidents and rulers generally do better to rely upon the advice of heads of departments and ministries than upon that of personal staffs is a fascinating speculation. Generally speaking the former are men who have already achieved distinction and perspective; they are not so dependent upon the chief of state for the advancement of careers. They have more dealings with the public and legislative bodies, and therefore better understand public and legislative opinion. The personal aide, subconsciously perhaps, sees his own fortunes tied up with the aggrandizement of the chief of state and tends to develop a fanatical ambition for him. These generalizations do not always apply. In the Roosevelt administration two department heads, Messrs. Morgenthau and Hopkins, functioned like personal aides. Both had no stature apart from the favor of the President and no capacity to deal with the problems of their respective departments, Treasury and Commerce.19 Both continually invaded other areas of responsibility. The famous Morgenthau plan, for instance, whatever its merits, was a typical palace maneuver. That is, its proponent made use of his ready access to the chief of state to urge a radical policy concerning a subject for which he had no responsibility. Appointments like those of Morgenthau and Hopkins to head departments are, however, unusual; such men are more frequently appointed to the personal staff. On the other hand, able and conscientious public servants are constantly appointed to the personal staff; unfortunately the palace atmosphere subjects them to unwholesome pressures.

In Great Britain, it was determined at a cost of two revolutions that the chief of state must accept the advice of the legislature. Recognizing the difference between a hereditary monarch and an elective President, the framers of the Constitution adopted a far less stringent control over the appointments of our chief of state, requiring merely the consent of the Senate. Any suggestion that the Constitution under the inferior officers provision contemplated exemption from this requirement for the immediate staff of the President cannot be entertained for a moment. The framers were entirely familiar with the evils of palace government, much more so than the educated men of the present day. They were well aware that those who had easy access to the chief of state were not inferior to village postmasters and sanitary engineers.

Needed reforms should not be explored in any spirit of hostility to the President. Both Messrs. Eisenhower and Truman inherited this apparatus; they did not create it, and probably none of the considerations advanced in this paper has even occurred to them. It should be frankly recognized that the enormous accretions of power to the President which have taken place in the last few years have created new problems which deserve careful study if constitutional government is to be preserved.


Mr. BUTLER. Mr. President, what has been referred to as the "farm issue"

18 Insofar as service in Washington is concerned. The Senate has been jealous of appointments to service in particular States. 19 Which is the reason why Mr. Morgenthau was such an easy mark for Soviet Agent Harry Dexter White.

is of vast importance to our national economy. This very issue has been debated throughout this session of Congress and we must soon make our decision. I have previously indicated, by means of my weekly newsletter to my constituents in Maryland, that I wholeheartedly support the President and Secretary Benson on their farm program. For this reason, and because I am firmly convinced that the interest of our farm citizens will be best served by that program, I was gratified to receive a letter from the president of the Maryland Farm Bureau which supports my conclusion. Mr. President, I recommend this letter to my colleagues and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the body of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:


Baltimore, Md., June 25, 1954. Hon. JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER,

Senate Office Building,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR BUTLER: I am glad for the privilege as suggested in your letter of June 22, to comment further regarding my observation of the reaction of Maryland farmers whenever they are actually brought face to face with control programs on their farming operations.

Probably nowhere else do farmers practice greater diversification on their crop program than in our small State of Maryland. As one with 35 years' experience, I am reminded as I look back through the past years that my present crop schedule is entirely different than during that earlier period. Freedom to choose and decide what seemed best to undertake for the year ahead without any regard whatsoever for the operation of the years past provided the greatest incentive for progress during my experience. Whatever success I have achieved in farming derives from that basic principle. Control programs must necessarily curtail that privilege. History of past years' production becomes the limitations beyond which farmers cannot go, even though factors in their particular situation would normally assure the plan to be according to good business management. Our farmers have never been forced to deal with situations in the past comparable to those we face at the present time. Unforeseen circumstances came along at the opportune time to permit the waiving of some of the regulatory features of our previous programs and I feel that this is giving some farmers of our present day the false hope that the control features of a high rigid program can somehow be avoided again.

Even today with the limited regulations in our corn program we are hearing numerous expressions of dissatisfaction-such as evidenced by Mr. Ingwalson's letter which I enclosed in my letter of recent date.

We must bear in mind, however, that a very large majority of our farmers express their disapproval of a high rigid support program at every opportunity. They foresee the handicaps involved in the controls necessary to meet present-day situations. They also very well understand that as attractive as prices may be, it represents only one factor in the determination of net income.

The necessary limitations on the right to produce will bring about a greater loss in net income in most instances than would result in a lesser price as possible under the flexible program.

Without question the flexible support program as recommended by the administration

will best serve the long time interests of

farmers and consumers alike.

This, of course, is only one part of a sound farm program, which must also include the supervision of diverted acres, along with a sound plan for conserving and building our

land and water resources. We believe this is well provided for in the soil fertility bank plan. There are many other important aspects of this problem which space does not permit covering.

The most thoughtful farmers whom I know are fully convinced that every means should be used to encourage farmers to exercise self-discipline in meeting this problem rather than to continue to perpetuate evils we have created under the program of the past few years. Sincerely,

WILSON A. HEAPS, President, Maryland Farm Bureau, Inc.

DROUGHT CONDITIONS IN TEXAS Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, it is probable that the recent dramatic story of the disastrous floods along the Rio Grande has diverted attention from the fact that some areas of Texas are more seriously affected by drought conditions now than at any time in the past several years. That appraisal is the statement of the Governor of Texas in a telegram sent to me yesterday.

Texas Agriculture Commissioner John C. White is in Washington this week to confer with Department of Agriculture officials about the possibility of aid for farmers and cattlemen in these droughtstricken areas. Commissioner White has reported to me that conditions are very serious in a number of central Texas counties.

Range conditions are the worst in the history of the cattle industry in this


There is practically no grass left. Cattlemen already have had to begin supplemental feeding of livestock.

The harvest of oats and other small grain was very scant. In most cases, the grain harvested was not enough to pay the expenses of making the crop.

The corn crop is virtually a total loss. Water supplies are dangerously low at several points in these central Texas counties.

There being no objection, the telegrams were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AUSTIN, TEX., July 7, 1954.


United States Senator:

I have just wired the Secretary of Agriculture as follows:

"A number of counties in central Texas are more seriously affected just now by drought than at any other time in the past several years. In my judgment, it is vital and urgent that some steps be taken to provide relief either by the extension of the emergency feed program or by the inauguration now of new program that would give the assistance so desperately needed. I respectfully urge and recommend that steps be taken by the United States Department of Agriculture to give assistance to this emergency. High regards."

I know you will be glad to take appropriate steps to encourage action by the United States Department of Agriculture which will provide relief in this emergency situation. Kind regards.

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Senator, United States Senate,

Washington, D. C.: We urge your support in extending the national drought emergency program and request that Coryell County be included on the active list for Federal aid for drought relief. Letter will follow.

E. PRICE BAUMAN, President, Gatesville Chamber of Commerce. GATESVILLE, TEX., July 7, 1954.

The cattlemen in these counties urgently need protein supplements and roughage or hay to sustain their breeding herds. If these cattle breeders are forced to sell their foundation stock, it will represent economic waste of the most Hon. LYNDON JOHNSON, flagrant kind.

The present cutoff date for the national drought relief protein feed program is July 15-Thursday of next week. That date can be extended by administrative decision.

It either should be extended, or a separate program should be set up for the assistance of these counties, which after 4 years of drought conditions are in a critical and even desperate situation.

Such action is vitally necessary.

I have received telegrams from officials in several of these counties, setting forth the conditions that exist. I ask unanimous consent that the text of these telegrams be appended to my remarks in the RECORD.

Washington, D. C.: Please extend drought emergency feed program and include Coryell County, Tex. Foundation herds are having to be sold. Breeding herds lost. Pastures are 15 percent of normal condition. Heavy grasshopper damage. Grain crop way below normal. CORYELL COUNTY FARM BUREAU, R. A. HEMPEL, President.

SAN SABA, TEX., July 7, 1954.


As 1 of the 9 livestock and farming counties in compact area in central Texas com

pletely missed by recent and earlier rains where pastures were burned to crisp and feed crops completely destroyed, we urge you use every reasonable means to prevent national drought relief protein feed program being closed July 15 or have separate program

set up for these counties after 4 years drought condition now more desperate and critical in these 9 counties than at any time. Stock feeding resumed this week.

M. W. TRUSSELL, San Saba County Judge. A. B. FORD, County Agricultural Agent. J. E. MCCOURY, Chairman, San Saba County Drought Committee. L. P. COBERN, Secretary, County Chamber of Commerce.

GEORGETOWN, TEX., July 7, 1954.


The executive committee of the William

son County Livestock Association has met and discussed the drought situation here in this county. It is the opinion of this group that the county is in need of drought relief and if any counties are designated, Williamson County should be included. The live

stock operator is especially up against it. Any number are feeding, others are just selling their livestock. The rainfall for this year will average about 5 inches which is about one-third of normal, and fell in such

small amounts each time that very little benefit was derived from what did fall. We would appreciate anything that can be done in designating this county for drought relief and especially in the way of feed for livestock.


ANDREW P. PRUDE, President.



The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. UpTON in the chair). Is there any further morning business? If not, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which the Secretary will state.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H. R. 9242) to authorize certain construction at military and naval installations and for the Alaska communications system, and for other purposes.

Mr. FLANDERS obtained the floor. Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Vermont may yield to me for 10 minutes without his losing the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the Senator from Michigan may proceed.


Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, very seldom do I find it necessary to take issue with a colleague on the floor of the United States Senate. Unfortunately, I would be remiss in my duties as a member of the Senate and a member of our Foreign Relations Committee if I did not make reply to the foreign policy views recently expressed by the junior Senator from Montana. To me there is great importance in differences of views regarding our foreign affairs deliberately debated, with decisions arrived at after full and fair debate and then supported with the greatest possible degree of bipartisanship. Little is accomplished in behalf of the American people if we establish as a rule of operations self-imposed and unnecessary limitations on what can and what cannot be said in our dealings with other nations.

When the junior Senator from Montana claims we have too many voices saying things about foreign relations, perhaps he is confused, but I have the utmost confidence that the American people are not confused. I have more confidence in them and their ability to judge situations, no matter how complicated, than apparently he has.

I have read the Mansfield speech. It seems to me a pretty fuzzy expression. Just what he wanted to accomplish is not so clear-unless it is only to criticize.

The Senator complains because various Senators have spoken about foreign policy which he says is confusing to the people. He says:

Presumably the President has a Secretary of State to assist him in matters of foreign policy. If that is the case, then the only official voices we should hear in these matters ought to be the voice of the President and the voice of the Secretary of State.

I cannot follow him on this. I recognize and respect his right to speak on the foreign policy of the United States. The only explanation for his speaking would be that Republican Senators are "officials" and Democrats are not "officials." This seems rather thin since the Senate is a coordinate branch of Government in relation to many aspects of foreign policy and all of its members are "officials."

Senator MANSFIELD suggests that the collapse of the French position in Indochina is because the United States went along with the French demand that it should have a peace conference at Geneva.

It is absurd to attribute French weakness, its loss of the will to fight, the loss of Dien Bien Phu, and so forth, to the Geneva Conference. The French were determined to talk of peace and would have done so whether or not we


American diplomacy is, of course, a potent force. potent force. But it is not sufficiently potent to overcome the consequences of growing French weakness and the fact that as a result of two world wars France has been weakened to a point where its overall commitments in the world are beyond its capability. The United States could, of course, push in to fill the vacuum created by the decline of French power. This would, however, have involved us, in the case of Indochina, in fighting the French for the privilege of getting in to fight the Viet Minh. I do not understand that the Senator from Montana advocates this course. This administration was alert to try to fill the vacuum to the maximum possible extent. We agreed in subWe agreed in substance to pay the entire cost of the war. We agreed to supply the French and the Vietnam forces with military equipment, and we agreed that we would share in an "internationalizing" of the war if the French were willing to put it on an international basis with the backing of the United Nations and with conditions for the independence of the associated states which would make it sure that it was not a colonial power. In these respects we went to the limit. If this was not enough, and it was not enough, the reason was not that the United States could properly have done more

but that the French weakness was too great to be bolstered even by the maximum potential of American diplomacy.

The fundamental blunder with respect to Indochina was made after 1945, when the French, as the colonial power in Indochina, had been ousted by the Japanese. The question then was whether or not the United States as a victor over Japan would use its power to put the French back into Indochina. Originally, President Roosevelt was against this on the ground that France did not have a good record as a colonial power and its return would not be accepted by the people. people. Nevertheless, our Government allowed itself to be persuaded in this matter by the French and the British and we acted to restore France's colonial position in Indochina. The French position was maintained only in the face

of bloody massacres by those who opposed the French which started the colonial war, of which the Communists subsequently took control, and the result has been a bleeding of France and the giving to the Communists of a popular issue against which the French were unable to prevail.

It was in 1945 that our Government cooperated in the reestablishment of French colonialism in Indochina. It was not until July 3, 1953, that the French gave assurance of independence to the associated states. This pronouncement came as a result of strong representations by Secretary Dulles. He prevailed upon the French to make such assurances within 6 months after this administration took office. Remember that the civil war had then been in progress for about 6 years.

The Senator from Montana says, "Geneva was a mistake; and the result was a failure of American policy. It is a profoundly humiliating result." Geneva may have been a mistake, but, if so, it was not a United States mistake. The United States has not the power, and, if it had, it could not wisely exercise the power to force France to go on fighting after its will and power to fight had gone. We might ourselves have stepped in and taken over the fighting but that apparently is not what the Senator from Montana wanted us to do. Certainly it is not what the American people wanted us to do. There is not the slightest reason why the United States should feel humiliated as a result of what is happening at Geneva. It has taken throughout a clear, strong and honorable position. If our position, for understandable reasons, is not shared by others, that may be a reflection upon them, but surely it is not a reflection upon the United States.

The Secretary of State, speaking at Seattle on June 10, 1954, pointed out that while the United States does have a large measure of responsibility in the world "that is far short of saying that the United States has responsibility for all that takes place throughout the world. We do not accept the view that whenever there is trouble anywhere it is the fault of the United States and we must quickly fix it. The United States does not believe that it can alone solve problems everywhere. The possibilities

of solution lie primarily with the peoples directly concerned."

It is a grave disservice to the United States to assume the contrary view and that it is a failure of the United States if anywhere in the world others fail. Uncle Sam is not a worldwide "Mr. Fixit."

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Vermont yield, to permit me to reply to the Senator from Michigan?

Mr. FLANDERS. I yield for that purpose.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I have listened with interest to the remarks made by the distinguished senior Senator from Michigan. In my opinion, the American people are just as confused as ever on the basis of the explanation made by administration spokesmen.

There is much in what the Senator has said with which I could agree. As a matter of fact, I believe I recognized some of the phrases I used in my speech yesterday, or at least they were paraphrases. I think the Senator from Michigan should be reminded that President Roosevelt recognized that an explosive situation would occur in Indochina if the French returned, and that he should be commended for his efforts to bring about an end of colonialism in that area.

After the war was concluded, the British occupied the southeast part of Indochina, and the Chinese Nationalists, under Chiang Kai-shek, occupied the northern part. The British left very shortly, and turned the southern area over to the French. But a great deal in the way of negotiations was required before the French and the Nationalist Government of China, under Chiang Kaishek, could get together on terms upon which the Chinese Nationalists would evacuate.

Finally, an arrangement was made by means of which the Chinese Nationalists were given railroad and seaport rights in Vietnam, and the French took over.

So far as I have been able to study the Berlin Conference, it was, in my opinion, a 100-percent failure, because the Russians won everything they wanted at that Conference. What they wanted comprised two objectives. One was to achieve some degree of recognition of Communist China; the other was to bring about a breakup of the European Defense Community.

So far as the recognition of Communist China is concerned-and much has been heard about that in this country during the past week-in my opinion, the mere fact that the United States agreed with France, Great Britain, and other nations, to attend the general conference at Geneva, Switzerland, to which Communist China was invited as an interested state, indicates that a degree of recognition was achieved.

What has happened to China through the person of Chou En-lai since the Geneva Conference got under way? He has been wined and dined while visiting the heads of state in Burma, India, and elsewhere. China now is really a far greater power than she was before the Geneva Conference. This is due, in some small part, at least, to the fact that the United States was a party to the particular

agreement to hold a conference after the Berlin Conference.

So far as the second objective of the Communists is concerned, namely, the breakup of EDC, it appears to me that that objective is well on the way to achievement. As I stated yesterday, I feel so forlorn about the possibilities of EDC that I think the United States should look for an alternative; and that alternative should be to bring about the inclusion of both West Germany and Spain in the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance.

The Senator from Michigan says that the administration went the limit. Well, it tried to go the limit, because Admiral Radford discussed with responsible congressional leaders-and perhaps the Senator from Michigan was among themthe idea of using American naval and air support at the time of the battle of Dien Bien Phu.

Furthermore, as the Senator from Michigan must know, the administration asked a group of responsible congressional leaders what they thought of the idea of having a resolution passed, which would give to would give to the President of the United States the discretion to use authority as he saw fit in the southeast Asia area. Those proposals are a matter of record.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Vermont yield?

Mr. FLANDERS. I yield to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. FERGUSON. Will the Senator from Montana state who was asked for a resolution to authorize the sending of troops into Indochina?"

Mr. MANSFIELD. I was going to raise a technical point about the question asked, because I said that American naval and air support had been proposed. Mr. FERGUSON. No; that was not my question.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes; that is what the Senator asked about. It is the same thing, because if one goes into Indochina on an airplane he is just as much a trooper as if he is on the ground.

Mr. FERGUSON. But will the Senator state who was asked for a resolution? Mr. MANSFIELD. Responsible congressional leaders. I was not present, because I am not one of the responsible leaders.

Mr. FERGUSON. I think I have attended all the meetings, and I have never heard of any such request.

Mr. MANSFIELD. If the Senator from Michigan will bear with me, and if the Senator from Vermont will be kind enough to yield further————

Mr. FLANDERS. I yield further. Mr. MANSFIELD. I shall be glad to look up the item for the Senator.

I have before me an article entitled "United States Twice Proposed Indochina Air Strike," written by Chalmers M. Roberts, and published in the Washington Post and Times Herald of June 7, 1954. I understand that Mr. Roberts is a quite reliable writer, and I believe the Senator from Michigan must have seen the article. Let me read the leading paragraph:

The United States twice during April proposed using American Navy carrier planes and Air Force planes based in the Philip

pines to intervene in the Indochina war provided Congress and our allies agreed. But the British would not agree and the plans fell through.

set a

The Eisenhower administration tentative date for an air strike to aid the then besieged fortress of Dien Bien Phu. The date was April 28, 2 days after the opening of the Geneva Conference.

President Eisenhower was prepared to go to Congress Monday, April 26, to ask for passage of a joint resolution to permit American intervention.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Adm. Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, first broached the idea at a secret meeting April 3 of the bipartisan leaders of Congress.

In neither instance was the use of American ground troops contemplated.

Now, if I may turn to April 3- Mr. FERGUSON. Just a moment. Mr. MANSFIELD. I am attempting to answer the Senator's question.

Mr. FERGUSON. I do not know where the statement came from about which Mr. Roberts has written.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I now have the information, if I may give it. I must say that I get my information only from the newspapers, because I do not have access to the confidential information of the Department.

Mr. FERGUSON. But is not the Senator a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations?

Oh, yes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. FERGUSON. Did not the Senator attend the conferences of the Committee on Foreign Relations on the very issue of Indochina, about which he is now speaking?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I may say to the Senator from Michigan that I get more information from the press than I get from my attendance at the executive sessions of the Committee on Foreign Relations. I read further from the article by Mr. Roberts:

Saturday, April 3: Dulles and Radford met in secret session at the State Department with eight congressional leaders representing both parties and with the then Under Secretary of Defense Roger Kyes and the then Navy Secretary Robert B. Anderson. Congressional leaders present were Senators KNOWLAND, MILLIKIN, LYNDON JOHNSON, RUSSELL, and CLEMENTS, and Representatives MARTIN, MCCORMACK, and PRIEST.

Dulles said the President had asked him to call the meeting. He said he felt that it was indispensable at this juncture that the leaders of Congress feel as the administration did on the Indochina crisis.

Radford said the administration was concerned with the rapidly deteriorating situation.

Dulles said that the President wanted him to take up with the congressional leaders action by Congress, but action short of a declaration of war or the use of ground troops. Dulles said that if Congress would permit the President to use air and naval power, then a way could be found to prevent broadening of the conflict.

I repeat the last sentence:

Dulles said that if Congress would permit the President to use air and naval power, then a way could be found to prevent broadening of the conflict. He said it was felt that the necessary air and naval power was already in the area and that Congress should shoulder its responsibility in the crisis.

Radford suggested that if Congress passed a joint resolution giving the President general power to act, it would be possible to

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