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today what do we find? We find a surrender line down right across the middle of Vietnam; and now the pious hope is expressed that Cambodia and Laos may be saved. Mr. President, who believes that they will be saved ultimately? As the Senator from Montana has pointed out, a little time may be gained, but certainly no more than that.

I think the strong statements which have been made have driven our friends away from us, and I believe such statements constitute one of the principal mistakes which have been made in regard to this whole situation.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield further to me?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. COOPER. The administration did express from the outset its concern over the situation in Indochina. My friend, the Senator from Alabama, will certainly agree that the administration ought to have expressed concern, as it did during all those months. The Congress cannot claim lack of knowledge. I cannot remember that representatives of the administration ever said the United States would intervene militarily in Indochina. The possibility of inter

vention would certainly be considered and properly so in any discussion of Indochina. But I do not believe it can be stated that the administration ever said it would use military force.

My friends on the other side of the

tions of southeast Asia help each other, in a way similar to the course of action taken by the nations of the Western Hemisphere under the Monroe Doctrine, in 1823.

Mr. COOPER. I said in the beginning that I thought the principles the Senator from Montana laid down were excellent. I shall not argue further, except to say that I have had great difficulty in finding one course of action the administration took to which any of my friends on the other side of the aisle disagree. I am referring to action, not attitudes and words.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. May I finish?

The Senator from Montana mentioned NATO and EDC. In the past year Germany has acted, and the British also have taken a position with regard to the nature of their association. Some progress has been made.

I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator from Kentucky is an incurable optimist. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from Kentucky seeks to oversimplify the problem. No one is objecting to one position alone. It is the approach as a whole to the problem which is the subject of criticism. The problem is very complex. It is not the action about which we are complaining. It is the inaction, the in

aisle cannot have it both ways. They ability to persuade any of our allies to

have said that the administration conveyed the impression that the United States was willing to intervene and did not do so. Yet all my friends on the other side of the aisle have said again and again that they opposed intervention. Let me ask them now whether they favor intervention?

Mr. MANSFIELD. No. I was never in favor of intervention; and I am opposed to it now. I think it would be suicidal. I believe the worst thing that could happen to the United States would be to have our forces intervene in Indochina and then bog down in the jungles there, for in that case I think there would not only be war in Indochina, but also another war in Korea, and a third world war would commence in Asia, and

no doubt it would involve the countries of Europe. As a result there would be regimentation and a garrison-state condition not only in Asia and Europe but also here in the United States.

Mr. COOPER. I agree that the attitude of most Members of Congress and of the American people was against military action by the United States. To what action taken by the administration was the Senator from Montana and his colleague opposed? Do they consider the effort to secure agreement among our allies and other countries in southeast Asia a failure of policy?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Not necessarily; but I did not see much use in it. Why get the western or occidental bloc of nations to agree about the handling of the situation in southeast Asia? Instead, the better course would be to get the nations of southeast Asia to form a bloc, if need be, and to agree upon a course of action, and in that way to have the na

go along with us to achieve results, both in Asia and in Europe.

With respect to Asia, I think it is quite

obvious that India and Indonesia are

quite important in that area; but for some reason or other we have alienated them or, to put it in another way, we have failed to achieve the friendly cooperation of India in any effort to bring about peace and settle the question in Indochina. I think that is the complaint.

I agree with the Senator that I complained about intervention under the conditions which existed. If the conditions had been different, as the Senator from Massachusetts indicated, particularly with regard to colonialism, then intervention might have been quite differ

ent. I was reluctant to recommend intervention so long as Indochina was still a colony and there was no real commitment that it would some day cease to be a colony. The Senator from Massachusetts mentioned certain other conditions.

Is not the real complaint that there was a lack of any policy, a lack of any action, or certainly a lack of success in achieving results, both in Asia and in Europe? With regard to EDC, contrary to what the Senator from Kentucky says, it is my impression that the administration has now almost given up hope of bringing about results. No one has said so, but the attitude of the press and of the administration is that there is no hope that France will ratify the EDC arrangement, or that Italy will follow. Is not that the Senator's impression?

Mr. MANSFIELD. There is very little hope, and the hope seems to be decreasing as time goes on. Personally, I Personally, I should like to see an end to the EDC

concert. So long as the originators do not wish to come in, why bother with it? The idea behind EDC was to bring Germany into the NATO organization. Why not forget EDC, and try to bring both Germany and Spain into NATO, and have the organization which we want?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from Alabama spoke of the admission of Red China into the United United Nations. It seems that a spirit of defeatism has overtaken the administration, and that it feels that it cannot achieve results in either Asia or Europe. That is a very bad thing. I do not wish to add to the difficulties.

I should like to find some way to strengthen the optimism of the administration and its determination to move forward, as I thought we were trying to do in connection with the trade policy. I thought we were giving the administration the opportunity to move in the direction in which the President himself said he wanted to move a short time before. Likewise in this area, if we can help the administration to obtain the cooperation of India, Indonesia, and Burma, along with Thailand, we can move forward. Thailand is really a rather small reed upon which to lean. We must have the cooperation of the other countries. If we have that, we can move forward with some kind of arrangement which will limit further Communist expansion. I think it would be possible if only the administration could believe it to be possible. Some of the administration leaders are continu

ally condemning Nehru as not speaking

for India. It is said that he is a neutralist. If we could assume a different at

titude, and could believe that we could work with India, I think we might get results.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. First let me say to the distinguished Senator that I was present at the opening of his remarks. Through the courtesy of his office I was supplied with a copy of his speech, which I have read during the time when, of necessity, I was absent from the Chamber.

I have several questions to ask the Senator, based upon the text of his remarks. Perhaps some of them have been clarified in the ensuing colloquy, most of which I missed. I think the answers to these questions might be helpful in achieving our common purpose, that of seeking a bipartisan foreign policy which will give strength to our Nation in meeting the very real challenges which exist in the world today.

Let me say to the distinguished Senator from Montana, with whom I serve on the Foreign Relations Committee, that I have the highest regard for his diligence in the committee, and for his sincerity. While we have from time to time disagreed on some aspects of our foreign policy, both on the floor of the Senate and on the radio or television, I have found that the Senator has a desire-as I think all 96 Members of this body have-to arrive at solutions, insofar as we are constitutionally called upon

to do so, in the best interests of our the executive branch of the Government Nation.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Before the distinguished majority leader begins, let me say that I reciprocate his kind words, and assure him that I have nothing but the highest respect and admiration for him, even though I disagree with him on occasion.

Mr. KNOWLAND. As I understand, the Senator was critical of the agreement to go to Geneva.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct.

Mr. KNOWLAND. As I understand, as a result of the cease-fire negotiations which were entered into under the last administration and continued under this one—and I raise this question not on the basis of partisanship, but as a matter of historical accuracy-in the armistice negotiations there was the requirement that there be a peace conference with respect to Korea.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I take it that the Senator would have no particular objection to the Secretary of State or the Government of the United States having complied with the terms of the armistice by attending a peace conference so far as Korea was concerned.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Not at all.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Holding the conference in Geneva may have been no better or no worse than holding it in New Delhi, Honolulu, Paris, or any other city which might have been selected.

Mr. MANSFIELD. It was more economical.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I take it that the Senator's objection to the Geneva Conference, and to the attendance by the Secretary of State and other United States Government representatives, does not pertain in the least to the aspects of the Geneva Conference dealing with the Korean war.

Mr. MANSFIELD. No. The Korean truce was given top priority when, as a matter of fact, everyone knew that the real matter to be discussed there would be Indochina.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I think the Senator is aware of the fact that the Secretary of State had shown no enthusiasm for the Geneva Conference, insofar as the Indochina aspects of the situation were concerned.

Mr. MANSFIELD. As I recall, neither did the majority leader show any enthusiasm for the Geneva Conference.


Mr. KNOWLAND. The Senator is correct on that point. Nevertheless, we were associated with certain allies. think it is historically correct to say that the chief urging for the Geneva Conference came from France, which was heavily involved in the situation in southeast Asia.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct. Mr. KNOWLAND. Does the Senator in any way now feel that the system of collective security under which both the prior administration and this administration have proceeded to date should be abandoned, either in Europe or in the Middle East, or in Asia?

Mr. MANSFIELD. No; I do not. Mr. KNOWLAND. So I assume that at least the Senator has not parted company with the present foreign policy of

the executive branch of the Government in supporting and trying to gain support for an effective system of collective security.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct. However, I should like to ask the distinguished majority leader what the difference is between this administration's foreign policy and the previous administration's foreign policy. We have been hearing speeches lately about a new policy of strength, instead of a policy of weakness. I should like to know what the differences are.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I will say to the Senator that I have not, as majority leader, endeavored to raise any narrow partisan issue. I realize that there were grave problems facing the last administration.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I understand.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I realize that there are grave policies facing this administration. There is one basic difference in the cycle of time, and that is that a number of new crises-if we may call them such-have arisen within the period of the last few weeks. Certainly the Secretary of State, when he went to Geneva, made an earnest effort to find out whether those nations who were associated with us were prepared to stand together in an effective system of collective security.

That is correct.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. KNOWLAND. I should like to find out whether the Senator differs on this point. It would appear that, having diligently sought to get their support, he came back with negative information. It seems to me that that in and of itself is extremely important information for the American people, for the Government of the United States, and for Congress to have. During the past 9 years, since the close of World War II, we have, through a great expenditure of our resources and through a considerable expenditure of our manpower in Korea, sought to build up a collective system of security, feeling that when the chips were down those with whom we were associated would be prepared to stand up and be counted. If we were operating under a false impression in that respect, does not the Senator feel that, entirely regardless of partisanship, it was extremely important for the American people to realize that some of the collective security ideas, which were embodied in our past policies, were not going to work? Was not that information of vital importance to the country?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes; but, if we should follow the Senator's logic, the next step would be to say, "Well, don't you think it is about time that we reappraised our foreign policy?" I would say, "Yes." My idea is that foreign policy should be appraised and reappraised all the time. There should be no "agonizing reappraisal," because, after all, we must make changes and additions from time to time.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I am not unmindful of the Senator's comment in his speech that foreign policy should always be reappraised. It is almost a daily, weekly, and yearly process. On that point I believe the Senator is quite correct, and that his point is well taken.

However, I submit to the distinguished Senator that when we have built a series of alliances, and we have done it with great sacrifices, and the time comes when we must find out whether our alliances will work and prevail, it is extremely important for the United States to find out whether those nations with which we are allied are prepared to stand up when the chips are down. Does not the Senator feel that it is of vital importance for us to know that?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I will say that I would agree with the majority leader; but let me ask him whether he has in mind the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I have in mind the European Defense Command under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The majority leader knows that that does not apply to southeast Asia, if he is trying to tie it to the proposal of Secretary Dulles to enter into a southeast Asia pact.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I know that, but I believe that the American people, at least for the past several years, have recognized the fact that we are facing a global menace in the form of international communism. I do not believe that anyone is under any illusion that if the Soviet Union should determine on aggression the aggression would be limited, for instance, to Europe alone. It would of necessity spread into the global field.


That is correct. In other words, we are facing a global menace in the event of war; therefore, we cannot close the door to that type of aggression merely by closing the door in Europe. Does not the Senator agree, as a practical matter, that that is a fact?

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is a logical premise. However, I should like to call the majority leader's attention to the fact that in considering mutual aid prior to this time the question arose on numerous occasions whether assistance of various kinds applicable to Europe would also be applicable to the colonies of the European nations who are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The answer has always been "No." There is sharp division so far as NATO is concerned. It is an alliance which extends from Turkey, north to Norway and Iceland, and includes the United States and Canada. It is confined to those countries, and not to any colonial possession held by them.

Mr. KNOWLAND. The majority leader and the distinguished Senator from Montana do not differ on either the legal or the moral basis of the North Atlantic treaty alliance as covering that particular area. However, I say there was the general impression in the Senate-and I think there was the general impression throughout the countrythat if it is, indeed, a fact, as many of us believe it to be, that international communism is a global menace, and aggression, if it took place in Europe, would be bound to spread to Asia, and therefore it would do no good then to close the front door in Europe if the back door was left open in Asia, and perhaps even have the Pacific coast left open. It

seems to me that we all have a right to expect those with whom we are allied in the North Atlantic treaty alliance in Europe not to be unconcerned with the same menace of communism if it should crop in southeast Asia or in the Middle East. Is not that a fair presumption?

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator's logic is very hard to contend against. However, I think there are certain factors which ought to be given consideration. Let us suppose that Mr. Dulles had been successful in getting the countries in this all-white pact to defend southeast Asia

Mr. KNOWLAND. If the Senator will permit me to interrupt, certainly we want to be fair in this situation, and I am sure the Senator wants to be fair, because that has been my observation of him. I should like to say that the Secretary of State has diligently endeavored to find out whether we could get the Philippines, Thailand, Burma, and other nations in Asia that were prepared to do so, to join in collective security.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct. Mr. KNOWLAND. And to join in that pact.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct. Mr. KNOWLAND. The Senator has mentioned certain other nations in Asia, such as India and Indonesia and Pakistan, I believe. Does the Senator not recognize the fact that under its present policies the Government of IndiaI am not complaining because those Asian countries are all sovereign governments and they have a right to make up their own minds-at least up to the present moment, has shown, to put it mildly, a reluctance to enter into any type of collective-security system which would involve the use of Indian armed forces in the support of a collectivesecurity system.

The Senator from Montana is not unmindful of the fact that even as to Korea, when the United Nations went on record as declaring Communist China and North Korea aggressors, and called upon all the member states to join together in a system of collective defense, of the 60 member states of the United Nations only 16 contributed forces and those 16 countries contributed less than 45,000 men, as compared with our own contribution of more than 450,000 men at one time. The Senator is not unmindful of the fact, I take it, that in that action, which was the first overt Communist aggression since the close of World War II, India did not contribute a single soldier, sailor, or airman to the resistance of aggression, despite the action taken by the United Nations, in which organization India holds membership.

Mr. MANSFIELD. correct.

Mr. MANSFIELD. But suppose New Zealand had 10,000, Australia had 50,000, Zealand had 10,000, Australia had 50,000, and France and Great Britain were involved in an armed conflict, who does the Senator think would be furnishing most of the manpower?

When the military commanders of five western nations met in Washington some time ago, what were they considering? They were considering a pact for southeastern Asia. That is not the way to win. If we wish to win, we have got to win. If we wish to win, we have got to give the nations in that area the opportunity to defend themselves. We should be in the background to help them when we can, but, certainly, we should not take the primary steps.

I noticed that after the military commanders had met for a few days, the Philippine Chief of Staff came to the Capital and met with them on the last day. I think it would have been better if he had not come at all, because if we are going to do anything in that quarter are going to do anything in that quarter of the world, we should give the people of the world, we should give the people who live there the primary responsibility.

Laotians, and the Cambodians want than has the Government of the United States?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I do not. I agree with the majority leader on that point. Mr. KNOWLAND. I mentioned the Republic of Korea, which has some 600,000 troops, well seasoned, battle-trained, equipped, and trained by our forces under General Van Fleet and General Taylor. The Army of South Korea is recognized as a very potent force; as a matter of fact, the fourth largest standing army in the world today. I have also mentioned the Republic of China, on Formosa, with some 500,000 troops, not so well equipped, not so battleseasoned, but, nevertheless, perhaps the sixth largest standing army in the world. Those two relatively small nations have a million one hundred thousand troops in their ground forces, but they were not included in the discussions regarding an Asian pact. Why? Because, in effect, the British felt they could not participate if the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China on Formosa partici

I am sure the Senator would agree pated. Why did the British feel that with that thesis.

Mr. KNOWLAND. The majority leader does not differ with the Senator as to the fact of the importance of the people of Asia participating in a collective security system for their own defense, but the point which I think goes to the basis of the argument-and I should like the Senator to clarify it if he will— is that, as it seems to me, there are two alternatives. One is that nothing should either be done or attempted until India and Indonesia, as an example, said they were prepared to furnish troops to the collective system of defense. Does the Senator believe that nothing should be attempted or that nothing should be done until India and Indonesia have signed on the line that they will furnish X number of divisions to help prevent the rest of southeast Asia from going down the drain?

Mr. MANSFIELD. No; I would not go that far, because I realize, as does the majority leader, that it will be a question of time before India and Indonesia come into such a pact. In my opinion, the primary emphasis should be placed on their being given an opportunity to determine their own fate. As I recall the results of the Colombo conference, it seems to me there was a good deal of opposition from the Ceylonese and the Burmese who were beginning to feel that there was an onrush of Communist aggression, and because of that, Nehru was beginning to do a little second thinking. Of course, since that time, since the Chinese Communist leader went to India and was wined and dined. The Senator is I do not know what the situation is. It

Going back now, to the pact idea, I assume the Secretary of State tried to contact some of the Asiatic nations in the southeastern part of the continent, but the thing that always worries me is the argument which the distinguished majority leader has made on many occasions, namely, the fact that we furnished 90 percent of the troops in Korea.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Ninety percent of the United Nations troops.

seems to me we should not bind them to a
pact. If they need military assistance,
we should provide it only after they have
used up their resources and manpower.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I think the dis-
tinguished Senator from Montana and I
see eye to eye on the question of
colonialism, and have so expressed our-
selves on the floor, but does he know of
a single nation that has more steadfastly
worked toward giving the freedom and
independence which the Vietnamese, the

way? I do not have the innermost secrets of the British Cabinet, but I rather suspect it was because the Indians were exercising a type of veto over such participation. If we are going to make the southeast Asian countries have an exclusive society and eliminate 1,100,000 Asians who want to fight for their independence—and they outnumber all the rest of the armed forces of Asia put together by probably at least 5 times or possibly 10 times-how can we possibly build a system of collective defense in southeast Asia, particularly when neither India nor Burma is willing to go ahead with such a system?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I will admit that such a possibility would be difficult of achievement. But it has not been attempted and we will never know, unless we try, whether or not there is much of a possibility to have a pact of that kind. I should like to see this country, through the Secretary of State or one of his emissaries, come forward with a suggestion of that kind and hold some sort of conference in the far Pacific, with India, India, Indochina, Ceylon, Pakistan, Burma, and the three Indochinese states, as well as the Philippines, invited, and, if we want to, have the people on Formosa invited. If we had such a conference as that, carried on by the Asian nations themselves, there might be a possibility. If there were no possibility, then it would be time to reappraise our position and, once again, see what could be done.

Mr. KNOWLAND. The only point on which the Senator and I differ is with reference to one factor. What are the 600,000 ROK troops doing? They are mobilizing, at least, while a million and a half Chinese Communist troops are mobilizing. What are the Chinese Nationalist troops doing? They are mobilizing, while up and down the coast of China, opposite the island of Formosa, another million and a half Chinese Communist troops are gathered. If South Korea and the Nationalist Chinese Government on Formosa are not included as a part of a collective system of defense,

then we stand a good chance of the million and a half troops from North China and Manchuria, the million and a half troops from the coastline of China, and some 3 million additional troops over those now in the Yunan Province along the Indochina frontier moving against southeast Asia. So it seems to me, if we are going to have an effective collective system of defense in Asia, that the logic of the situation demands that the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China on Formosa be included, and we must at least encourage the Japanese to build their forces sufficiently large so that they can defend their own home islands, thus relieving us of the necessity of stationing American troops in Japan for ground defense purposes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I would agree with the Senator, but the question comes to my mind: How would the Japanese and the Koreans get along? How would the Japanese and the Chinese who are in Formosa get along? The same problem exists there as exists in connection with other Asiatic countries.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I am not suggestI am not suggest ing that Japanese troops be used in Korea. I think that, politically, at the present time they cannot be used. All I am suggesting is that it should not be necessary to tie down American divisions in Japan, to defend the homeland of Japan, when that nation of 80 million people should be able to supply sufficient ground forces to defend their own

homeland. Our divisions should be made a part of our general mobile reserves, which should be sufficiently strong so that the Chinese Communists or the Soviet Union would not dare to attack.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is a good argument, but how are the Japanese going to become strong if they are not able to live? How are they going to live, if they are not able to eat? Who is going to fill the void which has been created by a lack of markets, an increase in population, and a tremendous birthrate? think that is a serious problem.


We talk about withdrawing American divisions from Japan. I think I think they should be withdrawn. They should be withdrawn from Korea, too, at the earliest opportunity. Korea has a 600,000-man army, which should be sufficient to defend the southern half of the Korean Peninsula.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Does the Senator from Montana believe that the Japanese economy will be better able to exist if all of southeast Asia passes into the hands of the Communists? The raw materials and the rice of southeast Asia will be used as weapons by the Communists to try to bring Japan to her knees.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I do not at all believe that Japan would be better off. The majority leader knows how I feel on that subject. But the point is, with a population of 80 million, with a tremendous birthrate, and with very little arable land, how are the Japanese going to be effective on the side of the Allies, if they cannot find markets?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I shall not pursue I shall not pursue the subject further, but I wish to make it plain to Members on both sides of the aisle that we have very definite problems. Some problems have been pointed

out by the distinguished Senator from Montana today. Other problems have been pointed out by the President of the United States and by the Secretary of State.

This is not a partisan issue. I hope it will not become a partisan issue. It is a matter in which the life of our Nation and the life of the free world itself is at stake. I hope that we can avail ourselves of the ability and the knowledge which exist in the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, in the executive branch of the Government, and among those who are presently in office and those who have been in office. I hope we can all put our heads together, and recognize that we are confronted with one of the greatest dangers that has ever faced our Nation, or perhaps the entire world; and that unless the free peoples of the world are able to present a united front, unless they are all able to stand up and be counted, they may be engulfed, one by one, until finally the United States will be left, not by our own choice, but by the irresistible course of history, as an isolated island in a totalitarian world.

While under those circumstances it might be possible to make of this Nation a continental Dien Bien Phu, if all of Asia were in Communist hands, if all of Europe were in Communist hands, and if all of the Middle East were in Communist hands, it would certainly greatly endanger our survival, and certainly would lead to a much different political and economic system than that which we now have.

The situation is fraught with such consequences that I hope we can constantly rise above any narrow partisanship in an endeavor to find a solution which is best for the Nation.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the pending bill, but before doing so, I wish to say that I have been sitting in the Chamber for the last hour, listening to the very able debate between the Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND] and the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD]. I have enjoyed it very much. I think it has been very helpful.

However, I am one individual who does not believe in a bipartisan foreign policy. I am one who hopes that the Senators on the other side of the aisle will continue to be critical of our foreign policy, just as I have encouraged the Senators on this side of the aisle to be critical of the foreign policy when Senators on the other side were formulating it. I cannot see any reason why we should not have just as much right to question the foreign policy of our Nation as we have to question its domestic policy. I cannot quite understand how we shall ever have a good foreign policy unless we formulate it openly, and permit persons to express their viewpoints and to criticize.

I do not mean by that to say that once a decision has been reached by Congress or by the Government, once a law has been enacted, once the United States has joined an organization, once a treaty has been ratified, once an agreement has been entered into with another nation or with a group of nations, we should not have a bipartisan policy. Then the policy ought to become a bipartisan matter because it will then be the law of the land and the policy of the United States, and all of us should get behind it-Democrats, Republicans, and all 160 million Americans. The policy then should be enthusiastically supported as long as is law or the treaty.

But I think that great harm has been done the world and the United States

Mr. MANSFIELD. I wish to express my appreciation for the speech which has just been made by the distinguished during the past 25 or 30 years because majority leader. I admire him for his honesty and his integrity. I hope he is aware of the fact that when I say that, I mean it in all sincerity.

The Democratic Party, so far as I have been able to ascertain, has been more than willing to go along with the ideals which have just been expressed by the majority leader; but the Democrats, as a party, do not like to be kicked around or knifed in the back, as happens occasionally, for purely partisan purposes. We believe that politics should stop at the water's edge. We do not claim that Democratic administrations always have been perfect, any more than we will admit that the present administration is perfect. Both parties are subject to making mistakes.

But I feel, as does the majority leader, that the times are critical; that the times call for an honest, real bipartisan foreign policy, and that backbiting, knifing, and stabbing, should be done away with.

I think I can assure the distinguished majority leader that I express the sentiments of the Democratic Party when I say that we will try, as we always have done in the past, to go along on the basis of a good, sound foreign policy, and that we will always place our country ahead of our party.

there has been prevalent an idea that all of us had to agree to have a bipar

tisan foreign policy. What is a "bipartisan foreign policy"? What is meant by that term? Is it a policy of the Secretary of State, a policy of the President, a policy of Congress; or is it a policy which has been agreed to after open, frank, and honest debate and criticism in the Congress of the United States?

I think we shall become involved in a

great deal of trouble if we proceed on the theory that, so far as our foreign policy is concerned, it ought to be a dictatorial type-a policy which can be established by 1 or 2 men. I think that has been the mistake which has been made in the past. I think that if in the past there had been more frank and open expression, if Senators and Representatives, and the people as well, had been encouraged to stand up and to express themselves in respect to foreign policy, and to criticize it if they felt it should be criticized, the country would have been much better off. Instead, there has been what I believe to be a narrow conception of bipartisan foreign policy.

. The end result has been-and I think I can say this without fear of successful contradiction-that almost every one of the schemes or organizations or arrange

ments which the United States has entered into during the past 25 years has failed to accomplish the purpose for which it was intended. I am not saying that such organizations were not good. I voted for many of them. I am not saying they might not eventually accomplish the purpose for which they were intended. But, so far, up to this time, they have not accomplished the purposes for which they were designed.

It is now being said that perhaps, under certain conditions, the United States will have to withdraw from the United Nations. Evidently the United Nations has not accomplished the purpose for which it was intended.

We find our ally, Great Britain, pretty much going along in her own direction at the moment. We speak about making arrangements. It is very hard to make arrangements in advance, because my observation has been that nations are like individuals. They agree at the moment to do that which is to their best interest at the specific time. It has not been too long ago since the British were very much interested in anything the United States did toward helping them. Today their economy is quite strong, and they are back on their feet; and I am glad they are. As a result, they are showing quite a different attitude from that of 5 or 6 years ago.

My point is that other nations are going to "join up," as we say in Indiana, at a given time, depending on their own best interests at that particular time. It cannot be said in the Senate today, with any degree of accuracy, that we are making an arrangement today which will be good 10 years from now, because it may be that the best interests of a given nation today may not be its best interests 10 years from now.

The question of foreign policy is one which ought to be debated. Foreign policy changes from day to day, as it always will. I think we must have confidence in the President and the Secretary of State, and other persons who are or ought to be in a position of knowing more about conditions than Members of Congress do, and we will have to go along with them.

I hope we will not discourage anyone from being critical of our foreign policy. On the other hand, I think we should not encourage the sabotage of something to which the Congress has given its approval. For example, the United States is now a member of NATO. We ought to support that organization enthusiastically as long as our Government is a member of it. This country is also a member of the United Nations. We ought to go along with that as long as our country is a member of it, because the United Nations Charter is the law of the land.

I am 100 percent in accord with a bipartisan policy once we have decided an issue. Just as we fight on the floor of the Senate over proposed legislation, once it is approved and passed, we obey the law, and it is no longer a partisan matter. I think foreign policy ought to be treated on the same basis.

If we deny ourselves the right of debate, and carry the so-called bipartisan policy to extremes, we will end up not

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with a representative form of government, with 96 Senators representing 48 States participating in questions of foreign policy, but possibly the President or the Secreary of State, or some other individual or small group alone will determine foreign policy. I am sure that was never the intention of the founders of our Government, it is not stated in the Constitution of the United States, and I am certain it is not the intention of the people of the United States. ought to discuss foreign policy. We can disagree on the floor of the United States Senate as violently on foreign policy as we can on domestic policy, and we ought to speak our minds and say what we think, and we should think straight, if we possibly can; but once an issue is decided, what is agreed on should be recognized as the law of the land, and we ought not to be narrow-minded or bitter about the decision, nor should we backbite, but we ought to go along with the decision.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CAPEHART. I yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I should like to ask the distinguished Senator whether there was anything in either the remarks of the Senator from Montana or those of the Senator from California which indicated that there should not be free and full discussion of the question on the floor of the Senate?

Mr. CAPEHART. I never intended by the remarks I have made to intimate that there was any such suggestion. I said I sat here for an hour and enjoyed very much hearing the discussion, and learned a great deal, and I repeat that; but the Senator from California did discuss foreign policy, and he did talk about a bipartisan foreign policy, and both he and the Senator from Montana expressed different viewpoints, which I think is helpful. The majority leader has spoken out very sharply in the last few days on that subject. That is what one should do if he feels deeply about it. That is what we ought to do as parties, if we feel that way about it as parties. We will keep out of trouble if we encourage and permit open and frank discussion

those who will argue that if that is done, I know, of course, that there will be what is said will be misunderstood by other nations and other peoples. They seem to be misunderstanding us anyway. I think we get the best out of people when we permit frank and open discussion and debate. I hope that will be the course followed here.

Mr. President, I had not intended to make a speech. I do not know whether or not I have made any contribution, but I have stated my views about the subject of our foreign policy, which are the opinions I have held since I have been a Member of the Senate.


A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its clerks, announced that the House had agreed to the amendment of the Senate

to the bill (H. R. 7468) to amend certain provisions of part II of the Interstate Commerce Act so as to authorize regulation, for purposes of safety and protection of the public, of certain motorcarrier transportation between points in foreign countries, insofar as such transportation takes place within the United States.


The message also announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills and joint resolution, and they were signed by the Vice President:

S. 268. An act for the relief of Harold Trevor Colbourn;

S. 381. An act for the relief of Donald Grant;

S. 455. An act for the relief of Johan Gerhard Faber, Dagmar Anna Faber, Hilke Faber, and Frauke Faber;

S. 490. An act for the relief of Josephine Reigl;

S. 520. An act for the relief of Mr. and Mrs. Ivan S. Aylesworth;

S. 579. An act for the relief of Wong You Henn;

S. 676. An act for the relief of Eftychios Mourginakis;

S. 747. An act for the relief of Jacek Von Henneberg;

S. 1050. An act for the relief of Josephine Maria Riss Fang;

S. 1382. An act for the relief of Elie Joseph Hakim and family;

S. 1508. An act for the relief of Borivoje Vulich;

S. 1517. An act for the relief of Helen

Knight Waters and Arnold Elzey Waters, Jr.;

S. 1689. An act for the relief of Mrs. Cacila

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S. 1796. An act to incorporate the Board of Fundamental Education;

S. 1991. An act for the relief of Esperanza Jimenez Trejo;

S. 1999. An act to provide for the recovery, care, and disposition of the remains of members of the uniformed services and certain other personnel, and for other purposes;

S. 2198. An act for the relief of (Sister) Jane Stanislaus Riederer;

S. 2369. An act for the relief of Karl Ullstein;

S. 2370. An act to authorize the sale of certain vessels to Brazil for use in the coastwise trade of Brazil;

S. 2465. An act for the relief of Lydia Wickenfeld Butz;

S. 2468. An act to authorize the President to appoint to the grade of general in the Army of the United States those officers who in grade of lieutenant general, during World War II commanded the Army Ground Forces, commanded an Army, commanded Army forces which included a field army and supporting units, or commanded United States forces in China and served as chief of staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in the China Theater of Operations, and for other purposes;

S. 2488. An act to provide that each grant of exchange assignment on tribal lands on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation and the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation shall have the same force and effect as a trust patent, and for other purposes;

S. 2728. An act to authorize the collection of indebtedness of military and civilian personnel resulting from erroneous payments, and for other purposes;

S. 3196. An act for the relief of Dr. Helen Maria Roberts (Helen Maria Rebalska);

S. 3291. An act authorizing the President to present a gold medal to Irving Berlin;

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