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center for resistance, in the event of aggression or threat of aggression in Asia.

Sixth. The economic development of the nations of Asia is preponderantly the responsibility of the peoples of that region, to be pursued in accord with their individual national genius and objectives; any assistance rendered by this country, whether directly or through the United Nations or other agencies, should be peripheral in scope and should be rendered only when genuinely desired.

The erection of guideposts such as these is only one requirement for a policy that can succeed in Asia. This step will be futile unless the conduct of our foreign policy is restored to the dignity and orderliness which the people of this country have a right to expect.

What transpired in the weeks of the gathering crisis before and during the Geneva crisis came close to being a shameful spectacle. The conduct of policy in that period spread fear and uncertainty throughout this country and seriously damaged the prestige of the United States abroad.

The time has come to put a stop to the multiple voices which apparently speak for the administration on foreign policy. One part of the administration cannot indicate publicly that we are about to intervene in a war and then another part suggest the opposite course on the following day.

The people of the United States elected a President to conduct their foreign policy, with the advice and consent of the Senate. The President can delegate his authority if he so chooses. But for the sake of the orderly processes of government, it ought to be clear to whom he has delegated it when he does so.

Presumably the President has a Secretary of State to assist him in matters of foreign policy. If that is the case, then the only official voices we should hear in these matters ought to be the voice of the President and the voice of the Secretary of State. If that is not the case, then it would be most helpful if the President would enlighten the Nation as to their names and at what particular moment others are speaking in the name of this country on foreign policy.

Before concluding my remarks today, I desire to say only one thing more. The Geneva Conference, I believe, may mark a major turning point in the tide of world affairs. We may well be entering a period of great change and flux. The change is already suggested by the "agonizing reappraisal" which has begun and which, before it is over, may lead to agonizing readjustments. In these circumstances, it seems to me that the temptation to assume an "all or nothing" posture with respect to foreign policy is ever present. The tendency will be to blame friendly nations for all that has gone wrong. We We will be tempted to insist that they play the game our way or we will pick up our marbles and go home.

If this attitude prevails, if it is the decisive one, I believe we will end up, not with "all," but with "nothing." The tremendous economic sacrifices which the people of this Nation have made in

the last decade will have been made in vain. The lives that were given in World War II and in Korea to construct a more orderly and decent world will have been given in vain.

If we choose the course of all or nothing, we may perhaps secure a few years respite from the international responsibilities which we have been carrying. Then the world will once again close in on us. We will end up with nothing but our own bitterness. It has happened before.

We need not choose this course. There is another open to us. If the present reappraisal is conducted with recognition not only of immediate interests, immediate passions, but also with a sense of responsibility to the generations of Americans that will come after us, then I believe we shall take this other course. I believe we shall find much worth preserving in what has been done in the last decade, much that can be built upon. We will not obtain "all" but neither will we settle for "nothing."

The choice is ours to make. Ultimately, it is a choice between shouldering day in and day out a part of the responsibility-however burdensome and irritating-of maintaining freedom in a world from which tyranny has not yet been banished; or of abandoning this responsibility today only to have to pick up tomorrow the crushing burden of a third world war.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am glad to yield. Mr. FULBRIGHT. First, I should like to compliment the Senator on his magnificient speech and to associate my self with much that he has said. Of course, he is one of the best qualified

men in the Senate and in Government on the subject of Asia. I should like to ask him this question: Does he feel that the situation in Asia with regard to our policy is unique, and is the situation with regard to our relations in Europe any better than it is in Asia, or are the situations all a part of the general deterioration of international relations?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I would say to the Senator that my impression, for what it may be worth, is that, so far as both Asia and Europe are concerned, our policies and our prestige are both diminishing.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator believe that we can play our part, namely, the part it was intended that we play in the NATO organization, for example, and be friendly and cooperative with European nations, but in Asia follow a different and contrary policy?

Mr. MANSFIELD. The question the Senator asks is a difficult one to answer, because if we believe in NATO-and I am sure a great majority of the American people and most of the Senators do believe in it-then we believe in certain agreements which will last for a 20year period. We cannot forego those agreements in order simply to take care of something which is happening in another part of the world. It appears to me that the NATO agreement, which is tied to the security of this country, and under which each nation agrees that in case of an attack upon any one of them

all the other nations will come to that nation's assistance, is the primary instrument in the promulgation of our foreign policy and in providing for our security.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The point I am trying to make is this: I recognize the influence of written agreements and I believe this country has a very good record of carrying out its pledged agreements-but if violent and strong disagreements or differences of view arise under any particular treaty or agreement-in this case NATO-does it not weaken the alliance itself if there arise such differences, such as the difference that seems to be growing between Great Britain and the United States? Does not the Senator believe that although such differences may have their source in Asia they will nevertheless influence the effectiveness of the alliance in Europe?

Mr. MANSFIELD. There can be no question about that. I am afraid that sometimes we take too seriously differences of opinion among friends-not that we should not take them seriously— because they are in themselves signs of strength and courage, but I do not believe that we should go to the extreme of giving up all that we have built up over the years merely because at a particular time we may disagree with other nations on a certain question.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I appreciate the statement of the Senator from Montana. There is one other question that I should like to ask him. like to ask him. The Senator did not

quite say what he thought about the current matter of great interest with respect to withdrawing from the United Nations, which is a position taken by many persons during the last 2 or 3 days. I wonder what the Senator thinks about it. I believe it was implicit in his remarks, if I understood them, but he did not directly say what he thinks about the proposal to withdraw from the United Nations.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the Senator from Arkansas was a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations when I, as a Member of the House, and Representative VORYS were nominated by President Truman as members of the American delegation to the United Na


The Senator will also recall that at that time the ranking Republican member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH] Wrote letters to both Representative VORYS, to me, and to other members of the delegation, asking us what our stand was on recognition of Red China by this country, and what our stand was on the admission of Communist China into the United Nations.

We wrote him at that time that we were opposed to the recognition of Red China by this country, and that we were opposed to the admission of Red China to the United Nations. I have learned of nothing which would cause me to change my position from that day to the present. I am glad again to go on record this afternoon by saying that, so far as I am personally concerned, I am opposed to Red China being recognized by this

country, and I am opposed to Red China clearly and unequivocally, it seems to me entering the United Nations.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator from Montana then wish to leave the impression that if Red China is admitted, he will recommend the withdrawal of this country from the United Nations?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I intend to leave the impression, and to state as forcibly as I can, that when that time comes I, like the President of the United States, shall be glad to look into the question very thoroughly and to make up my own mind.

I believe that so far as the matter of withdrawal from the United Nations is concerned, we must weigh all factors involved, recognizing the fact that we were one of the originators of the United Nations and that, as the distinguished Senator from Iowa [Mr. GILLETTE] has pointed out, if we were to withdraw it would mean pushing free nations into the Soviet orbit.

It is very interesting to note that the President on a number of occasions-I have the news stories here-when asked about the admission of Red China into the United Nations, always has stated that for the present he is against the admission of Red China into the United Nations. Yesterday, Yesterday, if my if my memory serves me correctly, he stated he would consider all the possibilities at the time the question arose. I hope, however, that if it ever does come to pass he will call Congress into session and lay the facts before it, and let us help him make his decision.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from Montana agrees with the President, if I correctly understand him, that the determination which has been expressed in some circles that under no circumstances at any time should Red China be admitted into the United Nations, is not in accord with a wise policy such as we should pursue at this time?

Mr. MANSFIELD. It would be pretty difficult for us to follow such a policy, because, as one Congress cannot bind the succeeding Congress, one generation cannot bind the next generation. When the time comes, those who are then in power are the ones who will have to make the decision.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am in agreement with the Senator's views. It seems to me to be a great mistake to take the absolute attitude that under no circumstances shall we do this or that. It makes it impossible really to do business in this field with our allies, or with our enemies, for that matter.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senate should be upholding the hands of the President. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that in this instance that is correct.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator from Montana made the point that the United States is speaking with many tongues. The vagueness with which the President answered the question on the admission of Red China to the U. N. encourages a difference of view among members of the administration. This vagueness has contributed to our difficulties in Indochina. If the President had spoken

we would have avoided much of the difficulty which we now face.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is exactly right. The situation shows no sign of being alleviated at the present time.

Mr. KENNEDY. With reference to the question of whether the United States should withdraw from the United Nations if Red China is admitted, it seems to me the President should state our position one way or the other, instead of leaving the matter in doubt for the next few months, allowing pressures to next few months, allowing pressures to build up here and abroad.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I would say that the President's answer was a calculated answer, because he tried to anticipate all the angles.

Mr. KENNEDY. In answer to the question of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] as to what price the United States should pay in Asia to maintain its alliances in that area, there is no doubt that we have paid a heavy price since 1945 in order to conciliate the British and the French; we have paid a heavy price in connection with our relationship with the peoples of the Middle East and Asia. It seems to me we should realize what a heavy price we have paid, and, in the future, we should emphasize the policy of independence for all peoples and equal opportunities for them to develop and maintain a policy of self-government. If we continue to pay this price we are If we continue to pay this price we are going to be faced with other Indochinas all over the world where colonialism is maintained.

The two places in the Western Hemisphere where communism developed were British Guiana and Guatemala. Guatemala has been the victim of economic colonialism for many years in the past. British Guiana is a colony of the British. It seems to me that the United

States should first clarify its own posi

tion on this matter of colonialism and then adopt a policy of encouraging all the peoples of the earth, regardless of what alliances we may have in other parts of the world, to move towards independence. Otherwise we shall be independence. paying too great a price.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator from Massachusetts is correct. He will agree with me, I believe, that we cannot continue the course we are following at the present time. We have not the manpower. It is time to stop, look, and listen, and reappraise our foreign policy. I had hoped this administration would come forward with a new and bolder foreign policy, as was promised us in the campaign. But it is the same old policy, so far as I know. Nothing new has been added; the ingredients are the same, and we are faced with a lack of leadership.

time, does the Senator think it wise to announce in advance that we are going to send aid or troops to a country, when it is not necessary to make such a statement? In other words, it puts the enemy on notice that we are not going to do anything to stop aggression in a given area. That statement, among other statements, was made.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is true. There has been too much "bluff" in this administration, contrary to the policy during the period of the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, when the slogan was, "Speak softly, but carry a big stick." I think some of the officials of the administration are speaking loudly, but carrying a feather duster, because they do not have anything with which to back up the statements they make. They talk about a New Look, when we have 50 ships in mothballs and a large reduction in the naval force. We cannot back up our statements unless we have something with which to back them up.

Mr. JACKSON. Is it not a sound policy to keep the enemy in a state of uncertainty? Why announce to the enemy that we are not going to send troops? It may be very much of a political hazard in this country. I do not see the point of the administration's announcing in January that we were going to have massive atomic retaliation, and then following it up by saying that we were not going to send troops into Indochina. Why is it necessary to make such statements? Why not keep the enemy in a state of uncertainty so that he does not know what we are going to do next?

Mr. MANSFIELD. There is no need of trying to make policy by imposing threats on others. It simply does not work to make threats against our enemies unless we are prepared to back them up.

Mr. JACKSON. So, from this time forward, when we face other situations in the world and announce the policy of a possible use of force, the enemy will probably assume that we are not going to do anything, and that will leave our diplomats in a distinctly weakened position. So Mr. MANSFIELD. That is true. far as confusion is concerned, I think the American people are more confused than are our enemies.

Mr. JACKSON. Will the Senator agree that if we have learned anything from the situation in Indochina it is that military assistance alone is no longer our contribution to the world?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I could not agree more heartily with the Senator.

Mr. JACKSON. Is it not true that the American people have an unfortunate habit of feeling that there is a cure-all which they can buy at a bargain counter to solve our international problems? Mr. MANSFIELD. The American

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will people are looking for an easy way out the Senator from Montana yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. Mr. JACKSON. Needless to say, I am happy to join with my colleagues in commending the Senator from Montana for his outstanding contribution today for his outstanding contribution today to the subject of our foreign policy. Speaking of the conflicting statements which have been made over a period of

of the Nation's difficulties, and the Republican administration is trying to give it to them, but there is no quick way to do it.

Mr. JACKSON. Will the Senator agree with me that a country which is so powerful and strong as is the United States should act with a little more humility, a little more patience, and a little

more understanding in trying to work schedule agreed to at the Lisbon Conout its international problems? ference?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Again, I say to the Senator that I could not agree more heartily with him. I think he has hit the nail on the head.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I do, indeed.

Mr. HUMPHREY. In other words, is it not true that once the United States it not true that once the United States Government notified its North Atlantic

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will Treaty allies that the period of urgency the Senator from Montana yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator has discussed the variance of opinion which exists between our allies and ourselves, and the Senator from Arkansas and the junior Senator from Montana were discussing the NATO alliance and its relationship to our hoped-for policy in the Far East. If the senior partner in the great free world alliance is undecided or is without a policy in a particular area of the world, does it not lead the junior partners, the other partners, or the copartners, to go off on their own with any number of policies?

Mr. MANSFIELD. There is no question about it.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Would not the Senator say that the fact that there was indecision or confusion in our own policy statements has led to the British, the French, and perhaps other nations, to assert and to formulate policies beyond anything we ourselves had thought of or were planning?

Mr. MANSFIELD. That would be partly the case; but I think also it may well be that as the strength of the British and the French revives, as they become more and more their own masters in their own houses, and less and less dependent upon us, as nationalism takes over, and they begin to look out on their own, that will be a sign of health, because I do not want my country to be allied with people who are "yes-men" to us. I want our country to be allied with nations who respect us, who have ideas of their own, who can make their own decisions, but who can work together on a cooperative basis.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Is the Senator familiar with a number of statements which have been made by leading spokesmen of the administration, not only recently, but over the past year and a half? Does the Senator recall the month of February 1953, when the Secretary of State and the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration were touring in Europe, and statements came back, or at least were reported in the American press, that if the French did not sign up under EDC by April or by May, there simply would not be any more aid?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I do. That is only one of a number of illustrations which could be cited to indicate that this administration has used the idea of threat in order to force the happening of things it wanted. Of course, that does not work, and it has not worked, but we are now paying the price for it.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Does the Senator recall that in the meeting of the NATO representatives in 1953, following the Lisbon Conference of 1952, it was on the initiative of the American representatives that the NATO goal of strength buildup of both the air force and ground troops was extended for 2 more years, rather than to be accomplished within the time

was over, the natural tendency was for our allies to relax and, more or less, to take it easy?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes; to reduce their armed forces, to reduce the draft period for their youth, and to do a number of other things, because they all felt that since the United States was reducing its military expenditures and reducing its Armed Forces, they might well follow suit. It was an easy out for them. I do not blame them; I blame the United States Government for doing what it did at home, by setting an example.

Mr. HUMPHREY. There was a picture, then, first of all, of a very sharp reduction in our foreign operations program and in our military program. The statements of key spokesmen of the administration to our allies were to the effect that they would suffer the consequences, but there was no followup. As the Senator recalls, we went ahead and appropriated substantial sums of money for Britain and France, despite the statements made, to the effect that "if you do not join the EDC, you are going to be disciplined, and we are going to do something about it."

We went from that period of equivocation, or from making statements with no followup, to a period when Dictator Stalin died, and we were wondering whether or not there had been a change in the world situation. Is not that true? Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct. Mr. HUMPHREY. That was the only accomplishment of the Berlin Conference, according to the statement which was made by this Government; namely, that the Allies had agreed that the intentions of the Soviet Union were the same.


Mr. MANSFIELD. But that was no accomplishment. It was not necessary for representatives of this Government to go to Berlin to learn that fact. far as the Berlin Conference was concerned, there was a 100-percent failure of American diplomacy, just as the diplomacy at Geneva is turning out to be. We gained nothing at Berlin.

We have not agreed to the recognition of Red China, or to the admission of Red China to the United Nations, but at least by agreeing to the meeting at Geneva, and by getting a paper signed, we have given Russia an advantage she did not previously have. There are other things which Russia got, not directly, but indirectly. But the breakup of the European Defense Community is happening fast at the present time.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator is saying that the major accomplishment of the Berlin Conference was that the United States merely rediscovered that the Kremlin was still bent upon world domination and world subversion. Any one ought to have known that without having to go to Berlin to learn it. One would not have had to go to Arlington, Va., to find that out.

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know the number of trade agreements the United States of America has signed in the past year or year and a half, as compared with the number which have been signed by the Soviet Union?

Mr. MANSFIELD. To the best of my knowledge, the United States Government, under this administration, has signed no new trade agreements. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has signed between 20 and 30 new trade agreements. I may be wrong, but I think, generally speaking, those figures are correct.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Does the Senator from Montana recall the debate in the Senate not long ago on the extension of the Reciprocal Trade Act?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I recall the Democratic Party trying to uphold the President's hands in getting a 3-year extension of the Reciprocal Trade Act. I recall the defeat of the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE]. I recall that we now have a 1-year extension, but no new reciprocal trade treaties are in sight, with the possible exception of one with Japan some time early in the next year. But I am afraid that by the time we get around to considering a Japanese trade treaty, we may find that the Japanese Empire is not in a position to go along with us as we should like to have them do so.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Does the Senator from Montana realize that the Department of Agriculture, as a result of some 20 trade missions sent to many countries throughout the world to study American trade policies, particularly as they pertain to agricultural commodities, compiled and submitted a report, and made an announcement, or at least prepared a press release, which was dated for release as of Monday, June 28?

I have been looking through my files to see if I could locate a copy of the release, but I believe it is in my office. The release said that it was imperative for the national security of the United States to have a 3-year extension of the Reciprocal Trade Act. Is the Senator from Montana aware of that?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes. Did not the Randall Commission say the same thing?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Would the Senator be interested to know that that release was prepared by the President's own Cabinet officer, Mr. Benson, in his Department, and was available in the Department of Agriculture at the very moment and the very hour when the Senate was debating the so-called administration bill for a 1-year extension of the Trade Agreements Act?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I did not know that.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Would the Senator be interested to know that so far as the junior Senator from Minnesota is aware, that release was never made, although it was dated Monday, June 28, 1954?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I have never seen any indication that it had been released. Mr. HUMPHREY. I think it might be of interest to the Senate to know that during the very time when the Senate was debating the extension of the Reciprocal Trade Act, one of the key departments of the administration had prepared a report, which called for a 3-year extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act as being important or imperative for American security. Yet that release was held back while the Senate was debating the very subject.

I have a copy of the release which was prepared by the Department of Agriculture. How I got it is my business; but I have a copy of it. It was to have been released on Monday, June 28. It was nonclassified, I may say; it was not secret material. It was straight mimeographed copy.

Is the Senator from Montana aware of such a program having been released? Mr. MANSFIELD. No.

Mr. HUMPHREY. If it was released, it did not make very many headlines. I think this is indicative of a conflict of attitude and a conflict of policy within the administration. Is not that correct?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes. I agree with the Senator from Minnesota. All we asked of the administration is that it be honest with us. We want to cooperate with the administration in foreign policy, because we realize that politics stops at the water's edge. But we want to be in on the takeoff as well as in at the crash landings, as the statement was phrased by the distinguished leader of the majority party.

I think if the difficulty in the Republican Party, or between the two branches of the party could be overcome, President Eisenhower could get his program through Congress very rapidly, as he desires to do in the field of foreign policy.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Is the Senator from Montana saying that if the President is trying to formulate a policy which will unite the Republican Party, he will get a policy which will disunite our allies?

Mr. MANSFIELD. It will disunite the country.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Speaking of the report which was made at the roots, and which went over at the request of the Department of Agriculture, it recommended the very thing which the President recommended in his March 31 message. Yet at the time the report was made and the release was prepared, as was referred to by the Senator from Minnesota, is it not a fact that the President himself had withdrawn from the March 31 stand and had consented to a 1-year extension rather than to a 3-year extension?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes. That is the point I wish to make. The able Senator from Montana has said something about the uncertainty of our foreign policy. Is that not also exemplified in the foreign-trade program?

Mr. MANSFIELD. There can be no question at all about that. What good is a foreign-trade program if reciprocal trade agreements are not executed under the program? I really think that rather than an extension and possibly rather than an extension and possibly no formulation of new trade treaties, no formulation of new trade treaties, we might have been more honest with ourselves and with the countries with which we were dealing if there had been no extension of the trade-agreements act at all.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Is it not true that in the field of international relations, if we are to be successful, and certainly if we are to exert the leadership which we ought to exert, we must be firm and must be certain, so that every nation in the world will know what our policy is?

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is true, and I think the administration ought to take

the Senate, the House of Representatives,

and the American people into its confidence whenever and wherever it can.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I agree with the Senator in that statement. By the way, I should like to commend the able Senator from Montana for having given us one of the clearest and ablest discussions of some of our problems in the field of foreign relations that I have ever heard on the Senate floor.

In that connection, I should also like to commend the able Senator from Iowa [Mr. GILLETTE] for the very fine remarks which he made immediately preceding the speech of the Senator from Montana.

With respect to the subject which he discussed, and which the Senator from Montana has also discussed, that is, the question of admission of Red China into the United Nations, a thought occurs to me, and I wish to ask the Senator from Montana if he agrees with me: Why all this spirit of defeatism? Certainly we are opposed to the admission of Red China into the United Nations. As I recall, last year, or certainly not more than 2 years ago, the Senate voted unanimously that it was the sense of the Senate that it was opposed to the admission of Red China into the United Nations. I believe that is still the sentiment of the Senate today.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I know of no Senator who is in favor of the admission of Red China into the United Nations.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Why is it being assumed that, if the United States exercises the leadership in the United Nations which it ought to exercise and ought to be able to exercise, we stand in danger of having Red China admitted into the United Nations? Certainly during the Democratic administrations we were able to withstand that threat, and the question came up 200 times. Does the Senator remember that?

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct. Mr. SPARKMAN. That question came up in the deliberations of the Security Council and the various subordinate Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes; that is true, organizations of the United Nations; yet organizations of the United Nations; yet but that falls into a pattern. we were able, time after time after time,

to win when there was a vote on the question. No later than yesterday the move for such admission was voted down in 1 of the subordinate bodies of the United Nations, by a vote of 9 to 2, if I remember correctly. If we continue to work without allies and friends, and if we have the strength with which to maintain the leadership we should be exercising, why should it be assumed that we will not be able to win such a decison, just as we did during the Democratic administrations?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I wondered why the question was even raised.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. UPTON in the chair). Does the Senator from Montana yield to the Senator from Kentucky?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. First, I should like to say that I find much to commend in what the distinguished Senator from Montana has said. I have listened to most, if not

all, of the speeches he has made on foreign affairs, and I have found them, without exception, constructive and scholarly. I know the Senator from Montana is motivated by a high sense of patriotism, and I have the highest regard for his views. I wish to commend the Senator from Montana for the principles which he has outlined as the basis for a foreign policy in the Far East.

I am loath to argue certain points which the Senator from Montana has made with which I disagree, because of the constructive nature of his speech. I

am not a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and so far as foreign policy is concerned, my information is limited to that which is available to other Members of the Senate.

I must say that the speeches which the Senator from Montana, the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS], and other Senators, have made criticizing the administration's policy in Indochina seem to me to bear an aspect of indefiniteness. There has been much criticism of the administration policy. But when one tries to analyze exactly to what point the criticism is directed, it becomes difficult to ascertain. cult to ascertain. The question of what shall be done in Indochina is a monumental problem for this administration. Several courses were available to the administration in Indochina. One

course was to intervene with military force. I have read or heard the speeches of the Senator from Montana and of other Senators of the minority on the Everyone exquestion of intervention. cept the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS] was against intervention. Surely the Senators who criticize cannot find fault with the administration policy because it did not intervene militarily.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. First I should like to say how much I appreciate the kind words of the Senator from Kentucky. Mr. COOPER. I meant them.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I had the honor and privilege of serving with the Senator from Kentucky as a delegate to the United Nations.

The Senator is correct when he states that, so far as I am concerned, in all my speeches I have been against intervention; but I think he is a little incorrect when he states there was no possibility of intervention, because, if my memory serves me correctly, Secretary of State Dulles did talk with the leadership of the Congress about having a resolution introduced which would have given the President power to act as he saw fit in the Indochina crisis. If my memory serves me correctly, Admiral Radford also advanced the idea to congressional leaders about the possibility of waging what he called a limited war, in which air and sea power would go to the relief of the French and Vietnamese at Dien Bien Phu. I think we were right on the verge of intervention, and that the only thing that prevented intervention was the opposition of the Congress and the rising sentiment of the American people against intervention in that area of the


Mr. COOPER. I am sure that every possibility was considered by the administration. It would have been a very poor administration which would have failed to consider every course. I do not want to be critical of the speeches that have been made, for the sake of criticism or for any political reason, because the question is one which involves tremendous consequences to this country and its future. But as I have said, when I hear the criticism of failure of policy in Indochina it is difficult to pin down the charge of failure. One possibility was that of military intervention. As I have said, every Senator of the minority who spoke on the subject in the Senate, with the exception of one which I can remember, the distinguished Senator from Illinois, stated flatly that he was against intervention. Surely then, you do not criticize the administration because it did not enter the war.

Another possibility was to have washed our hands of the whole problem. You

would not want the administration to do

that and the administration did not do that. A year ago the Secretary of State came to the Congress and pointed out the danger in Indochina, and asked for an appropriation of $1 billion in aid of France and the states of Indochina. The question was debated on the floor of

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I simply find difficulty, when we pin down the find difficulty, when we pin down the criticism, in ascertaining just what the dissenting Senators regard as a failure on the part of the administration.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at this time I shall yield to the Senator from Massachusetts, and then I shall resume the debate.

Mr. COOPER. I wish to say to my friend, the Senator from Montana, that, in view of my very real confidence in him and my appreciation of the way in which he approaches the subject, in raising my questions, I do not detract from the parts of his speech which I regard as being of a constructive character.

Mr. MANSFIELD. As always, Mr. President, I deeply appreciate what the Senator from Kentucky has to say.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at this time I yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, in answer to the Senator from Kentucky, I would say that neither the congressional leaders nor any of the Members of the Senate on this side of the aisle whom I heard speak on the subject, when it was under debate in the Senate in April, took the position that the United States was absolutely opposed to intervention in Indochina. What they said was that they would not support United States intervention in Indochina unless certain

conditions were met. Those conditions were three in number. One was indeThe second pendence for Indochina.

was a united effort and action by other Asiatic powers in Indochina. The third was that the French be willing to continue the struggle. The meeting of tinue the struggle.

those three conditions was regarded as essential to any successful intervention in Indochina; and the Senators on this side of the aisle took the position that any intervention which occurred in the absence of meeting those conditions would be doomed to failure.

So the position of the Senators on this side of the aisle was not one of opposition to intervention, but, rather, it

was that certain conditions should be

met, in that these conditions constituted the minimum essential to success.

In addition to making that point, I wish to state, as a second point, that insofar as mistakes by the administration are concerned, I think the Democratic administration made some mis

truth is that the administration not only failed to realize that disaster was coming in Indochina; they failed to realize that French public opinion no longer supported any policy except negotiation in that area.

Mr. COOPER. But by laying down the conditions, the Senators were ruling out any possibility of immediate action, because it was evident that their conditions could not be met in any reasonable time.

I point out that, in my opinion, the administration has been working to achieve the very goals which the Senator from Massachusetts has stated. I do not see any great difference between the action the administration has taken and the conditions which the Senators on the other side of the aisle lay down in their speeches. The arguments which the Senators on the other side of the aisle have made are inconsistent.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield to me? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I should like to have the Senator from Kentucky remember that, following the massive retaliation threat, when there was some discussion and some objection, the administration made statements which indicated that we were going to see that Indochina did not fall. The statement was made that Indochina was so important that we were going to make sure that she did not fall. Certainly the inference to be drawn from those statements was that we would intervene, if necessary, even if we had to act alone. Considerable objection was raised to that


Then it was that the Secretary of

State announced, in effect, that he was going to have the alliance; and he made the hurried trip to which the able Sena

tor from Montana has referred. After the Secretary of State made that statement, he made a trip to Europe, to talk with the French and the British; but in that connection he got nowhere.

I think that is a mistake to which we can point, namely, the attitude expressed by our Nation, which led the world to believe that we were going to

intervene in Indochina, even if we had

statement was not likely to cause other to take action all by ourselves. Such a nations to become our allies and to help

us. So that is where a mistake was made.

As a matter of fact, probably the

the Senate. I remember that during the takes, too, before 1952, in not insisting French could not have complied with


debate on the appropriation for aid the Senator from Massachusetts KENNEDY] took part in the debate and urged that aid be conditioned on independence being granted to Indochina. It cannot be said that the administration abandoned Indochina. The record is to the contrary.

that independence be granted to Indochina.

However, certainly the present administration made a major mistake in assuming that the Navarre plan would be successful, and in continuing in that assumption right up until February and March 1954 when the situation in Indochina was very obviously deteriorating. In February 1954, Secretary Wilson said:

that condition, because by that time they had already, in effect, driven their allies away from them. But certainly the course of action on the part of the United States has not been such as to inspire friendly nations to stand with us in a move that could be calculated to elicit the full cooperation of Indochina.

At the time when we were reducing our defenses and were removing pressure on the Communists in Korea, and thus were making it possible for the Com

I see no reason why Indochina should be another Korea. I believe success in Indochina will be not only possible, but prob- munists to transfer their strength to the

What was the other possible alternative? It seems to me that the one adopted, that is the effort to build up a united front with the purpose of deterring further aggression, was the only possible course short of reckless intervention. And early in April Secretary Dulles Mr. MANSFIELD. That is partly reaffirmed his support of the Navarre correct. plan, which was predicated upon military success by the end of 1955. The

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President


borders of Indochina, brave, bold, big statements were being made, that we would not let Indochina fall at all; that we could not afford to let that happen; that Indochina was too important. But

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