the Judgment-day we are entirely at liberty to suppose, from what we know of the mind, that it will awake, that it will summon up thought and feeling from its hidden recesses, and will clearly present before us the perfect form and representation of the past.

"Each fainter trace, that memory holds
So darkly of departed years,
In one broad glance the soul beholds,
And all that was at once appears."

CHAPTER X.

REASONING.

§ 269. Reasoning a source of ideas and knowledge.

LEAVING the consideration of the memory, we are next to examine the power of Reasoning; a subject of inquiry abundantly interesting in itself, and also in consequence of its being one of the leading and fruitful sources of Internal knowledge. For our knowledge of the operations of this faculty we are indebted, as was seen in a former chapter, to Consciousness, which gives us our direct knowledge of all other mental acts. But it will be remarked, that Reasoning is not identical with, or involved in Consciousness. If consciousness gives us a knowledge of the act of reasoning, the reasoning power, operating within its own limits and in its own right, gives us a knowledge of other things. It is a source of perceptions and knowledge which we probably could not possess in any other way.

Without the aid of Original Suggestion, it does not appear how we could have a knowledge of our existence; without Consciousness we should not have a knowledge of our mental operations; without Relative Suggestion or Judgment, which is also a distinct source of knowledge, there would be no Reasoning; and, unassisted by Reasoning, we could have no knowledge of the relations of those things which cannot be compared

without the aid of intermediate propositions. The reasoning power, accordingly, is to be regarded as a new and distinct fountain of thought, which, as compared with the other sources of knowledge just mentioned, opens itself still further in the recesses of the Internal Intellect; and as it is later in its developement, so it comes forth with proportionally greater efficiency. Accordingly, Degerando, in his treatise entitled De la Generation des Connoissances, expressly and very justly remarks, after having spoken of judgment or Relative Suggestion as a distinct source of knowledge, "The Reasoning faculty also serves to enrich us with ideas; for there are many relations so complicated or remote, that one act of judgment is not sufficient to discover them. A series of judgments or process of reasoning is therefore necessary.' But we would not be understood to limit the results of reasoning, considered as a distinct source of knowledge, to a few simple conceptions, such as the discovery, in a given case, of the mere relation of agreement or disagreement. It sustains the higher office of bringing to light the great principles and hidden truths of nature; it reveals to the inquisitive and delighted mind a multitude of fruitful and comprehensive views, which could not otherwise be obtained; and invests men, and nature, and events with a new character.

§ 270. Illustrations of the value of the reasoning power.

The suggestions at the close of the last section are worthy of being considered in some particulars. It may be remarked, therefore, that the value of the Reasoning power is particularly observable in two things, viz., in its flexibility, and in its growth or expansion.

(1.) When we speak of the flexibility of the reasoning power, we mean to intimate the facility and perfcct fitness with which it can apply itself to the numerous and almost infinitely varied subjects of our knowledge. This remark is perhaps susceptible of illustration, by a slight reference to the instincts of the lower animals. Such instincts, according to the usual understanding of their nature, imply an original and invariable tendency to do certain things, without previous forethought and delibera

tion. Accordingly, it has been observed, that a bird which has always been confined in a cage will build, when suitable materials are furnished it, a nest precisely similar to those of its own kind in the woods. It places with the greatest ingenuity the sticks, leaves, and clay of its frail dwelling, without going through a long process of previous training, and without incurring a debt to others for their assistance. But the instinct in this and other analogous cases is limited to its one definite object; it discovers an utter inflexibility, neither varying the mode of its action, nor extending its range so as to include other objects.

But the reasoning faculty, altogether different in this particular, applies itself to almost everything. It is not easy to designate and limit the vast number of objects in nature, in events, and individual conduct, where it furnishes its aid, and secures the most beneficial results. It is an instrument equally fitted to investigate things that are most diverse; the mysteries of the mechanical arts, and the problems of political philosophy; the growth of a plant or flower, and the obscurities of the human intellect.

(2.) The excellency of the reasoning power is seen also in its expansion and growth.-Instinct appears to be full and perfect at the very first opportunity of its exercise; but there are no such restricted bounds to reasoning. Though weak at first, it is endlessly progressive. It is seen distinctly at work in the child, that frames his miniature house of small sticks and blocks; and in the architect, whose scientific views and exquisite labours have resulted in forming edifices that attract a nation's admiration. It is discovered, in its incipient efforts, in the regulation of the sports of childhood; but, without changing the elements of its nature, it gradually enlarges itself to the capability of administering the affairs of an empire.

§ 271. Definition of reasoning, and of propositions. Reasoning may be defined the mental process or operation whereby we deduce conclusions from two or more propositions premised.-A train of reasoning may be re

garded, therefore, as a whole; and, as such, it is made up of separate and subordinate parts. These elementary parts are usually termed PROPOSITIONS; and before we can proceed with advantage in the further consideration of reasoning, it is necessary to go into a brief explanation of them.

A PROPOSITION has been defined to be a verbal representation of some perception, act, or affection of the mind. Accordingly, when we speak of a Proposition, we are usually understood to mean some mental perception or combination of perceptions, expressed and laid out before us in words. Although such seems to be the ordinary meaning of the term, we may admit the possibility of propositions existing wholly in the mind without being expressed in words. Mr. Locke expressly speaks of mental propositions, or those states of mind where two or more ideas are combined together previous to their being imbodied and set forth in the forms of language.

The parts of the proposition are, (1.) The SUBJECT, or that concerning which something is either asserted or denied, commanded or inquired; (2.) The PREDICATE, or that which is asserted, denied, commanded, or inquired concerning the subject; (3.) The COPULA, by which the two other parts are connected.-In these two propositions,

Cæsar was brave,

Men are fallible,

Men and Cæsar are the subjects; fallible and brave are the predicates; are and was are the copulas.

Propositions have been divided, (1.) Into SIMPLE, or those whose subject and predicate are composed of single words, as in this,

Benevolence is commendable; (2.) Into COMPLEX, or those where the subject and predicate consist of a number of words, as in this,

Faithfulness in religion is followed by peace of mind;

(3.) Into modal, where the copula is qualified by some word or words, representing the manner or possibility of the agreement or discrepance between the subject and predicate, as in these,

Men of learning can exert an influence;
Wars may sometimes be just.

PROPOSITIONS, more or less involved, are necessary parts in every process of reasoning. They may be compared to the separate and disjointed blocks of marble, which are destined to enter into the formation of some edifice; the completed process of reasoning is the edifice; the propositions are the materials.

272. Process of the mind in all cases of reasoning.

Leaving the consideration of its subordinate parts or elements, we are further to consider the general nature of reasoning in other words, we are to examine the character of the complex mental process involved in that term. The definition given of reasoning, it will be remembered, was, That it is the mental process by which we deduce conclusions from two or more propositions premised. Hence there will be in every such process a succession of propositions, never less than two, and often a much greater number. The propositions often follow each other with much regularity; and hence, not unfrequently, we consider the arrangement of them as entirely arbitrary. But this is a mistaken supposition. It is true, when a number of ideas or propositions are presented nearly at the same time, the mind puts forth a volition, or exercises choice, in selecting one idea or proposition in preference to another. But the ideas or propositions from which the choice is made, and without the presence of which it could not be made, are not brought into existence by a direct volition, and, therefore, mere arbitrary creations, but are suggested by the laws of association.

As an illustration, we will suppose an argument on the justice and expediency of capital punishments in ordinary cases. The disputant first denies in general terms the right which social combinations have assumed of capitally punishing offences of a slight nature. But, before considering the cases he has particularly in view, he remarks on the right of capital punishment for murder; and admits, we will suppose, that the principle of self-defence gives such a right. He then takes up the case of stealing, and contends that we have no right to punish the