under an article of a treaty signed at Paris, on the 16th January, 1810, between Holland and and France, they were delivered to the French Government as American, and by them received as such, to be dealt with 'according to circumstances, and the political relations between France and the United States.' The United States were thus made parties to this sequestration, which was, in the most pointed manner, directed against them, as the public enemies of France, unless the American Government would vindicate the rights of neutrals by such means and in such a mode, as the French Government chose to prescribe. Other nations have demanded and obtained from France, indemnity for their citizens for less atrocious wrongs. In 1805, a French squadron under D'Allemand, destroyed several neutral vessels at sea, among which were four American ships. The owners of all these vessels, except the Americans were paid for their. property during the reign of Napoleon. The American owners are yet unpaid. In reference, indeed, to every class and description of claims, has this preference for the subjects of European powers, over American citizens, been strongly manifested. In 1814, when Napoleon was compelled to abdicate, and the Bourbons were restored by the allied forces, the Government of France, by a treaty with the principal powers of Europe, engaged to liquidate and pay all the legal obligations which the former Government was under to indi viduals, 'in countries beyond its territories.' This it was bound to do, without the formality of a treaty. In the practice of the civilized world, and according to every principle of publie law, it is well established that the obligations of treaties, and other official acts of government, are never affected by revolutions or changes of dynasty. Indeed the principle of making an indemnity, was distinctly admitted by the representatives of France, in their note to the ministers of the Allies, September 21st, 1815; and in the treaty by which the pacification of Europe was made, it was inserted to prevent any doubt as to the settled practice of nations. By this article, which was meant as a general declaration on the part of France to the civilized world, and not merely as a govenant in favor of the parties to the Treaty, all acts of violence not included within the description of damages of war, were provided for; and by a supplemental article with Great Britain, losses by assignats, in the heat of the revolution, and all claims for illegal confiscations or sequestrations by the revolutionary government, or by Napoleon, were liquidated and paid to English subjects. In pursuance of this treaty declaration, the Government of France since the restoration, proceeded to liquidate and extinguish claims of the subjects, both of the great Powers and petty States of Europe; but the claims of American citizens were uniformly neglected. Negotiations were opened for decision, that he would not suffer claims so justly founded, to continue unliquidated or answered with frivolous excuses or untenable pretences. A strong feeling had prevailed in the public mind on the subject, which only required an opportunity to manifest itself, and vigorous steps on the part of the Government, would have met with a hearty response from the people. Movements were made in poplar meetings, with the view of urging the Government to require indemnity and the Executive of the United States urged the demands of the claimants for justice with great ability upon the government of France; but the government, presuming upon the apathy of the American people towards the rights of the claimants, or upon the pacific policy of the Government, has hitherto met these remonstrances with the most futile excuses. The Government of France has not set up against these claims, the doctrine, that the liabilities of the former rulers of France did not descend to her a definite answer from France present governors, notwithstand- respecting the claims; and the ing the change of dynasty. But new minister to that Government it has sought to avoid making com- received instructions specially to pensation by silence, by delays, enforce their liquidation. by evasions, and finally, by a refusal to negotiate, unless the Government of the United States would connect its claims with the claim lately made by France, to be admitted into the ports of Louisiana upon the same footing as British vessels. This demand was brought up after all other pretences had been unavailingly resorted to, and after more than five years had elapsed subsequent to the treaty, which gave rise to that claim. The American Government refused either to admit that demand or to suffer it to be connect ed with the negotiations for indemnities, for spoliations upon its commerce. On that footing matters stood for many years, the claimants meanwhile suffering from the delay of justice. Upon the change in the administration of the Federal Government, it was hoped, from the character of the new President for energy and Before the close of the year, the recovery of these claims was placed on a more favorable footing by the revolution which took place in the French Government itself. A Government which regarded with a more favorable eye the institutions of a republic, was substituted for the bigoted and imbecile Bourbons, and the revered and patriotic La Fayette, the friend of America, was restored to the unlimited influence that he exercised in the commencement of the first revolution. These fortunate events rendered the liquidation of these long neglected claims almost certain, and the mercantile community congratulated itself upon the probable adjustment of the sole controversy between the United States and their ancient ally. The dispute with the Brazilian Government respecting the illegal seizure, and condemnation of American property had been happily adjusted; and an opening was afforded by the collisions of the principal European powers with the Sublime Porte, to extend the commercial relations of the United States, by entering into a treaty with the Turkish Government. Efforts had been made at an early period in the history of the Federal Government, to obtain access for the commerce of the United States to the Black Sea. During the administration of John Adams, a contingent commission was given to William Smith, then minister to Portugal, to proceed to Constantinople for that purpose. But the clamor, which was at that time raised against the extension of our diplomatic relations, prevented the execution of that mission. Mr Jefferson, in pursuance of the Chinese policy, which he deemed to be the true policy of The United States, permitted the subject to rest, and Mr Madison was diverted from prosecuting it by the urgency of our European relations during his administra Mr Monroe early directed his attention that way, and proposed not long after the commencement of his administration, to Mr William Lowndes to undertake a mission to Constantinople; but from personal considerations this proposal was declined by him. The insurrection in Greece which broke out shortly after, retarded the business by rendering it necessary to proceed with caution, in order to avoid entangling alliances with the Porte, which might have operated unfavorably upon the Greek cause. Mr George B. English, however, was employed as a special agent to collect information respecting the state of the war in Greece and of the substance of the commercial treaties to which Turkey was already a party. Mr English was again sent out with Commodore Rodgers in 1825, as a secretary and interpreter, with instructions to seek an interview with the Capitan Pasha and to hold an amicable communication with him. This was done and it was then ascertained, that a treaty on favorable terms could be concluded without difficulty. Mr Offley, the American consul at Smyrna, had, during the same period, frequently visited Constantinopleupon business and from his communications with some of the officers of the Porte, had formed a similar opinion; and in his communications with the Government he had strongly urged the propriety of taking steps to conclude a treaty. In the spring of 1820, Commodore Rodgers returned to the United States; and as the war between Russia and Turkey, and the battle of Navarino, by destroying the influence of England with the Porte, gave peculiar advantages in conducting the negotiation, the President determined that the opportunity should not be lost. In the month of July, 1828, Mr Adams authorized M Offley, the American Consul at Smyrna, to proceed to Constantinople for the purpose of ascertaining definitely the disposition of the Turkish government with regard to a commercial treaty with the United States. If he should find that such a treaty could be with certainty concluded, full powers were furnished to him and to Commodore Crane, then Commander of the American Squadron in the Mediterranean, jointly or severally for the negotiation of it; but they were expressly inhibited from assenting to any article, which might be incompatible with the neutrality of the United States. As the success of this business necessarily depended upon its secrecy, these commissioners were appointed under the authority of the President, to appoint executive agents, and such portion of the contingent fund as was at the disposal of the President, was set apart to defray the expenses of the mission and of the negotiation. Upon arriving at Constantinople, Mr Offley found affairs on so favorable a footing, that he at once commenced negotiations, and in a short time agreed upon the provisions of a commercial treaty. The preliminaries being thus happily adjusted, the treaty would have been at once concluded, had the commissioners been provided with funds to make the customary presents upon the formation of a treaty. Mr Offley was desirous of then concluding it and of assuming the responsibility of drawing upon the state department for the amount of the presents; but Captain Crane, who, as instructed by the President, had joined him at Constantinople, declining that course, the negotiation was suspended, and a communication was made to the American Government, informing it of the situation in which the business was placed. This communication was received at Washington a few days after the inauguration of General Jackson, who, after obtaining from his predecessor an account of the previous proceedings, determined to continue the negotiation. Commodore Biddle having, in the meantime, taken the place of Crane as commander of the squadron, was also substituted for him as one of the Commissioners, and Mr Rhind, who had been commissioned as Consul of the United States at Odessa, was appointed as a third commissioner to assist in bringing the matter to a conclusion. The commissioners were authorized to make the presents required, and a treaty was formed between the two governments, the details of which had not been promulgated at the close of the year. E. Everett. The controversy with Great Britain respecting the trade between the United States and the West Indies was not of recent origin. It was almost coeval with their separation from Great Britain. Previous to that event an intercourse, subject to but little restraint had existed as between colonies of the same power; and upon the establishment of peace it began to be renewed upon the ancient terms. It was not long, however, before the provisions of the British Navigation Laws were, upon the suggestion of Lord Nelson, then stationed in the West Indies, enforced against American vessels; and the controversy respecting the colonial trade was commenced. Mr Pitt, upon whom as minister it devolved to bring the matter forward in Parliament, was at first inclined to place the intercourse upon the footing of exact reciprocity. Unfortunately however for both countries, he was prevented from carrying into effect these liberal views, by the publication of a pamphlet of Lord Sheffield, showing the possibility of engrossing the direct carrying trade between the United States and England, by confining the circuitous voyage through the West Indies exclusively to British vessels. British goods destined for the American market, could then be transported in British vessels, which, after landing their cargoes, would return by a circuitous route carrying supplies to the islands, and bringing the produce of the West Indies to the ports of the mother country. • This combination of voyages was felt to be a great advantage, and it was determined to secure it to British navigation. American vessels were accordingly excluded from the islands, but the hostilities in which England soon after became involved with France compelled her to relax the rigor of the system in order to secure to her colonies supplies which were indispensable to their existence, and which could not then be obtained except from the United States. The colonial governors accordingly assumed the power of opening from time to time the ports of their respective islands, and though this intercourse was precarious and subject to continual interruptions, it served to keep the islands supplied, and gave to the navigation of the United States a share in the carrying trade, with which they were satisfied. On this footing the matter rested, until the late war between this country and England put an entire stop to the trade and compelled the islands to depend upon other sources for supplies. Upon the renewal of friendly relations, the United States found the situation of England materially changed. The world was peace. Her navigation no longer, with that of the United States, carried on the trade of Europe. The continental kingdoms sought to secure their own commerce to their own tonnage, and a contest commenced between these two great maritime powers for the carrying trade between their respective possessions. Both sagacious, active and alive to their own interests, they endeavored to promote them upon conflicting principles. England, possessing extensive colonies in remote quarters of the globe, strove to monopolize their commerce, and the principles she acted upon in her navigation system were, 1st, to secure the carrying trade of the world to her own shipping, and 2d, to distribute such portion of it as did not devolve to her own tonnage among the other maritime powers, so that no one by her single strength might endanger the commercial supremacy of England and question her title to the sovereignty of the seas. To effect these objects, her celebrated Navigation acts were passed, founded upon the principles of monopoly and exclusion. The United States, on the contrary, without colonies, but unbur |