SECESSION AND CONSTITU. TIONAL LIBERTY APPENDIX 31 (I Page 81) WHEN Cleinias asks the Athenian, "Can you show that what you have been saying is true?" the latter answers: "To be absolutely sure of the truth of matters concerning which there are many opinions is an attribute of the gods not given to man, O Stranger; but I shall be very happy to tell you what I think, especially as we are now proposing to enter on a discussion concerning laws and constitutions." And Cleinias rejoins: "Your opinion, Stranger, about the questions which are now raised is precisely what we want to hear." Mr. Madison may fittingly represent Plato's Athenian. From his intimate relation with the Constitution in all its phases, in the steps leading thereto from the Confederation, in the Federal Convention, in securing its ratification, in interpreting it as Secretary of State and as President, and as its historian, he is aptly called its Father; and the authority of no individual, as authority, should be more weighty: hence the inquiry here into his opinions at such length. In them lies the crux of the question. Nowhere else has the anti-secession side been so fully stated and developed with so great ability. The preceding part of this inquiry has been but recitation and proof of historical facts necessary to judge the political question here brought to issue. Yet it is proper to remember the Athenian's disclaimer of authority; and that Mr. Madison having so fully stated his reasons, his opinion loses its authority as such,—and is no weightier than the stated reasons therefor. 7 Forty years after the formation of the Constitution, when South Carolina, seeking to avoid the legalized robbery of the "protective" tariff, prepared to put in force the doctrine of nullification, Mr. Madison, then in extreme age, wrote various papers against that (and the doctrine of secession), as follows: "Augst. 28, 1830. "DR. SIR-I have duly recd. your letter in wch. you refer to the 'nullifying doctrine,' advocated as a constitutional right by some of our distinguished fellow citizens; and to the proceedings of the Virga. Legislature in 98 & 99, as appealed to in behalf of that doctrine; and you express a wish for my ideas on those subjects. "I am aware of the delicacy of the task in some respects; and the difficulty in every respect of doing full justice to it. But having in more than one instance complied with a like request from other friendly quarters, I do not decline a sketch of the views which I have been led to take of the doctrine in question, as well as some others connected with them; and of the grounds from which it appears that the proceedings of Virginia have been misconceived by those who have appealed to them. In order to understand the true character of the Constitution of the U. S. the error, not uncommon, must be avoided, of viewing it through the medium either of a consolidated Government or of a confederated Govt. whilst it is neither the one nor the other, but a mixture of both. And having in no model the similitudes & analogies applicable to other systems of Govt. it must more than any other be its own interpreter, according to its text & the facts of the case. "From these it will be seen that the characteristic peculiarities of the Constitution are 1. The mode of its formation, 2. The division of the supreme powers of Govt. between the States in their united capacity and the States in their individual capacities. "1. It was formed, not by the Governments of the component States, as the Federal Govt. for which it was substituted was formed; nor was it formed by a majority of the people of the U. S. as a single community in the manner of a consolidated Government.31A "It was formed by the States-that is by, the people in each of the States, acting in their highest sovereign capacity; and formed, consequently by the same authority which formed the State Constitutions. "Being thus derived from the same source as the Constitutions of the States, it has within each State, the same authority as the Constitution of the State; and is as much a Constitution, in the strict sense of the term, within its prescribed sphere, as the Constitutions of the States are within their respective sphere; but with this obvious & essential difference, that being a compact among the States in their highest sovereign capacity, and constituting the people thereof one people for certain purposes, it cannot be altered or annulled at the will of the States individually, as the Constitution of a State may be at its individual will. "2. And that it divides the supreme powers of Govt. between the Govt. of the United States, & the Govts. of the individual States, is stamped on the face of the instrument; the powers of war and of taxation, of commerce & of treaties, and other enumerated powers vested in the Govt. of the U. S. being of as high & sovereign a character as any of the powers reserved to the State Govts. "Nor is the Govt. of the U. S. created by the Constitution, less a Govt. in the strict sense of the term, within the sphere of its powers, than the Govts. created by the constitutions of the States are within their several spheres. It is like them organized into Legislative, Executive, & Judiciary Departments. It operates like them, directly on persons & things. And, like them, it has at command a physical force for executing the powers committed to it. The concurrent operation in certain cases is one of the features marking the peculiarity of the system. "Between these different constitutional Govts.-the one operating in all the States, the others operating separately in each, with the aggregate powers of Govt. divided between them, it could not escape attention that controversies would arise concerning the boundaries of jurisdiction; and that some provision ought to be made for such occurrences. A political system that does not provide for a peaceable & authoritative termination of occurring controversies, would not be more than the shadow of a Govt.; the object & end of a real Govt. being the substitution of law & order for uncertainty confusion, & violence. "That to have left a final decision in such cases to each of the States, then 13 & already 24, could not fail to make the Constn. & laws of the U. S. different in different States was obvious; and not less obvious, that this diversity of independent decisions, must altogether distract the Govt. of the Union & speedily put an end to the Union itself.31B A uniform authority of the laws, is in itself a vital principle. Some of the most important laws could not be partially executed. They must be executed in all the States or they could be duly executed in none. An impost or an excise, for example, if not in force in some States, would be defeated in others. It is well known that this was among the lessons of experience wch. had a primary influence in bringing about the existing Constitution. A loss of its general authy. would moreover revive the exasperating questions between the States holding ports for foreign commerce and the adjoining States without them, to which are now added all the inland States necessarily carrying on their foreign commerce through other States. "To have made the decisions under the authority of the individual States, co-ordinate in all cases with decisions under the authority of the U. S. would unavoidably produce collisions incompatible with the peace of society, & with that regular & efficient administration which is the essence of free Govts. Scenes could not be avoided in which a ministerial officer of the U. S. and the correspondent officer of an individual State, would have rencounters in executing conflicting decrees, the result of which would depend on the comparative force of the local posse attending them, and that a casualty depending on the political opinions and party feelings in different States. "To have referred every clashing decision under the two |