ly contributed, there are at least two spheres in which human nature may speak with authority-that strict authority which admits of no appeal.

First of these we may distinguish that authority which is simply negative. In this act of the soul, though no substance of truth is brought into, or even secured within, the mind, serious errors are kept out. Though in certain cases the soul may be unable to ascertain what the special truth is, or where to find it, in every case where special dogmas are brought into direct contact with it, the soul may absolutely know, and authoritatively affirm, what is not

true.

We do not forget that this is a disputed point. We are aware that orthodoxy, commonly so called, systematically denies the right of the soul to resist any dogma coming to it with the apparent sanction of external evidence. A recent school of Calvinistic theologians, of whom Mr. Mansel is the great leader, make this their distinctive tenet-the incompetency of human nature to pronounce aught against dogmas assumed to rest on certain extrinsic testimony. And we are not disposed to deny the plausibility with which this tenet is argued, especially by the author of The Limits of Religious Thought. Yet are we confident that such extreme ground is taken, only because a desperate cause compelled it. An absurd theory can rest only on assumptions equally absurd.

It is a significant fact, that outside of theology no one would pretend to make a similar assault upon the integrity of the soul of man. No theory of philosophy, of politics, of anything, religion alone accepted, could find one intelligent devotee, if formally as well as in fact, maintained in opposition to acknowledged human instincts. Arguments and external evidence to prove that two added to two make five, though ever sò specious could not weigh with any well-organized mind. No canon of criticism in the department of thought, of literature, of art, would be deemed worthy of notice, if acknowledged to be in conflict with the known. laws of human intelligence and taste. No outward authority could impose doggerel rhymes as poetry on any person in whom the poetic sensibility is at all vivid. The noise accompanying the grating of a file will never be acknowledged as

music, let the argument therefor rest upon any conceivable evidence.

In all of the matters named, the inherent faculties of the soul are assumed-assumed as a matter of course—to have a final and absolute authority, so far at least as to pronounce against whatever dogmas are set up in defiance of them. And shall not the moral and spiritual faculties be conceded to have equal dignity? Shall they alone, of all the endowments of human nature, be subjected to outrage-forced to accept and to foster what is intrinsically hateful to them? We, at least, cannot appreciate the wisdom of that philoso phy, which dares not thwart the instincts of man's musical faculty, while it presumes to trample with impunity upon the far nobler powers which indentify the soul as the image of the Creator. With great confidence, therefore, we claim for human nature an unlimited negative authority, whereby its verdict against religious dogmas is conclusive, and admits of no appeal.

We come now, in the second place, to specify another particular in which human nature has a rightful authority in religious doctrine. We take it that all will concede, that there are in the Scriptures at last two widely distinct classes of facts. One class embraces facts of a historical, biographical, and a local character. It is clear that these must rest entirely upon external proofs. Human nature has no positive authority over them whatever. Another class embraces facts of an essentially spiritual nature; facts which appeal directly to the human soul-we mean in the sense of meeting and satisfying inherent spiritual wants. Now human nature has a positive authority over such facts, in the sense of confirming them.

That the Bible does reveal facts of this nature will, we suppose, be promptly conceded by every person who believes in revelation at all. These facts are not intuitions; for they have been brought to, not given by, the spiritual nature. And yet they do not wholly depend upon the authority of external evidence; for though revealed by a process external to the soul, they are, as soon as appreciated, sanctioned by the soul, and henceforth may be said to rest upon its authority. When the young tree is transplanted, it will first require external props to sustain it against the fury of the wind. But in due time the roots strike into the congenial soil, put

the tree in vital contact therewith, and this force strengthening with its growth, the tree is finally able to stand by its own strength, and so discard the assistance of artificial support. So a doctrine which the soul could not originate, comes to it, at first, as something foreign to it. For the time, it can be held in human belief only by the artificial support of an outward authority. But soon it sinks its roots into the spiritual nature, finds there a congenial soil, an organic, living union is effected; and so, in time, the revealed fact comes to rest in this interior confirmation as its authoritative basis.

The result to which our present investigation has led us, may be succinctly summed up as follows: Human nature in matters of religion is authoritative,—

First, over its own intuitions which it directly contributes to the substance of doctrine ;

Secondly, over all revealed spiritual truths, which, though not intuitions, and not within the soul's power to originate, human nature has nevertheless grown to appreciate, and hence to confirm-thus finally becoming the support of truths, which, at first, it could receive only on external authority; and,

Thirdly, over all dogmas which are palpably and directly at war with the soul-over these in the negative sense of pronouncing them false, and this without appeal.

Looking next at the limitations of this religious authority, we reach the following results :

First, Human nature has no authority over any of the facts of Scripture which do not appeal directly to it, in the sense of meeting inherent wants (such for example, as local and narrative facts); which therefore rest entirely and always upon external testimony ;-nor

Secondly, over any of the intrinsically spiritual truths of Scripture, until the period of inner growth is reached, when these truths are appreciated and so apprehended as truthsprior to which period, such truths depend upon external testimony; nor

Thirdly, over any of those portions of religious doctrine which are inferential in their character-having been evolved by the logical faculty from data either intuitional or revealed.

In stating this summary we may add, that every possible scheme of Christian doctrine, must be made up, in large measure, of the three kinds of matter enumerated as without the province of the soul's authority. Hence we may claim that the analysis we have given exhibits the necessity of that careful discrimination in appealing to this authority which we announced at the outset of our inquiry.

An application of the leading results, now summed up, to the contents of Christian theology, would lead us into a large field of thought, and demand a very special and extended inquiry. Yet as without the addition of something in this direction, our labor must seem extremely bald, we shall present a few specimen particulars of such an application, with a view to greater clearness, if not comprehensiveness. Our analysis of religious doctrine has presented for elementary matters: 1. Spiritual intuitions; 2. Facts of revelation appealing directly to the soul; 3. Facts of revelation having no direct application to the soul; 4. Inferential matter logically educed. We will now specify a few particulars of these several kinds of doctrinal matter.

The being of God, the soul's immortality, the fundamental laws of right and obligation, and a sense of dependence on a higher power, may be named as among the soul's intuitions. None of these truths can be proved by a priori argument; they are all gloriously confirmed by a posteriori argument. It is now agreed on nearly all hands that man being naturally religious must necessarily have a religion ;not merely be capable of having but actually have a religion. But it is impossible to conceive of a religion, no matter what its form, that does not substantially include the four particulars named; and to say that man naturally has (as distinct from being capacitated to have) these particular truths, is but another way of saying that these truths are intuitions. Of course, it will not be said that we are indebted to revelation for facts which were in the world ages before there was a Bible; and which are still accepted, in some form or other, in regions of the globe where no knowledge of the Bible as yet exists. We must add, that we here use the revelation in the restricted sense already explained-as expressing the fact of a special communication of truths by means distinct from the natural operation of the inherent power of

man.

As a matter of valuable instruction, and as tending to fortify and consolidate religious convictions, it is well to present the numberless a posteriori sanctions of the doctrine of God, of the fact of immortality, and of moral responsibility. But, strictly speaking, proof of them is not needed. The soul knows them, will never be robbed of them, will forever assert them. Keep the soul pure, and doubt on these fundamental doctrines will be as unnatural, as doubt of the existence of sunlight in a cloudless day to a person whose vision is clear. We apprehend that our statement here would not be called in question, if the distinction was observed between the truths named considered as elementary on the one hand, and as held in concrete relations on the other. The Indian's notion of deity, the Mahometan's notion of paradise, and the Tartar's notion of duty, are not intuitions, are not elementary, are, we may assume, not true. In each case the notion is not simple various elements are compounded with the intuition. But eliminate these other elements, and determine that which is the nucleus with which the several matters composing the notion have been compounded, and this will be, in the nature of the case it cannot otherwise than be, a primative fact, or intuition.

2. That God sustains a paternal relation to man; that his providence watches over him for good; that chastisement is salutary; and that the Divine purpose includes the greatest good of all souls, these are facts of revelation. Whether or not revelation, in the enunciation of them, has anticipated the intuitional faculty, or has proclaimed things beyond the power of human nature ever to have discovered, may be a question. Yet the historical fact stands, that they have been specially revealed, and therefore are not to be classed as intuitions. Yet they speak directly to the human heart; they meet intrinsic wants; and the spiritual nature, when it shall have reached a certain stage of culture, and a certain degree of vision, will apprehend them as truths, and ever after sustain them by its own authority. Of course, all that we thus state will not be obvious to every person. We can only express our confidence in the position we thus assume; and leave it with those whose spiritual experience best qualifies them to determine the question.

3. We believe, on the authority of the Scripture, that there was such a person as Jesus of Nazareth; that he spoke sub

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