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explain our statement, that, conceding the fact of the authority of human nature in the things of religion, great room remains for careful discrimination.

As we read the writings of those who confidently and, as we think, justly make their appeal to the authoritative soul, we still feel that there is a general lack of the discrimination which we have now explained. It has seemed to us that modern theology, even as set forth by our favorite authors, is too much a jumble,-intuitions, facts of revelation, and the deductions of reason huddled together, instead of being assorted, and put into their logical relations. Our theology, considered as an aggregate of items, is needlessly confused. It ought to exist in our understandings as a system, in which each part has its true place, and is viewed in its true relations with all the other parts. And particularly as respects what is contributed by the soul in its authoritative character, we ought to determine, as far as we may be able to do, precisely what, and only what, comes from this source; in what condition it comes; and how it blends with these portions. which may be presumed to have a specifically different origin. Let us hasten to say, that to determine those important questions is by no means our present intention. Such a labor would require volumes; even were we competent to execute so great a task, the undertaking could hardly be commenced within the narrow limits of an essay. It will be something, however, if we succeed in calling attention to the necessity of such a work-if we can, in any degree, with even a small number of minds, awaken a consciousness of the need. Meanwhile we will endeavor to give, in a small way, and by introducing a simple analysis, a specimen illustration of the work which it will rejoice us to see done better, and on a scale somewhat proportioned to the importance of the general theme.

Our special purpose now is to determine the limits within which human nature is an authority in religious doctrine. The mere statement of such a purpose implies the existence of elements in religious doctrine, which do not at least originate with human nature. Let it then be our first task to determine the specific sources of the several elements of truth, which, when systematically combined, make a theology. We shall not here attempt a very minute analysis of the contents of theology; for this would lead us into a field of

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inquiry far beyond the space now at our command. simple and somewhat general classification suffice as a specimen of the greater work, which the full importance of the subject would justify.

There are, then, at least three distinct kinds of matter in every theological scheme, namely: Intuitions, Facts of Revelation, and Inferences drawn either from intuitions or revealed facts. A word of each class in its order.

Intuitions are those first truths which are given as elementary by the nature of man under the stimulus of the proper occasion. Such, for example, are the axioms of mathematics, perceptions of the necessary relations of space and time, self-existence, the fundamentals of right, of obligation and of worship. The distinctive mark of intuitive matter is, that it is given outright, is elementary-admitting of no analysis, and, as self-authenticated, cannot be proved by appeal to anything prior to itself.

Facts of Revelation are those truths which are given by inspiration, in that special and restricted sense, which distinguishes it from any gift inherent in man. Such are those

moral and spiritual truths contained in the Bible which are presumed to be beyond the perception of unaided reason; and particularly such matters as come in the words and example of Jesus of Nazareth.

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But the logical faculty takes up alike the facts of intuition and of revelation, and educes therefrom doctrinal inferenIn this process, though nothing is added to the substance of theology, important additions are made in the way of form. What is primitively chaotic assumes relations-what comes at first isolated is seen in its sequences and grows into a system; and the mind, instead of holding an aggregate of items, sees in them an organic unity-each part sustaining a vital connection with all the parts, and in the various relations of dependence and of mutual affiliation.

Now taking into the account this simple analysis (the correctness of which, as far as it goes, will not, we presume, be questioned), saying nothing of the various sub-divisions into which it would be easy to classify the several matters, it is obvious that human nature cannot be an unqualified and unrestricted authority in every particular of religious doctrine. Its authority in matters which it originates must of course be direct and positive-in a way and to an extent in which

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it cannot authenticate matters which originate at a different source. It is therefore a primary question of our present discussion, What elements in religious doctrines does the human soul contribute?

The general answer to the question here propounded, is sufficiently obvious. The soul contributes certain of its intuitions (whatever these may be) to the common stock of elementary religious matter. These intuitions are known facts-known in the strictest sense in which the word knowledge can have a meaning. Revealed facts, in so far as they depend upon evidence external to man-in so far as they require testimony addressed to, and not coming from, man-in so far as any flaw in the chain of testimony can render the facts uncertain-cannot come to man as absolutely known. They may command his belief, and this to an extent so great as practically to amount to knowledge; yet speculatively they can never, and very seldom practically, be averred with that absolute certainty which characterizes facts strictly known. The soul is therefore an authority in the intuitional matter of religious doctrine in a much higher sense in which it can be an authority over revealed

matter.

Again; that element of doctrine which is denominated Inferential cannot find its authority in human nature, in the more restricted sense of the word. Inferences may be educed alike from the facts of intuition and also of revelation. So far as they are educed from revealed data, they of course involve necessarily all the uncertainty which pertains to those data-an uncertainty which speculatively must, and practically, generally does, pertain to whatever rests upon testimony external to man. The authority of human nature over its own contributions, its own intuitions, it must all along be remembered, is direct, absolute, and without appeal. And this unqualified authority, we have seen, it cannot have over facts strictly within the province of revelation; nor, by consequence, over the inferences of which such facts are the data.

But how is it with regard to those inferences which are educed from the facts of intuition? As respects these, the soul's authority, as we have seen, is absolute; is not the authority the same as regards the inferences of which intuitional facts are the data? To this question, if we view it in

any practical light, the answer is plainly in the negative. We must keep in mind, that when we speak of inferences, as elements of religious doctrine, we are not speaking of such as are absolutely logical, but of such as the human intellect, in the best use of its logical faculties, may be able to educe. The distinction here is unequivocal. We know that there is such a thing as the logical faculty; we concede that in the skilful use of this faculty, conclusions have been educed worthy of being called demonstrations. Yet we never concede a demonstration to be absolutely, unqualifiedly such. We never concede infallibility to any process of the finite intellect never concede absolute certainty to any result of such a process. From data absolutely known, and absolutely known to be all the data belonging to the question, the conclusion, if absolutely logical, is undoubtedly absolutely certain. But the finite intellect when engaged upon real subject matter, cannot claim to be absolutely logical-cannot claim that it has not erred in the process-in short, cannot claim infallibility.

The distinction on which we insist is that between logic itself and any finite specimen of the use of logic as applied to a real question. Take for illustration the abstract syllogism-the syllogysm as disconnected from any real problem. Thus: Every A is B; C is A; therefore C is B.

In this example, there can be no question that human nature is as absolute an authority for the conclusion, C is B, as for the two propositions,-A is B, C is A,-which are its data. The testimony of the logical faculty as respects the inference, is as direct, as unequivocal, and as final, as the testimony of the intuitional faculty to either or both of the propositions which, as data for the inference, may be supposed to be within the province of this faculty. But in place of the abstract syllogism, if we substitute a corresponding solution of an actual problem; if in place of the two abstract premises, we have two special affirmations; so that the conclusion, instead of being virtually stated, must be evolved by an intellectual process, the case presents a different aspect. It may happen that in one or both of the premises, we have intuitional matter-unequivocally such, so that it may be said to be known in the strictest use of the term; but it will never happen where an intellectual process is involved at least outside of the exact sciences

(and religious doctrine is of course outside of these) that the conclusion will be equally, that is absolutely, certain. In the abstract syllogism reason sees the relation of premise and consequent sees this as directly and absolutely, as the understanding sees the facts stated in the premises; but in the actual solution, the case rightly supposes that the conclusion is not an object of sight but of deduction is not directly and absolutely affirmed by reason, but mediately reached by an act of reasoning. And it is in this act of reasoning, as distinct from an affirmation of reason, that the fallibility of man is pre-eminently obvious, and universally conceded.

We cannot therefore speak of any logical conclusion as resting upon the authority of human nature. For though in innumerable cases, the approach to certainty in logical deductions is so near as practically to amount to certainty,and, in point of fact, we every day trust our lives and the lives of those dearest to us to a logical deduction,-yet speculatively, absolute certainty cannot be affirmed of any proposition wrought out by human reasoning. The term authority, as affirmed of human nature, has no application to matters of the truth of which uncertainty is even conceivable; and we rob the term of its special and distinctive force if we give it a wider latitude of signification.

The general conclusion, then, which we reach may be stated thus: Human nature is the authority for the validity of its own intuitions; for those elements in religious doctrine which, as its intuitions, it has contributed; for of these intuitions, of these elements of doctrine, it has direct, absolute knowledge; and while human nature is not, strictly speaking, an authority for its beliefs, it is authority for what it knows. If, therefore, there is in our religious doctrine, matters specially revealed, and requiring external evidence, -for such matter the soul is not an authority. Again, if in our religious doctrine, there is matter which our reasoning has evolved-no matter whether from intuitional or from revealed data,-over this matter human nature is not authority, in any proper use of the term.

While, however, the authority of the soul of man is thus restricted from certain revealed matters, and from all the results of reasoning, it does not follow that such authority is restricted to the intuition it directly contributes. It will presently appear, we trust, that beyond the intuitions direct

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