At 6 A. M., on the appointed day, Gen. Blair's (17th) corps, holding the extreme left of Gen. McPherson's line, moved toward the eastern point of the mountain to threaten the enemy's right, while Gen. Dodge's (16th) corps and Gen. Logan's (15th) corps assaulted the northern slope adjoining. The brunt of the attack was borne by three brigades of the 15th corps, which immediately scattered the enemy's skirmishers, and pushing on up the hill with impetuosity, carried part of the rebel rifle-pits. Some of the retreating enemy were captured while endeavoring to escape to a gorge which intervenes between the right and left halves of Kenesaw. Still pressing forward our troops arrived at the foot of a perpendicular cliff thirty feet high, from the crest of which the enemy formed in line of battle, poured a destructive plunging fire, and rolled down huge stones. Seeing it impossible to scale these cliff's our line halted, retired a short distance, and fortified on the extreme right. For the second and more important attack portions of Gen. Newton's division of the 4th corps, and of Gen. Davis's of the 14th corps, were selected. At a given signal the troops rushed forward with buoyant courage, charged up the face of the mountain amidst a murderous fire from a powerful battery on the summit and through two lines of abatis, carried a line of rifle-pits beyond, and reached the works. The colors of several regiments were planted before the latter, and some of the men succeeded in mounting the ramparts, but the deaths of Gens. Wagner and Harker, and the wounding of Gen. McCook, the destructive fire of both musketry and artillery, and the difficulty of deploying the long columns under such fire, rendered it necessary to recall the men. Gen. Newton's troops returned to their original line, while Gen. Davis's 2d brigade threw up works between those they had carried and the main line of the enemy, and there remained. The whole contest lasted little more than an hour, but cost Gen. Sherman nearly three thousand in killed and wounded, while the enemy, lying behind well-formed breastworks, suffered comparatively slight loss. During the day Gen. Schofield had sharp skirmishing with the enemy's left wing, and Gen. Cox's division of the 23d corps pushed forward to a point nine miles south of Marietta and three from the Chattahoochee; but the important fighting was in the centre. The failure of the attack is to be attributed to the fact that Gen. Johnston did not allow himself to be deceived by the lengthened line which Gen. Sherman opposed to him. From his elevated position on the summit of Kenesaw he could see plainly that the main posts still confronted him, and that the flanking movement to his left was not in earnest. Contenting himself, therefore, with sending a single corps to watch the right wing, he held his main body to repel the assault on his centre. It was not, however, the intention of Gen. Sherman to rest long under the imputation of defeat, and he almost immediately commenced

preparations to turn the enemy's left, amusing Gen. Johnston, meanwhile, by a show of approaching his centre by saps. On July 1st, Gens. Hooker and Schofield advanced to the right some two miles, and on the 2d Gen. McPherson received orders to rapidly shift his whole force from the extreme left to the extreme right of the Federal lines, and push on to Nickajack Creek, which flows into the Chattahoochee, four miles below the railroad bridge. His place on the left, in front of Kenesaw, was occupied by Gen. Garrard's cavalry, while Gen. Stoneman's cavalry moved on his flanks to strike the river near Turner's Ferry, two miles and a half below the railroad bridge. The object of the movement was speedily detected by Gen. Johnston, who at once prepared to evacuate Kenesaw and fall back to the Chattahoochee. On the night of the 2d his rear guard abandoned the works which for upward of three weeks had been so resolutely assailed and defended, and before dawn of the 3d the Federal pickets occupied the crest of the mountain. Orders were immediately given for Gen. Thomas to move forward along the railroad to Marietta, and thence southward to the Chattahoochee, the rest of the army pressing rapidly toward Nickajack Creek to harass the enemy in flank and rear, and if possible to assail him in the confusion of crossing the river. Gen. Sherman himself, accompanying the Army of the Cumberland, entered Marietta at 9 o'clock on the morning of the 3d. During the retreat about two thousand prisoners, principally stragglers, fell into the hands of the Federal troops.

Gen. Johnston was too good a general to leave his movement uncovered, and Gen. Thomas pushing forward in pursuit, found him intrenched behind a fortified line at Smyr na, half way between the river and Marietta, having his flanks protected by Nickajack and Rottenwood Creeks. This, however, was but an advance line, his intention being to make his real stand in a series of works on the left bank of the river, and at the railroad bridge, where he had constructed a strong téte do pont. Again a flanking movement to the right was attempted, and with such success that on the night of the 4th Gen. Johnston fell back to the river, across which the main body of his army passed, Gen. Hardee's corps remaining on the right bank. Gen. Sherman then moved up to the Chattahoochee, and on the evening of the 5th Gens. Thomas's and McPherson's troops occupied a line extending from a short distance above the railroad bridge to the mouth of Nickajack Creek, while Gen. Schofield was posted in the rear near Smyrna as a reserve. Cavalry demonstrations were extended as far south as Campbelltown, fifteen miles below the railroad bridge. By these several manœuvres, and particularly by the shifting of Gen. McPherson's troops to the right, Gen. Sherman aimed to convey to Gen. Johnston the impression that it was his left flank that was to be turned; and in pursuance of the same strategy the Fed

eral general having determined that the enemy's position was unassailable except by a flank movement across the river, amused his enemy by demonstrations south of the railroad bridge, as if he intended crossing there. His real object was, by rapidly shifting masses of troops from extreme right to extreme left, to turn the enemy's right flank, and seize and hold the vital strategic points in that direction.

Gen. Schofield was, accordingly, directed to move due eastward from his position at Smyrna to the Chattahoochee, and to make a crossing near the mouth of Soap Creek, eight miles north of the railroad bridge. This was successfully accomplished on the 7th, with the capture of a gun and a number of prisoners, and a lodgment was effected on high ground on the left bank, and a substantial bridge constructed. At the same time Gen. Garrard occupied Rosswell, a town near the Chattahoochee, nearly due north of Atlanta, and about seven miles above Gen. Schofield's crossing, where he destroyed some woollen and cotton mills which had supplied the rebel armies. In accordance with Gen. Sherman's orders he secured the ford at this place until a corps could be sent thither from the Army of the Tennessee on the right wing. On the 9th, while the enemy were amused by feints extending from Power's Ferry, four miles above the railroad bridge, to Turner's Ferry, three miles below it, a crossing was effected at Rosswell, and the river firmly bridged; and under cover of the same demonstrations Gen. Howard was enabled to throw a bridge across at Power's Ferry. Gen. Johnston at length took the alarm, and during the night of the 9th gave orders for another retreat. His heavy guns were removed to Atlanta, seven miles distant, Gen. Hardee's corps was safely crossed to the left bank, and at daylight of the 10th the railroad bridge, the road bridge, and the pontoons, were in flames. The rebel army then fell back toward the fortifications of Atlanta, abandoning the whole line of the river, although its left wing kept in the neighborhood of Turner's Ferry, in the expectation of an attack from that quarter. Leaving Gen. Johnston to his delusion, Gen. Sherman rapidly and quietly moved the rest of the Army of the Tennessee behind the line of our forces, to its old position on the extreme left, and busied himself with strengthening his bridges and collecting supplies, which, as early as the 8th, were brought by railroad within a mile of the railroad bridge.

A week's rest was now allowed the army, a sufficient force being detailed to the left bank of the Chattahoochee to secure the several positions there and occupy the works of the enemy. These proved to be of the most formidable character, and had evidently cost many months of labor, the lines extending for upward of five and a half miles along the river, with almost impenetrable abatis in front. The sudden abandonment of them caused more consternation to the enemy than any previous disaster of

the campaign, as it was anticipated that here, in the immediate neighborhood of his supplies, Gen. Johnston could make a long and probably successful stand; or at least keep Gen. Sherman at bay until reënforcements from other parts of the confederacy should arrive. The catastrophe completed the long catalogue of complaints against this general which his enemies had sedulously arrayed before the public, and his removal was clamored for as indispensable to the salvation of the cause. The inhabitants of Atlanta in particular urged that the retreating policy had been followed far enough. It can hardly admit of a doubt, however, that he had conducted the campaign with prudence and skill, and considering his inferiority in numbers to Gen. Sherman, who was always in a condition to outflank him, he had probably delayed the Federal advance as long as it was possible.

On the 17th the whole army was across the Chattahoochee, with the exception of Gen. Davis's division of the 14th corps, left to watch the railroad bridge and the rear, and prepared to move upon Atlanta. The Army of the Cumberland now occupied the right wing and right centre, resting on the river just above the railroad bridge, the Army of the Ohio the left centre, and the Army of the Tennessee the left. In this order a grand right wheel was commenced, the right wing of the Army of the Cumberland serving as the pivot, which, on the evening of the 17th, brought the Federal line into a position about northeast of the railroad bridge, along what is known as the old Peach Tree road. On the 18th the left wing, swinging rapidly around, struck the Georgia Railroad, which connects Atlanta with Augusta, at a point two miles west of Stone Mountain, a vast elevation of granite towering over the surrounding country, fifteen miles northeast of Atlanta. With the aid of Gen. Garrard's cavalry, which moved on his flank, Gen. McPherson broke up a section of about four miles of the road, while Gen. Schofield occupied Decatur, six miles east of Atlanta, and Gen. Thomas brought his troops close up to Peach Tree Creek, a small stream rising five or six miles northeast of Atlanta, and flowing southwesterly into the Chattahoochee, near the railroad bridge. In these manœuvres our extreme left encountered little else than cavalry, supported by a few guns and a very inadequate force of infantry, an evidence that the enemy was still laboring under the delusion that his left and not his right was the real point of attack, and that Atlanta was to be approached from the southwest instead of from the northeast. Under these circumstances Gens. McPherson and Schofield were enabled, on the 19th, to pass with little trouble westward of Decatur, within the naturally strong defensive lines of Nance's and Peach Tree Creeks. Gen. Thomas, moving more directly from the north of Atlanta, found the enemy in larger force, but succeeded on the same day in crossing Peach Tree Creek in front of their intrenched lines.

The Federal line then held the arc of a circle, extending from the railroad between Atlanta and the river to some distance south of the Georgia Railroad, and in a direction north and northeast of Atlanta.

Meanwhile, on the 17th, Gen. Johnston had, in accordance with orders from the confederate war department, turned over his command to Gen. Hood, accompanying the act with the following farewell address to his troops:

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
July 17, 1864.

In obedience to the orders of the War Department, I turn over to Gen. Hood the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee. I cannot leave this noble army without expressing my admiration of the high military qualities it has displayed so conspicuously-every soldierly virtue, endurance of toil, obedience to orders, brilliant courage.

The enemy has never attacked but to be severely repulsed and punished. You, soldiers, have never argued but from your courage, and never counted your fears. No longer your leader, I will still watch your career, and will rejoice in your victories. To one and all I offer assurances of my friendship, and bid an affectionate farewell.

J. E. JOHNSTON, General. General Hood, on assuming command, issued the following address:

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE, July 18, 1864. SOLDIERS: In obedience to orders from the War Department, I assume command of this Army and Department. I feel the weight of the responsibility so suddenly and unexpectedly devolved upon me by this position, and shall bend all my energies and employ all my skill to meet its requirements. I look with confidence to your patriotism to stand by me, and rely upon your prowess to wrest your country from the grasp of the invader, entitling yourselves to the proud distinction of being called the deliverers of an oppressed people. J. B. HOOD, General.

With this change in commanders commenced a change in the method of conducting the campaign, by which it was expected that the morale of the rebel army, weakened by the persistent Fabian policy of Gen. Johnston, would be fully reestablished. The time for retreating had passed when the chief city of western Georgia lay almost in the grasp of Gen. Sherman; and the rebel army, which, to give Gen. Johnston due credit, had been kept in a compact body, and had experienced but insignificant losses of guns or material of war, was to be launched, after their well-known tactics, in fierce assaults upon the invader. With this view the command was given to Gen. Hood, who had an unequalled reputation among their generals for energy and impetuous bravery.

On the 20th the Federal lines converged still more closely around the northern and eastern sides of Atlanta, and as a gap existed between Gens. Schofield and Thomas, Stanley's and Wood's division of Gen. Howard's corps were moved to the left to connect with Gen. Schofield, leaving Gen. Newton's division of Gen. Howard's corps, with inadequate force, to hold an important position on the road leading from Atlanta to Buckhead. This weak point was soon detected by Gen. Hood, who determined to signalize his appointment to the chief com

mand by an assualt which, at one blow, should retrieve the disasters of the campaign. Gen. Sherman also was well aware that his line was vulnerable at this point; and as there were indications during the morning of a concentration of troops on the enemy's right, as if to attack the left, orders were sent to Gen. Newton and the rest of the Army of the Cumberland to close rapidly up in the latter direction. Gen. Newton accordingly pushed forward to a prominent ridge, where, about two o'clock in made a temporary halt. Some prisoners, gaththe afternoon his troops stacked arms and ered up by the skirmishers, having reported that there was no considerable force of the enemy within a mile and a half, no apprehension of an attack seems to have been felt, and no preparations had been made beyond the accustomed piles of logs and rails, which the Federal troops constructed as a matter of course, whenever halting for any considerable time on new ground in presence of the enemy. Gen. Hood had meanwhile been massing his main body in the woods immediately in front of Gen. Newton and of Gen. Hooker, who was approaching from the right, expecting, by a sudden and overwhelming attack upon the columns while in motion, to cut the Federal army in twain. At 4 o'clock he advanced from his covert without skirmishers, and pushed directly for Gen. Newton's position. Notwithstanding the unexpectedness of his appearance, the Federal troops sprang instantly to their arms, and from behind their breast works poured deliberate and deadly volleys into the dense masses of the Confederates, who were further kept in check by well-served batteries which Gen. Newton had posted on each of his flanks.

Almost at the instant of the attack on Gen. Newton, Gen. Geary's division of Gen. Hooker's corps was struck by the advancing columns of the enemy and thrown back in some confusion. But quickly rallying, it recovered its ground and kept the enemy in check until Ward's division could arrive to its assistance. The latter met the enemy's charge by a counter charge, and the two columns mingling in the shock of battle, the enemy, after a brief and fierce struggle, were driven back. Further to the right, and next to Geary, Williams' division, though attacked with desperation, stood manfully up to the work, and repulsed with heavy loss every onset of the enemy. After four hours of incessant fighting, the latter retired precipitately to his intrenchments, leaving on the field upward of six hundred dead, one thousand severely wounded, seven regimental flags, and a number of prisoners. His total loss was estimated by Gen. Sherman at five thousand. That of the Federal troops was one thousand nine hundred, of which the greater part fell on Gen. Hooker's corps, which fought wholly on open ground, and bore the brunt of the battle.

During the 21st the enemy kept within his intrenched position, commanding the open valley of Peach Tree Creek, his right beyond the

Georgia railroad to the east, and his left extended toward Turner's Ferry, at a general distance of four miles from Atlanta. In the course of the day a steep and strongly-fortified hill, about five hundred yards in advance of the skirmish line of the extreme Federal left, was gallantly carried by Gen. Leggett's division of the 17th corps, though with a loss of seven hundred and fifty men. Four desperate attempts were made by the division of Gen. Cleburne to regain the position, which completely commanded Atlanta and the two principal roads leading north and south from the city; but the enemy finally retired, baffled and severely crippled, leaving his dead and most of his wounded on the slope of the hill. He also lost about a hundred prisoners. Gen. McPherson immediately threw out working parties to the hill, with the intention of occupying it with strong batteries.

On the 22d the whole advanced line of the enemy was found abandoned, a circumstance which at first led Gen. Sherman to believe that they intended to surrender Atlanta without further contest. Gen. Hood, however, was only preparing to repeat, on a larger scale, the experiment of the 20th. By a show of retreating upon the city he hoped to decoy Gen. Sherman into a rapid advance, and then suddenly, with heavy masses of troops, to strike the Federal army while in motion, at such weak points as should present themselves. "It is now quite evident," says an army correspondent, writing on the 24th, "that the enemy, when they fell back out of their works, did not retire to the inner line around the city at all, though by taking that direction, and showing themselves in large numbers upon their works, they intended to make us believe they had done so. Gen. Hardee's corps, instead, marched during the night away round to the eastward, sweeping entirely the circle of the Federal left wing, and then, as we closed in around the city, and before the left wing had got in position, struck us upon the front, and also upon the flanks." Unsuspicious of this deep laid plan for his discomfiture, Gen. Sherman pushed his troops beyond the abandoned works, and found the enemy occupying in force a line of finished redoubts completely covering the approaches to Atlanta, and busily occupied in connecting these redoubts with curtains strengthened by rifle trenches, abatis, and chevaux-de-frise. This satisfied him that Gen. Hood meant to fight, and he immediately resumed the dispositions previously commenced for pressing the city on its eastern and northern fronts. As the Federal line closed in, the circle which it formed became so contracted, that the 16th corps, Gen. Dodge, which formed the right of the Army of the Tennessee, was thrown out of position, and fell behind the 15th corps, the latter thus closing up with Gen. Schofield, who held the centre. Gen. McPherson accordingly ordered Gen. Dodge to shift his position to the extreme left of the line, and occupy the hill carried by the 17th corps on

the previous day, and which was still held by Gen. Leggett's division. At about 11 A. M., soon after this movement had commenced, Gen. McPherson met the commander-in-chief near the centre of the lines. "He described to me," says Gen. Sherman in his official report, "the condition of things on his flank and the dispositions of his troops. I explained to him that if we met serious resistance in Atlanta, as present appearances indicated, instead of operating against it by the left, I would extend to the right, and that I did not want him to gain much distance to the left. He then described the hill occupied by Gen. Leggett's division of Gen. Blair's (17th) corps as essential to the occupation of any ground to the east and south of the Augusta railroad, on account of its commanding nature. I therefore ratified his disposition of troops, and modified a previous order I had sent him in writing to use Gen. Dodge's corps, thrown somewhat in reserve by the closing up of our line, to break up railroad, and I sanctioned its going, as already ordered by Gen. McPherson, to his left, to hold and fortify that position."

At noon Gen. McPherson rode off to the left, where the enemy appeared to be making a slight cavalry demonstration. He had not been gone half an hour when the desultory skirmishing which had been going on in that quarter all the morning suddenly deepened into a loud crash of musketry, followed by rapid artillery firing, indicating the presence of the enemy in large force. Gen. Hood had in fact secured the opportunity which he desired, and apprehending rightly that a demonstration was least expected on the left flank, had massed Gens. Hardee's and Stewart's corps under the cover of the thick woods which skirt the railroad, and was preparing to attack the 16th and 17th corps while they were getting into position, his forts meanwhile holding the Federal centre and right in check. Gen. Sherman instantly transmitted orders to Gens. Schofield and Thomas to keep the enemy employed on all parts of their front, and the former was directed to hold as large a force as possible in reserve to sustain the left, should aid be needed.

Gen. McPherson, upon reaching the left, found the 16th corps just about moving into position to prolong the flank, and temporarily facing to the left in a direction perpendicular to our main line. Between the right of the 16th and the left of the 17th corps was a wooded space of about half a mile which was not occupied by any troops. Shortly after twelve o'clock the enemy emerged from the dense woods in front of these corps in three solid columns, and marched directly upon the 16th corps for the purpose of turning our whole line. Three desperate assaults were repelled by Gen. Dodge, in the last of which the enemy suffered severe loss from the well-directed fire of the Federal batteries. Finding that the attempt to break the lines had failed at this point, Gen. McPher

sou took advantage of a temporary lull in the fighting to ride through the woods to Gen. Gides A. Smith's division, which held the left of the 17th corps. A report that the enemy in heavy force were moving around the left of the 17th corps, and were pushing in through the gap above mentioned, as existing between it and the 16th (the attack on the 16th corps having, in fact, been a feint to draw attention from the real point of attack), induced him to hasten in that direction. After reaching the gap he gave directions to the only member of his staff who accompanied him, the rest having been sent with orders to different portions of the field, to obtain a brigade from Gen. Logan's command and throw it across the gap, and then, with a single orderly, struck into a cross road leading directly to Gen. Smith's position. Already, however, unknown to him, the enemy's skirmish line had advanced close up to this road, and when it was too late to retrace his steps he found himself within fifty feet of it. The rebel officer in command called upon him to surrender, but he only dashed his horse to the right of the road, and was almost immediately brought to the ground, mortally wounded, by a volley from the skirmishers. His body was for a time in the possession of the enemy, bat was subsequently recovered and brought within the Federal lines. Upon hearing of this disaster, Gen. Sherman ordered Gen. Logan to assume command of the Army of the Tennes

see.

The brigade (Wangelin's) ordered up from Gen. Logan's corps, arrived in time to partially check the enemy, but could not prevent him from getting a portion of his force in the rear of the 17th corps, while heavy masses of troops, principally from Gen. Stewart's corps, were pushed against the works held by Gen. Leggett on the hill, wrested from Gen. Cleburne the day before, and which they were evidently determined to retake at any sacrifice. Sweeping up in their advance the working party engaged upon the fortifications, the enemy bore heavily against Gens. Smith's and Leggett's divisions, which, attacked in front and rear, were obliged to fire alternately from behind their own breastwork and the old abandoned parapet of the enemy. Gen. Leggett's troops clung firmly to their important position on the top of the hill, against the fortified angle of which the rebels dashed their columns with desperate but fruitless energy. Gen. Smith had meanwhile been compelled to abandon his more exposed lines, but by a skilful movement he gradually withdrew his men, regiment by regiment, to a new line connecting on the right with Gen. Leggett, his left, refused, facing to the southeast. In executing this movement he was obliged to abandon two gans to the enemy. Against this new formation of the 17th corps the enemy could make no impression, but recoiled again and again before the deadly fire of the Federal troops, which mowed down whole ranks at a time, and covered the ground and ditches with dead and VOL. IV.-6 A

wounded men. A part of the rebel force that pushed for the gap between the 16th and 17th corps renewed the attack upon the right flank of the former, and upon its first advance captured a six-gun battery of the regular army, which was moving along unsupported and unapprehensive of danger. Gens. Sweeney's and Fuller's divisions soon checked the enemy's advance, and finally drove him back in confusion with the loss of many prisoners. At a critical period of the battle several of Gen. Sweeney's regiments were found to be without ammunition; but as it was indispensable that they should hold their position, their commander ordered them to meet the enemy with the bayonet, whereupon the latter broke and fled to the rear. At about half-past three o'clock the enemy desisted from his attack on our left flank, having gained no ground and suffered enormous losses, for which his capture of eight guns ill compensated.

Meanwhile two divisions of Gen. Wheeler's cavalry, with a section of artillery, took a wide circuit to the east and fell upon Decatur, now three miles in our rear, where Col. Sprague, with three infantry regiments, and a battery, was guarding a number of wagon trains filled with commissary and ammunition supplies. By a skilful disposition of his small force, Col. Sprague held the enemy in complete check until every wagon except three was sent to the rear of Gens. Schofield and Thomas, when he also fell back nearer the main body, having inflicted considerable damage upon the enemy and secured a number of prisoners. Gen. Wheeler's unopposed approach to Decatur was owing to the absence of Gen. Garrard's cavalry on a raid southeast of Atlanta.

About 4 P. M. a pause occurred in the battle, occasioned by Gen. Hood's massing troops for an assault upon Gen. Logan's (15th) corps, temporarily commanded by Gen. Morgan L. Smith, which held the right of the Army of the Tennessee behind substantial breastworks, immediately adjoining the 17th corps. At halfpast 4 P. M., while just enough of an attack was maintained against the extreme left to occupy the attention of the troops in that quarter, a heavy force two lines deep marched directly toward the left of the 15th corps, driving before it a couple of regiments of skirmishers and capturing two guns. Protected by their works, Gen. Lightburn's brigade, which held this part of the line, for half an hour kept the enemy at bay by well-directed discharges from a battery of 20-pounder Parrotts; but a second strong rebel column now approached, which scarcely faltered beneath the volleys which ploughed its ranks in long furrows, and presently, to add to the perplexity of the situation, a third column was seen pouring in at the rear through a deep cut in the Georgia railroad. Finding that to hold their position would insure capture, Gen. Lightburn's troops retired in considerable confusion to the second line of breast works, five hundred yards from