considerable portion of the expenditure of public money may be dispensed with, while greater facilities can be afforded to the liquidation of claims upon the government, and an examination into their justice and legality, quite as efficient as the present, secured. With a view to a general reform in the system, I recommend the subject to the attention of Congress.

1 deem it my duty again to call your attention to the condition of the District of Columbia. It was doubtless wise in the framers of our constitution to place the people of this district under the jurisdiction of the general government; but, to accomplish the objects they had in view, it is not necessary that this people should be deprived of all the privileges of selfgovernment. Independently of the difficulty of inducing the representatives of distant states to turn their attention to projects of laws which are not of the highest interest to their constituents, they are not individually nor in Congress collectively, well qualified to legislate over the local concerns of this district. Consequently, its interests are much neglected, and the people are almost afraid to present their grievances, lest a body in which they are not represented, and which feels little sympathy in their local relations, should, in its attempt to make laws for them, do more harm than good. Governed by the laws of the states whence they were severed, the two shores of the Potomac, within the ten miles square, have different penal codes: not the present codes of Virginia and Maryland, but such as existed in those states at the time of the cession to the United States. As Congress will not form a new code, and as the people of the district can not make one for themselves, they are virtually under two governments. Is it not just to allow them at least a delegate in Congress, if not a local legislature to make laws for the district, subject to the approval or rejection of Congress? I earnestly recommend the extension to them of every political right which their interests require, and which may be compatible with the constitution.

The extension of the judiciary system of the United States, is deemed to be one of the duties of government. One fourth of the states in the Union do not participate in the benefits of a circuit court. To the states of Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, admitted into the Union since the present judicial system was organized, only a district court has been allowed. If this be sufficient, then the circuit courts, already existing in eighteen states, ought to be abolished: if it be not sufficient, the defect ought to be remedied, and these states placed on the same footing with the other members of the Union. It was on this condition, and on this footing, that they entered the Union; and they may demand circuit courts as a matter, not of concession, but of right. I trust that Congress will not adjourn, leaving this anomaly in our system.

Entertaining the opinions heretofore expressed in relation to the bank of the United States, as at present organized, I felt it my duty, in my former messages, frankly to disclose them, in order that the attention of the legislature and the people should be seasonably directed to that important subject, and that it might be considered and finally disposed of in a manner best calculated to promote the ends of the constitution, and subserve the public interests. Having thus conscientiously discharged a constitutional duty, I deem it proper, on this occasion, without a more particular reference to the views of the subject then expressed, to leave it for the present to the investigation of an enlightened people and their representatives.

In conclusion, permit me to invoke that power which superintends all

governments, to infuse into your deliberations, at this important crisis of our history, a spirit of mutual forbearance and conciliation. In that spirit was our Union formed, and in that spirit must it be preserved.

SPECIAL MESSAGE.

DECEMBER 13, 1831.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States :THE accompanying papers show the situation and extreme peril, from which more than sixty of our fellow-citizens have been rescued by the courage and humanity of the master and crew of a Spanish brig. As no property was saved, there were no means of making pecuniary satisfaction for the risk and loss incurred in performing this humane and meritorious service. Believing, therefore, that this obligation devolved upon the nation, but having no fund at my disposal, which I could think constitutionally applicable to the case, I have thought honor, as well as justice, required that the facts should be submitted to the consideration of Congress, in order that they might provide, not only a just indemnity for the losses incurred, but some compensation adequate to the merit of the

service.

SPECIAL MESSAGE.

FEBRUARY 15, 1832.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

BEING more and more convinced that the destiny of the Indians, within the settled portion of the United States, depends upon their entire and speedy migration to the country west of the Mississippi, set apart for their permanent residence, I am anxious that all the arrangements necessary to the complete execution of the plan of removal, and to the ultimate security and improvement of the Indians, should be made without further delay. Those who have already removed, and are removing, are sufficiently numerous to engage the serious attention of the government, and it is due, not less to them than to the obligation which the nation has assumed, that every reasonable step should be taken to fulfil the expectations that have been held out to them. Many of those who yet remain, will no doubt, within a short period, become sensible that the course recommended is the only one which promises stability or improvement. And it is to be hoped that all of them will realize the truth, and unite with their brethren beyond the Mississippi. Should they do so, there would then be no question of jurisdiction to prevent the government from exercising such a general control over their affairs as may be essential to their interest and safety. Should any of them, however, repel the offer of removal, they are free to remain, but they must remain with such privileges and disabilities as the respective states within whose jurisdiction they live, may prescribe.

I transmit, herewith, a report from the secretary of war, which presents

a general outline of the progress that has already been made in this work, and of all which remains to be done. It will be perceived that much information is yet necessary for the faithful performance of the duties of the government, without which it will be impossible to provide for the execution of some of the existing stipulations, or make those prudential arrangements upon which the final success of the whole movement, so far as relates to the Indians themselves, must depend. I recommend the subject to the attention of Congress, in the hope that the suggestions in this report may be found useful, and that provision may be made for the appointment of the commissioners therein referred to; and for vesting them with such authority as may be necessary to the satisfactory performance of the important duties proposed to be intrusted to them.

THE bill "to modify and continue" the act entitled, "An act to incorporate the subscribers to the bank of the United States," was presented to me on the 4th of July instant. Having considered it with that solemn regard to the principles of the constitution which the day was calculated to inspire, and come to the conclusion that it ought not to become a law, I herewith return it to the senate, in which it originated, with my objections.

A bank of the United States is in many respects convenient for the government and useful to the people. Entertaining this opinion, and deeply impressed with the belief that some of the powers and privileges possessed by the existing bank are unauthorized by the constitution, subversive of the rights of the states, and dangerous to the liberties of the people, I felt it my duty, at an early period of my administration, to call the attention of Congress to the practicability of organizing an institution combining all its advantages, and obviating these objections. I sincerely regret that, in the act before me, I can perceive none of those modifications of the bank charter which are necessary, in my opinion, to make it compatible with justice, with sound policy, or with the constitution of our country.

The present corporate body, denominated the president, directors, and company of the bank of the United States, will have existed, at the time this act is intended to take effect, twenty years. It enjoys an exclusive privilege of banking, under the authority of the general government, a monopoly of its favor and support, and, as a necessary consequence, almost a monopoly of the foreign and domestic exchange. The powers, privileges, and favors bestowed upon it in the original charter, by increasing the value of the stock far above its par value, operated as a gratuity of many millions to the stockholders.

An apology may be found for the failure to guard against this result, in the consideration that the effect of the original act of incorporation could not be certainly foreseen at the time of its passage. The act before me proposes another gratuity to the holders of the same stock, and in many cases, to the same men, of at least seven millions more. This donation finds no apology in any uncertainty as to the effect of the act. On all hands it is conceded that its passage will increase, at least twenty or thirty per cent. more, the market price of the stock, subject to the payment of

the annuity of two hundred thousand dollars per year secured by the act; thus adding, in a moment, one fourth to its par value. It is not our own citizens only who are to receive the bounty of our government. More than eight millions of the stock of this bank are held by foreigners. By this act, the American republic proposes virtually to make them a present of some millions of dollars. For these gratuities to foreigners, and to some of our own opulent citizens, the act secures no equivalent whatever. They are the certain gains of the present stockholders under the operation of this act, after making full allowance for the payment of the bonus.

Every monopoly, and all exclusive privileges, are granted at the expense of the public, which ought to receive a fair equivalent. The many millions which this act proposes to bestow upon the stockholders of the existing bank must come directly or indirectly out of the earnings of the American people. It is due to them, therefore, if their government sell monopolies and exclusive privileges, that they should at least exact for them as much as they are worth in open market. The value of the monopoly in this case may be correctly ascertained. The twenty-eight millions of stock would probably be at an advance of fifty per cent., and command in market at least forty-two millions of dollars, subject to the payment of the present bonus. The present value of the monopoly, therefore, is seventeen millions of dollars, and this the act proposes to sell for three millions, payable in fifteen annual instalments of two hundred thousand dollars each.

It is not conceivable how the present stockholders can have any claim to the special favor of the government. The present corporation has enjoyed its monopoly during the period stipulated in the original contract. If we must have such a corporation, why should not the government sell out the whole stock, and thus secure to the people the full market value of the privileges granted? Why should not Congress create and sell twenty-eight millions of stock, incorporating the purchasers with all the powers and privileges secured in this act, and putting the premium upon the sales into the treasury.

But this act does not permit competition in the purchase of this monopoly. It seems to be predicated on the erroneous idea that the present stockholders have a prescriptive right not only to the favor, but to the bounty of government. It appears that more than a fourth part of the stock is held by foreigners, and the residue is held by a few hundred of our own citizens, chiefly of the richest class. For their benefit does this act exclude the whole American people from competition in the purchase of this monopoly, and dispose of it for many millions less than it is worth. This seems the less excusable, because some of our citizens, not now stockholders, petitioned that the door of competition might be opened, and offered to take a charter on terms much more favorable to the government and country.

But this proposition, although made by men whose aggregate wealth is believed to be equal to all the private stock in the existing bank, has been set aside, and the bounty of our government is proposed to be again bestowed on the few who have been fortunate enough to secure the stock, and at this moment wield the power of the existing institution. I can not perceive the justice or policy of this course. If our government must sell monopolies, it would seem to be its duty to take nothing less than their full value; and if gratuities must be made once in fifteen or twenty years, let them not be bestowed on the subjects of a foreign government, nor upon a designated and favored class of men in our own country. It is but justice

and good policy, as far as the nature of the case will admit, to confine our favors to our own fellow-citizens, and let each in his turn enjoy an opportunity to profit by our bounty. In the bearings of the act before me, upon these points, I find ample reasons why it should not become a law.

It has been urged as an argument in favor of rechartering the present bank, that the calling in its loans will produce great embarrassment and distress. The time allowed to close its concerns is ample; and if it has been well managed, its pressure will be light, and heavy only in case its management has been bad. If, therefore, it shall produce distress, the fault will be its own: and it would furnish a reason against renewing a power which has been so obviously abused. But will there ever be a time when this reason will be less powerful? To acknowledge its force, is to admit that the bank ought to be perpetual; and, as a consequence, the present stockholders, and those inheriting their rights as successors, be established a privileged order, clothed both with great political power, and enjoying immense pecuniary advantages from their connexion with the government.

The modifications of the existing charter, proposed by this act, are not such, in my view, as make it consistent with the rights of the states or the liberties of the people. The qualification of the right of the bank to hold real estate, the limitation of its power to establish branches, and the power reserved to Congress to forbid the circulation of small notes, are restrictions comparatively of little value or importance. All the objectionable principles of the existing corporation, and most of its odious features, are retained without alleviation."

The fourth section provides "that the notes or bills of the said corporation, although the same be, on the faces thereof, respectively made payable at one place only, shall, nevertheless, be received by the said corporation at the bank, or at any of the offices of discount and deposite thereof, if tendered in liquidation or payment of any balance or balances due to said corporation or to such office of discount and deposite from any other incorporated bank." This provision secures to the state banks a legal privilege in the bank of the United States, which is withheld from all private citizens. If a state bank in Philadelphia owe the bank of the United States, and have notes issued by the St. Louis branch, it can pay the debt with those notes, but if a merchant, mechanic, or other private citizen, be in like circumstances, he can not by law pay his debt with those notes, but must sell them at a discount, or send them to St. Louis to be cashed. This boon, conceded to the state banks, though not unjust in itself, is most odious, because it does not measure out equal justice to the high and the low, the rich and the poor.

To the extent of its practical effect, it is a bond of Union among the banking establishments of the nation, erecting them into an interest separate from that of the people, and its necessary tendency is to unite the bank of the United States and the state banks in any measure which may be thought conducive to their common interest.

The ninth section of the act recognises principles of worse tendency than any provision of the present charter.

It enacts that the cashier of the bank shall annually report to the secretary of the treasury the names of all stockholders who are not resident citizens of the United States; and on the application of the treasurer of any state, shall make out and transmit to such treasurer a list of stockholders residing in, or citizens of such state, with the amount of stock owned by each." Although this provision, taken in connexion with a decision of the