by readings. I had some money with my wife, and some settled upon me by a friend. I have had many gifts by friends; many anonymous and considerable gifts. I married in 1858. The income of my wife was sufficient for me to live comfortably upon but it has been suspended for a time owing to a technical legal difficulty. I believe the first spiritual powers appeared to me when I was six months old; but the first external manifestation that I knew any thing of was developed in 1850. At first I had no means of interpreting the sounds. The alphabet was given to me by a clergyman in America. I did seek to influence plaintiff in the disposition of her property. I endeavoured to influence her against the course she was following, but I do not say that in my heart I was not glad. I still adhere to the statement that the position was forced upon me by the plaintiff. I deny the statement of Mrs. Fellows with reference to what took place in February. The plaintiff did not say, “Oh, my darling, let me see you!" and I did not say, "Don't interrupt me." It is untrue that Mrs. Fellows said, "Let us have a manifestation," and that I replied I had a bad headache. I recollect the pocket-handkerchief being knotted. That was on the 8th of October last. Mrs. Lyon was sitting at the table, and she held up her handkerchief and said, "Look what has occurred!" I asked her whether she had not done it to remind herself of something, and she replied in the negative. On the 7th of October, as I was about to leave the house, I heard a knocking, and the following was rapped out, "Do not say the light of other days has fled. I, Charles, am with you." I did not know the name of her husband at that time. All that has been stated by Mrs. Key with reference to what she heard is perfectly false. What has been stated by Mr. Wilkinson with reference to what took place when the will was made is true. I never said, in answer to a request that there should be a manifestation, "I cannot do it, mother; there is something in Mrs. Fellows' presence." The defendant then proceeded to deny the statements contained in Mrs. Pepper's affidavit.

Mr. James then read a letter from the defendant to a person named Bradshaw, stating, "Should the information you speak of be correct, I will place at your disposal the sum of 300l. after my suit is concluded. I can only do this as you are not a witness, and are outside the cause."

The defendant then went into a history of the letter, stating that it resulted from an anonymous communication he received, which from the first he knew was a trap. He wrote the letter in order that it might be produced in court.

Re-examined by Mr. Matthews.-I have been the guest of crowned heads, and have resided at the Emperor of Russia's palace. I have also been a guest of the Emperor of the French. I never claimed to have the power to produce the manifestation, nor have I the slightest belief that I have the power to do so. There are mediums besides myself. They are always persons of nervous temperament. I know mediums who cannot for a moment be suspected of making a profit out of the manifestations. I saw manifestations in Mr. Jenkin's house. I never consulted spirits with regard to his pecuniary affairs, nor have I professed to do so for other people. I have known Dr. and Miss Gully for many years, and had no motive for deceiving them. Miss Gully was with me at the time the raps came on the umbrella, and she spelt out some of the words. At the last manifestation Mr. Ellis, M.A., of Oxford, was present; that was about a fortnight ago, at Mr. Jenkin's house. At the time Mrs. Lyon gave me the money I had a father, a sister, two aged aunts, and my child dependent upon me. Nobody made money out of the Spiritual Athenæum; on the contrary, the

members lost by it. It was only a place of meeting for the members. When the will was executed I was in Mrs. Lyon's bedroom. I was there at her request, and she asked me to go into the other room when the will was made. Before the will was executed I never spoke to Mr. Wilkinson about it. Nor have I had any communication with Mr. Wilkinson about his other business with Mrs. Lyon. I had two meetings with Mrs. Bradshaw (the person who sent the anonymous letter). She lived at Albert-terrace, in the same house with Mrs. Lyon. When I had an interview with Mrs. Bradshaw I had a witness present.

Mr. Matthews proceeded to comment on the case for the defendant. He remarked on the plaintiff's demeanour in the witness-box, by which she had shown herself a good woman of business and of singular vigour and shrewdness of understanding, and thus unlikely to have been under the extraordinary influence alleged. He dwelt upon the improbability of the plaintiff's story, and read the letter of the 10th of October from the plaintiff to the defendant, in which she wrote, "I have a desire to render you independent of the world, and having ample means for the purpose, without abstracting from any needs or comforts of my own, I have the greatest satisfaction in now presenting you with, and as an entirely FREE GIFT from me, the sum of 24,000l." The plaintiff, în her cross-examination, at first persisted in denying all recollection of the letter, and it was not until it was actually put into her hands she admitted that she had written such a letter, and that it was in her handwriting. Then, all at once, she remembered all about it, how she wrote it from a copy, how, as soon as she had copied the draft, the draft was immediately torn up. What reliance was to be placed upon such testimony? In her answer, speaking of this letter, she said that the draft from which it was copied was destroyed with other business papers on a subsequent occasion, in accordance with the supposed commands of her husband's spirit. What answer, again, could she give to the questions with which she was pressed as to the underscorings in the letter? She evaded the question, and would give no answer. Feeling, with natural shrewdness, the pinch of her case upon this point, she was obliged to resort to shifts, prevaricating and cunning suggestions to evade the difficulty. Her testimony as to all the circumstances attending this letter was full of contradictions. It was impossible to read her letters and doubt the existence of her affection for the defendant. Mr. Fitzroy Kelly followed on the same side.

Mr. James then replied, and in the ensuing term the Vice-Chancellor delivered judgment in this suit, which, he stated, had for its object the setting aside of a gift by the plaintiff to the defendant Home absolutely of a sum of 30,0001. stock, and the settlement upon him of a further sum of 30,000l. His honour first read a statement, or narrative, of the facts of the case, and referred to the lonely position of the plaintiff, who was a widow and childless when the occurrences material to the case took place, and who lived in cheap lodgings, without society or friends capable of advising her. He then read considerable extracts from the bill and answer and evidence in the suit, illustrative of the acquaintanceship and position of the plaintiff and defendant, and referred specially to the denial in the defendant's answer that he had ever caused any spiritual manifestations when alone with the plaintiff, and his statement that if any such had occurred they were occasioned by the plaintiff. As to this denial and statement, his honour read extracts from manuscript books in the plaintiff's handwriting containing accounts of manifestations-such as a handkerchief

supposed to be knotted by the husband's spirit. After reading extracts from Mr. Wilkinson, the solicitor's answer, his honour said that it appeared that nearly all who had made affidavits in support of the defendant's case were spiritualists, and contradicted the plaintiff in many particulars, showing what the conduct and statements of the plaintiff were when they were present. Some of the evidence went to show that the plaintiff treated the manifestations in conversing about them with levity, and in a joking manner. His honour then said that he would refer to passages of the defendant's cross-examination and other evidence. He must, however, state that a comparison of the statements in the plaintiff's affidavits with the cross-examination and Mr. Wilkinson's evidence showed that no reliance could be placed on the plaintiff's statements, uncorroborated by other evidence. Nevertheless, his honour did not hesitate to say that he totally disbelieved the defendant's allegation that she was turned against him in consequence of his refusing to respond to her affection. If this were true it would not assist the defendant's case. But every letter, act, and communication in the case disproved and were inconsistent with this. In approaching the substantial and effective part of his judgment his honour said that he had to consider, first, the merits of the case, and, secondly, the law applicable to it. As to the first, he could have wished the bill so framed as to contain the substance of the evidence and manuscript books relied on to support it; still it could not be said that each party had not had fair notice of all the issues that were to be raised. The question here was, whether two gifts, each supported by irrevocable deeds, were or were not to be upheld; on this the principles of the Court were clear, as expressed in the judgment of Lord Eldon, in Hatch v. Hatch, and Lord Cottenham, in Dent v. Millett. These principles were that in such relationships as guardian and ward, attorney and client, medical man and patient, where undue influence was easy of exercise, the spontaneousness of gifts must be shown by the clearest evidence. On considering the facts of this case it was clear from the outset that the plaintiff was passionately attached to her dead husband, and that she expected to meet him again in the year in which the events in question took place. She had taken to reading spiritualistic works, and had become a believer in their theories. She was superstitious, and open to the influence of visions, one of which-that of a goldenhaired boy, who was to be her son-had had the greatest effect upon her. With. her mind well saturated with these things, she made overtures for acquaintance with Home. His honour then detailed the events following her first knowledge of him, and the mode in which the gifts were made. On the defendant Home lay the onus of showing that what she did was the result of her pure volition uninfluenced by him. The defendant denied that he had occasioned any spiritual manifestations at their interviews. But Mrs. Fellows' evidence showed that much more had taken place in the shape of manifestions than he was willing to admit. In short, when the antecedents of both parties, the facts, letters, and actions proved in the case, were considered, it was clear that the transactions were such as should be jealously watched. It was true that the plaintiff for several months was obstinately desirous of supporting the gifts, owing, amongst other causes, partly to fear lest her sanity should be questioned, and his honour was therefore satisfied that the statements that spiritualism had not influenced her mind were contrary to the fact. It was true that the plaintiff had knowledge of business, but this was limited as compared with the defendant's. It was urged that she had independent advice. But it must be borne in mind that the

defendant was in constant communication with her; that she feared the interference of her husband's relatives; that she thought her sanity might be questioned; and that no power of revocation was contained in the deeds, or even suggested to her. All that was done in the way of advice and warning was apparently done more by way of caution against what others might do than of protection of the plaintiff. It was most important that no suggestion of a power of revocation or of the advisability of communicating with the husband's relatives had been made. As before stated, the onus of proving that no influence had been exercised lay on the defendant. From the reasons, facts, and evidence before referred to, he must hold that the defendant had not made out a case in support of the gifts. There must, therefore, be the usual declaration setting aside the gifts as fraudulent and void, a re-transfer and re-assignment of the property must be directed, with usual accounts, by the defendant. Under the circumstances of the case he should not order the defendant to pay more than his own costs. As to the costs of the defendant Wilkinson, the trustee, his answer and evidence had been so enormously increased in length and expense by the charges made against him by the plaintiff, whose statements were so perverse and untrue, that the Court felt itself seriously embarrassed by them; and, therefore, should direct his costs to be paid by the plaintiff. His honour then stated that, knowing nothing of spiritualism beyond what had appeared in the course of the suit, he could not, nor was it his duty to, express his opinion on the merits of the belief. It was not for him to say what might or might not be the effect of peculiar nervous organizations in inducing a belief that certain phenomena were the result of spiritual agency. Nevertheless, the views of the defendant on this matter tended to give him an influence, and his honour felt compelled to say that the system was a most mischievous one, and well calculated on the one hand to control the believers in it and to assist the plans of the needy and designing.

III.

PROSECUTION OF MR. EYRE.

CHARGE OF MR. JUSTICE BLACKBURN.

THE case of Mr. Eyre, Ex-Governor of Jamaica, came before the Court of Queen's Bench upon a prosecution for high crimes and misdemeanours, in acts of alleged abuse and oppression under colour of execution of his office as Governor of the island.

Mr. Justice Blackburn delivered the following charge to the grand jury:-In the year 1865 Mr. Eyre was Governor of Jamaica, and in October of that year, on the breaking out of an insurrection, Mr. Eyre, as Governor, and in order to put it down, took steps into the legality of which we are now to inquire. It is not disputed that he did, with the assent of his counsel, proclaim martial law, and put it in force; in this sense I mean that he not only caused troops to act in the proclaimed district to put down the insurrection and to suppress armed resistance, but he also caused martial law to be executed in the sense of summary proceedings, superseding the common law; and that a number of persons were tried by this summary process and subjected to severe punishments; and further, that he caused this to be done for a period of thirty days. The ques

tion is, whether in doing these things he did anything for which he ought to be criminally responsible. Now the law upon the subject is of great importance, and when I have explained it to you it will be for you to determine the questions of fact which arise upon it. The prosecution is not under the First Colonial Governors' Act of William III., but under the Act of the 42nd of George III., c. 85, which enacted in substance that if any governor of a colony, or any military officer holding any station in a colony should be guilty of any crime or offence in the exercise or execution of his office, or under colour of it, he shall be liable to be tried here. There is no question that Mr. Eyre did what was done by him as Governor of Jamaica, and that if any of the things he did are crimes or offences they were done in execution or under colour of his office. So the question comes to be, What are the "crimes and misdemeanours and offences which can be committed, what is the rule or test of the criminal responsibility which may be incurred by a governor when acting, as Mr. Eyre undoubtedly was, as governor, and for the purpose of putting an end to an insurrection ?— a question on which it is of great importance that the law should be distinctly laid down. For it is of great importance that it should be known when a governor in such a position can be deemed to have so far exceeded his duty as to be criminally responsible. Upon that question there can be no doubt that the legal duty, and therefore the legal responsibility, of persons in such a position varies very much according to their powers or functions, either by the common law or by any particular statutes. The powers of a governor of a colony are far more extensive, for instance, than those of the lord-lieutenant of a county or the mayor of a borough in England, when a riot or insurrection has broken out, and consequently the things he would be authorized to do, and which he might be blamable if he did not do, would greatly differ. But the principle on which the doctrine rests is the same; the officer is bound to exercise the powers which the law gives him in the manner which under the circumstances would be right, and if he fails in something he ought to do, or which the circumstances render it his duty to do, and he neglects his duty to such an extent as to amount to criminal negligence, then he will be criminally responsible. All this was considered thirty years ago in the case of the Mayor of Bristol, when riots broke out there, which for want of proper steps taken to put them down continued three days, and a great part of Bristol was burnt down. The Government thought that the Mayor was responsible for not having done his duty as Mayor in putting down the riots, and he was therefore prosecuted. That case was the converse of the present. Here the charge against Mr. Eyre is that he exceeded his duty, and did so much more than he ought to have done, that he is criminally responsible; there the charge was that the mayor failed in his duty, and did not do enough. The two questions are correlative, and the law laid down in that case on a trial at Bar by Mr. Justice Littledale, in the name of the Court, affords useful guidance in laying down the principle applicable in the present case. The learned Judge said that a party entrusted with the duty of putting down a riot, whether by virtue of an office of his own seeking (as in the ordinary case of a magistrate), or imposed upon him (as that of a constable), is bound to hit the exact line between excess and failure of duty, and that the difficulty of so doing, though it might be some ground for a lenient consideration of his conduct on the part of the jury, was no legal defence to a charge like the present. Nor could a party so charged excuse himself on the mere ground of honest intention. He might omit acting to the extent of his duty from a perfectly good feeling, and that might be considered in appor