The amendment was supported by Sir H. Williamson and Mr. Osborne, and opposed by Mr. D. Bromley, Mr. Newdegate, Lord Galway, and Mr. A. Peel. Eventually it was carried on a division by 184 to 148. The success of this amendment secured the passing of the Bill. Other amendments hostile to the recommendations of the Select Committee were moved and rejected, and the Bill finally passed through Committee in a shape by which the fifteen large boroughs, about which the controversy had been raised, were retained in the position recommended by the Select Committee.

The differences which had excited a considerable amount of party feeling in the House of Commons were revived with even greater animation when the Bill came before the House of Lords. The question was again raised as to the conduct of Government in attempting to set aside the recommendations of the Select Committeee, to which it was alleged they had agreed to refer the settlement of boundaries by way of compromise. Earl Beauchamp having moved an amendment with respect to the Parliamentary limits of Birkenhead and Birmingham in accordance with the original report of the Boundary Commissioners, Earl Granville earnestly protested against this course, and appealed to the Government to withhold their support from the amendment, on the ground that Mr. Disraeli in the House of Commons had assented to the alterations suggested by the Select Committee as a compromise.

The Earl of Malmesbury observed that it was not in the power of any Ministry to control the action of the House of Lords by speeches delivered in the House of Commons.

This remark drew from Earl Russell the rejoinder that the Prime Minister had distinctly declared after the Bill assumed its present shape that the question of boundaries was settled. It would, therefore, he submitted, be a breach of faith on the part of the Government now to disturb that settlement.

The Lord Chancellor denied that Ministers were bound to accept the report of the Select Committee.

After some further discussion, Earl Granville and the principal members of the opposition party rose from their seats and simultaneously left the house.

The Duke of Marlborough emphatically declared that such a step on the part of those noble lords was unwarrantable and an insult to the House. Earl Beauchamp warmly disclaimed any intention of taking the house by surprise.

On the following day the Earl of Malmesbury referred to the scene which took place on the previous evening, when Earl Russell, Earl Granville, and other leading members of the Liberal party walked out of the house. He said that such a scene had never occurred within his memory, and it was entirely without excuse. If the noble lords believed that Government was deceiving the House they ought to have taken a different course. In order, however, to leave no pretence for such a charge, Government were

willing to postpone the Boundary Bill and the Scotch Reform Bill, and to request the independent members of the House not to press their amendments.

Earl Russell defended the conduct of himself and his friends, which he held was justified by the unusual course pursued by the Government, who might, if so minded, have proposed an adjournment, in order that the statement of the First Minister as to the sense in which he had accepted the amendment made by the Commons in the Boundary Bill might be explained.

The Duke of Montrose (who had given notice of an amendment with respect to the boundaries of Glasgow) remarked that he would never have put it on the paper if he had thought it could be regarded in the light of a breach of faith.

The Marquis of Salisbury recommended, for the dignity of the House, to let the matter rest.

The Lord Chancellor said a retractation of the charge against the Government should first be made.

Earl Granville said the course adopted by himself and his noble friends was not disrespectful to the House. The course was no doubt unusual, but its justification was shown by the fact that it had been successful. It was, moreover, the course adopted by the Government themselves, who frequently, during the Session, had walked out of the House of Commons in a body before a division, to avoid committing themselves on the eve of a general election.

The Duke of Argyll said he had from the first suspected that Government intended to move amendments which he had determined to protest against as a breach of faith.

The Earl of Derby said the discussion had been conducted with unnecessary warmth, and although the Prime Minister's statement respecting the Boundary Bill was open to some doubt, it was just as reasonable to conclude that he had committed their lordships to the Irish Church Bill because Ministers had permitted it to go through its later stages in the Commons without opposition. After the explanation of the Government he thought that noble lords were bound to express their regret at what had occurred, instead of continuing the unworthy course of imputing motives.

The Earl of Harrowby attributed the original breach of faith to the Liberal party in the Commons, who, being dissatisfied with the conclusions of an impartial Commission, insisted on referring the Bill to a Select Committee, thus making it a question of party and local politics.

Eventually the Bill passed through the House of Lords in the same shape in which it had been sent up from the Commons.

Another measure which had been announced by the Government as necessary to complete the legislation connected with Parliamentary Reform was directed to the amendment of the law relating to Election petitions and the more effectual prevention of bribery and

corruption. This very difficult subject, which the House of Commons had for many years past vainly endeavoured to grapple with, had been remitted in the preceding Session to a Select Committee of that House, whose inquiries had resulted in a recommendation which, if adopted, involved a material change in the law and practice of Parliament. The measure proposed was the abdication by the House of Commons of the privilege hitherto tenaciously adhered to, of exclusive jurisdiction as to the elections of its own members. This indeed had been regarded by many generations of statesmen as an indispensable privilege of an independent legislature, and in all the changes which had taken place in the mode of exercising the jurisdiction in question the right itself had been jealously guarded and insisted upon. At length, however, the opinion which had for some time been gaining strength prevailed, that the competency and impartiality of the tribunal was even of higher importance than the conservation of a constitutional principle which the great change in the balance of political power in modern times had reduced almost to a nominal value. Experience had proved that the Election Committees did not satisfactorily fulfil the office either of detecting electoral corruption or of determining the rights of conflicting claimants to a seat. They were neither wholly exempt from the suspicion of partiality according as the composition of the particular tribunal might impress it with a party bias, nor even if they escaped such imputation were they considered to possess the judicial attributes which might qualify them to ascertain the truth and enforce the penalties of the law upon the offender.

Impressed with this conviction, the Select Committee, which included several leading members of the House of Commons, arrived at the conclusion that the time had come when, in order to grapple effectually with the hitherto irrepressible vice of electoral corruption, the jurisdiction of the House as to the elections of its own members should cease and determine. In resolving, however, to part with this power the Committee pronounced in decided terms that there was one condition upon which alone they would consent to the abolition of the privilege, namely, that the jurisdiction should be transferred to no judicial body except to the highest known to the Constitution, the judges of the superior Courts at Westminster. It was recommended that every case of a controverted election should be tried before a single judge, having the absolute decision both of law and fact, with power to report not only as to the seat but as to the existence of bribery or corruption at the election, with which the House might afterwards deal in the exercise of its powers as it should see fit.

The reform thus proposed in the election tribunal appeared likely to meet with no unfavourable reception either in the House of Commons itself or with the public, but an obstacle arose to the execution of the plan which at first seemed likely to be of a formide character. The judges, upon being consulted, with one voice

condemned the proposal, and declared that the fulfilment by them of such a function would be inconsistent with their other duties and would, in consequence of the peculiar character of the inquiries and the strong feelings excited by them, not improbably involve discredit to their judicial character. The Lord Chief Justice addressed to the Lord Chancellor a letter, which was made public, in which these objections were urged in forcible terms. Remonstrances coming from such a quarter naturally produced much effect upon the minds of the Government, who recoiled from imposing on the chief magistrates of the realm a duty they were so unwilling to assume, and which they so strongly deprecated on public grounds. In deference to these objections it was determined to propose to the House of Commons a modification of the scheme of the Select Committee, substituting for the superior judges a Court consisting of three persons to be specially appointed for the trial of petitions, to whose jurisdiction it was proposed also to annex some other functions of a cognate kind. In propounding this measure to the House, Mr. Disraeli did not conceal his own reluctance to surrender the original scheme proposed by the Committee, explaining that he did so with some disappointment, but in deference to scruples to which the Government felt bound to defer. The alternative plan was not received with favour by the House. The objection to create a special tribunal for a jurisdiction so limited and occasional as the trial of Election petitions which rarely occur in any number except in the first Session after a General Election was forcibly urged, and it was still more strongly insisted upon that to none less than the highest judicial power in the country ought the House of Commons to consent to transfer its constitutional privilege. With regard to the validity of the objections raised by the judges some differences of opinion were expressed.

Mr. Lowe said he was disposed to resent the protest of the judges, and to doubt that they had any more right than other public servants to refuse duties imposed on them by Parliament.

Lord Cranborne defended the conduct of the judges in this matter as eminently wise and patriotic, and argued that as most of them had been active party men, and might still be supposed to retain party predilections, to throw these semi-political duties upon them would be to weaken the unlimited confidence at present reposed in them.

Sir R. Palmer said the judges had done no more than their duty in protesting against this semi-political function, if they believed that it would weaken public confidence in their administration of the law. Moreover, as election committees usually came together after a general election, it would be necessary to have four or five new judges to try them with necessary expedition. The general business of the country did not need such an increase.

Mr. Gladstone pointed out two considerations in favour of a transference of jurisdiction-one, that committees could only deal with the questions between the two candidates, and could not enter

on a general examination of the manner in which the electoral franchise had been exercised in a particular borough; the other, that by the present system the immense advantages of a local inquiry were sacrificed. To the principle of a transference of jurisdiction he did not object, but it must be to the superior judges. The question he held to be-would the House give this power to the highest authorities of the law, or retain it in its own hands? The defects of the present system would be raised to a maximum by the creation of an inferior tribunal.

Mr. Bright denied that the case was so desperate as to require the House to give up this important privilege. But for the prevention of bribery he preferred to trust rather to the inevitable enlargement of constituencies and the adoption of the ballot.

Upon the whole the tone of the debate on this first promulgation of the measure was adverse to its adoption, nor did its reception out of doors indicate the satisfaction of the public. It did not, therefore, create any surprise when Mr. Disraeli, in moving the second reading of the Bill, frankly admitted that he thought the objections made to the projected tribunal were well founded; he therefore now proposed to substitute another plan, viz., that two judges of one of the superior courts of law at Westminster should be appointed, with the same salary that they had when judges, and that they should investigate petitions on controverted elections on the spot; that on their appointment to this office they should cease to be ordinary judges, but that they should become members of the Privy Council, and form part of the Judicial Committee, and also be required to sit in the Exchequer Chamber, or such other appeal court of an analogous character as might hereafter be appointed. He thought that by this means they would obviate the objections of the Lord Chief Justice to these duties being thrown upon the judges.

Mr. Gladstone thought this tribunal an improvement on that first proposed. At the same time it was a tribunal of a novel character, involving many points for consideration, and he did not preclude himself from objecting to it hereafter.

On the order of the day for going into Committee on the Bill Mr. Mitchell moved an amendment which put in issue the expediency of transferring the jurisdiction over Election petitions to an exterior tribunal. The amendment was as follows:-"That while the House earnestly desires to provide the best tribunal for the trial of controverted elections, and to ensure the detection and punishment of bribery and corruption, it is not prepared to assent to any measure which aims at the destruction of its ancient privilege to hold in its own hands the power of determining who are its members." He said this Bill would place the House of Commons under the power of a judge appointed by the Crown. The tribunal ought to consist of one member from each side of the House, with a legal assessor, and their report to the House should be acted upon if not questioned within a certain time.