all the physical qualifications, and their habits of obedience constitute a good foundation for discipline. They furnish a more promising material than many armies of which we read in history, which owed their efficiency to discipline alone. I think those who are employed should be freed. It would be neither just nor wise, in my opinion, to require them to serve as slaves. The best course to pursue, it seems to me, would be to call for such as are willing to come with the consent of their owners. An impressment or draft would not be likely to bring out the best class, and the use of coercion would make the measure distasteful to them and to their owners.

66

I have no doubt that if Congress would authorize their reception into service, and empower the President to call upon individuals or States for such as they are willing to contribute, with the condition of emancipation to all enrolled, a sufficient number would be forthcoming to enable us to try the experiment. If it proved successful, most of the objections to the measure would disappear, and if individuals still remained unwilling to send their negroes to the army, the force of public opinion in the States would soon bring about such legislation as would remove all obstacles. I think the matter should be left, as far as possible, to the people and to the States, which alone can legislate as the necessities of this particular service may require. As to the mode of organizing them, it should be left as free from restraint as possible. Experience will suggest the best course, and it would be inexpedient to trammel the subject with provisions that might, in the end, prevent the adoption of reforms suggested by actual trial.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, General."

The proposition to arm the slaves was made in November 1864. It was not passed until March 1865, and then the Bill

studiously set aside the recommendation of General Lee. The reward of freedom was not held out to the slaves. The law merely authorized the President to accept such slaves as the masters might choose to put into the military service. In short, no inducement was to be offered to the negro; he was to be forced to fight for his own captivity.

The law having passed in this form, it was not reasonable to expect to raise black troops. Still the effort was made, and it failed. The measure was also passed too late. General Lee wanted the negroes in the fall, so that they might be trained to their duties during the winter, but Congress trifled away the time, and the opportunity for making soldiers of the blacks was lost forever.

Had these troops been raised, it is doubtful whether anything could have been accomplished with them. They would have been so many more men to feed, and would have increased the sufferings of the army. The measure proposed to put two hurdred thousand black troops in the field, and at that time there were not arms enough in the South to enable the returned prisoners to go back to duty. It is difficult to understand how the negroes would have been armed; and besides, it was not reasonable to suppose that they would under any circumstances fight for a slaveholding Government.

An

In January, 1865, an effort was made to secure peace. interview was held between President Lincoln, Secretary Seward, and others, on the Federal side, and Vice-President Stephens, Senator Hunter, and others, on the Confederate side, on board of a steamer in Hampton Roads, but nothing was accomplished.

Towards the last of February, General Longstreet was informed by General Ord of the Federal army, that General Grant was willing to meet General Lee for the purpose of settling the terms of an honorable peace, provided General Lee

was authorized to act in the matter. President Davis at once conferred upon General Lee full powers, and the Confederate commander notified General Grant that he was ready to open the negotiation. It proved, however, that General Ord had misinformed General Longstreet, having mistaken General Grant's meaning. The following correspondence passed between the two commanders:

"HEADQUARTERS CONFEDERATE STATES ARMIES, March 2, 1865.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, commanding United States Armics: "GENERAL: Lieutenant-General Longstreet has informed me that in a recent conversation between himself and MajorGeneral Ord as to the possibility of arriving at a satisfactory adjustment of the present unhappy difficulties, by means of a military convention, General Ord stated that if I desired to have an interview with you on the subject, you would not decline, provided I had authority to act. Sincerely desiring to leave nothing untried which may put an end to the calamities of war, I propose to meet you at such convenient time and place as you may designate, with the hope that upon an interchange of views. it be found practicable to submit the subjects of controversy between the belligerents to a convention of the kind mentioned.

may

"In such event I am authorized to do whatever the result of the proposed interview may render necessary or advisable. Should you accede to this proposition, I would suggest that, if agreeable to you, we meet at the place selected by Generals Ord and Longstreet for the interview, at 11 A. M., on Monday

next.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed)

R. E. LEE, General."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES UNITED STATES, March 4, 1865.

"GENERAL R. E. LEE, commanding Confederate States Armies: "GENERAL: Your two letters of the 20th instant were received yesterday. In regard to any apprehended misunderstanding in reference to the exchange of political prisoners, I think there need be none. General Ord or General Longstreet have probably misunderstood what I said to the former on the subject, or I may have failed to make myself understood, possibly. A few days before the interview between Generals Longstreet and Ord, I had received a dispatch from General Hoffman, Commissary-General of prisoners, stating in substance that all prisoners of war who were or had been in close confinement or irons, whether under charges or sentences, had been ordered to City Point for exchange. I forwarded the substance of that dispatch to Lieutenant-Colonel Mulford, Assistant Agent of Exchange, and presumed it probable that he had communicated it to Colonel Robert Ould. A day or two after, an offender, who was neither a prisoner of war nor a political prisoner, was executed, after a fair and impartial trial, and in accordance with the laws of war and the usage of civilized nations. It was in explanation of this class of cases I told General Ord to speak to General Longstreet.

"Reference to my letter of February 16th will show my understanding on the subject of releasing political or citizen prisoners.

"In regard to meeting you on the 6th instant, I would state that I have no authority to accede to your proposition for a conference on the subject proposed. Such authority is vested in the President of the United States alone.

"General Ord could only have meant that I would not refuse an interview on any subject upon which I have a right to act, which, of course, would be such as are purely of a military

character and on the subject of exchange, which has been en

trusted to me.

(Signed)

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."

This last effort for peace having failed, like the first, there

was nothing left to the South but to fight the war out to its close.