fibility of it, and to have a lively inftance and example prefented us, of one in our nature conquering death, and triumphing over the grave. I proceed to the

II. Thing, What Chrift hath done towards the bringing of life and immortality to light. And becaufe I told you that this is comparatively spoken, and fignifies to us a greater degree of evidence, and a firmer affurance given us by the Chriftian religion, than the world had before, therefore it will be requifite to enquire into these two things:

First, What affurance men had, or might have had, of the immortality of the foul, and a future ftate, before the coming of Chrift into the world, and the revelation of the gospel.

Secondly, What greater evidence, and what higher degree of affurance the gospel now gives us of immortal life; what greater arguments this new revelation and difcovery of God to the world doth furnifh us withal, to perfuade us of this matter, than the world was acquainted withal before.

First, What affurance men had or might have had of the immortality of the foul, and confequently of a future ftate, before the revelation of the gofpel by Chrift's coming into the world. And here are two things diftinctly to be confidered.

Firft, What arguments natural reafon doth furnish us withal, to perfuade us of this principle, that our fouls are immortal, and that there is another state remains for men after this life.

Secondly, What affurance de facto the world had of this principle, before Chrift's coming into the world: what the Heathens, and what the Jews had. The reafon why I fhall fpeak to these distinctly, is, because there are two very different enquiries; what affurance men might have had from the principles of natural reafon concerning this matter, and what affurance they had de facto. I begin with the

Firft, What arguments natural reafon doth furnish us withal to perfuade us to this principle, that our fouls are immortal, and confequently that another ftate remains for men after this life. And here I fhall fhew,

I. How much may be faid for it.

II. How

II. How little can be said against it. But before I come to fpeak particularly to the arguments which natural reafon affords us for the proof of this principle, I fhall premife certain general confiderations which may give light and force to the following arguments. As,

ift, By the foul we mean a part of man diftinct from his body, or a principle in him which is not matter. I chufe rather to defcribe it this way, than by the effential properties of it, which are hard to fix upon, and are more remote from common apprehenfion. Our Saviour, when he would convince his difciples after his refurrection, that the body wherein he appeared to them was a real body, and that he was not a fpirit or apparition, he bids them touch and handle him; for (fays he) a fpirit hath not flesh and bones as you fee me to have. So that, by the foul or fpirit of a man we mean fome principle in man, which is really diftinct from his vifible and fenfible part, from all that in man which affects our outward fenfes, and which is not to be defcribed by any fenfible and external qualities, fuch as we ufe to defcribe a body by: Because it is fuppofed to be of fuch a nature, as does not fall under the cognizance and notice of any of our fenfes. And therefore I defcribe it, by removing from it all thofe qualities and properties which belong to that which falls under our fenfes, viz. That it is fomething in man diftinct from his body, a principle in him which is not matter; that principle which is the cause of those several operations, which by inward fenfe and experience we are confcious to ourfelves of; fuch are perception, understanding, memory, will. So that the most plain and popular notions that we can have of the foul is, that it is fomething in us which we never faw, and which is the cause of those effects which we find in ourselves; it is the principle whereby we are confcious to ourfelves, that we perceive fuch and fuch objects, that we fee, or hear, or perceive any thing by any other fenfe; it is that whereby we think and remember, whereby we reafon about any thing, and do freely chufe and refufe fuch things as are prefented us. Thefe operations every one is confcious to himself of, and that which is the principle of thefe, or the cause from whence thefe proceed, is that which we mean by the foul 2dly, By

2dly, By the immortality of the foul, I mean nothing elfe, but that it furvives the body, that when the body dies and falls to the ground, yet this principle, which we call the foul, ftill remains and lives feparate from it; that is, there is ftill a part of us which is free from the fate of the body, and continues to perform all thofe operations, to the performance of which the organs of the body are not neceffary; that is, when our bodies are deftitute of life, and become a dead carcafe, there is ftill fomething that did belong to us, which retains the power of underftanding, which thinks, and reafons, and remembers, and does all these freely.

3dly, That he that goes about to prove the foul's immortality, fuppofeth the existence of a Deity, that there is a God: For although there be a very intimate and strict connection between these two principles as to us, as being the two great pillars of all religion, yet that which is first and moft fundamental to all religion, is the existence of a God, which if it be not firft proved, the beft arguments for the foul's immortality lofe their force. Therefore, as to the prefent argument, I fuppofe the being of God, as a thing acknowledged, and not now to be proved; which I may the better do, having formerly endeavoured to make good this grand principle of religion, against the pretenfions of the Atheists.

4thly, The existence of a God being fuppofed, this doth very much facilitate the other, of the foul's immortality. For this being an effential property of the divine nature, that he is a fpirit, that is, fomething that is not matter, it being once granted that God is, thus much is gained, that there is fuch a thing as a fpirit, as an immaterial fubftance, that is not liable to die or perish; fo that he that goes about to prove the immortality of the foul, fhall not need to prove that there may be fuch a thing as a spirit, that the notion of an immaterial fubftance does not imply a contradiction ; because, fuppofing that there is a God, who is effentially a fpirit, there can be no doubt of the poffibility of fuch a thing as a fpirit: and though there be this difference between God and all other fpirits, that he is an infinite. fpirit, whereas others are but finite; yet no man that

grants

grants the existence of an infinite fpirit, can with any pretence or colour of reafon deny the poffibility of a finite fpirit.

5thly and laftly, It is highly reasonable that men fhould acquiefce and reft fatisfied in fuch reasons and arguments for the proof of any thing, as the nature of the thing to be proved will bear; because there are feveral kinds and degrees of evidence, which all things are not equally capable of. It is fufficient that the evidence be fuch as the nature of the thing to be proved will admit of, and such as prudent men make no fcruple to admit for fufficient evidence for things of the like nature, and fuch as, fuppofing the thing to be, we cannot ordinarily expect better, or greater evidence for it.

There are two kinds of evidence, which are the higheft and most fatisfactory that this world affords to us; and thofe are the evidence of sense, and mathematical demonstration. Now there are many things, concerning which the generality of men profefs themfelves to be well fatisfied, which do not afford either of thefe kinds of evidence. There is none of us but do firmly believe that we were born, though we do not remember any fuch thing; no man's memory does furnish him with the teftimony of his fenfes for this matter, nor can any man prove this by a mathematical demonftration, nor by any neceffary argument, fo as to fhew it impoffible that the thing fhould be otherwife. For it is poffible that a man may come into the world otherwife than by the ordinary courfe of generation, as the first man did, who was created immediately by God; and yet I know no man in the world who doubts in the leaft concerning this matter, though he hath no other argument for it but the teftimony of others, and his own obfervation, how other perfons like himself came into the world. And it is reasonable to acquiefce in this evidence, because the nature of the thing affords no greater. We who never were at Jerufalem, do firmly believe that there is fuch a place, upon the teftimony and relation of others: And no man is blamed for this, as being over credulous; be aufe no man that will not take the pains to go thither, can have any other greater evi

dence

dence of it, than the general teftimony of those who fay they have seen it. And, indeed, almost all human affairs, I am fure the most important, are governed and conducted by fuch evidence, as falls very much fhort both of the evidence of fenfe, and of mathematical demonstration.

To apply this then to my prefent purpose. That the foul of man is of an immortal nature, is not capable of all kinds and degrees of evidence. It cannot be proved by our fenfes, nor is it reasonable to expect it fhould be fo proved: because the foul is fuppofed, by every one that difcourfeth of it, to be a thing of fuch a nature, as cannot be seen or handled, or fall under any other of our senses: nor can it be proved to us by our own experience, while we are in this world; becaufe whoever dies, which is the only trial that can be made whether our fouls remain after our bodies, goes out of this world. As for mathematical demonftration, the nature of the thing renders it incapable of it. It remains then, that we reft contented with fuch arguments as the nature of the thing will bear, and with fuch evidence as men are contented to accept of, and do account fufficient in other matters; fuch evidence as a prudent confidering man, who is not credulous on the one hand, and, on the other, is not prejudiced by any interest against it, would reft fatisfied in.

Having premised these general confiderations, to clear my way, I now come to fpeak to the particular arguments, whereby the immortality of the foul may be made out to our reafon. And the best way to estimate the force of the arguments which I shall bring for it, will be, to confider, before-hand, with ourselves, what evidence we can, in reafon, expect for a thing of this nature. Suppofe our fouls be immortal, by what kind of arguments could we defire to be affured of it? Setting afide miracles and divine revelation, could we defire more than this? I. That the thing be a natural notion and dictate of our minds.

II. That it doth not contradict any other principle that nature hath planted in us, but does very well accord and agree with all other the most natural notions of our minds.

VOL. VIII.

C

III. That