Report of Major-General B. McClellan: Upon the Organization of the Army of the Potomac, and Its Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland, from July 26, 1861, to November 7, 1862 |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 63
Page 4
... rear of the enemy's points of concentration , and we must threaten their seaboard cities , in order that each State may be forced , by the ne- cessity of its own defence , to diminish its con- tingent to the confederate army . The ...
... rear of the enemy's points of concentration , and we must threaten their seaboard cities , in order that each State may be forced , by the ne- cessity of its own defence , to diminish its con- tingent to the confederate army . The ...
Page 25
... rear . " Brigadier General D. C. BUELL . ” " HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY , Washington , November 7 , 1862 . GENERAL : In giving you instructions for your guidance in command of the department of the Ohio , I do not design to fetter you . I ...
... rear . " Brigadier General D. C. BUELL . ” " HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY , Washington , November 7 , 1862 . GENERAL : In giving you instructions for your guidance in command of the department of the Ohio , I do not design to fetter you . I ...
Page 29
... rear , ( concealed by the woods ) , and the arrangement of his troops is such that he can oppose some considerable resistance to a passage of that stream . Information has just been re- ceived , to the effect that the enemy are intrench ...
... rear , ( concealed by the woods ) , and the arrangement of his troops is such that he can oppose some considerable resistance to a passage of that stream . Information has just been re- ceived , to the effect that the enemy are intrench ...
Page 30
... rear of Rich- mond , thus forcing the enemy to come out and attack us , for his position would be untenable , with us on the southern bank of the river . " Should circumstances render it not advisa- ble to land at Urbana , we can use ...
... rear of Rich- mond , thus forcing the enemy to come out and attack us , for his position would be untenable , with us on the southern bank of the river . " Should circumstances render it not advisa- ble to land at Urbana , we can use ...
Page 33
... rear , and it was not till the month of February that I felt prepared to accomplish this very desirable but not vital purpose . stated to the President and Secretary of War that the chief object of the operation would be to open the ...
... rear , and it was not till the month of February that I felt prepared to accomplish this very desirable but not vital purpose . stated to the President and Secretary of War that the chief object of the operation would be to open the ...
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
10-pounder Parrott advance Alexandria Antietam arrived artillery attack bank battery battle Boonsboro Bottom's bridge bridge brigade Burnside camp campaign Captain cavalry Chickahominy Colonel column command corps creek cross defence despatch direction enemy enemy's eral field fire flank Fort Magruder Fort Monroe forward Franklin front G. B. MCCLELLAN garrison general-in-chief guard guns H. W. HALLECK Hagerstown Harper's Ferry HEADQUARTERS ARMY Heintzelman hill Hooker infantry intrenched James river land Lieutenant Major General H. W. Major General MCCLELLAN Manassas Maryland ment miles Monroe morning move movement necessary night occupied officers operations Parrott guns Peninsula Pope Porter position possible Potomac President quartermaster railroad rear rebels received reconnoissances regiments reinforce Richmond road Rohrersville Savage's station Secretary Secretary of War sent Sharpsburg soon Sumner supplies telegram telegraphed tion transportation troops United States cavalry vicinity Virginia wagons Warrenton Washington Williamsburg York volunteers Yorktown
Popular passages
Page 90 - Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband, under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it.
Page 81 - In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak.
Page 27 - That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the general-in-chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.
Page 38 - That the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. (Unanimous.) " II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against the enemy, behind the Rappahannock, at the earliest possible moment...
Page 81 - I now know the full history of the day. On this side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish, but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war. The sad remnants of my men behave as men.
Page 30 - West Point, the key of that region, and thence but two marches to Richmond. A rapid movement from Urbana would probably cut off Magruder in the Peninsula, and enable us to occupy Richmond before it could be strongly reenforced.
Page 34 - That no more than two army corps (about fifty thousand troops) of said Army of the Potomac shall be moved en route for a new base of operations, until the navigation of the Potomac from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay shall be freed from the enemy's batteries and other obstructions, or until the President shall hereafter give express permission.
Page 3 - We have not only to defeat their armed and organized forces in the field, but to display such an overwhelming strength as will convince all our antagonists, especially those of the governing aristocratic class, of the utter impossibility of resistance.
Page 110 - It will be seen from what has preceded that I lost no time that could be avoided in moving the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula to the support of the Army of Virginia ; that I spared no effort to hasten the embarkation of the troops at Fort Monroe, Newport News, and Yorktown, remaining at Fort Monroe myself until the mass of the army had sailed ; and that after my arrival at Alexandria, I left nothing in my power undone to forward supplies and re-enforcements to General Pope.
Page 96 - General, certainly could not have been more pained at receiving my order than I was at the necessity of issuing it. I was advised by high officers, in whose judgment I had great confidence, to make the order immediately on my arrival here, but I determined not to do so until I could learn your wishes from a personal interview. And even after that interview I tried every means in my power to avoid withdrawing your army, and delayed my decision as long as I dared to delay it. I assure you, General,...