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covering the whole ground of our national trouble. The responsibility of determining, declaring and supportin such civil and military policy, and of directing the whole course of national affairs in regard to the rebellion must now be assumed and exercised by you, or our cause will be lost. The constitution gives you wer sufficient even for the present terrible exigency.

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This rebellion has assumed the character of war; as such it should be regarded; and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any state in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of states, or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations. All private property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for: pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes: all unneccessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military towards citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist, and oaths not required by enactments constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received. Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political rights. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves contraband under the act of Congress. seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the government to appropriate permanently to its own service, claims to slave labor, should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized.

This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves within a particular state, thus working manumission in such state; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time.

A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty.

Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requsite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radi al views, especially upon slavery, will rap idly disintegrate our present armies.

The policy of the government must be supported by concentrations of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be mainly collected into

masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the confederate states. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist.

In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a commanderin-chief of the army; one who possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior.

I may be on the brink of eternity, and as I hope for forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity towards you, and from love for my country.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, "G. B. MCCLELLAN,

"Major General Comag. "His excellency, A. LINCOLN, President." I telegraphed the Presidednt on the 11th as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, July 11, 1862-3 p. m.

We are very strong here now so far as defensive is concerned. Hope you will soon make us strong enough to advance and try it again. All in fine spirits. "G. B. MCCLELLAN, “Major General

"A. LINCOLN, President." These telegrams were sent on the 12th, 17th, and 18th, to his excellency the President:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"Berkeley, July 12, 1862-7.15 a. m. "Hill and Longstreet crossed into New Kent county via Long bridge. I am still ignorant what road they afterwards took, but will know shortly.

Nothing else of interest since last despatch, rain ceased and everything quiet. Men resting well, but beginning to be impatient for another fight.

"I am more and more convinced that this

army ought not to be withdrawn from here; but
promptly reinforced and thrown again upon
Richmond. If we have a little more than half a
chance we can take it. I dread the effects of
any retreat on the morale of the men.
"G. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major General Comď'g.

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"A. LINCOLN, President."

'HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Berkeley, July 18, 1862-8 a. m. "I have consulted fully with General Burnside, and would commend to your favorable consideration the general's plan for bringing (7) seven additional regiments from North Carolina, by leaving Newbern to the care of the gun-boats. It appears manifestly to be our policy to concentrate here everything we can possibly spare from less important points, to make sure of crushing the enemy at Richmond, which seems

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"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Berkeley, July 28, 1862-8 a m
"Nothing especially new except corrobora-
tion of reports that reinforcements reaching Rich
mond from south. It is not confirmed that any
of Bragg's troops are yet here. My opinion is
more and more firm, that here is the defence of
Washington, and that I should be at once rein-
forced by all available troops, to enable me to
advance. Retreat would be disastrous to the
army and the cause. I am confident of that.
"G. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major General.

"Major General H. W. HALLECK,
"Comd'g U. S. Army, Washington, D. C."

'HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, August 2, 1862-8 a. m. Firing of night before last killed some ten men, and wounded about fifteen. No harm of the slightest consequence done to the shipping, althongh several struck. Sent party across river to Cole's house; destroyed and cut down the timber; will complete work to-day; and also send party to Coggin's point, which I will probably occupy. I will attend to your telegraph about pressing at once, will send Hooker Give me Burnside and I will stir these people up. I need more cavalry, have only thirty-seven hundred for duty in cavalry division.

out

Adjutant general's office forgot to send Sykes's commission as major general, with those of other division commanders. Do me the fa vor to hurry it on.

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"G. B. MCCLELLAN,
"Major General Commanding.

Major General H. W. HALLECK,
Washington, D. C."

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To prevent another demonstration of this character, and to secure a debouche on the south side of the James, it became necessary to occupy Coggin's Point, which was done on the 3d, and the enemy, as will be seen from the following despatch, driven back towards Peters burg:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"Berkeley, August 3, 1862-10 p. m.

Coggin's point was occupied to-day, and timber felled so as to make it quite defensible. I went over the ground myself, and found that Duane had, as usual, selected an admirable position, which can be intrenched with a small amount of labor, so as to make it a formidable tete-de-pont, covering the landing of a large force. I shall begin intrenching it by the labor of contrabands to-morrow. The position

On the 30th I sent the following to the gen-covers the Cole's house, which is directly in eral-in-chief:

“HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, July 30, 1862-7 a. m.

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*

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"I hope that it may soon be decided what to be done by this army; and that the decision may be to reinforce it at once. We are losing much valuable time, and that at a moment when energy and decision are sadly needed. "G. B. MCCLELLAN, “Major General.

front of Westover. We have now a safe debouche on the south bank, and are secure against midnight cannonading. A few thousand more men would place us in condition at least to annoy and disconcert the enemy very much.

"I sent Colonel Averill this morning with three hundred cavalry to examine the country on south side of the James, and try to catch some cavalry at Sycamore church, which is on the main road from Petersburg to Suffolk, and some five miles from Cole's house.

"He found a cavalry force of five hundred and fifty men, attacked them at once, drove in Major General H. W. HALLECK, their advanced guard to the camp, where he had "Comď'g U. S. Army, Washington, D. C." a sharp skirmish, and drove them off in disor

About half an hour after midnight, on the morning of August 1st, the enemy brought some light batteries to Coggin's point and the Coles house, on the right bank of James river, directly opposite Harrison's landing, and opened a heavy fire upon our shipping and encampments. It was continued rapidly for about thirty minutes, when they were driven back by the fire of our guns. This affair was reported in the following despatch:

der.

"He burned their entire camp, with their commissary and quartermaster's stores, and then returned and re-crossed the river. He took but two prisoners, had one man wounded by a ball, and one by a sabre cut. Captain McIntosh made a handsome charge. The troops engaged were of the fifth regulars and the third Pennsylvania cavalry.

"Colonel Averill conducted this affair, as he

does everything he undertakes, to my entire | the 2d of August. He failed to do so, as the satisfaction. following despatch recites:

"G. B. MCCLELLAN,
"Major General Commanding.

"Major General H. W. HALLECK,

“Comď'g U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.”

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE Potomac, Berkeley, Aug. 3, 1862-10.20 p. m. "The movement undertaken up the river last night failed, on account of the incompetency of

On the 1st of August, I received the follow-guides. The proper steps have been taken toing despatches:

"Washington, July 30, 1862–8 p. m. "A despatch just received from General Pope, says that deserters report that the enemy is moving south of James river, and that the force in Richmond is very small. I suggest that he be pressed in that direction, so as to ascertain the facts of the case.

"H. W. HALLeck, "Major General. "Maj. Gen. G. B. MCCLELLAN."

"Washington, July 30, 1862–8 p. m. "In order to enable you to move in any direction, it is necessary to relieve you of your sick. The surgeon-general has therefore been directed to make arraugements for them at other places, and the quarter-master-general to provide transportation. I hope you will send them away as quickly as possible, and advise me

of their removal.

"H. W. HALLECK, "Major General. "Maj. Gen. G. B. MCCLELLAN."

day to remedy this evil, and I hope to be ready
to-morrow night to carry out your suggestions
as to pressing: at least to accomplish the first
indispensable step.
"G. B. MCCLELLAN,
'Maj, Gen. Comd'g.

"Maj. Gen. HALLECK,
"Comd'g U. S. Army."

On the 4th General Hooker was reinforced by General Sedgwick's division, and, having obtained a knowledge of the roads, he succeeded in turning Malvern hill, and driving the enemy back towards Richmond.

The following is my report of this affair at the time:

"Malvern Hill, Aug. 5, 1862-1 p. m. "General Hooker, at 5.30 this morning, attacked a very considerable force of infantry and artillery stationed at this place, and carried it handsomely, driving the enemy towards New Market, which is four miles distant, and where it is said they have a large force. We have captured 200 prisoners, killed and wounded several, with a loss on our part of only three killed and eleven wounded-among the latter two officers.

It is clear that the general-in-chief attached some weight to the report received from General Pope, and I was justified in supposing that the order in regard to removing the sick, con- "I shall probably remain here to-night, ready templated an offensive movement, rather than a to act as circumstances may require, after the retreat, as I had no other data than the tele-return of my cavalry reconnoissances. grams just given, from which to form an opinion

"The mass of the enemy escaped under the as to the intentions of the government. The cover of a dense fog, but our cavalry are still following telegram strengthened me in that be-in pursuit, and I trust may succeed in capturing

lief:

many more.

This is a very advantageous position to cover "Washington, July 31, 1862–10 a. m. an advance on Richmond, and only 144 miles "General Pope again telegraphs that the en-distant, and I feel confident that, with reinemy is reported to be evacuating Richmond, forcements, I could march this army there in and falling back on Danville and Lynchburgh. "H. W. HALLECK, "Major General.

Maj. Gen. G. B. MCCLELLAN."

five days.

"I this instant learn that several brigades of the enemy are four miles from here, on the Quaker road, and I have taken steps to prepare to meet them.

In occupying Coggin's point, as already described. I was influenced by the necessity of possessing a secure debouche on the south of the James, in order to enable me to move on the communications of Richmond in that direction, as well as to prevent a repetition of midnight" Major General H. W. HALLECK, cannonades.

“General Hooker's dispositions were admirable, and his officers and men displayed their usual gallantry. "GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major General

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"Commanding U. S. Army.”

On the same day the following telegram was sent:

To carry out General Halleck's first order of July 30th, it was necessary first to gain possession of Malvern hill, which was occupied by the enemy, apparently in some little force, and controlled the direct approach to Richmond. Its "MALVERN HыLL, Aug. 5, 1862-8 p. m. temporary occupation, at least, was equally ne- "Since my last despatch Colonel Averill has cessary in the event of a movement upon Peters- returned from a reconnoissance in the direction. burg, or even the abandonment of the Peninsula. of Savage's station, towards Richmond. He General Hooker, with his own division and encountered the 10th Virginia cavalry near Pleasonton's cavalry, was therefore directed to White Oak swamp bridge, charged and drove gain possession of Malvern hill on the night of them some distance towards Richmond, captured

28 men and horses, and killing and wounding several.

"Our troops have advanced twelve miles in one direction, and seventeen in another, towards Richmond, to-day.

"We have secured a strong position at Coggin's point, opposite our quarter-master's depot, which will effectually prevent the rebels from using artillery hereafter against our camps.

"I learn this evening that there is a force of 20,000 men about six miles back from this point, on the south bank of the river, what their object is I do not know, but will keep a sharp look out

on their movements.

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Major General G. B. MCCLELLAN."

And soon after the following:

"WASHINGTON, August 6, 1862. "You will immediately send a regiment of cavalry and several batteries of artillery to Burnside's command at Acquia Creek. It is reported that Jackson is moving north with very large force.

"H. W. HALLECK,
66 Major General.

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Major General G. B. MCCLELLAN."

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"Under advices I have received from Washington, I think it necessary for you to abandon the position to-night, getting everything away before daylight.

"Please leave cavalry pickets at Malvern, with orders to destroy the Turkey creek bridge when they are forced back.

"The roads leading into Haxall's from the right should be strongly watched, and Haxall's, at least, held by strong cavalry force and some light batteries, as long as possible.

"I leave the manner of the withdrawal entirely to your discretion.

"Please signal to the fleet when the withdrawal is about completed.

Report frequently to these headquarters. General Sumner was ordered up to support you, but will halt where this passes him, and will inform you where he is. "GEO. B. McClellan, 'Major General.

'General J. HOOKER,

Comd'g ai Malvern hill."

And the following reply was sent to General Halleck :

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"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTAMAC, “Berkeley, August 6, 1862-11.30 p. m. 'Despatches of to-day received. I have not quite four thousand cavalry for duty in cavalry divisions, so that I cannot possibly spare any more. I really need many more than I now have, to carry out your instructions.

a "The enemy are moving a large force upon Malvern hill. In view of your despatches, and the fact that I cannot place the whole army in position before daybreak, I have ordered Hooker to withdraw during the night, if it is possible. If he cannot do so I must support him. Until

On the 4th I had received General Halleck's this matter is developed, I cannot send any batorder of the 3d (which appears below), direct-teries. I hope I can do so to-morrow, if transing me to withdraw the army to Acquia, and onportation is on hand.

“GEO. B. McClellan, “Major General Comd'g. Major General H. W. HALLECK, Comd'g U. S. Army.”

the same day sent an earnest protest against it. "I will obey the order as soon as circumA few hours before this, General Hooker had stances will permit. My artillery is none too informed me that his cavalry pickets reported numerous now. I have only been able to send large bodies of the enemy advancing and driv-off some twelve hundred sick, no transportaing them in, and that he would probably be tion. There shall be no delay that I can avoid. attacked at daybreak. Under these circumstances I had determined to support him; but as I could not get the whole army in position until the next afternoon, I concluded, upon the receipt of the above telegram from the generalin-chief, to withdraw General Hooker, that there might be the least possible delay in conforming to General Halleck's orders. I therefore sent to General Hooker the following letter:

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Five batteries with their horses and equi ments complete, were embarked on the 7th and 8th. Simultaneously with General Hooker's op erations upon Malvern, I despatched a cavalry force under Colonel Averill towards Savage's station, to ascertain if the enemy were making any movements towards our left flank. He found a rebel cavalry regiment near te White Oak "I find it will not be possible to get the whole swamp bridge, and completely routed it, pursuarmy in position before some time to-morrowing well towards Savage's station. afternoon, which will be too late to support you

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'HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, August 6, 1862-10 p. m. "MY DEAR General,

These important preliminary operations as

sisted my preparations for the removal of the army to Acquia creek, and the sending off our sick and supplies was pushed both day and night as rapidly as the means for transportation permitted.

without distinctly setting forth my views upon the subject to the authorities, as in the following telegram :

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, August 3, 1862.

On the subject of the withdrawal of the army from Harrison's landing, the following corres- "I hear of sea-steamers at Fort Monroe: are pondence passed between the general-in-chief they for removing my sick? If so, to what exand myself while the reconnoissances towards extent am I required to go in sending them Richmond were in progress:

On the 2d of August I received the follow

ing.

"WASHINGTON, August 2, 1862 3.45 p. m. You have not answered my telegram [of July 30, 8 P. M.] about the removal of your sick. Remove them as rapidly as possible, and telegraph me when they will be out of your way. The President wishes an answer as early as possible. "H. W. HALLECK, Major General.

Major General G. B. MCCLELLAN.”
To which this reply was sent.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berkeley, August 3, 1862-11 p. m. Your telegram of 2d is received. The answer [to despatch of July 30] was sent this morning. We have about twelve thousand five hundred sick, of whom perhaps four thousand might make easy marches. We have here the means to transport twelve hundred, and will embark to-morrow that number of the worst Bases. With all the means at the disposal of the medical director, the remainder could be shipped in from seven to ten days. It is impossible for me to decide what cases to send off, unless I know what is to be done with this army.

"Were the disastrous measures of a retreat adopted, all the sick who can not march and fight should be despatched by water. Should the army advance, many of the sick could be of service at the depots. If it is to remain here any length of time, the question assumes still a different phase.

"Until I am informed what is to be done, I cannot act understandingly, or for the good of the service. If I am kept longer in ignorance of what is to be effected, I cannot be expected to accomplish the object in view. In the mean time I will do all in my power to carry out what I conceive to be your wishes.

"G. B. MCCLELLAN,

"Major General Comdg.

• Major General H. W. HALLECK,

Coma'g U. S. Army, Washington, D. C."

The moment I received the instructions for removing the sick, I at once gave the necessary directions for carrying them out. With the small amount of transportation at hand, the removal of the severe cases alone would necessarily take several days, and in the mean time I desired information to determine what I should do with others.

The order required me to send them away as quickly as possible, and to notify the general-in-chief when they were removed."

"Previous to the receipt of the despatch of the 2d of August, not having been advised of

off?

"There are not many who need go.

As I am not in any way informed of the intentions of the government in regard to this ar my, I am unable to judge what proportion of the sick should leave here, and must ask for specific orders.

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"G. B. MCCLELLAN, “Major General Comďg.

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

“Comďg U. 8. Army Washington.”

If the army was to retreat to Fort Monroe, it was important that it should be unincumbered with any sick, wounded, or other men who might at all interfere with its mobility; but if the object was to operate directly on Richmond from the position we then occupied, there were many cases of slight sickness which would speedily be cured, and the patients returned to duty. As the service of every man would be important in the event of a forward offensive movement, I conceived it to be of the utmost consequence that I should know what was to be done. It was to ascertain this that I sent the despatch of 11 P. M. on the 3d, before receiving the following telegram:

Your materiel and

"WASHINGTON, August 3, 1862-7.45 p. m. "I have waited most anxiously to learn the result of your forced reconnoissance towards Richmond, and also whether all your sick have been sent away, and I can get no answer to my telegram. It is determined to withdraw your army from the Peninsula to Acquia creek. You will take immediate measures to effect this, covering the movement the best you can. Its real object and withdrawai should be concealed even from your own officers. transportation should be removed first. You will assume control of all the means of transportation with your reach, and apply to the naval forces for the assistance they can render you. You will consult freely with the commander of these forces. The entire execution of the movement is left to your discretion and judgement. You may leave such forces as you may deem proper at Fort Monroe, Norfolk and other places which we must occupy.

"H. W. HALLECK,

"Major General Comd'g U. S. Army. "Major General GEO. B. MCCLELLAN.”

I proceeded to obey this order with all possible rapidity, firmly impressed, however, with the conviction that the withdrawal of the army of the Potomac from Harrison's landing, where its communications had, by the co-operation of the gun-boat, been rendered perfectly secure, would at that time have the most disastrous ef fect upon our cause. I did not, as the com

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