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are to be subsumed under the category, into self-consciousness. I assert that these facts-what to Kant are the Erscheinungen-already possess, and must possess, and by Kant (especially in the case of causality) are admitted to possess, that very necessity (of order or otherwise), which alone it is the business and the use of the category to bestow. Kant, to be sure, names this necessity only subjective," and still thinks it necessary to call in his peculiar "epigenesis" in order that it may become "objective." The verbal distinction, however, nowise effaces the actual facts; and these are such that, on Kant's own terms, his epigenesis is a hypergenesis that explains nothing. There are twelve categories for the subsumption into consciousness of (to say so) as many sense-successions. The latter, it is to be conceived, differing as the former differ, are respectively to be subsumed, each under each. Those are the rules (II., 139); these are the cases. One form of judgment is determined rather than another (III., 66); and the grounds of determination are the empirical circumstances (II., 737). No sensesuccession but must blow its particular category's own whistle, ring that category's own bell.

We shall take the categories in their order now, and examine them as they come; only, we shall omit modality as before; do little more than briefly indicate in regard to the rest; and reserve our main discussion for causality alone. For we consider always that causality is in every way the decisive and the master category, as well as this, that what objection founds on the empirical facts was, in our first article, scarcely more than suggested; it was only touched upon.

But we shall advert, first, for a moment to what Kant calls pure perception, space and time. This, too, is an essential part of his doctrine; and without it, also, that doctrine goes at once to the ground. Kant will have it that space (time likewise) is not an independent entity there in itself and on its own account without us, but a form from within which we throw into things, not they into us; and his arguments are excellent. Nevertheless, they are inadequate and erroneous. Space is involved in every special case of external perception; but it does not follow that therefore it is not a cognition acquired from without, but only an a priori form projected from within. Suppose actual external bodies in an actual

tutored by sight, is perfectly adequate to bring us, otherwise constituted as we are, to a complete perception of them in the usual understanding of the word. In fact, there is no doubt at all, that space and the bodies in space are precisely such actualities; and just as little that the cognition or perception of them is so acquired. As for the apodictic evidence of the relations of space which is the burden of Kant's other argument here, it is not necessary to have recourse to an a priori source for that either. Indeed, how can mere a priori explain necessity? It may be that (though not yet proved) the a posteriori cannot be necessary, but it does not follow thence that the a priori must be necessary. The light of evidence is as much wanted in the latter case as in the former, and the mere position by no means extends it. The truth is that the apodictic evidence of the relations of space issues from the very nature of space, and not from its position, whether a priori or a posteriori (though the latter is undoubtedly the fact). Space, namely, is the generalè or common universal of all forms of externality as forms of externality; and, all relations that belong to it, it imposes upon them. Further, space itself is externality as externality; and, simply as being such, all its relations bring with them the very necessity of externality as externality. These relations, in a word, are consequences from the very notion of externality as externality; and as such consequences they necessarily share in all the necessities of their primitive and parent notion as a thought that must be thought. Having said this on space, special reference to time is not called for; and what has been said will, generally, suffice for the present. We return to the categories.

And what, on the whole, is to be said here is this. The use of the categories at all is to account for the fact of necessity and objectivity being in existence. But the expedient is supererogatory and gratuitous. Necessity and objectivity as much are, or are as much given, as the contributions of special sense are, or as the contributions of special sense are given. As special sense is there, they are there; and we have simply to receive them, or we have simply to apprehend them.

To refer specially, the whole result of the category of quantity is the axiom, "All perceptions are extensive magnitudes." Kant, indeed, talks of axioms (in the plural) here, and calls this proposi

tion only the "principle" of such. But, axiom or principle, it stands alone as the result of the category of quantity. He also exemplifies it by such an object as a house. Now, Kant would grant that a house has in this respect no advantage over any one of its component stones, or, as it may be, bricks. Before I can apprehend that stone as a stone, or that brick as a brick, am I to suppose, then, that a mysterious spectrum from within my own mind must, first of all, throw itself, fusingly, into it? That is accurately, and fully, and truly, Kant's supposition. Common sense says at once No. That stone, that brick, is really as much its own in its quantity as it is its own in its weight or hardness. That stone or that brick has really its quantity in externality to me, and in independence of me, as it has its solidity in externality to me, and in independence of me. The objection that the color, heat, etc., are in me and not in the object is really inapplicable. The true theory of perception finds the primary qualities in the object, and correctly ascribes the secondary qualities to the same object as their cause. I really am so endowed that I come to apprehend the stone or the brick, and truly to apprehend the stone or the brick, as the red or gray, large or small, rough or smooth thing it is out there in space, absolutely on its own account, and quite independent of me. It is not I that give it its quantity. On the contrary, I have to take its quantity simply as it itself gives it me. Kant, of course, never assumed to give the stone or brick its special quantity, but only its general quantity, or its capability of manifesting quantity at all. That question of special quantity (a difficulty in the Kantian scheme that I have not yet seen handled) that question of special quantity, I do not boggle at; I take only what quantity Kant allows me, and I say the stone or the brick brings with it that quantity quite in the same way as it brings with it that hardness, solidity, etc. Of course, fully to discuss this, one would require to be agreed as regards the theory of perception as perception. That, plainly, we cannot posibly assume here. But still, in independence of every theory, I can assert that, whatever quality I get from the stone as the stone, or the brick as the brick, quite in the same way I get from it its quantity also. The supposition of a special faculty (or category) within me to give me that quality, or whatever else it may be named, is gratu

And as much as this we can say, not generally only, but on Kant's own terms. Space, for example, being on those terms quantity itself, pure quantity, and in a priori possession, or native clutch of the mind, to what end still postulate a faculty of quantity? Why endow us, not only with an innate object, but actually with an innate notion of it, as though the one being given, and given to a mind, the other were not, even so, a necessary and irresistible consequence? Is it possible that a mind can have the self of an object without at the same time the notion of it? Did we possess the object a posteriori, Kant would have no hesitation in styling its notion a derivative; why should a priori possession make any difference in this respect? It is still an object there for inspection of the mind, which, indeed, as having it in its own direct naked clutch, ought all the more readily to come to the notion of it. Kant says himself (754), "just the same synthetic unity which space is, has, abstraction being made from the form of space, its seat in the mind, and is the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous;" and the question is, why so unnecessarily supererogate? One can see pretty plainly, too, that, once in space, the stone or the brick possesses synthesis of the homogeneous in its own right; each is but a synthesis of the homogeneous. And one wonders how, for recognition of this, one requires, over and above the usual perceptive agencies, a special category.

As regards the category of quality, it promises us a positive "anticipation" of actual sense-perception. Accordingly one lays one's self out for something very definite this time, for some actual object, or, at least, for some smallest spang or spangle of an actual object. It is disappointing, then, instead of that to receive only this, "sensation has degree." Surely, we think, if the possession of an actual special a priori faculty can tell us no more than that, it is there for very little purpose. On Kant's own terms, indeed, seeing that he allows us sensation in time, we cannot see how, for the cognition in question, more should be required. We have already there all the elements that can possibly be wanted to convey it.

If quantity and quality seem thus of undeniably empirical origin, it is not otherwise with substance or with reciprocity. When I think of a certain waterfall that is sometimes large and sometimes small, sometimes gray and sometimes brown, sometimes with stones

tion only the "principle" of such. But, axiom or principle, it stands alone as the result of the category of quantity. He also exemplifies it by such an object as a house. Now, Kant would grant that a house has in this respect no advantage over any one of its component stones, or, as it may be, bricks. Before I can apprehend that stone as a stone, or that brick as a brick, am I to suppose, then, that a mysterious spectrum from within my own mind must, first of all, throw itself, fusingly, into it? That is accurately, and fully, and truly, Kant's supposition. Common sense says at once No. That stone, that brick, is really as much its own in its quantity as it is its own in its weight or hardness. That stone or that brick has really its quantity in externality to me, and in independence of me, as it has its solidity in externality to me, and in independence of me. The objection that the color, heat, etc., are in me and not in the object is really inapplicable. The true theory of perception finds the primary qualities in the object, and correctly ascribes the secondary qualities to the same object as their cause. I really am so endowed that I come to apprehend the stone or the brick, and truly to apprehend the stone or the brick, as the red or gray, large or small, rough or smooth thing it is out there in space, absolutely on its own account, and quite independent of me. It is not I that give it its quantity. On the contrary, I have to take its quantity simply as it itself gives it me. Kant, of course, never assumed to give the stone or brick its special quantity, but only its general quantity, or its capability of manifesting quantity at all. That question of special quantity (a difficulty in the Kantian scheme that I have not yet seen handled) that question of special quantity, I do not boggle at; I take only what quantity Kant allows me, and I say the stone or the brick brings with it that quantity quite in the same way as it brings with it that hardness, solidity, etc. Of course, fully to discuss this, one would require to be agreed as regards the theory of perception as perception. That, plainly, we cannot posibly assume here. But still, in independence of every theory, I can assert that, whatever quality I get from the stone as the stone, or the brick as the brick, quite in the same way I get from it its quantity also. The supposition of a special faculty (or category) within me to give me that quality, or whatever else it may be named, is gratu

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