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Entered according to Act of Congress, in the Year 1880, by WILLIAM T. HARRIS, in the Office

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If we suppose it to result (from the foregoing') that Kant's schemata, as simply so many self-deceptions, must be held to vanish, we may suppose, also, that Kant himself-seeing that, for reception of the contributions of special sense, there can now no longer be question of any a priori system of forms, half-sensuous and halfintellectual-would admit his whole transcendental enterprise to have failed. In view of Kant's own perfect honesty, we may really allow ourselves to suppose this. It does not follow, however, that others (Sir W. Hamilton, for instance), who opine Kant's causality to be just a separate and peculiar mental principle, would be disposed to sympathize with as much. They know nothing of the schematism; for them the categories alone exist; and they have no thought but to place these in direct contact with sense. We may safely assume their possible contention to be insufficient, however, and Kant's conjectural admission to be alone tenable.

My second main objection, now, to the Kantian theory of perception concerns the empirical facts which, through the schema,

1 The reference is to the preceding portion of this article published in the July (1880) number of this Journal.-[ED.

are to be subsumed under the category, into self-consciousness. I assert that these facts-what to Kant are the Erscheinungen-already possess, and must possess, and by Kant (especially in the case of causality) are admitted to possess, that very necessity (of order or otherwise), which alone it is the business and the use of the category to bestow. Kant, to be sure, names this necessity only "subjective," and still thinks it necessary to call in his peculiar "epigenesis" in order that it may become "objective." The verbal distinction, however, nowise effaces the actual facts; and these are such that, on Kant's own terms, his epigenesis is a hypergenesis that explains nothing. There are twelve categories for the subsumption into consciousness of (to say so) as many sense-successions. The latter, it is to be conceived, differing as the former differ, are respectively to be subsumed, each under each. Those are the rules (II., 139); these are the cases. One form of judgment is determined rather than another (III., 66); and the grounds of determination are the empirical circumstances (II., 737). No sensesuccession but must blow its particular category's own whistle, ring that category's own bell.

We shall take the categories in their order now, and examine them as they come; only, we shall omit modality as before; do little more than briefly indicate in regard to the rest; and reserve our main discussion for causality alone. For we consider always that causality is in every way the decisive and the master category, as well as this, that what objection founds on the empirical facts was, in our first article, scarcely more than suggested; it was only touched upon.

But we shall advert, first, for a moment to what Kant calls pure perception, space and time. This, too, is an essential part of his doctrine; and without it, also, that doctrine goes at once to the ground. Kant will have it that space (time likewise) is not an independent entity there in itself and on its own account without us, but a form from within which we throw into things, not they into us; and his arguments are excellent. Nevertheless, they are inadequate and erroneous. Space is involved in every special case of external perception; but it does not follow that therefore it is not a cognition acquired from without, but only an a priori form projected from within. Suppose actual external bodies in an actual

tutored by sight, is perfectly adequate to bring us, otherwise constituted as we are, to a complete perception of them in the usual understanding of the word. In fact, there is no doubt at all, that space and the bodies in space are precisely such actualities; and just as little that the cognition or perception of them is so acquired. As for the apodictic evidence of the relations of space which is the burden of Kant's other argument here, it is not necessary to have recourse to an a priori source for that either. Indeed, how can mere a priori explain necessity? It may be that (though not yet proved) the a posteriori cannot be necessary, but it does not follow thence that the a priori must be necessary. The light of evidence is as much wanted in the latter case as in the former, and the mere position by no means extends it. The truth is that the apodictic evidence of the relations of space issues from the very nature of space, and not from its position, whether a priori or a posteriori (though the latter is undoubtedly the fact). Space, namely, is the generalè or common universal of all forms of externality as forms of externality; and, all relations that belong to it, it imposes upon them. Further, space itself is externality as externality; and, simply as being such, all its relations bring with them the very necessity of externality as externality. These relations, in a word, are consequences from the very notion of externality as externality; and as such consequences they necessarily share in all the necessities of their primitive and parent notion as a thought that must be thought. Having said this on space, special reference to time is not called for; and what has been said will, generally, suffice for the present.

categories.

We return to the

And what, on the whole, is to be said here is this. The use of the categories at all is to account for the fact of necessity and objectivity being in existence. But the expedient is supererogatory and gratuitous. Necessity and objectivity as much are, or are as much given, as the contributions of special sense are, or as the contributions of special sense are given. As special sense is there, they are there; and we have simply to receive them, or we have simply to apprehend them.

To refer specially, the whole result of the category of quantity is the axiom," All perceptions are extensive magnitudes." Kant,

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