conceded boundary of authority. This theory was unsatisfactory and insufficient, because it was easily shown that the contract assumed was purely imaginary, and of course that the supposed obligations were incapable of being defined. The American Revolution cut, at a blow, the Gordian knot, which science had found it impossible to unloose, and demonstrated to mankind that the only foundation of authority was the consent of the people, who had lawful right to subvert, modify, or change civil institutions, at their own pleasure.

It was well understood that the only true object of government was the happiness of the people, and that "its four pillars were religion, justice, counsel, and treasure;" but the possible establishment of those pillars in a republican structure still remained to be demonstrated. This was happily done by the institution of a democracy, based practically on the principles of universal toleration of conscience and universal suffrage, which is the perfection of political justice, because it is political equality. This democracy was made to act with counsel by means of the principle of representation; and the representatives in the various departments of the government were made more or less independent of popular control according to the danger of passion and prejudice. This system was established in each of the several states, clothed with powers adequate to the maintenance of order, the protection of personal liberty, life, and property, and the conduct of municipal affairs. The same system was distinctly embodied in a precisely similar federal structure comprehending all the states, relying on the self-renewing action, not of the states, but of the people, and limited in its powers to the management of foreign relations and others important to the general welfare. The institution of a judiciary in each state, to hold all the representative agencies within their prescribed spheres, and a supreme independent tribunal at the seat of the federal government, with appellate jurisdiction, enabling it to decide all conflicts between state and federal authority, completed this complex and extraordinary structure. Under its shade property has been safe, life secure, and liberty inviolable; social equality has continually increased, and national power has become firm, effective, and immovable. Such are the instructions which our country has given to the world in the philosophy of government. They are universally received, and they are more precious than any other VOL. III.-2

human knowledge not derived by immediate illumination from the Source of all light.

If, now, after imparting these sublime and beneficent instructions, this people could at once perish from the earth-leaving only their remembrance behind, as of a vision briefly but distinctly seen and then lost for ever it may not be doubted that they would nevertheless be held in perpetual memory for excellent wisdom and unsurpassed magnanimity.

Th institutions we enjoy have a tendency to strengthen their own deep foundation in the elements of national character and popular affection. The anxiety to save these institutions from serious danger or overthrow is the predominating motive of every citizen on every occasion of public action. He holds his own share of sovereignty by the same tenure which limits their existence, and he derives that sovereignty from the equality which they secure. That portion of sovereignty is almost infinitesimal; yet it is appreciated, because it is the safeguard of inestimable rights, a title to consideration, and an Appian-way for ambition.

Honor received begets self-respect; self-respect ambition; ambition animates resolution, quickens mental activity, and discerns the advantages which knowledge and virtue bring to their possessor. Arbitrary power procures the performance of duty only by the terror of penalties. Laws relying on that motive alone will be ineffectual, whether written in the statute-book in blood, or engraven in the rock by even an Almighty hand. A republic employs emulation; it offers wealth, power, and fame, and it distributes these rewards with impartiality and justice, in exact proportion to the intelligence of the people. Nor does such emulation endanger the public safety by encouraging faction. It is manifest that a republic could not endure in a society divided into unequal masses by aristocracy. But universal suffrage, exercised with wisdom and moderation, would be the most conservative of all institutions in a country where the dissemination of knowledge and of wealth should be nearly equal.

There is an opinion that our system is unfavorable to great national achievements, which results from the error of regarding the government as an unbalanced, pure democracy, veering with every breeze, and in danger of shipwreck from every storm. The United States of America are not a mere city, or a city with suburbs, easily subjected by machinations of intrigue, or cor

rupted by largesses, or exposed to sudden and overwhelming convulsions; but they are a nation of many states confederated, affiliated, and even assimilated, but yet not absolutely centralized or consolidated. They are individual and distinct political states, possessing elements and attributes of sovereignty transcendant and inviolable. The ruling mass of citizens in each of these states, and of course the governing constituency in the whole nation, are an educated, rural population, possessing property, and dispersed widely, reflecting singly, and acting individually. The day on which the constitution of a state, or the administration of the Union, is changed by the popular decree, is often the most quiet and tranquil secular day in the whole calendar. The collected will of the majority is not executed without encountering a modifying resistance by minorities. The state least populous, in one stage of legislation, speaks in a voice as potential as that of the greatest. Above all, the division of sovereignty and the subdivision of legislation break the force of popular passion. Affairs merely local are conducted by agents appointed and acting within the proper districts. Matters of more grave moment, relating to the interests of the states, or the rights of citizens, are decided within the states by representatives chosen for that purpose; and only national interests engage the consideration or employ the action of the federal authorities. Each agent acts subject to checks and supervision, but not to interference by a foreign department, or to central control or popular dictation.

Beyond doubt, an arbitrary prince can execute a given enterprise with greater promptness, energy, and firmness, than a government so complex. Nevertheless, it must depend on accident whether the prince be wise and humane, or weak and wicked. Princes are prone to mistake their own interests or passions for the general welfare. "I am France," said the Bourbon king. There was no one in his councils to deny, no power in the state to chastise, the arrogant assumption. Wisdom needs to hear the voice of Truth, and can find it in republics only. The battlefields of Europe, no less than the pyramids of Africa, bear witness to the ambition and the vanity of kings. The monuments of their beneficence are few and far between.

The energies and wealth of any state are easily overtasked, and no exhausted state is fit for enterprise, or can sustain warfare. The energy of one reign which we admire is sure to be followed

by a long season of inactivity-perhaps by ages of lethargy. Whatever may be the deficiency of the federal government in capacity for enterprise, it is not the only agency. There are the additional agencies of individuals, of corporations, and of states. If the federal authorities are slow to undertake achievements, they leave the other agencies free and strong. Congress has never committed, and is not like to commit, the great crime of princes-the consumption of the public wealth of future generations. On the contrary, we have seen the phenomenon of a government free from debt, returning superfluous treasures to the people, from whom they had been unnecessarily gathered.

Citizens thus virtually free from taxation, readily engage in public enterprises, either singly or in association; and the states in the same condition complete works which, while beneficial to themselves, are also important to the nation. All our railroads and canals are avenues of that internal trade and that postal communication, and are means of that national defence, which fall within the subjects of action properly belonging to the federal government. Moreover, that government contributes to such enterprises, indirectly, by military explorations, by nautical surveys, and by patronage. Thus it happens that more is achieved in this country, in proportion to its capital, than in any other; and more, perhaps, than would be accomplished if the federal government should undertake exclusively the responsibilities of improvement. There still remains, moreover, in the people the power, when they will, to oblige even that government to act directly and efficiently. The embarrassments of some cities, corporations, and states, incurred in public enterprises, do not affect these conclusions. They, like all human agents, are liable to occasional errors and disappointments; but they can retrieve their errors and renew their resources more easily than subjects or governments in other countries. Our system is to be judged, not by its partial but its comprehensive results.

The question remains, whether a government so simple in principle, yet so complex in organization, and resting so much on consent, can endure the shocks to which it must be exposed.

It must be conceded that, not only the adaptation of the government to the condition of the people, but also their capacity to understand and appreciate that adaptation, have been fairly proved by its existence during sixty years-a period which em

braces its projection amid doubt and perplexity, its organization and its consolidation in the midst of faction at home and of insidious and open hostility abroad, and its extension over double its original extent of territory, and over twice the first number of states, and a seven-fold increase of population. During the last fifty years of that period, there has been no armed and organized sedition, and within the last forty years the allegation of treason has been unknown.

The only danger now apprehended is that of a secession of one or more of the states. Since the expansion of the Union, and the increase of the number of its members, it is apparent that even a secession of one or more states would not now, as it might have done formerly, subvert the whole structure. It would still exist, yielding protection and dispensing prosperity to the members which should remain. The certainty of this result could not but exert a great influence, probably a controlling one, against a decision to separate by any discontented state.

Administration can not always be equally beneficent to all the states, even although it should be always equally just, which is not to be expected. A spirit sufficiently compromising has been. always developed on the great question of finance, and the increasing wealth and strength of the various industrious classes of the country are diminishing the importance of that question. In regard to slavery, the only subject which gives rise to apprehension, whatever is vital to any state is guarded against interference by the other states, and even against federal interposition. There is not now, and there never has been, in any quarter, a disposition to trespass beyond the forbidden limits. Incidental questions have been discussed with heat and acrimony, because liberty of debate was obstructed or denied. Nevertheless they have been decided with various advantages to the conflicting parties, and they have acquiesced. It will be so hereafter, and eminently so, because, debate being free, it will be seen that Truth is effective when she employs the language of persuasion and of moderation, and that Error owes all her strength to physical resistance.

The question which will arise when any emergency shall come, will be, not merely whether there is cause for discontent, but whether it is expedient to secede. He who gives that dangerous counsel will have to show that a miserable local traffic, pent up within the borders of the dissenting state—a timid and hesitating