treme right, he attacked the mountain with a confidence which the sequel will show was not misplaced. The great rise in the Tennessee had carried away his pontoon-bridges the night before, but his positions were so well taken, and had been so strongly fortified, that he did not hesitate to make the assault. He opened at eleven o'clock with his batteries in Lookout valley, directing his fire against our lines along the western side and northern face of the mountain. Our own batteries on the mountain could take no part in the engagement, owing to a dense fog Some infantry had also been landed on the which enveloped Lookout Point and the crest east side of that stream-the remainder, and above. At half-past twelve o'clock, the infantry much more numerous body, on the west sidebecame engaged, and the battle was then fully all up the Tennessee and some distance above joined. our right wing. This movement greatly endanVery few details have been received-too few, gers the dépôt and railroad, and furnishes an adindeed, for me to attempt to enter into particu-ditional reason for withdrawing across the Chicklars. The impression prevails in well-informed amauga. Another danger, and a still more serious circles that the affair has not been well conduct- one, is the probability that Grant will turn our ed by the confederate officers in command on right and get between the main army and Longthe mountain. Our forces had been much weak-street at Knoxville. It is now well ascertained ened the night before by the withdrawal of that Sheridan has not gone to the relief of BurnWalker's division, which was sent to the right, side, as was fully believed a few days ago; but leaving only Stevenson's and Cheatham's di- the whole Federal army is here marshalling for visions behind, both under command of General our destruction. Perhaps Grant has concluded Stevenson. General Cheatham arrived on the that he could best succor Burnside by forcing ground late in the afternoon, having just return- Bragg to retire. ed to the army. Up to the time of his return, his division was under the command of General Jackson, the senior Brigadier in the division. It was thought that these two divisions would have been sufficient to hold the position against a largely superior force; but not so. The confederates were steadily pushed back from the moment the infantry opened fire until late in the evening, when General Breckinridge went to the assistance of Stevenson with a brigade. The Federals, who had driven the confederates slowly around the north face of the mountain to Craven's house, and thence around almost to the road which leads to the top, were, in their turn, forced back after night some four or five hundred yards. The fight continued until ten P.M., and even now I can hear an occasional shot while I write. I have just heard that our communications with Knoxville have been cut, probably by the Federal cavalry that crossed the river above this afternoon, and that the dépôt buildings at Joyner's Station, on the Chattanooga and East-Tennessee road, have been burnt. The troops and guns on the mountain were brought down safely, only a few commissary stores being left behind. We lost a considerable number of prisoners, nevertheless, early in the day, and on the western slope of the mountain, the enemy, it is alleged, having got in the rear of Walthall's brigade, under cover of the prevailing fog. One account says that Walthall lost from five hundred to six hundred prisoners, including nearly the whole of one regiment, the Thirty-fourth Mississippi. It is not improbable that our loss has been exaggerated somewhat. er possession of Lookout Mountain of comparatively little importance, and, now that the mountain has passed into his hands, there is no reason left why we should longer remain in the mud and water around Chattanooga. Besides, General Grant has been throwing a heavy force up the river, and crossing it over in the boats we neglected to burn, all this afternoon. A portion of this force consists of heavy cavalry, which have been landed above the mouth of the Chickamauga. November 25-2 A.M. Finding that he could not withdraw his army in time, General Bragg has given orders to mass his whole available force on the right. A battle may be expected to-day. The situation is critical. CHICKAMAUGA, November 25-Midnight. The confederates have sustained to-day the most ignominious defeat of the whole war-a defeat for which there is but little excuse or palliation. For the first time during our struggle for national independence, our defeat is chargeable to the troops themselves, and not to the blunders or incompetency of their leaders. It is difficult to realize how a defeat so complete could have occurred on ground so favorable, notwithstanding the great disparity in the forces of the two hostile armies. The ground was more in our favor than it was at Fredericksburgh, where General Longstreet is said to have estimated that Lee's army was equal to three hundred thousand men. And yet we gained the battle of Fredericksburgh, and lost that of Missionary Ridge. But let us take up the painful narrative at the beginning, and see how this great misfortune, if not this grievous disgrace, has befallen the confederate arms. Orders have been given to evacuate the mountain, and for the whole army to retire across the Chickamauga, in the direction of the station of Lookout Mountain was evacuated last night, it that name. The loss of Lookout valley and being no longer important to us after the loss of Brown's Ferry removed all doubt as to the Lookout or Will's valley, and no longer tenable ability of General Grant to subsist his army at against such an overwhelming force as General Chattanooga this winter, and rendered the long-Grant had concentrated around Chattanooga General Bragg abandoned, also, the whole of protection for his flanks and rear, and rendered Chattanooga valley, and the trenches and breast-his front almost impregnable. He possessed the works running along the foot of Missionary additional advantage of being able to manœuvre Ridge and across the valley to the base of Look- his army upon the chord of a semi-circle, while out, and moved his troops up to the top of the Bragg could move only upon the arc. ridge. It was found necessary to extend his right well up toward the Chickamauga, near its mouth, in consequence of the heavy forces which the enemy had thrown up the river in that direction. The Tennessee and Missionary Ridge proach nearer to each other as one goes up, or rather down, the valley, the width of which, at some points, does not exceed one fourth of a mile. Across this valley, now almost an open plain, varying from a fourth of a mile to two miles in width, the Federals advanced to the assault, their ranks exposed to an artillery fire from the ridge, while in the plain, and to the infantry fire when they attempted the ascent of the hill | or mountain. Grant deployed his immense masses in two ap-heavy lines of battle, and sometimes in three, supported by large reserve forces. The spectacle was magnificent as viewed from the crest of Missionary Ridge. He advanced first against our right wing, about ten o'clock, where he encountered that superb soldier, Lieutenant-General Hardee, who commanded on the right, while Major-General Breckinridge commanded on the left. Hardee's command embraced Cleburne's, Walker's, (commanded by General Gist, General Walker being absent,) Cheatham's, and Stevenson's divisions. Breckinridge's embraced his old division, commanded by Brigadier-General Lewis, Stewart's, part of Buckner's and Hindman's, commanded by Patton Anderson. The enemy's first assault upon Hardee was repulsed with great slaughter, as was his second, though made with double lines, supported with heavy reserves. The wave of battle, like the wave of the sea when it dashes against a rock-bound coast, beat and hissed, and struggled in vain; for the brave men who guarded our right were resolved never to yield one foot to the hated invaders. The odds against which they contended were fearful; for while the enemy advanced in two and even three massive lines, their own army consisted of only one long and weak line, without supports. The only objection that can be urged against our line was its length and weakness, the latter being the result of the former, and the former the result of circumstances beyond our control, it being necessary for us to guard the passes in the ridge, and to conform to the length of the line presented by the enemy. The ridge varies in height from four to six hundred feet, and is crossed by several roads leading out from Chattanooga. The western side, next to the enemy, was steep and rugged, and, in some places, almost bare, the timber having been cut away for firewood. Our pickets occupied the breastworks below, while the infantry and artillery were distributed along the crest of the ridge from McFarlan's Gap almost to the mouth of the Chickamauga, a distance of six miles or more. In addition to the natural strength of the position, we had thrown up breastworks along the ridge wherever the cent was easy. But let us proceed with the battle, the strangest, most singular, and unsatisfactory conflict in which our arms have been engaged. Yet they not only repulsed every attack, but captured seven flags, about three hundred prisas-oners, and remained masters of the ground until night, when they were ordered to retire, carrying off all their guns, losing no prisoners, and but a small percentage of killed and wounded. The whole command behaved well, and especially that model soldier, Major-General Cleburne, a true son of the Emerald Isle, and his heroic division. General Hardee saved the army from a disastrous rout, and added fresh laurels to his brow. The Federal army was marshalled under Grant, Thomas, Hooker, and Sherman, and did not number less than eighty-five thousand veteran troops. The confederate army, under Bragg, Hardee, and Breckinridge, did not number half so many. Longstreet's Virginia divisions, and other troops, had been sent to East-Tennessee. Had these been present, with their steady leader at the head of them, we should have won a victory quite as complete as our defeat has been. As it was, we ought to have won the day, and should have done so if our men had done as well as usual. Possibly a mistake was committed when Longstreet was sent away, and possibly it would have been better not to have accepted battle to-day, but to have retired last night. General Bragg thought, however, that there was not time, after the loss of Lookout, to get his army safely over the Chickamauga last night, and that it would be better, occupying so strong a position, to fight it out. But what could he expect from a battle where the odds were so much against him? Not only did Grant have three to one in numbers, but the geographical configuration of the ground, in manoeuvring an army, was as favorable as he could desire. Nature had provided an ample The attack on the left wing was not made until about noon. Here as on the right, the enemy was repulsed, but he was obstinate and fought with great ardor and confidence, returning to the charge again and again in the handsomest style, until one of our brigades, near the centre, said to be Reynolds's, gave way, and the Federal flag was planted on Missionary Ridge. The enemy was not slow in availing himself of the great advantages of his new position. In a few minutes he turned upon our flanks and poured into them a terrible enfilading fire, which soon threw the confederates on his right and left into confusion. Under this confusion the gap in our lines grew wider and wider and wider, and the wider it grew the faster the multitudinous foe rushed into the yawning chasm. The confusion extended until it finally assumed the form of a panic. Seeing the enemy in possession of a portion of the heights, the men hastily concluded that the day was gone, and that they had best save themselves. Just at this time the alarm was increased by an artillery battery, which rushed down the hill to the river for a fresh supply of ammunition; the men, however, supposed they were flying from the field, and that all was lost. Nearly the whole left wing eventually became involved and gave way, a portion of it retiring under orders, but the greater part in unmitigated rout. General Bragg did all he could to rally the fugitives and re-form the broken line. He exposed himself in the most unguarded manner, and at one time it looked as if he certainly would be killed. His staff-officers were also conspicuous in their efforts to restore our line. They and their chief were the last to leave the ridge. The day was lost. Hardee still maintained his ground; but no success of the right wing could restore the left to its original position. All men -even the bravest—are subject to error and confusion; but to-day, some of the confederates did not fight with their accustomed courage. Possibly the contrast between the heavy masses of the Federals, as they rolled across the valley and up the mountain ridge, and their own long and attenuated line, was not of a character to encourage them. But it is late and bitter cold, and I must close. We cross the Chickamauga to-night, and then proceed to Dalton. I write under the greatest possible disadvantages. SALLUST. Doc. 15. MOVEMENTS ON THE RAPIDAN. Major-General Meade arrived at this juncture, and ordered a cessation of further operations till General French, Third corps, was heard from. At half-past one, orders were received by General Warren to move forward. Upon the advance guard of the Second corps making its appearance, the rebel cavalry pickets fled in hot haste, and Captain Schwartz, with his cavalry, at once forded the river, and marched some three miles, followed by General Caldwell's First division, Second corps, two brigades of which forded the stream. This force was crossed in this way simply to guard against any sudden surprise movement of the enemy, as well as to protect the crossing of the main body of our troops. The ford was a difficult one to cross, and many of the troops were up to their necks in icy water, so that their rations were saturated, and it required almost superhuman exertions to keep their muskets from being immersed. The artillery and ambulances experienced great difficulty in crossing the ford. Our casualties are small-very small-too small, indeed, to be recorded along with so complete and humiliating a defeat. Included among our losses are some of our best guns-perhaps as many as thirty or forty. The infantry supports, in some instances, fled so precipitately that there was no time left to remove the guns. There were but few roads down the mountain by which they could retreat, and this occasioned further loss. All the artillery behaved well. The men in Cobb's battery stood their ground after their supports had fled, and though they lost their guns, they fought them to the last; and when they could use them no longer, on account of the steepness of the descent, they hurled hand-gren-had charge of the laying of the pontoon-bridge, ades at the foe as he crawled up the mountain was delayed over an hour by finding that there beneath the muzzles of the guns. was not a sufficient number of boats to span the stream. He finally succeeded in constructing a temporary trestle which answered every purpose. This inexcusable blunder in not sending enough boats to meet any contingency, occurred both at Culpeper and Germania Fords, and caused dangerous delays. Captain Mendell was not responsible for this carelessness, and, in justice to him, it is but fair to say that to his industry and ingenuity the safe crossing of our entire army was indebted. Captain Mendell, of the Engineer corps, who The enemy's loss must have exceeded ours ten to one. Our dead and some of the wounded were left on the field. As soon as the infantry and artillery crossed the river, they were marched out on the plankroad, about two and a half miles, and encamped for the night on Flat Run. At daybreak on the twenty-seventh, the Second corps moved out on the plank-road, and marched to the old macadamized turnpike. From this point, the Second corps, with General Terry's division of the Sixth corps, marched rapidly toward Old Verdiers NEW-YORK TRIBUNE ACCOUNT. AT half-past six, on the morning of November twenty-sixth, (Thanksgiving,) the Second corps, Major-General G. K. Warren, left its camp on Mountain Run and marched to Germania Ford, with a battery of four four and a half-inch guns and one battery of six twenty-pounder Parrott guns from the reserve artillery, with three hundred cavalry, under the command of Captain Schwartz, of the Fourth New-York cavalry, and a pontoon train, under the command of Captain Mendell of the Engineers corps. The head of this column_reached the steep embankments at Germania Ford, at half-past eight A.M. Here a thick growth of almost impenetrable woods was met, and considerable time was occupied in felling trees, cutting out roads, and placing the artillery in position. All this was done with the greatest rapidity, and in the face of the enemy's pickets on the opposite bank of the Rapidan. By great exertions, all the necessary preliminaries were completed by eleven o'clock A.M., the men working with a vigor which indicated that their hearts were inspired with hopes of success. In the afternoon, General Meade ascertained that General French had participated in an en ville, which was the point to be reached. It ing the enemy to his line of battle down the was expected that the Third corps, General turnpike, where large numbers of Gordon's ori French, would join the Second at Robertson's gade, belonging to Early's division, were captured Tavern, but owing to General French having lost Colonel Carroll had a miraculous escape from inthe road, this part of the programme was not stant death, his clothing having ten or twelve carried out. General Hayes led the advance bullet-holes in it. Colonel Lockwood, of the same with his division, followed by General Webb's, brigade, had his uniform pierced in several places then General Caldwell's division. At Robert- by Minié balls. son's Tavern, General Hayes met a large body of rebels and drove them back. General Webb happened to be near at hand, and at once de-gagement, and the enemy had massed a force ploying his forces to the right of the road, drove strong enough to successfully resist him. The them back in confusion toward Raccoon Ford. exact position of the Third corps, at this time, It was in this spirited encounter that Lieutenant- still continued an uncertainty, although it was Colonel Hesser, a gallant officer, fell mortally known to be four or five miles distant. At sunwounded. About this time, half-past eleven down General Warren ventured to advance his A.M., our skirmishers ascertained that the rebels line of skirmishers, with a strong support. The were concealed in the thick woods, and were enemy made a stubborn resistance, and retreated shrewdly extending their skirmishers to such inch by inch, disputing his claim to the soil. an extent, that nearly all of the Second corps Owing to the almost impenetrable woods, it was was required to check them. an impossibility to preserve a perfect line of battle, beside affording a subtle foe concealment, and an excellent opportunity to construct formidable earthworks in addition to those already there. At this time, rebel deserters and prisoners informed General Warren, that Johnston's rebel division was between him and Raccoon Ford, and that he was confronting Rhodes's rebel division. General Warren evinced his thorough military knowledge by using sufficient military caution in advancing so as to deceive the vigilant enemy, and thereby deter him from hurling his overwhelmingly strong numbers upon our lines. General Warren continued to maintain his position, although no other corps had formed a junction with him. General Meade was at once informed of this, and also that General Warren had received no tidings from General French on his right, and General Sykes on his left. General Warren notified General Meade that he was ready and willing to begin the attack, if he so desired, by advancing the centre, which was so weak as to be in a critical condition, and wholly unfit to cope with the superior forces of the enemy. It must be borne in mind that both wings of our army were then separated four or five miles from General Warren. General Meade instructed General Warren to wait until the right and left were heard from. Soon after, the roar of artillery The Sixth corps, General Sedgwick, moved up was heard, and just then news came of the po- and took position to the right of the Second sition of the left wing. The rapid cannonading corps, at daylight. At sunrise, the First, Second, came from General Gregg's cavalry division, who and Sixth corps proceeded in line of battle siwere engaging the enemy briskly on the plank-multaneously, but, to their great chagrin, they road. Heavy firing was heard shortly after at found the fleet-footed enemy had decamped durMorton's Ford, where General Custer's cavalry ing the night. By constant and rapid marching, were skirmishing with Stuart's cavalry. During our advance overtook their retreating rear-guard, all this time, while General Warren was awaiting and shortly after discovered the main body of the further orders and information, the enemy were rebel army in a strong position on the west bank artfully changing their lines, endeavoring to turn of Mine Run, which is about one and three General Warren's right flank. While manoeu- quarter miles from Robertson's Tavern. vring our forces, Lieutenant-Colonel Josselyn, commanding the Fifteenth Massachusetts volunteers, was seriously wounded, and fell into the hands of the enemy. This determination on the part of the rebels, induced General Warren to make a feint movement, as though about to offer battle for a general engagement. To do this, it was necessary to advance his line of skirmishers. He was entirely successful in deluding the wily foe, for, in the language of the F. F. V.'s, he fought "right smart" along the front of the Second corps. Colonel Carroll's brigade, composed of Western troops, conducted themselves in a manner that cannot be too highly praised. Col Quite a number of deserters were picked up by our advance, and from them we learned that Hill's corps (rebel) had advanced from Orange Court-House down the plank-road, and there united with Ewell's corps, thereby concentrating the whole of Lee's army in a position⚫ naturally strong, and with formidable intrenchments to protect him. To add to our numerous disadvantages, a heavy rain-storm set in early in the forenoon, accompa nied with a thick fog, that foiled all our attempts, for a time, to continue a close inspection of the enemy's works and movements. Determined not to be balked by unpropitious weather, Genonel Carroll evinced considerable skill by draw-eral Warren made a minute and personal recon. The First corps, General Newton, which had been ordered from the left in the afternoon, reached the rear of General Warren's command half an hour before dark, and, at daylight on the twenty-eighth, they were in line of battle on his left, a little south of the turnpike. noissance of the enemy's fortifications, hoping thereby to discover some unprotected point where an attack might be made with some promise of success, but he failed to detect a single unguarded position. While making his perilous tour of observation along our front picket-lines, General Warren had twenty men killed and wounded. A laughable incident occurred on this reconnois-be sance which is worth relating; and as it is too good to be omitted, I give it place in this review. One of our infantry skirmishers approached a secesh house, where quite a quantity of poultry were perambulating in a defiant and careless, yet to a hungry soldier, inviting manner. The wearied and half-famished "skirmisher" immediately commenced the practice of barn-yard strategy, deploying first to the left, then to the right, and in fact in every direction, regardless of all military rule, bent only upon dealing the death-blow to a good-sized turkey, which was strutting its hour upon the stage of life. He finally managed to turn the left flank of his noisy fugitive, and having captured the entire right wing, he was in the act of carrying off his prisoner, when the rebel sharp-shooters caught a glimpse of him, and instantly opened a galling fire upon him. The leaden shower was more unpalatable and harder to digest than the defunct "gobbler," and the dish of Minié-balls was a warmer feast than the Yankee cared to indulge in, so he deemed it best to retire. He was in the act of doing this, when a tremendous volley accelerated his pace to such a degree that he dropped the coveted prize, and betook himself to a place of safety. Just then General Warren rode along, and seeing the soldier drop the fowl, he calmly dismounted, and, throwing the turkey over his saddle, rode quietly along, bearing off his valuable prize, while the enemy's bullets whistled tunes of the most discordant sound about his ears. This act caused considerable merriment among his troops, who reverenced the General for his bravery, which they have often witnessed on bloody fields. This, I believe, is the first time on record that a Major-General has been known to indulge in a foraging expedition. On the twenty-ninth, at daylight, General Warren marched rapidly toward the plank-road, a distance of eight miles, where he met General Gregg's cavalry outposts. Here General Warren and General Gregg scanned closely the position of the enemy. Just in the rear of the rebel videttes, General Gregg pointed out what he supposed to be a long line of intrenchments, but which afterward proved to be the embankment of the unfinished railroad projected several years since to run between Fredericksburgh and Gordonsville. General Warren forthwith ordered up General Caldwell's division, effecting his movements without the knowledge of the enemy, and deployed the Irish brigade to the right and Colonel Miles's brigade to the left of the plankroad. Captain Schwartz, with his three hundred cavalry, was also formed on the same road, with a battery in his rear for support; the balance of the division was ordered to march close up, ready for any contingency, while the whole column would follow on. Every thing being then in readiness, no time was squandered, and the order was given to advance. It was then noontime, and Brigadier-General Prince, on General Warren's right, was notified of this movement. The whole column then pressed on, and soon caught up with the retreating rebels, whom they drove three miles. Colonel Miles's brigade reaped new honors on this occasion, and deserve honorable mention for the cheerfulness with which they endured the privations on this rapid and most fatiguing march. Considerable time was spent in bringing up the three divisions in the rear preparatory to the grand assault, and by the time they arrived, staffofficers from General Gregg brought news that the enemy had cut his forces in two, and he was sadly in need of reënforcements. General War As soon as our entire army had been properly posted, ready for an aggressive moment, General Warren solicited the privilege of taking his corps and making a lively demonstration on the right wing of the rebel army, for the purpose of ascertaining, while he threatened, where the most feasible point of attack was. He requested that in case he should not be successful in discovering a favorable position to assault, to march around as if attempting to get in their rear, so as to com-ren at once sent word to General H. D. Terry, pel the enemy to change his front. This plan commanding Third division, Sixth corps, to renwas mutually agreed upon, and General H. D. der all necessary aid to General Gregg, and, if Terry's Third division, Sixth corps, one of the the enemy continued to press him so that he strongest and best fighting divisions in the army should need the whole division, to give it for his of the Potomac, was attached to the Second support. General Terry sent General Shaler's corps, with three hundred cavalry, in order to brigade to relieve General Gregg, but its services enable Generai Warren to carry on more exten- were not required when it arrived there. sive operations in case of an engagement with superior force. During all this time, Colonel Miles's brigade remained on the extreme left, closing around the railroad to the enemy's right, being two miles It was the intention of General Warren to make an important and quick movement, and to facilitate this he left half of his artillery, as well as half of his ambulance and ammunition trains, behind. Considerable time was required to issue extra rations, these being necessary, as it was expected to have a long and tedious movement, which made it essential that the troops should kept in the best condition, ready for any emergency which might arise. Time was likewise exhausted in assigning the surplus trains to proper guards, in relieving the picket-lines on our front; and the night being dark and stormy, and our route lying through dense woods filled with tangled underbrush, General Warren, under the circumstances, wisely deemed it useless and imprudent to proceed further till daylight. |