roads-neither myself nor any of the staff officers having ever been in Chattanooga, or nearer to it than the battle-field.

I was compelled to rely upon the guide of General Rosecrans, who assured me there was no other route we could take, and that the one we took led us toward Rossville. I expected to go by Rossville, or near enough to learn the situation of affairs there, until I met the troops of General Spears and found I was nearer Chattanooga than Rossville, and that General Rosecrans was still at the former place.

And I submit to the Court that without any order from him at all, if there was to be a tomorrow to that day, it was my duty to see General Rosecrans that day, and know his plans and see the country nearer Chattanooga, where I had no doubt the army must fall back; that this, too, was the superior duty for me if the troops I left behind were in competent hands. By the route I took, no body of soldiers was found until I met those of General Spears, within two (2) miles of Chattanooga, marching to Rossville.

"The General (Negley) had always been an active, energetic, and efficient commander, and displayed very good judgment in the affair of Widow Davis's house, in front of Stevens's Gap, where he was attacked by a superior force of the enemy, and successfully extricated his train and command from its perilous position."

Also: "From a careful perusal of that (my report) and the accompanying documents, (I find) that he acted (at Chickamauga) according to his best judgment under the circumstances of the

case.

But as General Wood, aided by several other general officers, labored assiduously to impair my military reputation, and thus my usefulness in the army, I deemed it imperative, being also influenced by the friendly advice of General Rosecrans and Thomas, to demand an investigation, as the only admitted and honorable means of vindicating myself. The application was considerately complied with in the order convening this Court.

General Rosecrans also states in the letter reI did not, immediately after reporting to Gen-ferred to: "But an impression that he left the eral Rosecrans, return to Rossville, on which my field on Sunday, without orders or necessity, troops had been directed to march, because the having made its way through the army, and General ordered me to remain with him until he statements having appeared in the official reports should receive further information, when he of general officers seeming to support this imwould determine his course and give me orders. pression," etc. When I left the field, it would have been easy to follow impulse, and, notwithstanding the reports I had received, endeavor to reach the left. It was the stronger with me, as one of my own divisions was there; but the path of duty, under my conception of my orders, or in the absence of any orders, was the same, and I felt compelled to follow it. Respectfully submitted.

A. McD. McCook,
Major-General U. S. Volunteers.

DEFENCE OF GENERAL NEGLEY.

LOUISVILLE, KY., February 22.

Major-General Hunter, President Court of Inquiry:

SIR: At Chattanooga, on the evening of October sixth, 1863, at a private interview, secured for me by a written request from General Thomas to General Rosecrans, I was informed for the first time that the Department Commander was dissatisfied with my official conduct at the battle of Chickamauga, on the twentieth of September, 1863. At the same time, General Rosecrans referred to statements made by Brigadier-Generals Brannan and Wood as the reasons for his unfavorable opinions.

The testimony and papers before the Court show conclusively that Generals Brannan and Wood, officers junior to me in rank and entirely independent of my command, were the authors of these imputations, and that they used their official report for otherwise unauthorized censures which necessitated this investigation. Official copies or extracts from these official reports were not furnished until submitted before this Court, February eleventh, 1864. Nevertheless, true extracts from these reports appeared from time to time in the public press, in direct violation of the following order:

"WAR DEPARTMENT, October 4, 1862.

"II. If any officer shall hereafter, without proper authority, permit the publication of any official letter or report, or allow any such document to pass into the hands of persons not authorized to receive it, his name will be submitted to the President for dismissal. This rule applies to all official letters and reports, written by an officer himself.

"By order of the Secretary of War.
"L. TOWNSEND,
"Adjutant-General."

In reply to my expression of pain and sur- The channels through which these extracts prise, that he should entertain such opinions were obtained may be plausibly conjectured, without my knowledge, or without giving me from the italicizing, and the purpose for which opportunity for explanation or defence, he re- they were used. The evidence further shows quested me to submit a supplementary report, that my most zealous, violent, and disrespectful with the written statements of officers whose accuser was General Wood; yet, as a sworn witnames I had mentioned, who were conversant ness before this Court, he not only failed to eswith the facts. This report occasioned General tablish the statement made in his report, but Rosecrans's letter to the Adjutant-General of the army, dated October fourteenth, 1863, in which he states:

could not mention a single instance where General Negley had failed to do his duty in the battle of Chickamauga, or which would in the slight

est degree justify the unwarrantable liberty he that, and "portions of Palmer's and Negley's arrogated to himself in publishing such insinuations.

the enemy, who manifested an intention of cutting off our retreat along the only passable route, the Dry Valley road. The artillery was becoming more scattered each moment, trying to escape the falling shells. It now became a question for me to decide, whether I should remain with my isolated command, and save it all if possible, or endeavor to reach the left with my infantry only, leaving the ambulances, filled with wounded, the stragglers, and the artillery, to inevitable capture. I was ignorant of the condition of the troops upon my left, who might, for aught I knew to the contrary, he in full retreat upon the La Fayette and Rossville road. Indications, and the general impression, were that such was the fact; and, indeed, it would column (unknown to me) of General Granger's corps prevented. My decision was to remain with my special command, until relieved by the same (or higher) authority which had assigned me to it. I withdrew until I reached McFarland's house, in the first open ground on the natural line of communication with Rossville, where I halted, induced to do so by the fact that it was the termination of a long and narrow defile, which could be held by a small force against the enemy, who were reported to be advancing. It is a reasonable presumption that a knowledge on the part of the enemy, of the assembling of our scattered forces at McFarland's farm, checked his further pursuit.

tillery I had in position endangered. I immediately gave directions for the protection of the left, and passed quickly to the position to which I was assigned, by an order received per Captain Gaw, of General Thomas's staff. On the way I met General Brannan, who urgently requested a regiment. I ordered to his support my largest regiment, the Twenty-first Ohio, armed with revolving (five-chambered) muskets. I found affairs in front assuming an alarming condition. The enemy was pushing heavy columns through the gap in our line, caused by General Wood's hasty abandonment of his position. Remaining portions of the line swung back like a gate before the wind. The troops from the right, who rested back against the ridge in echelon, pushed forward with intre- have been the case had not the approaching pidity to recover the lost ground, but were taken | in flank, and crumbled into flying fragments. My situation was desperate. My effective batteries were fast exhausting their ammunition. I had sent, on the first view, two aids to General Rosecrans, to describe my situation, and ask immediate reënforcements. At the same time I ordered up the remainder of the Third brigade, which was not then engaged. Lieutenant Moody returned through a shower of bullets, expressing surprise at finding me still on the ridge, and reported General Rosecrans's reply: "Tell Negley it is too late; I cannot help him." The regiment of stragglers on my left had vanished; those upon my right were disappearing in the dense woods, their speed redoubled by the farreaching shells; and the exultant yells of the enemy, whose closely planted batteries and long lines of musketry were sweeping the ridge with an appalling fire, were ringing in my ears. Yet the batteries of Schultz, Marshall, and one of Parrott guns, were heroically hurling death into the enemy's ranks, at such short-range, that the smoke from the guns of both contending hosts mingled together.

Contemplate my position, if it is possible to do so here, removed from the scene of action. No human eye could penetrate the dark woods to the left, where General Thomas, with the flower of the army, was struggling against the inspirited enemy. To seek succor from that quarter was hopeless. None could be expected from General Brannan, as he had just applied for and received assistance from me. Tidings of defeat came from the right; the enemy was gliding up the ravine to the left, and almost seizing the guns in action. All was now agonizing doubt and irremediable confusion. It was now, in my judgment, time to retire. To continue an unequal contest, could only add more graves to the battle-field, and give more trophies to the enemy. A proper realization of the situation, and a just regard for the lives and materiel of war intrusted to my care, urged the speedy withdrawal of my few troops and considerable artillery. The latter was moved to the second ridge, at which point a portion of the Third brigade had just arrived. The ground was unfavorable-a dense forest covered the movements of VOL. VIII.-Doc. 24

I now learned, for the first time, from a cavalryman, that General Thomas was holding the enemy in check upon the left, and as it would require time to organize the troops and clear the gap, I turned over the command to General Davis, and hastened back to find General Thomas, if possible, and report for orders. Meeting General Sheridan entering the defile from the west side, with a considerable body of troops, I suggested the propriety of moving what I thought was his division, to the support of General Thomas. He replied that it was his intention to proceed to Rossville. I passed on, and soon met the enemy, who prevented my further advance. I then returned to McFarland's, and held consultation with Generals Sheridan and Davis, and officers of General Rosecrans's staff. It was unanimously agreed, that General Davis should remain and hold the Gap; General Sheridan to pass through Rossville, toward General Thomas's left; while I should proceed to Rossville, with the debris of the army, organize the scattered troops, and be prepared to support either column. About this time, a despatch arrived from Captain Hill, of General Rosecrans's staff, stating that Forrest's cavalry was on the Ringgold and Rossville road, in General Thomas's rear. In view of this new danger, I marched expeditiously to Rossville, and prepared to hold it. This entire movement was only an anticipation of the order received from General Rosecrans, then at Chattanooga, sent by telegraph at seven P..

The great advantage of this effective, organization and disposition of troops, who otherwise

would not have halted short of Chattanooga, can scarcely be estimated; and its importance in a tactical point of view, must be apparent to every experienced military mind. Had the two roads converging at Rossville been relinquished to or seized by the enemy, it would in probability have sealed the fate of General Thomas's command, which was compelled to fall back that night for supplies. The influence my action exerted over subsequent events, may be designated in history as an accident, but it was one of those military accidents which restored order with equilibrium, changed the front of a defeated army, and according to the testimony of General Rosecrans and others, unquestionably saved Chattanooga. Public opinion estimates the ability of a general by results. The value and importance of my official action, from the moment I was assigned to the command of the artillery (without referring to the "handsome" operation of my command on the nineteenth September) until the close of the twenty-first, is not, in view of the testimony taken before the Court, open to controversy. The saving of fifty pieces of artillery is in itself significant. I beg of you to observe, in this connection, that I possessed no knowledge of the topography of the country or of the disposition of the troops, beyond an imperfect view from the position I occupied. The only intelligence I had of the disaster, was derived from statements of officers passing to the rear. A strong impression was naturally made upon my mind by General Rosecrans's significant reply to my application for aid, and by the information that he, with two of his corps commanders, had gone toward Chattanooga. If the Department Commander, with a large retinue of staff-officers, corps of engineers and a cavalry escort, failed, as he admits, to correctly comprehend under the circumstances the situation at noon, how was it possible, with my very limited facilities, and almost enveloped by the enemy, for me to know the facts at one P.M. ?

GENERAL BANKS'S ORDERS.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,
NEW-ORLEANS, February 3, 1864.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 23:

THE following general regulations are published for the information and government of all interested in the subject of compensated plantation labor, public or private, during the present year, and in continuation of the system established January thirtieth, 1863:

I. The enlistment of soldiers from plantations under cultivation in this department, having been suspended by order of the Government, will not be resumed except upon direction of the same high authority.

II. The Provost-Marshal General is instructed to provide for the division of parishes into police and school districts, and to organize from invalid soldiers a competent police for the preservation of order.

III. Provision will be made for the establishment of a sufficient number of schools, one at least for each of the police and school districts, for the instruction of colored children under twelve years of age, which, when established, will be placed under the direction of the Superintendent of Public Education.

Military history proves beyond contradiction that no single battle, no matter what may be its magnitude or results, is a positive or even fair test of the ability of a commander. The fear of public opinion, after a disastrous battle, betrays many officers, sometimes high in command, to deny even their unavoidable mistakes, to direct attention to the errors of brother officers, to claim honors undeserved, laurels never won, and by a skilful use of the pen exaggerate the simple performance of duty into a great achievement. If I know my own purposes in life, I seek no honor by such unsoldierly pretexts, and scorn such means of vindication. As this investigation refers to but a single battle, it would be unbecoming in me to refer to my previous services and the many assurances of confidence and appreciation won from my superior officers on other fields. The testimony before you pays a higher tribute to my fidelity to country, my skill, energy, and fortitude as a commander, than I could VI. Flogging and other cruel or unusual punclaim for myself. Therefore I respectfully sub-ishments are interdicted.

IV. Soldiers will not be allowed to visit plantations without the written consent of the commanding officer of the regiment or post to which they are attached, and never with arms, except when on duty, and accompanied by an officer.

V. Plantation hands will not be allowed to pass from one place to another except under such regulations as may be established by the provost-marshal of the parish.

mit the case to the Court, desiring only to add VII. Planters will be required, as early as

First and second-class hands, with families, one acre each.

practicable after the publication of these regula-
tions, to make a roll of persons employed upon
their estates, and to transmit the same to the
provost-marshal of the parish. In the employ-one
ment of hands, the unity of families will be se-
cured as far as possible.

VIII. All questions between the employer and the employed, until other tribunals are established, will be decided by the provost-marshal of the parish.

IX. Sick and disabled persons will be provid- | ed for upon the plantations to which they belong, except such as may be received in establishments provided for them by the Government, of which one will be established at Algiers and one at Baton Rouge.

X. The unauthorized purchase of clothing, or other property, from laborers, will be punished by fine and imprisonment. The sale of whisky or other intoxicating drinks, to them, or to other persons, except under regulations established by the Provost-Marshal General, will be followed by the severest punishment.

XI. The possession of arms, or concealed or dangerous weapons, without authority, will be punished by fine and imprisonment.

XII. Laborers shall render to their employer, between daylight and dark, ten hours in summer and nine hours in winter, of respectful, honest, faithful labor, and receive therefor, in addition to just treatment, healthy rations, comfortable clothing, quarters, fuel, medical attendance, and instruction for children, wages per month as lows, payment of one half of which, at least, shall be reserved until the end of the year:

...

First and second-class hands, without families, half-acre each.

Second and third-class hands, with families, one half-acre each.

Second and third-class hands, without families, one quarter-acre each.

To be increased for good conduct, at the discretion of the employer. The encouragement of independent industry will strengthen all the advantages which capital derives from labor and enable the laborer to take care of himself and prepare for the time when he can render so much labor for so much money, which is the great end to be attained. No exemption will be made in this apportionment, except upon imperative reasons, and it is desirable that for good conduct the quantity be increased until faithful hands can be allowed to cultivate extensive tracts, returning to the owner an equivalent of product for rent of soil.

XV. To protect the laborer from possible imposition, no commutation of his supplies will be allowed, except in clothing, which may be commuted at the rate of three dollars per month for first-class hands, and in similar proportion for other classes. The crops will stand pledged, wherever found, for the wages of labor.

XVI. It is advised, as far as practicable, that employers provide for the current wants of their hands, by perquisites for extra labor, or by apfol-propriation of land for share cultivation, to discourage monthly payments so far as it can be done without discontent, and to reserve till the full harvest the yearly wages.

For first-class hands,. $8 per month. For second-class hands,.. 6 per month. For third-class hands,. 5 per month. For fourth-class hands,.. 3 per month. Engineers and foremen, when faithful in the discharge of their duties, will be paid two dollars per month extra. This schedule of wages may be commuted by consent of both parties, at the rate of one fourteenth part of the net proceeds of the crop, to be determined and paid at the end of the year. Wages will be deducted in case of sickness, and rations, also, when sickness is feigned. Indolence, insolence, disobedience of orders, and crime will be suppressed by forfeiture of pay, and such punishments as are provided for similar offences by Army Regulations. Sunday work will be avoided when practicable, but when necessary will be considered as extra labor, and paid at the rates specified herein. XIII. Laborers will be permitted to choose their employers, but when the agreement is made, they will be held to their engagement for the year, under the protection of the Government. In cases of attempted imposition, by feigning sickness, or stubborn refusal of duty, they will be turned over to the provost-marshal of the parish, for labor upon the public works, without pay.

XIV. Laborers will be permitted to cultivate land on private account, as herein specified, as follows:

XVII. A Free Labor Bank will be established for the safe deposit of all accumulations of wages and other savings; and in order to avoid a possible wrong to depositors, by official defalcation, authority will be asked to connect the bank with the Treasury of the United States in this department.

XVIII. The transportation of negro families to other countries will not be approved. All propositions for this privilege have been declined, and application has been made to other departments for surplus negro families in this department.

XIX. The last year's experience shows that the planter and the negro comprehend the revolution. The overseer having little interest in capital and less sympathy with labor, dislikes the trouble of thinking, and discredits the notion that any thing new has occurred. He is a relic of the past and adheres to its customs. His stubborn refusal to comprehend the condition of things occasioned most of the embarrassments of the past year. Where such incomprehension is chronic, reduced wages, diminished rations, and the mild punishments imposed by the army and navy will do good.

XX. These regulations are based upon the assumption that labor is a public duty, and idle. ness and vagrancy a crime. No civil or military officer of the Government is exempt from the