for the
articles.

moreover, designed to discredit the use of armed con- Chapter V flicts as a means of settling international differences, in the general interest of humanity and peace. The incalculable damage which modern war may easily Justification inflict even upon States which are strangers to the conflict itself, make the employment of good offices and mediation more necessary than ever before, whether for the prevention or settlement of armed conflicts.

between good

offices and

There is a nominal difference only, between good Difference offices and mediation, and practically both of these means of action are distinguished less by their intrin- mediation. sic quality, than by the extent to which they contribute toward a friendly understanding. In other words, good offices constitute a mild and more general form of mediation. Very often mediation follows the extending of good offices, and a third Power which has begun to reëstablish relations between the Powers in conflict is requested to participate in the further negotiations: sometimes even to conduct them. Diplomatic usage therefore makes no real distinction. between good offices and mediation, the present treaty in using both expressions looks simply toward a conciliatory interposition.

mediation.

The great advantage of mediation, when compared Advantage of to other means calculated to settle international conflicts, is, above all, the remarkable elasticity of its action, and the possibility which it affords of adapting itself to particular circumstances in each given case. Addressing itself to the free consent of the parties, mediation by no means threatens the principle of

N

Chapter V their sovereignty any more than the liberty or indeAdvantage of pendence of States. It acts by influencing their free

mediation.

Former agreements unsatis.factory.

will, without in the least impairing it, or even throw-
ing doubt upon it. By the very fact that good offices
and mediation must proceed in the most friendly and
courteous manner, and can never exceed the bounds
of conciliatory advice, they offer the double advan-
tage of first, leaving entirely intact the indepen-
dence of the Powers addressed, and secondly, of being
entirely available, not only for conflicts of right, but
also for those of interest, thus adding materially to
the resources available for the preservation of peace.
It would seem that this instrument of ordinary diplo-
matic practice, handled with tact and skill, and
directed by a sincere desire to serve the cause of
peace, is destined to play in the future a striking
and beneficial rôle. At the same time it must be
confessed that up to this time mediation has played
one of the most modest parts in the settlement of
international controversies, and this fact will appear
most clearly from the history of recent conflicts.
the reason is sought, it will be found that the question
of mediation is usually put in a manner which is
as unsatisfactory in theory as it is in the practice of
International Law.

If

The treaty of Paris and the Protocol of the Congress of Paris, as well as the treaty regarding the Congo, signed in Berlin in 1885, all impose the obligation upon the parties in conflict of "having recourse to the mediation of one or more neutral Powers." This character of mediation, most irregular in theory, has

the further disadvantage of being quite unattainable Chapter V in practice. The request for mediation necessarily presupposes a preliminary agreement between the interested States on the subject of the necessity for it, and of the existence of the proper occasion. Such an agreement is hardly ever possible in the excitement of a controversy between diametrically opposing interests. At all events, it is out of the question to make the recourse to mediation obligatory for the States whose interests are at stake, for the reason that the very request presupposes an agreement of the parties concerned regarding the choice of the mediator. If, nevertheless, treaties impose such a duty upon States in case of controversy, they generally remain a dead letter, for no treaty can oblige States in dispute to limit their choice to such or such a mediator. These facts are proven by the entire history of international relations since the time of the Congress of Paris of 1856. During this period there have been several cases when neutral States, on the basis of Article 23 of the Congress of Paris, have proposed their mediation or good offices to States in conflict, but there has not been a single case when Mediation has any States in conflict have addressed to neutrals a voked. request for mediation. In 1898, during the controversy between France and Great Britain, concerning Fashoda, neither one nor the other of these Powers dreamed of having recourse to the provisions established by the Conference of Berlin in 1885, and requesting the mediation of a third Power. Other and similar examples could easily be cited.

not been in

Chapter V

Offer of mediation

not favored heretofore.

Mediation to terminate a

war.

As to the obligation of neutral States to offer their mediation to States in conflict, so far as it has not been defined by treaties, it has never been recognized or observed. In fact, so far as any such duty is concerned, many writers on International Law not only affirm that neutral States are not so obliged, but, more than that, they almost deny their right to offer their mediation to States in conflict.

Bluntschli and Heffter regarded mediation as dangerous and harmful meddling. Hautefeuille and Galiani advised States ordinarily to abstain from mediation, for fear of alienating, without any reason, the sympathies of one or the other parties to the conflict. Numerous examples of serious disagreements might be cited, which resulted in war, but which never suggested to neutral Powers an attempt. at mediation; yet such an effort, especially in cases where it could be made simultaneously by several Powers, might have averted wars, the consequences of which have been incalculable for all the States constituting international society. In many cases the proposition of mediation has been made so late, and in such uncertain terms, that it could no longer prevent a declaration of war.

It was thus, for instance, that the French Government in 1870 refused the good offices of Great Britain. at the outbreak of the conflict between France and Germany.

Mediation is often proposed, not with the object of preventing, but with that of terminating a war. Several recent wars- those between Austria and

Prussia in 1866, between Chile, Peru, and Bolivia Chapter V in 1882, and between Greece and Turkey in 1897, besides some others, were terminated through the mediation of neutral Powers. Had the same Powers shown half the energy in attempting to prevent these conflicts, it is fair to assume that, at least in the two latter cases, the outbreak of hostilities might have been averted.

established as

In view of all these facts, it was but natural Mediation that the Conference should have established media- a permanent tion as a permanent institution. The principle of institution. isolation which hitherto has almost dominated the political existence of every nation, must hereafter give way to a close solidarity of interests and a common participation in the moral and material benefits of civilization. Modern States cannot remain indifferent to international conflicts, no matter where they may arise, and who may be the parties. Under present conditions, war, though between two States. only, must be regarded as an international evil, which should be prevented wherever possible, by international means.

founded with

It must not, however, be understood that the good offices of other Powers are unreservedly recognized Not to be conas an every-day method of appeasing ordinary diplo- meddling matic differences. The language used is "In case of serious disagreements or conflicts, before an appeal to arms." Outside of these comparatively narrow limits, the offer of good offices or mediation would constitute simple meddling, without justification and not without danger.