CH. XX.] 66 BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 283 did not live to see the result of his heroic stand. Before noon he received a bullet in his brain and died instantly. "The death of this splendid officer," writes Fitzhugh Lee with grace, was regretted by friend and foe," and borrowing the words of another, he adds, "No man died on that field with more glory than he; yet many died, and there was much glory!" 1 After Reynolds's death matters went badly for the First and Eleventh Corps. They were "overborne by superior numbers and forced back through Gettysburg with great slaughter." Buford's despatch of 3.20 P. M. points out an important reason for the defeat. "In my opinion," he said, "there seems to be no directing person." "3 All was confusion and looked like disaster when Hancock arrived on the field. On hearing that Reynolds was killed, Meade, with his excellent judgment of the right man for the place, sent Hancock forward to take the command. He restored order and inspired confidence while the Union troops were placed in a strong position on Cemetery Hill east of the town. It is thought that if the Confederates had been prompt they might have carried the height, but the order to do so from Lee to Ewell was conditional, and with his force then present he did not deem the attempt practicable. Nevertheless, the first day of the battle of Gettysburg was a Confederate success. Late in the afternoon of July 1 Slocum with the Twelfth Corps had arrived at Gettysburg. Sickles with the Third Corps marched thither with celerity and zeal. The reports of Hancock, Howard, and others decided Meade that Gettysburg was a good place to fight his battle, and he issued orders to all of his corps to concentrate at that point. He himself arrived upon the battle-field at one in the morning,5 pale, tired-looking, hollow-eyed, and worn out from want of sleep, anxiety, and the weight of responsibility." • Doubleday, p. 156; Nicolay and Hay, vol. vii. p. 246. By the afternoon of July 2, Lee and Meade had their whole forces on the field, the armies being about a mile apart. Lee had 70,000, Meade 93,500, less the losses of the first day, which had been much greater on the Union than on the Confederate side. The Confederates occupied Seminary Ridge in a line concave in form, the Federals Cemetery Ridge in a convex line, a position admirably adapted for defence. Meade decided to await attack, and if he had studied closely the character and history of his energetic adversary, he might have been almost certain that it would come. Longstreet, however, differed with his commander. In a conversation at the close of the first day's fight, he expressed a desire that their troops be thrown around the left of the Union army, interposing themselves between it and Washington and forcing Meade to take the offensive. The anxiety of Lee at receiving no information from his cavalry had become excitement, and, somewhat irritated at a suggestion contrary to what he had determined upon, he said, "No, the enemy is there and I am going to attack him."2 From the commencement of his invasion, he had shown contempt of his foe. The stretching of his line from Fredericksburg to Winchester in the face of an opponent who had greater numbers can bear no other construction. While he deemed Meade a better general than Hooker, he thought that the change of commanders at this critical moment counterbalanced the advantage in generalship; and while he was astonished at the rapid and efficient movements of the Army 1 The statements in regard to Pickett are not exactly the same, but I have followed Lee's report of January, 1864, in which he says that "Pickett's three brigades arrived near the battle-field during the afternoon of the 2d." O. R., vol. xxvii. part ii. p. 320. 2 Longstreet's article, Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 339. 8 Hunt's article, ibid., p. 265; Life of Lee, Long, p. 271. Lincoln to Hooker, June 14: "If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg [north of Winchester] and the tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could you not break him?"- Complete Works, vol. ii. p. 852. 4 Long, p. 274. CH. XXI BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 285 of the Potomac after Meade took command, he had undoubtedly become convinced from his almost unvarying success that he and his army were invincible, a confidence shared by nearly all of his officers and men. His victories on his own soil were extraordinary, but if we compare his campaigns of invasion with those of Napoleon we shall see how far he fell short when he undertook operations in an unfriendly country, although the troops that followed him were in fighting qualities unsurpassed. "Except in equipment," writes General Alexander, "I think a better army, better nerved up to its work, never marched upon a battle-field." With such soldiers, if Lee had been as great a general as Napoleon, Gettysburg had been an Austerlitz, Washington and the Union had fallen. Lee was up betimes on the morning of July 2, but the movements of his soldiers were slow, and he lost much of the advantage of his more speedy concentration than Meade's. The afternoon was well advanced when he began his attack, and by that time the last of the Union army, the Sixth Corps, which had marched thirty-four miles in eighteen hours, was arriving. There was tremendous fighting and heavy loss. that afternoon on both wings of each army. On the Union side Warren and Humphreys distinguished themselves. Sickles was struck by a cannon ball that caused the loss of a leg and was borne from the field. The result of the day is accurately told by Lee: "We attempted to dislodge the enemy, and, though we gained some ground, we were unable to get possession of his position."2 The Confederate assaults had been disjointed: to that mistake is ascribed their small success. The feeling among the officers in Meade's camp that night was one of gloom. On the first day of the battle the First 1 Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 358. Meade to Halleck, 2 July 4, to Davis, O. R., vol. xxvii. part ii. p. 298. 8 P. M., July 2: "The enemy attacked me about 4 P. M. this day, and, after one of the severest contests of the war, was repulsed at all points. We have suffered considerably in killed and wounded." - Ibid., part i. p. 72. 1 and Eleventh corps had been almost annihilated. On the second day the Fifth and part of the Second had been shattered; the Third, in the words of its commander who succeeded Sickles, was "used up and not in good condition to fight." The loss of the army had been 20,000 men.2 Only the Sixth and Twelfth corps were fresh. But the generals had not lost spirit, and in the council of war called by Meade all voted to "stay and fight it out." The rank and file had fought as Anglo-Saxons nearly always fight on their own soil. On the first day and the morning of the second the martial ardor of many of the men had been mingled with cheerfulness at the report that McClellan had been restored to his old command. "The boys are all jubilant over it," said a soldier to General Hunt, "for they know that if he takes command everything will go right."4 We may guess that on this gloomy night the men went over again in their minds the fate of their army when under Pope, Burnside, and Hooker it had encountered the veterans of Lee, but in spite of this doleful retrospect they must have felt in some measure "the spirit that animated general headquarters," 5 the energy of Meade and the faithful co-operation of his generals. Meade had no thought of taking the offensive, and was busy in improving the natural defences of his position with earthworks. The partial successes of the Confederates 6 determined Lee to continue the attack on the 3d of July. In the early morning there was fighting on the right of the Union line. Then followed an unnatural stillness. "The whole field became as silent as a churchyard until one 1 Birney at the Council of War, O. R., vol. xxvii. part i. p. 74; Doubleday, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, p. 185, note 1; Walker's Hancock, p. 130. 2 C. W., 1865, vol. i. p. 350. 8 The words of Slocum which summarize the decision, O. R., vol. xxvii. part i. p. 73. 4 Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 301. 5 Gen. Walker, Second Army Corps, p. 99. • Well stated by Gen. Hunt, Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 369. CH. XX.] BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 287 o'clock."1 Suddenly came from the Confederate side the reports of two signal guns in quick succession. A bombardment from one hundred and fifteen cannon commenced, and was replied to by eighty guns of the Union army, whose convex line, advantageous in other respects, did not admit of their bringing into action a large part of their artillery. "It was a most terrific and appalling cannonade," said Hancock.2 But it did little damage. The Union soldiers lay under the protection of stone walls, swells of the ground, and earthworks, and the projectiles of the enemy passed over their heads, sweeping the open ground in their rear. Everybody from the commanding general to the privates felt that this was only preliminary to an infantry charge, and all braced themselves for the tug of war. Hancock with his staff, his corps flag flying, rode deliberately along the front of his line, and by his coolness and his magnificent presence inspired his men with courage and determination. For an hour and a half this raging cannonade was kept up, when Hunt, the chief of the Union artillery, finding his ammunition running low, gave the order to cease firing. The Confederates thought that they had silenced the Federal batteries, and made preparation for their next move. Longstreet had no sympathy with the vigorously offensive tactics of his chief; and when Lee on the morning of this July 3 directed him to be ready after the bombardment had done its work to make an attack with Pickett's fresh division reinforced from Hill's corps up to 15,000 men, he demurred, arguing that the assault could not succeed. Lee showed a little impatience, apparently made no reply, and by silence insisted on the execution of his order. Longstreet took Pickett to the crest of Seminary Ridge, pointed out to him what was to be done, and left him with a heavy heart. Alexander of the artillery was directed to note carefully the effect of his fire, and when the favorable moment came to give 1 Alexander, Century War Book, vol. iii. p. 362. 2 C. W., 1865, vol. i. p. 410. 3 Walker's Hancock, p. 139. |