closest observers, lineal and medical officers, disclose the startling fact that, as a rule throughout the entire war, not more than thirty-five per cent. of the muster-roll strength of the armies of the Union appeared on battle fields bearing muskets. Throughout the entire war the great battles were actually fought and the victories achieved by about thirtyfive per cent. of the men borne on the muster-rolls of the armies. Of course, many influences operated to produce this discrepancy, but the most potent one, in fact, the root of the great evil of the immense disparity between the musterroll strength and the fighting force of the armies, is to be found in the loose and careless manner of recruiting by the voluntary system. Under this system, worn-out drunkards, decayed asthmatics, one-eyed, one-armed men, men with different length of legs-in short, not only men whose systems were replete with the seeds of all the forms of incipient disease, but men laboring under active disease, utterly unfitting them for the performance of military service, were received as recruits, and sent to join the armies in the field, simply to fill the hospitals when they arrived there. The result is, a great many of these subjects never reached the field at all: they fell into and crowded the hospitals by the wayside. It was not unusual, during the war, to find men in the hospitals who had been months in the service, but had never done an hour's service in the field.

It is unnecessary to explain here-which, however, could be done perfectly satisfactorily on the most natural principleswhy so much looseness and carelessness obtain in recruiting by the voluntary system. It is sufficient to state the fact, a fact attested by the observation of all military men who had any breadth of experience, during the late war, of the Union armies in the field. Another fact, equally indisputable, is, that the evils caused by the looseness and carelessness of recruiting by the voluntary system would in a great measure be corrected by a well-regulated system of conscription. The rigid inspection to which the recruits would always be subjected, under a system of enforced recruiting, would in a great degree stop the flooding of the ranks of regiments with men morally, mentally, and physically disqualified for the performance of military service. Then, if every regiment had its battalion or other fractional part of its organization in dépôt, for the preparation of recruits for the field, whereby the unserviceable, who had escaped the scrutiny of the recruiting inspector, would be weeded out, the armies of the Republic would no longer be weighed down by the incubus of crowded hospitals, and the country no longer taxed to maintain soldiers only in name, render no return for their pay.

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Perhaps the greatest purely military error which marked the

conduct of the war of the rebellion consisted in the utter absence of any effective system of reserves. The system of recruiting practised simply supplied, and not always those, the immediate demands of the armies in the field. No available reserves were ever formed. During the first three years of the war, when an advantage was gained in a field conflict, it was impossible to prosecute it to its full fruition, simply because there were no reserves in hand to supply the casualties of battle. Months often were spent in repairing damages and putting the armies on a footing to resume active operations. In the mean

time, the enemy had improved the leisure in repairing his losses and restoring an equipollence of forces. It is scarcely necessary to say that this is not war. It is simply butchery. An effective system of conscription, which would have enabled the Government to have in hand, at all times, ample reserve corps, would have obviated the necessity for those expensive delays which so often most painfully tried the national patience.

During the last year of the war, the armies of the Union were able to press the advantages gained in the field conflicts, because, first, owing to the narrowing (thanks to the sound military judgment of the present illustrious commander-in-chief), in a great measure, of the theatre of war, to two important and vital lines of operation, it was possible to assemble on them vast and preponderating armies; and, because, secondly, the resources of the enemy were exhausted, his ranks depleted, and his armies, consequently, no longer a match for the magnificent armies of the Republic, which it had required three years of most severe and painful instruction to educate for the achievement of decisive victory.

It may be postulated as an axiom, that a war of any magnitude cannot be vigorously prosecuted without intermission, without having in hand reserve corps at all times sufficient to meet promptly the ever-varying exigencies of active operations. It is scarcely to be expected, on account of the great, but, as it is respectfully submitted, absurd prejudice which exists in the United States against any other method than voluntary recruiting, that it will be possible to enforce a system of conscription in time of peace; but let it be hoped that, if the country should be again involved in a great war, wiser and juster views may obtain, views dictating a system by which the burden of military service would fall equally on all citizens capable of bearing arms, and the military establishment be made truly efficient in proportion to the means of the nation, by filling the ranks of its armies by enforced recruiting.

As intimately connected with the maintenance of the permanent military establishment of the nation, the proper organization of the national militia is a matter of grave importance. The subject should early engage the attention of Congress, a

uniform and efficient system be enacted, and its enforcement throughout the entire country intrusted to officers specially assigned to that duty. All the arms-bearing citizens should be required to do military service a certain portion of time in each year, within the limits of their own States. By this means the rudiments of military instruction would be desseminated among the people. It is not apprehended that the military spirit of the American people will soon fall seriously into decay; but it should be borne in mind that martial ardor, uninstructed, will not at once make an efficient army out of citizens drawn from all the associations of peaceful pursuits. Whatever disseminates military instruction among the people renders the formation of an active army more facile.

A minute system of military regulations, comprehending every branch of the military establishment, so minute, indeed, as to meet as nearly as possible every case that could possibly arise in the administration of the service, should be published, and the observance of them strictly enforced alike on the highest and the lowest. The preparation of these regulations should be intrusted to the most accomplished and best cultivated military men in the country-men of thorough military education, and large, practical experience of the administration of armies in the field. Deviation from them should be the result of an inexorable necessity knowing no other resource, and should be tolerated only in this case. There was much popular clap-trap heard during the war of the rebellion about "cutting red tape," and the tape-cutters were generally esteemed by ill-informed persons in the military service and by the bulk of the people to have done a very meritorious action; but it is confidently believed such is not the judgment of the best-informed military men of the country-men who exemplified in their own careers the necessity and propriety of a rigid obedience to law and regulations, and who, nevertheless, did more by far to suppress the rebellion than all the red-tape cutters to whom the war gave a public existence. It is confidently asserted that there is no recorded instance in which Generals Grant, Sherman, or Thomas found it necessary to cut any red tape, though, had it been absolutely necessary for the good of the country to do so, they are all men who would promptly have taken the responsibility of applying the scissors to the most time-honored regulations. They obviated the necessity of pursuing a course in conflict with the army regulations and military laws by making proper and ample preparation in advance to meet, as far as human foresight could do it, all the requirements of the service. It is not denied that there may be occasions when it may be necessary for a commander to adopt a course outside of the regulations, or even in direct conflict with them; but it is believed such instances are few

indeed, and can generally be guarded against by proper precautions taken sufficiently in advance.

The opinion is hazarded, that in most of the cases during the late war, when it was absolutely necessary to perform the popular operation of cutting red tape, the necessity was due to the previous neglect of the commander, who, subsequently, could relieve himself from the consequences of his previous neglect only by ignoring the regulations for the administration of the military service, and otherwise transcending the legitimate functions of his office.

And the further opinion is hazarded, that in nine cases out of ten in which red tape was cut during the war, it was done more in the interest of the cutter, or to gratify some favorite whim or caprice of his, than in the interest of the country. When the extent of the lawlessness which was practised during the war in setting aside laws and trampling on the army regulations is considered, it is believed these remarks will not be deemed unfounded or inappropriate.

It has been remarked that all military men of every grade should be educated for the profession of arms. The United States Military Academy, more fostered by the Government, and its capacity sufficiently expanded to furnish annually the number of officers required by the increasing demands of the military service of the country, would nobly and amply supply the necessary theoretic and much of the practical military education. But with the organization herein proposed, the permanent military establishment would be a vast military school. In this school young men of natural adaptability for the military profession, who have received the necessary previous general education, would soon acquire sufficient military instruction to entitle them to promotion. This they should and doubtless would receive. The influence of such promotion on the morale of the army would be of the very greatest advantage.

Having sketched generally the principles which should fix the extent and regulate the organization of a military establishment, it is proposed to consider briefly the influence which the organization proposed would exercise on the efficiency of an active army. An army formed as herein proposed would take the field commanded by thoroughly instructed and experienced officers, supported by instructed non-commissioned officers, with its ranks filled by men drawn from civil life, and devoted to the military service only after the most careful and rigid scrutiny and thorough preparation subsequently, in dépôt, to prepare them for the various and arduous duties of a soldier's life. The efficiency of an army so constituted, over an army made up of recruits accepted into the service without rigid scrutiny and subsequent preparation and instruction, cannot be denied, and may be readily estimated. With an army so or

ganized, the hospitals would not be filled to overflowing with young soldiers before they had seen a half-year of service, and the nation might reasonably expect (and would doubtlessly be gratified in the expectation) to see the fighting strength of such an army bear a reasonable-yes, a large-proportion to the muster-roll. Such an army would be a mass of intelligent, prepared, hardened human beings, capable of accomplishing any enterprise its numbers would warrant its undertaking. Not weighed down with ignorance, stupidity, and inefficiency in its officers, nor with numerous invalids, its ranks would be full, and nearly the whole of its numerical strength would be at all times available for the service of the country. What soldier would not delight to command such an army, and glory in the deeds he could achieve with it to his country's advantage?

It is not pretended that any new principles of military organization, nor even novel facts, are enunciated in this paper. Such is not its purpose. The true principles of military organization, based on a large experience, have long been fully demonstrated and established. But the utterance of sound principles at fortunate junctures, when they are appropriately stated, is often more beneficial to the public than the propounding of startling paradoxes. The purpose of this article is respectfully to invite the attention of the high public functionaries charged with the control of the great national interests to the well-established principles on which the permanent military establishment of the country should be based.

A word of explanation is proper in regard to the criticism indulged in, in certain passages, touching some of the transactions of the late war. This criticism is not made in any spirit of censoriousness, nor with the disposition to ventilate injuriously matters around which, in many cases, the haze of time has already begun to gather. It is made simply and honestly, for the purpose of humbly aiding to inaugurate a more healthful and useful system for the future.

That the permanent military organization of the country needs enlargement and thorough reorganization, is believed to be a proposition which will not be questioned by the most casual observer of the national history during the past four years. It is thought the present is a most propitious season for the performance of this most necessary work. The public mind is fresh touching the dangers through which the Republic has passed, dangers which menaced its very existence, and which might have been in a great measure avoided, by having at the outset of the struggle a permanent military establishment proportioned to the wants and resources of the country, and so organized as to make those resources immediately available. The subject will doubtlessly engage the attention of the National Legis