REPORT

OF

MAJOR GENERAL A. PLEASONTON,

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN,

October 15, 1865.

MY DEAR SIR: Agreeably to your request I submit, for the consideration of your honorable Committee on the Conduct of the War, some of the prominent facts that came under my observation during the campaigns in which I was engaged in the late war of rebellion, and which had any bearing on their success or failure.

The first most important and prominent step in the prosecution of the war, and one whose consequences were felt to the end, was the defective and injurious organization given to the army of the Potomac in the winter of 1861-'62. It was most unfortunate, that, with the finest men and material ever furnished to any army of the world, that army should have been organized with 80 little reference to the rules of war governing the organization of armies. The highest military authorities have laid down, that, in the proper organization of an army, the cavalry should form from one-fourth to one-sixth of the infantry which composes it. This relation of the cavalry to the infantry is so important, in consequence of the necessary duties assigned to each in time of war, that it may fairly be said no army is fit to take the field unless these two arms are properly organized and bear the proper proportion to each other in respect to numbers; and it is also a strong fact, which the war has demonstrated, that the more closely these proportions are observed throughout the campaign the greater will be the success, and the greater will be the confidence reposed by the troops of the different arms in each other; which greatly tends to lighten their most arduous duties. It is a vicious organization that requires the infantry to supply the deficiencies of service for want of sufficient cavalry, or the reverse; or, that imposes upon a small body of cavalry the arduous and ruinous service that should only be borne by thrice their number.

With eighty thousand cavalry on the pay-rolls of the country in the winter of 1862, the army of the Potomac was kept so deplorably deficient in cavalry as to be unable to ascertain what the enemy were doing at Fairfax and Manassas; were unable to raise the blockade of the Potomac; and the rebels had finally moved away from those places in the spring before our army had started in pursuit. Does any one now assert that those obstacles could not have been removed by twenty thousand cavalry, properly supported by that army? So little interest was taken in the organization, support, and efficiency of the cavalry that. it became more of a farce than the earnest effort to create an important arm to advance against the enemy.

I served with the army of the Potomac from October, 1861, until March, 1864, in the various capacities of regimental, brigade, division, and corps commander

of cavalry. My constant theme was the proper increase and organization of the cavalry, and, from what has since been done, I am confirmed in the opinion formed at that time, that if the proper steps had been taken that winter of 1862, a superb cavalry corps could have been organized by the spring, in which event the Peninsula campaign, one of the bad consequences resulting from the neglect of the cavalry, would not have been forced upon us. McClellan dreaded the rebel cavalry, and supposed that, by placing his army on a peninsula with a deep river on each side, he was safe from that arm of the enemy; but the humiliation on the Chickahominy of having a few thousand of the enemy's cav alry ride completely around his army, and the ignominious retreat to Harrison's landing, are additional instances in support of the maxim, "that a general who disregards the rules of war finds himself overwhelmed by the consequences of such neglect when the crisis of battle follows."

While the cavalry arm was thus neglected in the organization of the army, the infantry force, which was upwards of one hundred and thirty thousand men, was kept in divisions until the army entered the field in the spring, when the corps formation was adopted; but so indifferently, however, that the command of the corps fell upon officers of no higher grade than that of brigadier general. This carelessness of assignment, by rendering every high officer uncertain of the position he held, was a fruitful source of the jealousies and dissensions that af terwards occurred among the commanders in this army, and which did so much to retard and frustrate the best devised plans that were attempted to be executed, and taken in connection with the useless superabundance of artillery with which at that time the army was supplied, and which was without higher organization than that of the battery, added to the other causes mentioned, prevented that unity of action, compactness, confidence, mobility, courage, energy, and enterprise in the army, which are so essential in the prosecution of successful warfare.

General Hooker was the first commander of the army of the Potomac to exhibit a correct appreciation of organization in an army. He consolidated and increased his cavalry, organized them into a corps, supplied them with artillery, and was rewarded by some distinguished service that made the march of his army a triumph from Falmouth to Frederick city.

The campaign of Gettysburg, which he commenced so brilliantly, was afterwards conducted by his successor with such results as to produce the deepest mortification throughout the country. The doubt, hesitation, and fear of conse quences displayed by General Meade, were in striking contrast to the heroic valor so constantly and stubbornly exhibited by the army. Never did the cavalry, though few in numbers for the labors assigned them, perform more brilliant and successful deeds of arms than those which, after the battle of Gettysburg, brought to bay a shattered, baffled, and beaten army at Falling Waters, on the banks of the Potomac, in July, 1863. The army was eager for the attack; they knew the end of the rebellion was within their grasp, but their commander, General Meade, receiving no inspiration from their genius, only held them back until the enemy had escaped. The same fear of consequences which animated General Meade, caused the army to fall back from Culpeper to Centreville, in the fall of 1863, when the rebels advanced and took from the campaign of Gettysburg whatever might have been claimed for it on the score of generalship, and the Mine Run campaign showed so plainly that General Meade was deficient in the qualities required for a commander, that it was not surprising to see Lieutenant General Grant, a short time after, assume the personal direction of the army of the Potomac.

It is a very important fact that the numbers of the cavalry in that army were then more nearly in the proper proportion to those of the infantry than at any other time in its history, and the noble record of the cavalry and of the army while under General Grant can consequently be accepted as one of the

results of observing that important principle of war-the proper organization of an army.

In reviewing this subject it is well to observe that the success of the rebel army in Virginia, for the first two years of the war, was mainly due to its superior organization, and to the splendid corps of cavalry it was able to maintain. That army was not hampered with a surplus of artillery, and its numerous and efficient cavalry kept its commander well informed of our movements. But when the casualties of war reduced this cavalry faster than they could replace them, which was the case in the campaigns of 1863, the army was soon thrown upon the defensive, from which it was never after able to recover. We then deduce the following facts: that the army of the Potomac was better organized in the later periods of the war than at the beginning, while the reverse was the case with the rebel army. The successes of either army bore a marked correspondence to its superior organization to that of its opponent, at the time of achievement. The question then recurs, could not the war have been much sooner closed by giving to the army of the Potomac a proper organization at the beginning? The government should now decide this question, and if responded to in the affirmative, make the necessary corrections to prevent similar evils in our military system hereafter.

CAMPAIGN OF THE PENINSULA.

In the campaign of the Peninsula I commanded the second regiment of United States cavalry until the army arrived at Harrison's landing, when I was made a brigadier general of volunteers, and commanded a brigade of cavalry in the second action at Malvern Hill on the 5th of August, 1862, and also covered the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula. Throughout this campaign there was a decided want of vigor in the conduct of the army, and the first great mistake was made in permitting the rebels to occupy and re-enforce Yorktown before taking possession of it. Some thirty days' delay occurred in laying siege to Yorktown, when it might have been taken by assault the first few days after the army arrived before it; at all events, the importance of time at that period was such as to make an attempt worthy of a trial. The time lost at Yorktown and on the Chickahominy gave the rebels an opportunity to gather their forces to defend Richmond; and the error committed in placing the army on both sides of the Chickahominy enabled the enemy to cripple first our left wing at Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, and afterwards our right wing at Mechanicsville and Gaines's mill, and by the moral effect of these partial actions caused the armyto retreat to James river. There appeared no disposition throughout this campaign to bring the entire army into action as an army; there was no controlling spirit so decidedly strong as to effect the necessary concert of action in the different portions of the army, and, as a consequence, the battles that took place resulted from the enemy's successively massing heavier forces on our detached corps, which were outnumbered, beaten in detail, and compelled to retreat. It has been claimed that more troops should have been furnished the army for the purpose of taking Richmond; but the facts of the case do not support this assertion, as the troops that were in the army were never all used and fought in connection with and in support of each other, as should have been done. To have increased these large masses, without material change in the manner of fighting them from that which had been adopted, would not have changed the ultimate result from what it was, and would have only added to the embarrassments which already existed. Besides the causes already mentioned, there were numerous oversights and neglects bearing upon discipline, and which also had a serious influence upon the success of the campaign. Very little was done to excite the energy, emulation, and enthusiasm of the troops, while some measures were adopted that had a decided tendency to diminish these necessary qualities

in a marked degree. At Yorktown an order from headquarters prohibited all music by bands and all calls by either drums or bugles, and they were not resumed until after the army had arrived at Harrison's landing. When the large masses of men which composed the army of the Potomac were moving among the swamps of the Chickahominy, without any of the enlivening sounds of martial music, or the various well-known calls of an army life, the effect was very depressing, and caused the soldiers to exaggerate the issue that required of them to lose the most agreeable part of their profession. The army, however, had gone to the Peninsula very enthusiastic, the soldiers always earnest and faithful in the discharge of their duties; and although the field for the campaign had been badly selected, and there were numerous drawbacks to disappoint their hopes, there were also several occasions won by their valor when a bold, determined, resolute commander could have forced the result to a successful issue.

CAMPAIGN OF ANTIETAM.

In this campaign I commanded the cavalry division of the army, and took the advance from Washington city through Maryland and until the field of Antietam was reached, when I fought my command in front of the bridge leading from Keedysville to Sharpsburg, and held the centre of our army throughout the battle. The same mistakes were made in this campaign that characterized that of the Peninsula. The army was not moved with sufficient rapidity or vigor from the Peninsula or through Maryland, and the enemy was again given time to prepare and concentrate. When the battle was delivered it was fought by detached commands in such positions as to be unable to give or receive assistance from each other. Hooker's, Franklin's, and Sumner's corps were on the right, too distant to receive support from the rest of the forces, while Burnside's forces were on the left, at least three miles from where my command was, without any troops being between us, and with Antietam creek, which was not fordable, behind us. Fitz John Porter's corps was behind my position a mile and a half on the opposite side of the creek as a reserve, but it was never brought into action. Notwithstanding the disadvantages our army labored under from these arrangements, a decisive victory could have been won at 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the 17th of September, if a strong attack had been made on Sharpsburg from the centre. My command had cleared the enemy from my front and were in high spirits, while the stubborn fighting of the army generally had told fearfully upon the rebels. I therefore recommended this attack, and requested to be permitted to take the initiative in it. The proposition was not approved, and I was directed to hold the position I then had. The enemy were then 80 far off, falling back, my guns could not reach them, and the battle ended so far as my command was concerned. On the next day the army was not permitted to advance, and on the 19th the enemy had crossed the Potomac and escaped. The rebel army had suffered so much more than ours in this campaign, and their ammunition was so much exhausted, that I was convinced a rapid and energetic pursuit would have routed them, if it had not caused Lee himself to surrender. Colonel Davis, of the eighth New York cavalry, had, before the battle, destroyed all the ammunition belonging to Longstreet's corps, and the heavy demands of the fight had nearly exhausted the supply for the rest of their army. This, with the disappointment of the rebel soldiers at the failure of their enterprise to invade Pennsylvania, were advantages which should not have been thrown away.

Another opportunity for success was offered when the army was at Warrenton, in the fall of 1862. The rebel force was then divided; Longstreet and A. P. Hill, with their corps, being at Culpeper, while Stonewall Jackson and D. H. Hill were in the Shenandoah valley, at Front Royal. By crushing Longstreet