Immediately after the surrender of Lexington, which was made on the 19th of September, 1861, General Frémont began to throw forward to Jefferson City, for an active campaign against Price, all the regiments which had been encamped around St. Louis for several weeks previously. The whole force, however, was unorganized. Only the regimental organizations made before the regiments reached St. Louis were in existence. At Jefferson City these regiments were assigned in orders to constitute brigades and divisions, but many of them were scattered at remote points, and some of them did not join the brigades to which they were assigned until some time after General Frémont was relieved from command of the western department. The second division, so designated in orders, was given to me. There were only fragments of it together, and other regiments belonging to it were stationed at remote points, far beyond my reach and beyond communication, except by telegraph through St. Louis and by way of Springfield and Quincy, Illinois, and Palmyra, Missouri. I append the order issued by General Frémont for the organization and distribution of his force: HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, St. Louis, September 24, 1861. SIR: For a basis of operations the army will take the following position: Right wing, second division, Acting Major General Pope, headquarters at Boonville, covering the line between Boonville and Palestine, and keeping communication with centre, fifth division, Acting Major General McKinstry, headquar ters at Syracuse. Left wing, first division, Major General Hunter, headquar ters Versailles. Advance guard, third division, Acting Major General Sigel, headquarters Georgetown, keeping communication with troops stationed at Marshall. Reserve, fourth division, Acting Major General Ashboth, headquar ters Tipton. The bridge over the Osage river at Osage City and the crossings at Tuscumbia and Linn creek are to be occupied by the division of General Hunter. The first Kansas regiment, of General Pope's division, is directed to proceed from Hannibal at once to Chillicothe, re-enforcing our troops at that place, and preventing, in this manner, the enemy from crossing Grand river. General Pope, after arriving at Boonville, will open communication by way of Glasgow and Brunswick, and add re-enforcements in his discretion to the post at Chillicothe. The commander of the troops which have already advanced to Marshall will also open communication with the troops at Chillicothe by way of Brunswick. The commanders of the different divisions will so order their troops as to occupy their designated stations in the quickest time and by the shortest possible route. It is also recommended to obtain by every mode, especially by strong scouting parties, all possible information in regard to the strength and movements of the enemy. And it is especially enjoined upon them to send daily reports to the commanding general whether any movements have been made by the enemy, or their own forces, or not, and also to communicate, daily, with the commanders of adjoining divisions. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Brigadier General J CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER, Acting Major General, Commanding Fifth Division. My headquarters were fixed at Boonville, on the Missouri river. Price was still in the immediate vicinity of Lexington, miles above Boonville, when I landed from a steamboat with one regiment on the 30th of September. It is unnecessary to pursue the history of the campaign which terminated at Springfield, Missouri, where General Frémont was relieved from command by orders received on the 4th of November. His letters and despatches to me at the time are appended: Springfield, Mo., November 1, 1861. GENERAL: I am directed by the general commanding to inform you that he has sent duplicate despatches to you, urging your moving forward with the greatest alacrity to join the advanced corps at this place. This communication has been sent to you in the uncertainty of the others having reached you, and to report that it is imperatively necessary that you should come here by forced marches. Mr. Jullan, who bears this to you, a well informed and reliable guide, is directed to move with and guide you. Very respectfully, Major General J. POPE, J. H. EATON, Acting Assistant Adjutant General. Commanding Second Division, en route. SPRINGFIELD, Mo., November 2, 1861. GENERAL: Your despatch of this day en route is received. General Frémont directs me to say, that having been relieved from the command of the western department, and having relinquished command in orders in the hands of Major General Hunter, when you reach here the control of the public service at this point will fall upon you; you should, therefore, he says, push on to reach here with all despatch. Respectfully, J. H. EATON, Acting Assistant Adjutant General. Acting Major General JoпN POPE, U. S. A., Commanding Second Division U. S. forces, en route. In relation to the withdrawal of General Hunter to Rolla, and the line of the Pacific railroad west of Jefferson City, I suppose that I can give little information that is not already in possession of the public. The withdrawal was made at the suggestion of the President of the United States, from whom a letter to that effect had been received by General Hunter, which was read to a council of war which he assembled at Springfield, a day or two after he assumed the command. While the letter from the President did not convey a positive order to General Hunter, as to his movements, yet the suggestions made were so strong and the wishes of the President so manifest, that I do not well see how General Hunter could have acted otherwise than in conformity to them. It was manifest that Price would retreat as soon as we advanced on him from Springfield. No provision whatever had been made for such a campaign, even as far as Springfield, fact sufficiently indicated by the necessity I was under, as soon as I reached that place, to empty my wagons nearly entirely of provisions for the sick men in the hospital at Springfield, who had been thirty-six hours without food, according to the terms of the application made to me for supplies. Although I marched back to the Pacific railroad with all speed, I only succeeded in getting there without great suffering by meeting half way a small train which I had sent back from Humansville for rations ten days before, with orders to load and follow to Springfield by forced marches. One-half of this train I was obliged to leave behind me, when I met it, to furnish provisions to the division coming after me, only keeping enough to reach Otterville, on the railroad, by rapid marching. Had we gone far south of Springfield after Price, I do not believe we would have been able to get back without great suffering and loss of life from starvation. By the time General Hunter reached the railroad, he was superseded in the command by General Halleck. About one-half the army that ahd retired from Springfield was assembled along the Pacific railroad from its western terminus (Sedalia) to Jefferson City. Of this force I was placed in command, and occupied with it a section of Missouri officially known as the district of central Missouri. Shortly after the withdrawal of our forces from Springfield, Price begun to move north slowly and cautiously, and finally, by the first of December he was encamped on the Osage river, at and around Osceola. His army and the force under my command were separated by about seventy miles of beautiful prairie country, everywhere practicable for artillery and wagons. Price issued a proclamation, inviting the young men of Missouri to join his standard. His great personal popularity and commanding influence in the State produced powerful effects for mischief, and thousands of young men organized in squads, large and small, in various counties of the State, north as well as south of the Missouri river, and began to make their way to his camp, carrying with them all the supplies they could procure by robbery, and transported in the wagons which they seized all over the country. As long as Price remained so near at hand as his camp on the Osage the excitement continued, and his irregular force was for a time daily augmented by the arrival of small parties from every county in the State. I append hereto several letters on the subject. SYRACUSE, December 8, 1861. Major General HALLECK: Steen's division of Price's force crossed Osage three days since, and scattered along the river above and below Osceola. Price on south side still. Returns of his force show eight thousand men. It is undoubtedly his purpose to scatter most of force in the counties adjoining the Osage on north side for subsistence. One battalion of Steen's division descended the river towards Warsaw. If it be desired to keep Price's force on south side of Osage an advance in force towards Clinton will be necessary. JNO. POPE, Brigadier General Commanding. SYRACUSE, December 9, 1861. Major General HALLECK: Detachment returned from Warsaw this morning. Drove in enemy's pickets from points ten miles this side. Found no force in Warsaw. Confirms information that Steen is on north side of Osage. Strong pickets of enemy from Bolivar to Osceola to cover his rear. Whole region south of Osage devastated by Price. It was understood by people at Warsaw and along the road that this detachment was our advanced guard moving on Springfield. The people understood that it is the determination of Price to force his way to Missouri river. (Doubtful.) No news of importance from the front. I shall not move from Tipton until I hear from you. JNO. POPE, Brigadier General Commanding. SYRACUSE, December 11, 1861. Major General HALLECK: I transmit a number of letters captured with the mail carrier. There is a large number of them, but in substance they convey the same information, viz., that Price's force is disintegrating; that he has short of ten thousand men now with him; that recruiting is very slow; that unless he can raise five regiments to enter the confederate service, he cannot get a commission in their army, &c. I am satisfied that a rapid movement would utterly destroy his army, either as the result of an action or of a retreat. His army cannot possibly survive another retreat south. His men are only kept together now by the speedy termination of their terms of service, and the prospect of getting home by New Year's day. They will not be led south again in any large number. With the delightful weather we have had, and which promises to continue for some time, and the good roads, such a movement would consume but a few days, and would destroy in a moment all hope of recruiting for Price in this whole region. I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant, JNO. POPE, Brigadier General Commanding. HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT CENTRAL MISSOURI, Major General HALLECK: The constantly increasing disturbances in all this region, occasioned by the efforts of Price's recruiting officers and straggling parties of guerillas, exhibited in the general alarm, the robbing of peaceful inhabitants, and the outrages of every description perpetrated in every village, hamlet, and farm-house, are caused directly by the encouragement and countenance given to such acts by the presence of the enemy in such force on the Osage. Once driven from that position, and forced back into the region of country which he has so recently laid waste, all encouragement would be withdrawn from his adherents and sympathizers now disposed to enlist in his army. We can march from the railroad in this vicinity with a full and well appointed army of fifteen thousand men and forty pieces of artillery, and still leave force enough along the railroad to guard all the public stores and protect the road itself from any damage. I would respectfully suggest, therefore, that to quiet all the disturbances and uneasiness engendered by the presence of so large a hostile force in this region, an advance in force against Price be made as soon as possible. For this army of fifteen thousand men there is abundance of transportation and of supplies, and they constitute a force large enough, considering the difference of organization, discipline, and arms, to deal with Price easily, even had he the fifty thousand men he calls for in his proclamation. Most of his men are only armed with shotguns, and have scarcely the pretence of an organization. He has, perhaps, four or five thousand tolerable troops, armed with muskets, and about thirty pieces of artillery, few of which can be properly served, and some of which are rough iron pieces, made in Missouri. Our forces here are in such condition that they can march with two hours' notice. Each regiment has its own transportation, and there is nothing necessary except to throw into the wagons camp equipage and rations. Should such a movement be intrusted to me, I would respectfully suggest the following plan: The first object to be kept in view is, that the enemy, to some extent, must be surprised, in order that he may be brought to an engagement. For this purpose I would propose that, for several days before the real movement was made, strong bodies of cavalry with some artillery be sent forward on the Warsaw and Clinton roads to force in their pickets, reconnoitre in force, and then return; that this operation be repeated several times, and that finally, under cover of such a movement, the whole force be rapidly thrown forward to the Osage at Warsaw. I believe by proper management and vigor, the advanced division of this army could cross the Osage before the news of the movement could reach the enemy. If he then attempted to retreat to the southwest, he must at least lose his baggage train and supplies. While his line of retreat would be threatened, if not intercepted, by such a movement, ours would be open to the railroad at almost any point east of Otterville. I, however, do not suppose for a moment that he will stand, unless retreat is cut off, and in either event the disturbances in this sectiou will be ended. Such a campaign need not last more than twenty days, if so long, and the forces here would enter upon it with a feeling very different from that of going into winter quarters on the Lamine. I submit these views to you with much diffidence, and should probably not do so at all, but that I am impressed with the belief that neither secession in Missouri nor Price's army can survive another retreat of that army towards Arkansas. I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant, JNO. POPE, Brigadier General Commanding. HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT CENTRAL MISSOURI, COLONEL: To-morrow morning at 10 o'clock I wish you to march in the direction of Knob Noster, keeping a sharp lookout on your left as far as you can towards the road leading from Warrensburg to Clinton; when you get within three miles or so of Knob Noster you will halt and await further orders. I will be in the neighborhood of Warrensburg, most likely, to-morrow night. The enemy, about four thousand strong, is in the neighborhood of Warrensburg. Your movement is designed to cut them off from getting into the Clinton or Warsaw road east of Warrensburg. Be very cautious in your movements, and keep your flanks and front well protected by scouts; keep your train and command well closed up, and your force ready for action at any moment. If you need re-enforcement despatch to Colonel Turner at Sedalia. JNO. POPE, Brigadier General Commanding. On the 14th of December he (General Halleck) directed me to move a part of my force from Sedalia in the direction of Lexington (the opposite direction from Price) for the purpose of trying to intercept a large body of recruits for Price's army, said to be moving towards Osceola from the Missouri river. By telegraph, I was afterward permitted to direct my march from Sedalia to the southwest, so as to occupy a position half-way between Sedalia and Osceola, on the great road usually travelled from Lexington south. For the details of the movement and its results, I refer to the appended copy of my report: REPORT OF MOVEMENT OF TROOPS.-CAPTURE OF PRISONERS AT BLACK WATER. HEADQUARTERS District of CENTRAL MISSouri, Otterville, December 23, 1861. Captain JOHN C. KELTON: I have the honor to report that having replaced by troops from Lamine the garrison of Sedalia, I marched from that place at 3 o'clock on Sunday, the 15th instant, with a column of infantry, cavalry, and artillery numbering about four thousand men. The first brigade was commanded by Colonel Jeff. C. Davis, Indiana volunteers; the second, by Colonel F. Steele, eighth Iowa regiment. The object of the movement was to interpose between Price's army on the Osage, and the recruits, escort, and supplies on their way south from the Missouri river. This body of the enemy was represented to be between five and six thousand strong, with a large train of supplies |