ABORTIVE MOVEMENT OF GENERAL MEADE.

671

corps came up with the enemy, and began developing his strength by a brisk skirmish, but was ordered not to make a serious attack until the third-French's-corps should come up. This corps, however, did not come up, having been delayed by various difficulties, the most serious of which was, that it took the wrong road, and was brought face to face with. Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, which held it in check, and delayed its progress. But this mishap was more serious in its consequences than merely delaying the march of the corps, for it revealed to Ewell the entire movement of Meade, and led him to plant his entire force across the turnpike, and thus prevent Warren's advance, and while holding Warren in check, to bring Hill up to close the gap between them.

His plan thus unmasked to the enemy, and completely thwarted by being thus prematurely disclosed, General Meade could only order up other corps to the support of Warren, in the hope that he might yet be able to force Ewell back, and gain the position which he coveted, and from which he might have fought Lee's army with strong hope of decisive victory. The first-Newton's-corps was ordered up, but did not reach him before dark. The sixth-Sedgwick's-corps arrived about the same time, and was posted on Warren's right, but they could not fight well in the darkness, where the country was entirely unknown to them, and they were compelled to wait until morning, with the certainty that before that time Hill would have joined Ewell. In the morning, General Meade found the enemy occupying the very position he had striven to gain, their line formed on a series of ridges, with enfilading positions for batteries, while in front stretched the marsh of Mine Run, and the enemy had added fortifications to the natural strength of the position. To attempt to assail this in front, was simply suicidal, for while floundering through the marsh, every soldier would have been destroyed by the concentrated fire of the enemy's batteries. Saturday, and a part of Sunday, were spent in a careful reconnoissance of the enemy's position; General Warren had examined carefully the enemy's right, and reported confidently his ability to carry it. It was determined to make the assault on Monday morning, and to ensure the success of his attack, two divisions of the third, and one of the sixth corps, were ordered to report to him During the night of the 29th, General Warren again examined the pcs...on, with still greater care, and came to the conclusion that it could not be carried without an immense sacrifice of life. This conclusion he reported to General Meade, who then resolved to postpone the attack. Under the circumstances, to postpone it, was to abandon it. His ten day's rations were nearly exhausted, and a single day's rain would place the army in a perilous position. The commander, therefore, reluctantly, but of necessity, marched his army back in safety across the Rapidan, to their former position. The losses of the army of the Potomac, in this unfortunate movement, were sixty killed, and five hundred and forty wounded and missing.

CHAPTER LV.

THE ANACONDA" POLICY-REASONS WHY IT COULD NOT SUCCEED IN CRUSHING THE REBELLION-DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF THE OCCUPATION OF TEXAS DETERMINED UPON-THE REASONS ASSIGNED FOR IT-GENERAL FRANKLIN ORDERED TO LOUISIANA-EXPEDITION OF GENERALS BANKS AND FRANKLIN TO TEXAS-THE GREAT PREPARATIONS MADE FOR IT—THE TROOPS AND THEIR COMMANDERS-the DISASTROUS ATTACK ON SABINE PASS AND CITYADVANCE OF THE ARMY TO VERMILLIONVILLE-THE COAST EXPEDITION TO TEXAS-RECONSTRUCTION IN LOUISIANA-THE STARTING OF THE ADVANCE OF THE GRAND ARMY-CAPTURE OF SIMMSPORT, BAYOU GLACE, AND FORT DE RUSSY-ALEXANDRIA CAPTURED AND OCCUPIED BATTLES OF TEACHOES AND CANE RIVER-THE ARMY TOO MUCH SCATTERED-ARRIVAL AT GRAND ECORE-THE ADVANCE TOWARD MANSFIELD-THE BATTLE OF MANSFIELDROUT AND PANIC-BATTLE OF PLEASANT HILL-THE RETREAT DOWN THE RED RIVERGRAND ECORE-JUMPING THE SAND BARS-ALEXANDRIA-THE RAPIDS-COLONEL BAILEY'S DAMS-ESCAPE OF THE GUNBOATS-REAR-ADMIRAL PORTER'S REPORT-THE RETREAT TO SIMMSPORT AND MORGANZIA-GENERAL STEELE'S RETREAT TO LITTLE ROCK-GENERAL CANBY IN COMMAND OF THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI DIVISION-DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTHPOLITICAL ASPIRATIONS OF FLORIDA UNIONISTS-THEIR PLEAS FOR AN EXPEDITION INTO NORTHERN FLORIDA--THE EXPEDITION ORDERED-THE PLAN-GENERAL SEYMOUR AT ITS HEAD-DELAYS AND DISASTERS-BATTLE OF OLUSTEE-RETREAT OF THE UNION FORCES

LOSSES-END OF THE " ANACONDA" POLICY.

THE policy of the Government of the United States during the first three years of the war, in regard to its prosecution, was that originated, it is said, by General Scott, and more fully developed by General McClellan, and known in popular phrase as the "Anaconda" policy. It contemplated the surrounding the insurgents at all points by a cordon of troops, cutting off their supplies by a land as well as sea blockade, and by a gradual contraction of its lines, hemming them in and crushing them, as the anaconda, by the contraction of its coils, crushes its prey. With a territory far less extended, and a country possessing few or none of the topographical difficulties which the region occupied by the insurgents presented, and a more gigantic army than that of the Union, this policy would possibly have succeeded; but, under the circumstances, its success was impossible. Particular battles or campaigns might prove successful; the enemy might be defeated at one point or another; his sources of supply from one point or another, either by running the blockade, or by communication with the disloyal at the north, might be cut off; but the number of troops required to inclose the insurgent territory, and drive the Rebels in upon their own centre, was too great, the expenditure it necessitated too vast, and the opportunities of evading the pressure too many, to admit of complete success. The triumphs which led to the close of the war were not attained until this policy had been abandoned, and that of concentration adopted. When, by the movements of the

THE ANACONDA POLICY.

673 Union armies, the Rebels were compelled to collect their forces mainly around two or three points, whose preservation and defence was vital to their existence, the problem of the continuance of the war was very much simplified. If they could successfully defend these positions, and destroy, or thoroughly and permanently cripple, the armies which assailed them, they would thereby present a claim to foreign recognition, which would not be long withheld. If, on the contrary, they found it impossible, after a long and desperate struggle, to retain their possession of these vital points, and were compelled to yield them to the assailing power, their claim to independence or separate national existence, would be proved futile, and the Rebellion must come to an end.

The United States Government had not, however, at the time of which we write, fully comprehended the necessity for the abandonment of the "anaconda" policy. They were beginning, indeed, to see that it involved a vast expenditure, and that when a particular section had been subdued, the work was often to be done over-that they could not maintain lines. of such vast extent, even with the great armies they were keeping in the field; but the desire to overrun and conquer new portions of the insurgent territory, even if their occupation of it were only temporary, where such occupation yielded to the captors a plentiful supply of cotton or cattle, or would result in a crop of lucrative offices, was too strong to be as yet resisted.

The Department of the Gulf had not been in all respects judiciously managed. Its civil administration under General Butler had been wise and efficient; but the military force, during his administration, had never been sufficient to hold more than a narrow strip of territory along the banks of the Mississippi, and his tenure of some portions of that was precarious. When General Banks assumed command of the department, he was at first crippled by the same lack of troops; and it was not until his second expedition into the "Attakapas country" that he was strong enough to hold the region of central Louisiana. When he undertook the siege of Port Hudson, though reinforced by a very considerable body of nine months troops, he was compelled to weaken the garrisons of the central towns to such an extent that the Rebels regained possession of several of them. Galveston, Texas, had been captured and held for a few weeks by a combined naval and land force; but with the disastrous assault upon the mere handful of Union troops forming its garrison, and the capture, destruction, and defeat of the squadron there, it had lapsed again into Rebel hands, and all efforts to obtain a permanent foothold in Texas had failed from the want of a sufficient Union force to garrison and hold what they might capture. The possession of Texas, except for the relief of its. oppressed and long-suffering Unionists, was not essential to the successful conduct of the war. If left alone till the vital points in the insurgent territory were reduced, it would, as it afterward did, fall into the hands

of the Union Government without a battle. But on the "anaconda" theory its occupation was essential, and despite its vast extent, its plains and plateaus, covered only with the mesquit, or the more formidable cactus growths, its unhavigable rivers, and its storm-lashed coasts, the decree went forth that it must be occupied. The reasons assigned for the expe dition for its invasion were sufficiently plausible. It was known that there had been many thousands of Unionists in the State, and that they had been treated with great cruelty, murdered, imprisoned, exiled, and plundered of all they possessed. Those who, amid great suffering, had been able to make their escape into Mexico, or into the loyal States or territories, gave a frightful, but probably not overdrawn picture of the persecutions to which they and their loyal fellow-citizens had been subjected. The Texan soldiers in the Rebel armies had been among the most efficient and reckless troops in their service. Accustomed to a life on horseback, and skilled in all equestrian accomplishments, leading, especially on the frontier, a life of daring and hardship, exposed for years to the attacks of the Apaches, Camanches, Navajoes, and other formidable tribes of Indians, and educated, from the early history of their State, to a criminal disregard of the sanctity of human life, they were troops which were not to be despised for their prowess, and often to be dreaded for their cruelty. Their numbers, too, compared with the population of the State, were large. Nearly the whole disloyal male population, of military age, had, in one capacity or another, entered the Rebel service, and the larger portion had been enrolled in the armies east of the Mississippi, and in Missouri, Arkansas, and Louisiana. To call these home, or to overrun the State while they were absent, would, it was argued, inflict serious injury upon the enemy. Texas, from a variety of causes, was richer than the other insurgent States. She had, from the first, refused to receive the worthless Confederate currency for her products, accepting nothing but gold in exchange. Her cattle and sheep, which by tens and hundreds of thousands dotted her plains and prairies, had furnished a large part of the Rebel commissariat; and, on her western border, the Mexican port of Matamoras formed the nominal, and Brownsville, Texas, the real, destination of great numbers of blockade-runners, which brought thither the greatly coveted products of European manufactories, and took in exchange, at high prices, vast quantities of cotton, carted across the plains from eastern Texas. To check this blockade-running, and obtain for loyal use this contraband cotton, was surely desirable.

The route to be selected was a question of great importance. To send an expedition overland, through western Louisiana and eastern Texas, was difficult, and fraught with numerous dangers; there were bayous, lakes, and rivers to be crossed, requiring large pontoon trains; the roads, much of the way, were muddy and heavy, and where they were not, the cross timbers, or dense forest, so matted as to obstruct passage, and extend

THE EXPEDITION TO TEXAS

675

ing for many miles, and the chapparal, a thick and impenetrable growth of the thorny cactus and the acacia, barred any rapid progress, especially of wagon trains; yet a large force, and one having an immense train, could alone force its way through, and the delay which the trains would necessitate, would leave ample time for the concentration of the Rebel forces in front of the advancing army.

The route by sea was perhaps equally perilous. The coast of Texas presented but few even tolerable ports; sand-bars at the mouth of nearly every harbor, obstructed the entrance, and rendered the passage of vessels drawing over ten feet of water impossible; while the norther, a fierce cold wind which sweeps down upon the gulf from the Rocky mountains, and often lasts for a week, renders the navigation exceedingly dangerous, and imperils the lives of the horses and cattle needed for the land service. The knowledge of the coast possessed by the squadron, was imperfect, especially of that portion adjacent to its ports.

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Still, with all these difficulties, the Administration, stimulated to the work by those who had sinister ends to gain, and who had the skill to . conceal their purposes under the cloak of desire to serve the country and to put down the Rebellion, determined upon the expedition, and, as if to render disaster certain, decided to proceed by both routes, attacking by way of the coast, and sending a column inland through western Louisiana. Major-General Franklin was sent from the army of the Potomac to take command of one of the corps which was to take part in the expedition; Major-General Ord was to command the other, and Major-General Banks was to have the chief command of the expedition, as department commander. At a later period, the commanding general was authorized to borrow what troops could be spared from other departments, and did obtain portions of the sixteenth and seventeenth army corps, under General A. J. Smith, from the Department of the Tennessee, while General Steele was ordered to march with as large an army as he could collect in Arkansas and Missouri, to his support, through Arkansas.

While the troops, supplies, and vessels of light draft were being collected at New Orleans for the great expedition, it was determined to attack, with a moderate force, Sabine City, a place of considerable strategic importance, and defended by a small but somewhat troublesome fort, a battery of small field pieces, and affording shelter to two bay steamers, which the Rebels had converted into rams. The town lies at the outlet of Sabine lake, the estuary of Sabine river, and the boundary-line between. Louisiana and Texas. The place was supposed to be indifferently fortified; though the information in regard to it was very imperfect, and such as rendered the enterprise unjustifiable, without a previous reconnoissance. About four thousand men of the nineteenth corps, were sent on this expedition, under the command of Major-General Franklin, while Brigadier-General Weitzel accompanied it as chief engineer and chief of staff.