COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

467

been carried at once by an assault with perfect ease; that McClellan might have captured Richmond at three different times-the first, by advancing immediately after the battle of Williamsburg, the second, after the battle of Seven Pines, the third, after the battle of Malvern Hill; that the retreat of the army from Richmond to Harrison's bar was unnecessary and premature; that all the reinforcements had been sent to McClellan during the time that he was in the peninsula, which could possibly be spared; and that even some troops were sent to him which were really indispensable to the safety of Washington. In addition to all these points, the report alleged that when General McClellan received positive orders to withdraw his army from Harrison's Landing, he delayed eleven days before he executed it, by which delay the army of Virginia and the Federal capital were both placed in imminent peril; that the battle of Antietam was unsatisfactory and indecisive in its results; and that the destruction or capture of the army of Lee would have been certain if the conflict had been renewed on the next day, and if the large body of troops had been brought into action who had remained idle spectators of it; and finally, that McClellan's mysterious inactivity from the 17th of September to the 26th of October, was extremely pernicious to the cause of the Union, and greatly promoted the interests of the Rebellion.*

This interesting report also presented many facts in relation to the three months' campaign of General Patterson in Virginia, which seemed to demonstrate that to his failure in intercepting the march of Johnston to Manassas, was to be attributed the defeat of the Federal forces under General McDowell at Bull Run. The report also set forth the facts in reference to the disaster of the Federal troops at Ball's Bluff, which left the impression that that misfortune was attributable to the neglect and incompetence of General Stone, the commanding officer. Other matters of minor importance, including the battle of Fredericksburg, were discussed in this document, and the effect produced by its revelations was to convince a large proportion of the community that unless its statements could be rebutted by evidence of an explanatory and mitigating character by those parties whose acts were scrutinized in it, the general belief would be that they had been guilty of incompetence, cowardice, and of a line of

*This portion of the report of the committee developed an amusing illustration of the playful satire sometimes indulged in by the President, when his patience was exhausted. It was as follows: "On the 25th of October, General McClellan transmits to General Halleck, a report from Colonel Robert Williams, commanding a detachment of cavalry, in which it is stated that nearly half his horses are unsound from sore tongue, grease, and consequent lameness, and sore backs; and that the horses which are still sound, are broken down from fatigue and want of flesh. To this the President replies on the same day: 'I have just read your despatch about sore tongue and fatigued horses. Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done, since the battle of Antietam, that could fatigue any thing!"-Report of Congressional Committee, p. 23.

policy which had proved pernicious to the interests of the Union. At the same time the friends and partisans of the generals in question, confidently anticipated that they would be able to set forth such facts in defence of their conduct as would demonstrate their loyalty, their ability, and their innocence of the charges preferred against them.

The summer campaign of 1863 was now rapidly approaching, during the progress of which the most important and decisive engagements were anticipated. Various indications clearly proved that the Confederate leaders, both civil and military, looked forward to the struggles of this campaign as more desperate and bloody than any which had yet occurred during the war; and that they were determined, with dauntless resolution and unconquerable patience, to exhaust every possible resource within their reach in order to resist and to vanquish the forces of the Union. Previous, however, to the termination of the winter campaign of 1862–3, the events of which we have been describing, several minor incidents occurred which here require a brief allusion.

On the 1st of April, a small detachment of the troops connected with the command of General Curtis, in the Department of the Southwest, consisting of two companies of the first Arkansas cavalry, made an incursion into Carroll county, in the northwestern portion of Arkansas. During this raid they had four skirmishes with the enemy. The result was that they killed twenty-two of the latter and took seven prisoners. Their own loss was insignificant, only one being wounded. On the 2d of April, eight regiments of the army of General Rosecrans marched toward Woodbury, the capital of Cannon county, Tennessee, twenty miles from Murfreesboro, for the purpose of surprising and capturing a brigade of Confederate troops which were posted at that point. The Federals were commanded by Generals Craft and Hazen. The latter made a detour of fifteen miles, with the intention of attacking the enemy on the flank and rear, while the rest of the troops assailed them in front. During the night, however, the pickets of the enemy had been extended in such a way that the cavalry advance of the Federals encountered them unexpectedly before Hazen was able to reach his destination. The result was that the Rebels received notice of their peril, and succeeded in making their escape. A running fight ensued, over the space of three miles, during which twelve of the enemy were slain and thirty captured. They left their camp equipage in the hands of the Federals, together with fifty horses and twenty mules.

Contemporary with these skirmishes was the abortive attempt made to proceed through the Black Bayou, in Mississippi, toward the rear of Vicksburg. The expedition consisted of six gunboats from Rear-Admiral Porter's squadron, and two thousand troops from Grant's army, com manded by General W. T. Sherman. This bayou runs for fifty miles chiefly through dense forests, and is composed of a number of tortuous

ABORTIVE EXPEDITION UP THE BLACK BAYOU.

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streams, whose navigation is extremely difficult. It was supposed that the Federal gunboats would move noiselessly and without observation through the woods, and suddenly take a position near the works of the enemy, to their great astonishment and dismay. The event, however, proved to be entirely different. The Confederates had guarded this avenue of access with their usual skill and vigilance. As the expedition slowly advanced, the adjacent woods were found to be swarming with Rebel riflemen-the banks of the stream to be lined in many places with batteries defended by bales of cotton, and that immense numbers of negroes were engaged in felling the trees to obstruct the passage. The bed of the bayou was found to have been already made impassable in many places; and so difficult was the progress of the expedition that ten days were occupied in advancing fifty miles. When at length the admiral found it impossible to proceed further, and resolved to return, he discovered that the enemy had been actively engaged in rendering that enterprise more difficult than his advance had been. After a forced march, one of the most extraordinary on record, some desperate fighting, and much hard work, General Sherman succeeded in releasing the gunboats from their perilous situation, and they returned to their former position on the Mississippi.

CHAPTER XLII

PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS-RISE OF THE ANTI-WAR DEMOCRATS, OR THE PEACE PARTY— ITS AVOWED OPINIONS AND OPPOSITION TO THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION-SUSPENSE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS THE COURSE OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN SUSTAINED BY CONGRESS AND THE LOYAL PORTION OF THE NATION AS CONSTITUTIONAL, WISE, AND PATRIOTIC -PRECEDENT OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT-FACTIOUS OPPOSITION OF THE PEACE PARTY TO THE CONSCRIPTION ACT AND TO THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR-THEIR PROFFERED FRIENDSHIP SPURNED EVEN BY THE CONFEDERATES THEMSELVES-THEIR ALLEGED BUT GROUNDLESS FEARS OF DESIGNED CENTRALIZATION BY THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIONTHEIR HOSTILITY TO THE PRESIDENT'S EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION-THE EXISTENCE OF NEGRO SLAVERY AND DETERMINATION TO PERPETUATE IT THE SOURCE OF OUR GREATEST NATIONAL DIFFICULTIES, AND THE ULTIMATE CAUSE OF THE PRESENT REBELLION-THE JUDICIOUS, GRADUAL, AND PROGRESSIVE COURSE OF THE GOVERNMENT ON THIS SUBJECT VINDICATED-OBJECTIONS OF THE PEACE PARTY TO THE FINANCIAL MEASURES OF THE GOVERNMENT-THEIR VINDICTIVE BUT FUTILE ATTEMPTS TO detract FROM THE PERSONAL CHARACTER OF THE PRESIDENT.

EVERY civil war, like that between the loyal and disloyal States of the Union, will inevitably be rich in developments both of national and individual character. New parties will arise, new systems of political doctrine will be affirmed, which derive their birth from the novel combination of events which take place during such a contest. Perhaps the most remarkable of these developments which occurred during the progress of this war was the sudden rise of a faction in the free States, to whom the epithet of Anti-War or Peace Democrats was not inappropriately applied. When the Rebellion commenced, the sentiment of the whole community who lived beyond its limits seemed to be unanimous in its condemnation, and harmonious in favor of the prosecution of a vigorous war against it by the forces of the Federal Government, until it should be completely crushed. After the expiration of a year, a few dissenting voices began to be heard; and at the period whose events we have just described, these malcontents had become much more numerous, had taken external organization and consistency, had become bold and fearless in their denunciation of the measures of the Federal Government, and had acquired an importance in connection with the war which renders it proper that they should now be made the subject of our special scrutiny.

The opinions and measures advocated by this party were regarded by the majority of the community with great distrust, even with undisguised censure. Many opprobrious epithets were applied to them. By some they were compared to the Tories and Royalists of the Revolutionary era.

* One of these, and perhaps the most common, was the significant term “Copperhead."

PEACE DEMOCRATS ON THE HABEAS CORPUS ACT.

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This comparison, however, was incorrect in one important respect. The motives which gave rise to the two factions were evidently dissimilar and incongruous. The Tory was induced to oppose the patriot cause during the Revolution chiefly from cowardice and fear. He was afraid of the penalties of confiscation and death by the British tyrant. But it cannot be affirmed that the peace Democrats of the period now under consideration were actuated by an apprehension of punishment in any case from the power and vengeance of the Confederate Government. Whatever may have been their motives, they were free from the craven meanness, the pusillanimous baseness, which disgraced those who opposed the cause of liberty in the memorable period which tried men's souls.

Let us proceed to describe the principal opinions affirmed and measures advocated by this party, which, by its numbers, its boldness, and its ability, had already made itself historical.

First, they condemned with intense fervor the indemnity bill, which was passed by the Federal Congress during the session of 1862-3, the purpose of which was to throw the broad shield of the protection of the whole Federal Government over those acts which had been performed by the sole authority of the Executive. The title of this bill was "An act relating to the habeas corpus, and regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases." The peace Democrats affirmed that the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus at an early stage of the Rebellion by the President was an unconstitutional measure; that it was wholly illegal; and that no subsequent legislation could justify it, or render it valid. It was objected that the effect of this indemnity bill was to delegate to one branch of the Government, namely, the executive, functions which legitimately belonged only to the legislative, which would be an express violation of the established principles maintained by the judicial branch of the Federal Government.* The answer to this allegation is, that it is an established principle of the Federal Constitution, that Congress may grant to the executive or the judicial branch of the Government administrative functions; and that the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the arrest and conviction of offenders are functions which are clearly administrative. The truth is, that the act of President Lincoln in suspending this writ at a moment of fearful peril to the country, was clearly justifiable under an express provision of the Federal Constitution, which declared: "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it." Now this section does not specify which branch of the Federal Government shall exercise this power of suspending the writ. It seems to have been vested in each of the three

* See address of G. M. Wharton, before the Democratic Central Club of Phila delphia, April 18, 1863.

† Constitution of the United States, Art. I. Sec. ix. 2.