merchants and other civilians, who, in a moment of danger, take com mands in it. So incompetent were some of these officers, that it is certain that many of the orders of General McDowell were never delivered to those to whom they were sent; and thus fatal errors were committed, against the express precautions of the chief officer.

It is probable that the position of the reserve under Colonel Miles was much too far in the rear, to be of actual service in the crisis of the battle. Seven miles is manifestly too great a distance to intervene between the main body of an army, and the reinforcements which must be used in the last extremity. If, when the troops of Johnston deployed upon the field, the regiments stationed at Centreville could have marched against them and checked their advance, the issue of the day might have been different. The field was also encumbered by a host of spectators and visitors, whose presence was most pernicious. If all went well, their shouts would indeed rend the heavens and cheer the victors. But if any disaster occurred, they would be the first to set the example of cowardice, and their flight would inevitably become contagious with troops who had already been disheartened by the duration and difficulty of the struggle. Such actually proved to be the result at Manassas. Prominent in that vast and tumultuous torrent of retreating men were to be seen terrified and frantic civilians; and among the many who, on that day, fled in hot haste, they led the van, and kept it.

It is clear also that many minor blunders were committed which served to consummate the disaster. The unarmed teamsters were permitted to advance with their wagons too near the enemy, and within the range of their attack. The Federal army was not sufficiently provided with cavalry to pursue the retreating foe. Proper care was not taken, when batteries had been captured, to secure possession of them, and turn them upon the Rebels. The left flank and the rear of the Federal army were not suitably guarded against attack. An order to fall back a short distance was mistaken for a general order to retreat. To this must be added the desperate courage of the Rebel troops, the skill and bravery of the Rebel commanders, and the immense advantages of their position.

Nevertheless, all these causes combined together would have not inflicted the repulse at Manassas, had it not been for another and still more potent cause. It would have been a victory to the Federal arms, or at least a drawn battle, had not the troops of General Johnston arrived by railway from Winchester, and deployed upon the field precisely at the critical moment. That calamity turned the scale with decisive and resistless effect. The prodigious influence produced by the sudden accession of fresh troops on the battle-field, to one side or to the other, after a long and obstinate struggle, has been illustrated by the issue of many of the most memorable conflicts of modern times. Thus the great battle of Wagram was lost by the Austrians, after they had in effect wrested the

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victory from Napoleon by prodigies of valor, because the Archduke John did not reach the field with his reinforcement of eighteen thousand troops, as he had been expressly ordered to do; which accession would have completely broken the exhausted lines of the French. It is well known that at Waterloo, the issue of the day depended entirely upon the fact whether Blucher would arrive with his Prussians to reinforce the English, or Grouchy would arrive with his division to reinforce Napoleon. Blücher rushed upon the field when Wellington was almost frantic with despair, and thereby changed the fortunes of the world. Thus also at the battle of Inkermann, forty thousand Russians attacked fifteen thousand British troops. After a protracted and desperate conflict the latter were about to break, when the arrival of a large French force under General Bosquet decided the issue of the engagement. It was precisely thus with the battle of Manassas. The accession of Johnston's regiments turned the scale, and wrested the triumph from the wearicd hands of the exhausted victors.

By whose fault it was that Johnston was permitted to make good his hurried march to Manassas, we are not prepared to say. It was expected that the junction would be prevented by the division under General Robert Patterson; but whether the force under his command was suffi ciently large to enable him to achieve that result, it is not for us to determine. General McDowell, however, asserted in his official report of the battle, that it was expressly understood when he assumed the command of the army marching against Manassas, that he was not to encounter the troops of Johnston; and that declaration, thus boldly and publicly inade, was never contradicted. If, therefore, the force under Patterson was not sufficiently numerous to intercept Johnston, it was a measure of indispen sable importance that it should have been rendered such, before the advance of McDowell toward Manassas was commenced.

It was natural that the Rebels should exult with frantic joy, and with boundless exaggeration, over their unexpected victory. The reports which were diffused throughout the Southern States in reference to it exceeded any thing ever exhibited before in the art of misrepresentation. It was confidently asserted that the Federal army had been composed of a hundred thousand men; that twenty thousand had been slain and wounded; that thirty thousand handcuffs had been taken, with which the Federals intended to manacle the defeated Confederates; that sixty pieces of artillery had been captured, with an innumerable number of knapsacks, and with provisions enough to support the Confederate army for months. The result of these fabrications was, that the whole South became still more enthusiastic for the war; and many who, till then, had been reluctant to enter the struggle, now rushed forward, enlisted, and commenced with martial ardor to swarm northward toward Richmond.

Soon, however, this general exultation began to give place to sadder

and more sober thoughts, when the details of the losses of the Rebels at Manassas began to be known throughout the South. Then it was that they discovered at what an enormous price their victory had been bought; and like Pyrrhus of old, after vanquishing the Romans, they might exclaim, that another such triumph would complete their ruin. The Rebels had lost many of their best officers. They made great exertions to conceal the precise number of their dead and wounded; so much so that even southern journals complained that the relatives of the soliders who fought at Manassas, could obtain no information as to whether they were living or dead. Every thing was concealed on that subject for a long time. The reason was, that a knowledge of the real facts would have appalled and disheartened the people by the horrid details involved in them. But such secresy could not always be preserved; and at length certain revelations began to leak out, which opened the eyes of men as to the actual state of the case. Thus, among other instances, the Richmond Dispatch, when applauding the heroism of the eighth Georgia regiment, declared that “at length they withdrew from the fight. Their final rally was made with some sixty men out of the six hundred they took in." This regiment, thus almost annihilated, was succeeded by the seventh Georgia regiment, who actually met the same fate, their commanding officer, Colonel Barton, being killed. One Louisiana regiment lost three hundred men out of eight hundred. The Hampton Legion and an Alabama regiment were almost totally destroyed by the terrible charges of the New York sixty-ninth and seventy-ninth. Single facts like these demonstrate how terrific and overwhelming the grand total loss must have been on the Rebel side. It was manifestly much greater than the Federal loss; and it is not improable that five or six thousand in killed and wounded were the number of the enemy placed hors du combat.

In view of indisputable facts like these, it could scarcely be affirmed that the result of this engagement was very advantageous to the cause of the Rebel Government; while on the other hand, it may with truth be asserted, that under the outward and forbidding guise of a reverse, the general result of the catastrophe at Manassas was propitious to the interests of the Federal Union. This declaration, which seems very like a paradox or an absurdity, we believe to be strictly true; and we will briefly state the grounds of this opinion. As adversity is often the wisest and best school for the individual learner, so also is it often the wisest and best school for the national learner. Especially in military affairs, a few disasters at the commencement of a war produce a beneficial effect. Many celebrated commanders began their careers with serious defeats, and by those very defeats were taught how afterward to triumph more gloriously. Frederic the Great, to whom reference has already been made, confessed that the first clear insight which he obtained into the military art, was when he was compelled by Charles of Lorraine to retreat with heavy losses from

ITS INFLUENCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION.

145 Silesia, at an early stage of the Seven Years War; yet Frederic subsequently became the greatest general of his age. William of Orange, afterward king of England, acquired more millitary skill from his defeats by the Prince de Condé than by all his other studies and experiences combined. The Emperor Charles V. of Germany, who agitated Europe during many years by his contests with the chivalrous Francis I., generally commenced his campaigns against that monarch with disasters, but invariably closed them with supremacy and triumph.

Now it is well known that the American people began the war against Secession with an undue contempt of the resources and the prowess of the Rebels. No proper conception was entertained of the difficulty and intensity of the struggle which was about to commence. It was generally believed that the southern soldiers would not fight; that they possessed no powers of physical endurance; that they were enervated by drunkenness and debauchery; that their conquest would be an easy and rapid achievement. All these were gross and fatal delusions; but the result of their prevalence was, that a spirit of extreme carelessness and frivolity pervaded the Federal army. A reckless temper characterized the public journals. The march to Richmond was to be a grand and exciting hunt for Rebels; and the most rare and excellent sport would be the entertainment of those who took part in the chase, and of those who accompanied it as spectators. With this hilarious spirit the army marched gaily forth toward Manassas, Inexcusable neglect characterized every thing connected with their advance. Their numbers were deficient; their ammunition was not properly supplied; the men had received but little drilling; and some of the officers, it was charged, were on this occasion intoxicated. Let us suppose that this army had been successful at Manassas; and that, after a short and perhaps a feigned resistance, the Rebel forces had retreated toward Richmond. Elated with the easily-earned victory, entertaining still more contemptuous and absurd sentiments respecting the prowess of the enemy, our troops would have become more reckless. and imprudent than before. As they advanced further into the bowels of the hostile country, the dangers which surrounded them would become much greater. Then, at length, when a facile and safe retreat to the entrenchments at Washington would be rendered impossible, even by a Bull Run race; when the army of the Rebels had been increased to three times the number it contained at Manassas; when our officers and soldiers were regardless of prudence and vigilance, another attack would be made upon them. Is it not perfectly evident that the probability, the certainty even, is, that in that dreadful and unequal onslaught scarcely a single man would have escaped, and that a calamity far greater than that at Manassas would have ensued to the Federal army, to the nation's honor, and to the cause of the Union ?

But the effect produced upon the Federal troops by the check at Ma

nassas was instantaneous and redeeming. Their eyes were at once opened to the terrific depth of that abyss toward which they had been madly rushing. They acquired more valuable information by one day of defeat than they would have attained by ten days of victory. The blow brought them to their senses, and sobered them at once. How soon was a new spirit infused into the service! How quickly did the most rigid dicipline, the most careful precautions, the most extensive and systematic preparations, take the place of the previous neglect, laxity and bravado! Every department of the army underwent a thorough reformation; and soon there was assembled, under the national colors, a well drilled, well appointed, formidable force of several hundred thousand men. But nothing of this would have existed, had not the defeat at Manassas taught the nation and the government wisdom. Therefore, we repeat, that that defeat was in reality not a misfortune, but a benefit to the Federal arms, and to the interests of the Union.