the same doctrines of natural laws and of inalienable individual right that were at that time current in political thought.

In the epoch-making work of Adam Smith, An Enquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, the science of political economy assumed more nearly its modern form, but doctrines of natural rights still played a considerable part in its theory. Furthermore, as the title partly indicates, questions of political policy were everywhere emphasized. Since Smith's day, however, the uniform tendency among economists has been to consider as the primary purpose of their science the investigation of the production, distribution and consumption of wealth; and questions of public policy are held to have a place in their inquiries only in so far as they introduce modifying conditions. This fact is shown by the general tendency of the economists of today to discard altogether the use of the qualifying adjective "political" and to term their science simply "economics." It is still true, of course, that when the economists attempt to make practical applications of the principles which they have deduced, most of them are concerned with questions of the exercise by the state of this or that function, or the adoption by the law of this or that policy. But this is only the application of principles already determined. So far as economics is considered as a science or a philosophy, it is conceived as concerned solely with the discovery of the natural laws that control industry and of the psychic laws that regulate the conduct of men in their efforts to secure wealth and to obtain the greatest amount of benefit from its consumption.

Political philosophy is related to the philosophy of history only through its own history, but there its relationship is very intimate. Political theories, however abstract their form of statement, have ever been the product of the objective conditions and needs of their times. Also, though in much less measure, they have, when formulated, influenced the course of historical movements. Thus, in tracing their development, one necessarily discovers and discusses the same fundamental motive ideas which the philosophical historian has to deal with in his efforts to explain and rationalize the past. Thus, not only does an adequate grasp upon political

theory enable one correctly to determine the thoughts and intentions of men of the past, but a history of the development of political theories, in its reflection of the thoughts and actuating motives at the basis of important political movements, furnishes the historical student with an insight into the logic of events which he can obtain from no other source. Especially where, as in the history of the United States, questions of constitutional right have required practical solution, a knowledge of political theory, and of its history, is of the greatest value.

By a philosophy of law may be meant two things: First, an inquiry into the nature or source of obligation of the rules of conduct that are enforced by the governing power; or, secondly, a search for those principles which, from an ethical viewpoint, should be accepted as juridical. If we accept the view of the English Analytical School that all laws, in so far as they are laws at all, are the commands of the state, an inquiry into their nature and source of authority necessarily becomes a single topic of a general political philosophy. If, however, following the general lead of Continental schools, it is held that enforcement by the state is but an incidental fact, and that in the truest sense laws derive their authority from their inherent rationality as tested by their consonance with abstract principles of right and their suitability to the civic needs of the people whose conduct they control, a philosophy of the law becomes in effect largely an ethical undertaking.

With this explanation of the meaning of the term philosophy of law, we can see how necessarily intimate is its relation with political philosophy. In so far as laws are viewed as commands of a political superior to a political inferior, from a sovereign to a subject, a legal philosophy is, as has been already said, nothing more than a particular branch of political inquiry. Also, when viewed as a search for ideal principles of right, its connection with political speculations is very close. For, in determining these ideal principles, the considerations involved are almost identical with those that the political philosopher has to bear in mind in his attempts to ascertain the elements of an ideal commonwealth. In fact,

the only important distinction between a system of ideal law and a political Utopia is that in the latter there must necessarily be included, in addition to the statement of the general principles of right which should be recognized, the outline of a scheme of governmental organization through which such principles are to be declared and enforced.

By way of summary of our statement of the relation which political philosophy bears to other fields of speculative inquiry, it may be said that metaphysics, ethical philosophy, and political philosophy constitute the three divisions into which any general philosophical system is logically divisible. By metaphysics are determined the nature and essential attributes of man as a rational, moral being. Upon its conclusions are based the principles which the ethicist declares. Finally the results reached by the ethicist are in turn those which it should be the aim of all political life to realize. Thus, to state the sequence in other words, metaphysics determines the possibility of human freedom, ethics lays down the principles by which it should be regulated, and politics ascertains the means through which those principles may best receive recognition and enforcement. Thus, the final aim of philosophy is fulfilled. Without ethics and politics metaphysics is reduced to useless imaginings. Without metaphysics ethics has no foundation for its premises, and without politics it is without the means of securing a realization of the aims which it declares desirable. Without metaphysics and ethics, politics is unable either to determine the relative values of different possible lines of public policy, or to establish grounds upon which political obedience may rightly be demanded.

By way of final word, the writer would repeat what he has had occasion in an earlier paper to declare, that, though abundantly justified by its practical fruits, the greatest incentive to the study of political theory is the pure intellectual delight which is to be obtained in the pursuit of any speculative inquiry. Philosophy is the search for the essentially true and alone is able to satisfy the mind's insatiable demand for the whence, the how, and, to use a scholastic term, the whatness or quiddity of human phenomena. Its results are,

therefore, satisfying apart from their practical value, and its method enticing by giving play to our highest intellectual faculties. At all times political speculation has occupied an important place in the general field of philosophy; and has attracted the attention of the greatest minds, from Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, Locke and Spinoza, to Kant and Hegel, Savigny and Austin, Jefferson and Mill. And, when we reflect upon it, what can be more provocative of inquiry than the nature of the corporative control to which all men submit in one form or another, and under which and because of which they have been able to progress from the lowest stages of savagery to the highest attainments of civilized life? What wonder that, apart from the pursuit of practical ends, the greatest minds should have been stirred to its critical examination!

George Brandes

BY WILLARD H. DURHAM,

Fellow in English in Yale University

Of "The Emigrant Literature," a series of lectures begun at Copenhagen by George Brandes, on November 3, 1871, and afterwards published as the first volume of "Main Currents in Nineteenth Century Literature," Ibsen wrote in 1872: "It is one of those works which place a yawning gulf between yesterday and today. In twenty years one will not be able to comprehend how existence at home was possible before these lectures." At Copenhagen they aroused a tremendous storm of controversy. Men waited hours in rain and snow to gain admission to the lecture hall. For weeks it was the main topic of conversation. The newspapers, without exception, attacked Brandes furiously. To gain insertion for a reply he had to pay at advertising rates. For years after, the Danish press was closed to him. He was called socialist, advocate of free love, blasphemer, atheist, a traitor to his country. No calumny, no lie failed to gain circulation and acceptance.

Today, when at last the "Main Currents" is, as a whole, accessible in English, the casual reader finds there much to admire, some things to regret, nothing so electric as to account for this tremendous shock to the nerves of a people. Brandes's work still arouses interest, but hardly excitement. Some of it is widely read, even in this country; more of it is quite neglected. One of his most interesting volumes has lain for twenty-seven years on the shelves of a great university library without a reader. Its pages have never been

cut.

Where are we to find an explanation for this great praise from a great man, for this violent assault, for this final mild approval and frequent indifference? In the man, and still more, in the people.

I.

In 1871 all Denmark, all Scandinavia, for that matter, was isolated from the thought of Europe. "For a number of