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ton: “I cannot express to you the pain and mortification I have experienced to-day, in listening to the distant sound of the firing of my men. As I can be of no further use here, I respectfully ask, that if there is a probability of the conflict being renewed to-morrow, I may be permitted to go to the scene of battle with my Staff, merely to be with my own men, if nothing more. They will fight none the worse for my being with them. If it is not deemed best to intrust me with the command of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. Please reply to this to-night.” To this he received no answer.
Sach an appeal was enough to move a heart of stone. Though disgraced from his high command, he did not yield to resentment, and stand aloof in scornful anger, but, from a heart wrung with anguish for his brave troops, he prayed simply that he might fly to the battle-field and share their fate. If, however, he had wished for revenge, he would have been satisfied the next day, when the terrified Generalin-Chief, whose treatment of him had been so extraordinary, sent to him the following telegram: "I beg of you to assist me in this crisis, with your ability and experience. I am entireler “Help me, Cassius, or I sink.” The President, too, who had hoped to the last for success, at length yielded to alarm, for he was suddenly aroused at the sight of the Capital in imminent peril, and sending for McClellan, placed him once more at the head of the army. The country, at last, awoke to the humiliating fact, that Pope's campaign had been a lamentable failure. A few friends, however, endeavored to break his fall, by asserting that he failed through the willful neglect of some of the commanders, to aid himchief
aimong whom was Porter. Certainly, if Pope's state. ments cre to be received as true, he was the most injured and abused Commander of his time. In the first place, at the
CAUSES OF FAILURE.
outset, General Hatch failed to obey orders and take Gordonsville. Afterwards, he neglected to march to Charlottesville and destroy the railroad between that place and Lynchburg, for which he was removed from the command of the cavalry of General Banks' Corps. On the top of this misfortune, came the calamitous battle of Cedar Mountain, which Pope declares was fought contrary to his orders. In the third place, when Jackson was retreating from Manassas Junction towards Centreville, Pope says, “if the whole force under General McDowell, had moved forward as directed, and at the time specified, they would have intercepted Jackson's retreat;" and he adds, “I do not believe it would have been possible for him to cross Bull Run without heavy loss.”. Again, directly after, when he “felt sure there was no escape for Jackson, to his great disappointment the plan all fell through,” because “King's division had fallen back, leaving open the road to Thorough Fare Gap.” Again, on the 29th, he would have achieved a signal victory over Jackson, but for the "strange failure” of Gen. Porter to move as he was directed. And finally, on the 30th, he says "he began to feel discouraged and nearly hopeless of any successful issue” to his operations, on account of a letter he received from General McClellan, informing him that “rations and forage were at Alexandria, waiting a cavalry escort.” Beginning with a commander of cavalry, and being kept up by three corps commanders, two of whom were in the regular army, this constant disobedience to orders worked the disastrous issues over which the country mourned. If all this was true, he certainly was an injured man, and the wrongs done him received their climax, when the Administration virtually withdrew him from the field, and sent him to the Northwest, to conduct a campaign against the Sioux Indians, who had risen and massacred several hundred of the inhabitants of Minnesota. The cam
REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN
paign, however, needs no elaborate criticism. Recalling the army from the James River was a great blunder. The removal of McClellan did not necessitate the removal of the army, for there were Generals in, it besides him, who, from that point, with proper reinforcements, could have carried it into Richmond. Pope, also, was no match for Lee, least of all in a country so thoroughly known by the latter, and of which he was almost wholly ignorant. Pope comprehended neither the campaign nor the country, and the General-in-chief, at Washington, was no wiser. The former, by looking at his map, could see points, where a proper force might thwart the movements of his adversary, and hence ordered them there, without taking into consideration the probabilities, and sometimes the possibilities, of their getting up in time to carry out his plans. If the arnıy had been endowed with wings, his campaign might have been a very successful one, but, as it was, it turned out a miserable failure, the blame of which fell wholiy on him, while it should be divided between him and General Halleck
ALA&M AT WASHINGTON ANTIETAM-MC CLELLAN TAKES THE FIELD-BATTLE
OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN-SURRENDER OF HARPER'S FERRY-BATTLE OF ANTIE-
PUBLIC DISAPPOINTMENT-THE ARMY RESTS-EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION
-SUBPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUSITS EFFECTS-ITS DANGERS.
HE terror inspired at Washington, by the unfortunate
Lee was throwing his mighty columns across the Potomac, in the vicinity of Hagerstown, but whether for the purpose of moving down upon Washington on the Maryland side, or of invading Pennsylvania, or with the design to draw our troops in that direction, and then suddenly recross the river, and come down on the Capital on the Virginia side, no one knew.
Reorganizing the army, as by magic, McClellan at once took the field, moving cautiously up the Potomac, on the Maryland ride. His gallant army, though coot sore and worn, were, however, full of spirit and courage, because their beloved Commander rode at their head, and were eager to meet the exultant foe, before whom they had been so reluctantly compelled to retire.
With his left wing resting on the Potomac, and his right extending far out into the country, he moved by five different parallel roads, slowly and cautiously up the river, anxiously watching the development of the rebel plans. On the thirteenth, he had reached Fredericksburg, still in ignorance of the exact whereabouts of the rebel army. Bato
during the day, an order of General Lee, fell into McClellan's hands, which fully disclosed the plans of the former. This was all the latter had been waiting for. He was now no longer compelled to feel his way, and immediately gave orders for the entire army to move rapidly forward. Harper's Ferry, on the Virginia side of the river, was, at this time, held by Colonel Miles, with a large garrison, which, for some unexplained reason, was not allowed, at the first, to be under McClellan's charge, though being directly in the field of his operations. Before he left Washington, he hai requested that the garrison be withdrawn, either to the Maryland Heights, which could be easily held, or sent to aid in covering the Cumberland Valley. This advice was unheeded, and the place kept from his control, until Jackson, with a heavy force, was already advancing against it. Two days after McClellan was informed that the place was under his command, he received a verbal report from Colonel Miles, that he had abandoned Maryland Heights, the key to the position, but that he could hold out two days longer. McClellan sent couriers back, by three different routes, to inform him that he was forcing the pass on the Hagerstama road, over the Blue Ridge, and that he would certainly soon relieve him.
"Hold to the last extremity," was his urgent command. In the mean time the
BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN.
was raging. The rebels occupied the sides and tops of the mountain, on both sides of the road, at a point called Frog's Gap. The lofty slopes were steep, broken, and wooded, furnishing a strong position for defense, and which commanded every approach to the base of the ridge. The battle commenced at seven o'clock in the morning, by the advance of Dox's division of Reno's Corps. A heavy artil