586

FORT STEADMAN.

Steadman, in front of the Ninth Corps, and brought on an unexpected battle.

Whether Lee designed this as a movement to cover his own retreat, or hoped to break through our lines, and suddenly wheeling to the left, take our batteries in reserve, and keeping on, cut our communications, and thus raise the siege of Richmond, we cannot tell. At all events, it was a bold movement, and was made so suddenly that the fort was carried with a single bound, and its guns turned on us. Three mortar batteries adjoining it were also taken. But the troops on either flank held their ground, while Hartranft's division advanced to aid Wilcox in driving the enemy out of the captured works.

In the meantime our surrounding artillery was brought to bear upon Fort Steadman, the fire of which became so hot that the victors had to abandon their prize; and many of them, afraid to recross the intervening space to their own lines, surrendered. Our loss was nine hundred and nineteen, while we took nineteen hundred prisoners. Meade at once ordered the other Corps to advance and feel the enemy's line in their front. They did so, and captured and held the rebel picket line in front of the Second and Sixth Corps, taking eight hundred and thirty-four prisoners. Thus the transient success of the enemy proved a sad reverse to him.

Two days after this, as we have seen, Sherman reached Grant, to hold the interview mentioned in the commencement of the chapter.

The events above narrated, covered the whole military field, and Sherman when put in possession of them, compre hended the exact state of things.

It was plain to both Commanders, as before remarked, that the time for the last, great, decided movement had come. Even Davis could see that the crisis of the Confed.

THE COMING CRISIS.

587

eracy was fast approaching. The year before, the pros pect looked gloomy enough, and in its terror, the rebel Congress had prevailed on him to make Lee Commander-inChief of all the rebel forces. But that did not increase the army, and to do this, it was resolved to enroll the slaves. But this measure, if ever practicable, was adopted too late. The march of events was too rapid. Lee's new power gave him no new confidence. The heavens were gathering black as midnight above him, and the thunder was muttering angrily around the entire horizon. Look which way he would, the rebel Chieftain saw the lightning's flash. The hand-writing was being traced on the wall.

After full deliberation on the state of affairs, and the probable movements of the enemy, it was agreed that Sherman should return to his army, and making a fernt, as if to move up the Neuse to Raleigh, march rapidly north to the line of the Roanoke. This would be closing the last door on Lee, and Grant knew that the moment Sherman approached this river, the former would evacuate Richmond.

It seems strange that Lee remained in the rebel Capital so long as he did. But knowing how closely he was watched by Grant, he may have feared to leave his fortificationsfor desertions having become so fearfully great, the moment he retreated, they might and probably would be so increased. as to leave him but the remnant of an army, and, therefore, he thought it the wisest course to wait and see if Johnston could not stop Sherman's northward march. Grant, however, felt very uneasy, and spent many an anxious night, fearing that the morning light would reveal Petersburg and Richmond evacuated, and the rebel army well on the road to Danville, to effect a junction with Johnston. He knew if he succeeded in doing this, new combinations would have to be formed, and a new campaign organized. He, therefore, determined to carry his original plan, adopted

.588

THE FINAL MOVEMENT.

before the attack on Fort Steadman, and before the arrival of Sherman.

He did not expect this to be the decided movement it turned out to be. But he said, "by moving out, I would Iut the army in better condition for pursuit, and would, at least, by the destruction of the Danville road, retard the concentration of the two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemy to abandon much material that he might otherwise save."

He, therefore, on the night of the 27th-the very day Sherman reached him--dispatched two divisions of Ord's Corps, under General Gibbon, and one division of the. Twenty-fifth Corps, commanded by Birney, and McKenzie's cavalry, to a position near Hatcher's Run, the scene of so many bitter conflicts.

Thus it will be seen, that Grant was to repeat over again the unsuccessful experiment so often tried, of getting around the enemy's right flank.

The whole scope, and plan and object of this movement, is given so much more clearly by Grant, in the following letter of instructions to Sheridan, than any language of ours can do, that we quote it:

"CITY POINT, Va., March 28, 1865.

GENERAL:-The Fifth Army Corps will move by the Vaughn road, at three, A. M., to-sirow morning. The Second moves at about nine, A. M., having but about three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on the right of the Fifth Corps, after the latter reaching Dinwiddie Court-House. Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being confined to any particular road or roads. You may go out by the nearest roads in rear of the Fifth Corps, pass by its left, and passing near to, or through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible. Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field, and will probably be able to communicate with you. Should I not do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main, intrenched line, you may cut loose and push for the Dan

SHERIDAN'S MOVEMENTS,

589

ville road. If you find it practicable, I would like you to cross the Southsido road, between Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some extent. I would not advise much detention, however, until you reach the Danville road, which I would like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible. Make your destruction, on that road, as complete as possible. You can then pass on to the South-side road, west of Burkesville, and destroy that in like manner.

After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to this army, selecting your road further south, or you may go on into North Carolina and join General Sherman. Should you select the latter course, get the information to me as early as possible, so that I may send orders to meet you at Goldsboro'.

U. S. GRANT, Licutenant-General."

On the morning of the 29th, the movement commenced, and Sheridan, sweeping around the extreme rebel right, pushed on toward Dinwiddie Court-House, which he reached that night, while the left of the infantry line had extended nearly to the junction of the Quaker and Boydton plank road.

Sheridan, as we have seen, was on our extreme left-next to him came Warren, then Humphreys, Ord, Wright, and Parke. It looked now as if Grant would succeed in get ting well on the rebel flank, and he, therefore, sent word to Sheridan not to cut loose to operate against the railroads, saying, “I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back. We will all act together as one army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy."

The next day the rain fell in torrents, turning the roads into such beds of mud that neither artillery nor trains could be moved. Sheridan, however, advanced toward the Five Forks, while Warren pushed on toward the White Oak road, where he found the enemy in force.

Finding the enemy confronting his line, no matter how far he extended it, Grant determined to give Sheridan a Corps of infantry, and let him cut loose from the army, and swing independently around the rebel flank, and when this

590

SHERIDAN'S GENERALSHIP.

was done, advance with the other Corps sternly to the assault in front.

On the morning of the 31st, Sheridan moving forward, got possession of the Five Forks, while Warren advanced to seize the White Oak road. The enemy, at first, retired before the latter, but suddenly rallying, fell, with such fury on Ayers' division, which had the advance, that it was driven back in confusion. Following up his success, he kept on, and striking Crawford next, bore him back also on the Third division, under Bell, where the onset was checked. A division of the Second Corps being now scnt to Warren's support, he re-formed his broken lines, and charging in turn, drove the enemy back with heavy loss, and gained possession of the White Oak road.

The transient success, however, of the enemy enabled him to send a heavy force against Sheridan, which drove him out of the Five Forks back to Dinwiddie Court-House.

"Here," says Grant, "General Sheridan displayed great generalship. Instead of retreating with his whole command on the main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of the horses. This compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of woods and broken country, and made his progress slow. At this juncture, he dispatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly on Dinwiddie CourtHouse. General McKenzie's cavalry and one division of the Fifth Corps, were immediately ordered to his assistance. Soon after receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys could hold our position on the Boydton road, and that the other two divisions of the Fifth Corps, could go to Sheridan, they were so ordered at once."

At midnight, the Fifth Corps joined him, and feeling strong enough to resume the offensive, he, in the morning,