by him, and he would not fail in case of discovery to attack both in flank and rear.

Hitherto all of Grant's movements had been by his left flank, and made in the same way; at night, the Corps holding the extreme right would throw out a strong picket line in front, to cover its movements, and then fall back, and marching in rear of the army, take position on the extreme left. The next Corps would follow in the same manner, until, by this simple process, the army was advanced the entire length of its line, some eight or ten miles. But Grant was now not to advance his lines so as to lap the enemy's flank and threaten his rear, but, if possible, to swing loose entirely from him, and make a rapid march of fifty miles, with all his trains and artillery. To secure himself in case of attack, while doing this, he gradually concentrated his lines until, in front, they were scarcely more than four miles long. This, consequently, forced the several Corps back, until the army assumed the form of a square, in its main outline; all along the sides of which, and beyond, strong earth-works were thrown up to protect the flanks.

Having completed all his preparations, and Sheridan, with his cavalry, being off, he, on the night of the 12th, silently withdrew from the enemy's front. Wilson's cavalry and the Fifth Corps crossed the Chickahominy, at Long Bridge, and proceeded to the White Oak Swamp, to cover the crossing of the rest of the troops. The Eighteenth Corps, in the meantime, marched back to the White House and again embarked in the transports for Bermuda Hundred.

With such secrecy and dispatch did the Army of the Potomac move away, that its departure was not known by Lee till next morning, when it was miles away. It marched below the White Oak Swamp instead of through it as it did under McClellan and by different roads stretched forward toward the James River. Meade, to whom was intrusted

FIRST ATTEMPT ON PETERSBURG.

395

the management of the army, in this delicate movement, evinced the highest skill, and everything went on with the precision and regularity of machinery. There was some skirmishing on the way, but none serious enough to check the onward movement; and the grand army swept steadily and swiftly forward and crossed the James River without molestation. This probably would hardly have happened, "if ́if Lee had been aware of Grant's plan; but supposing his design was to advance on Richmond by the way of Malvern Hill, he disposed his forces to meet this imaginary move

ment.

Two days before Grant broke up his camps at Cold Har bor, a demonstration was made against Petersburg by Kautz's cavalry, and an infantry force under Gillmore. The cavalry penetrated beyond the outer works, but not being supported by the infantry, was compelled to retire. Gillmore thought the works too strong to be carried by assault, and, hence, did not make the attempt, for which he was much blamed.

Grant having deceived Lee, as to his intentions, determined to capture Petersburg before the latter could throw reinforcements into it; and hence, before the army was over the river, planned an assault upon it. As the failure of this well-laid plan, on the success of which everything, for the time, depended, has been the cause of much dispute, we let General Grant give his own account of it. He says:

"After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by a steamer to Bermuda Hundred, to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture of Petersburg.

"The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him to send General Smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give him without sacrificing the position he then held. I told him that I would return at once to the Army of the Potomac, hasten its crossing, and

396

GRANT'S STATEMENT.

throw it forward to Petersburg, by divisons, as rapidly as it could be done; that we could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the enemy could bring troops against us. General Smith got off as directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg, before daylight next morning, but, for some reason, that I have never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines until near sundown. Then, with a part of his command only, he made the assault, and carried the lines northeast of Petersburg, from the Appomattox River, for a distance of two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery, and three hundred prisoners. This was about seven o'clock, p. m. Between the lines thus captured and Petersburg, there were no other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reinforced Petersburg with a single brigade from any source. The night was clear-the moon shining brightly-and favorable to further operations. General Hancock, with two divisions of the Second Corps, reached General Smith just after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (Smith) might wish, waiving rank to the named Commander, who he naturally supposed knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. But, instead of taking these troops, and pushing at once into Petersburg, he requested General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured works, which was done before midnight.

"By the time I arrived the next morning, the enemy was in force. An attack was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening, by the troops under Smith, and the Second and Ninth Corps. It required until that time for the Ninth Corps to get up and into position. The attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued, with but little intermission, until six o'clock the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of the main works of the

1

BUTLER'S FAILURE.

397

enemy to the right (our left) of those previously captured by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over four hundred prisoners."

It seems that this sudden victory was gained by the skir mish line alone, which, at a single bound, captured thirteen. redoubts, sixteen guns and several colors, with three or four hundred prisoners. The colored troops took three of the redoubts, and six of the guns.

As soon as Lee was made aware of the danger threatening Petersburg, he had the garrison reinforced with the troops nearest it; in doing which, he weakened the force on the railroad in front of Butler. The latter informed of this, immediately sent out a few thousand men, under Terry, who succeeded in reaching the road, and tore up the track for three or four miles, but was in turn driven back by Longstreet's Corps.

For not holding this important road, gained thus a second time, Butler again receives the lash of the Lieutenant-General. He says:

"As soon as I was apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it I ordered two divisions of the Sixth Corps, General Wright commanding, that were embarking at Wilcox's Landing, under orders for City Point, to report to General Butler, at Bermuda Hundred, of which General Butler was notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of his present line, urged upon him.

"About two o'clock in the afternoon, General Butler was forced back to the line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. General Wright, with his two divisions, joined General Butler on the forenoon of the 17th; the latter still holding, with a strong picket line, the enemy's works. But instead of putting these divisions into the enemy's works to hold them, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear of his own line. Between four and five o'clock in

398

LAST ASSAULT.

the afternoon, the enemy attacked and drove in his pickets, and re-occupied his old line.

"On the night of the 20th, and morning of the 21st, a lodgment was effected by General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank of the James, at Deep Bottom, and connected the pontoon bridge with Bermuda Hundred."

On Thursday, the assault was made on the rebel lines, and no permanent success gained. The next morning, Friday, at daylight, Burnside, with Miles' division of the Second Corps, made an attack on the right of the enemy's line, capturing three redoubts, and five hundred and fifty prisoners. The Second Corps was then thrown forward, and struggled nobly to gain the works, but failed.

On the right, Neill's division of the Sixth Corps, and Martindale's of the Eighteenth, pushed the enemy handsomely, for some distance, but gained no material advantage. We had lost, probably, six thousand men during these two days, which showed that the fighting had been very severe.

This was the condition of things when Grant arrived at the scene of action. The result thus far, of his grand coup de-main, was most deplorable. Two lines, however, of the enemy's works had been captured, and so, on Saturday, he resolved to carry the third and last, by general assault. Three times during the day did the gallant battalions move steadily up in the face of a deadly fire, and were swept down by thousands, but each time failed to gain the coveted position.

Grant succeeded in occupying and holding a ridge that completely commanded Petersburg, into which he could hurl his shells, but the "Cockade City," as it was called, was of no consequence whatever, so long as the rebels held the heights beyond. The city lay in a hollow, with two ridges on either side, frowning with hostile batteries. and dark with