240 SITUATION OF THE ARMY. was scattered from Kingston to Williams' Island, a distance of seventy miles, and yet, so adroitly did Hazen manage itcausing the heads of strong columns to appear simultaneously at different fords-building camp-fires at prominent points, and beating calls all along the river-that Bragg was thoroughly deceived, until the main army was far to the south of him. When he discovered it, he saw at once that he must retreat, or be cut off from his base of supplies; and, hastily breaking up his camp, he evacuated Chattanooga. The news reached Rosecrans on the 8th, and he immediately started in pursuit. To understand the positions of the armies at this time, it is necessary to remember that the Tennessee at this point runs nearly east and west in its general direction, and the Chickamauga Creek and the Lookout Mountain hang south from it, like two great pendants-the former above and the latter below Chattanooga. Bragg retreated along the valley formed by the Creek and Mountain. Over the Lookout Mountain, on the west side, lay the Lookout Valley, up which Rosecrans was marching. The Lookout Mountain, therefore, divided the two armies. But Rosecrans' army was very much scattered at the time he heard of Bragg's retreat. McCook's Corps was far up the Valley, forty-five miles south of Chattanooga; Thomas, commanding the center, was thirteen miles back of him, down the Valley; while Crittenden was on the river, and only some eight miles from Chattanooga-two of his divisions not yet being across. Rosecrans now immediately ordered Crittenden to move around the head of Lookout Mountain, and follow up Bragg's retiring columns as rapidly as possible, by crossing the Valley of Chickamauga in a south-easterly direction to Dalton. Had Crittenden done so, he would have been cut off; for Bragg, instead of striking the railroad, as Rosecrans supposed he would, had moved directly south, and now lay about A NARROW ESCAPE. 241 half-way between Dalton and Lookout Mountain. Fortunately, Crittenden's movement was delayed, until Rosecrans ascertained where the enemy really was. The former was therefore ordered to follow up the Chickamauga Creek, and take position at Gordon's Mill, where the road from Lafayette to Chattanooga crossed. Rosecrans had supposed that Bragg was in full retreat, and that the chief effort should be to intercept him; but now, to his astonishment, he learned that the rebel General was not only not fleeing, but had faced about, and was preparing to march back on Chattanooga. · His first, great object therefore was, to get his scattered army together, before Bragg should fall on Crittenden and cut him to pieces. The Corps of the latter lay stretched along the Chickamauga, and extended up the Valley towards Crawfish Springs, in order to be near as possible to Thomas, who was directed to march with all haste over the mountain to his support. The latter must cross by way of Stevens' Gap, and Bragg, aware of it, ordered General Hindman to occupy and hold the Gap, while Polk should fall on Crittenden, isolated and away from all support. Had Hindman done as he was directed, Bragg would doubtless have won Chattanooga again, and hopelessly cut Rosecrans' line of communication. Why he neglected to do so, or why Polk did not attack Crittenden during the entire week he was alone in the Valley, does not appear. The double failure doubtless caved Rosecrans and the Army of the Cumberland. Thomas, having sent forward Negley to hold the Gap, on the 8th and 9th hurried his columns across it, and, pushing down into the Valley, moved up to Crittenden's right. McCook was over the Lookout Mountain, far to the south, when he received the order of Rosecrans to join Thomas, and at midnight put his columns in motion. Bragg was aware of his isolated position, and took measures to intercept 242 POSITION OF THE ARMIES. him on the road which it was supposed he must take. McCook, however, instead of marching directly down to Thomas, recrossed Lookout Mountain, and, hurrying down Lookout Valley, crossed again at Stevens' Gap. He lost two or three days' march by this route, but saved his army. But, while he was urging his columns down Lookout Valley, and over its rugged heights by Stevens' Gap, events were assuming an alarming aspect along the Chickamauga Creek. A race had already commenced between the two armies, that were moving in parallel lines back towards Chattanooga. Bragg, having received the reinforcements he had been waiting for, determined to get between our army and Chattanooga, and thus cut Rosecrans' line of communications, and force him into a dangerous retreat, or give him battle on ground of his own choosing. Whether Rosecrans would have retreated to Chattanooga without risking a battle, had McCook arrived in time, would probably have depended on circumstances; but when the latter did at length form on Thomas' right, the line had been so prolonged that it was twelve miles in length, and still ten miles from Chattanooga. On the 18th, two fords, on our extreme left, were fiercely assailed, and our forces there driven back-showing that the enemy, though manoeuvering in front, designed to outflank Rosecrans, and thus force him to a decisive battle. On that night, therefore, Thomas was ordered to break off from the center and take position on the left, leaving McCook to close up and fill his place. Thus, on the morning of the 19th, he held the left, Crittenden the center, and McCook the right the whole stretching along the Chickamauga Creek, from Gordon's Mill towards Chattanooga. The army was still in motion on the morning of the 19th, closing up its line, for no portion of it was perfectly settled in position THE ATTACK. but the Corps of Thomas. 243 Granger was at Rossville, four miles from the left, with a division in reserve.' Early in the morning, Wood, who was stationed at Gordon's Mill, saw low clouds of dust hovering along the roads that, beyond the Creek, run towards Chattanooga-showing that heavy columns were marching in that direction-and reported the fact to Rosecrans. Brannan held the extreme left, Baird came next, and Reynolds next to him. Negley's division, belonging to Thomas, was holding Owen's Ford, two miles beyond Gor don's Mill. Palmer and Van Cleve, of Crittenden's Corps, held the center. Sheridan and Davis, of McCook's Corps, were marching swiftly up to close the right, when, about ten o'clock, the sudden explosion of artillery on the extreme left, told that the enemy had commenced the attack.. Crox ton's brigade, having been sent towards the river to recon noiter, was furiously assailed, and the remainder of Brannan's division came to his succor. Thomas, hearing the rapid firing, rode forward to ascertain the nature of the attack, and finding the whole division hard pressed and slowly giving way, ordered Baird's division to move at once to its support. The enemy, to his surprise, was over the river, and all the advantage it was supposed to give as a line of defense was lost, and it might as well have never been chosen. No strong position was left to fall back upon, and ranks of living men and batteries, stretching for nearly four miles, through the fields and woods, stood face to face to each other. The storm that struck Brannan and Baird with such terrible fury, and rolled rapidly down the line from left to right, showed that Bragg, beginning with his extreme right, was swinging the rebel army against our whole line, with the intention, at some point, of breaking through it. Before the attack had reached the center, and while Reynolds and Johnson were struggling desperately to hold their ground, Thomas 244 A GRAND CHARGE. succeeded in rallying the broken divisions of Brannan and Baird, and hurled them once more on the enemy. The suddenness and energy of the assault, that had well-nigh driven his whole Corps from the field, thoroughly aroused him. His sturdy regulars had been rolled back in confusion, and Scribner's brigade saved from annihilation only by cutting its way through a horde of rebels; and, stung by the disaster, the moment his columns were once more in position, and presented a solid front, he ordered the whole line to advance. The troops now caught the high courage and resolution of their Commander, and the deep murmur that rolled along their terrible front, foretold a fearful onset. Not sudden and headlong, but grand and awful, like the mighty march of the ocean-tide, the firm-set battalions moved sternly, steadily forward. Longstreet's veterans, flushed with success, threw themselves in their way, but could not stay that determined march for a moment. The rebel batteries, forced back, wheeled into new positions, and hurled shot and shell into the close formations in vain. The leaders flung themselves along their yielding lines, with waving swords and fiery appeals, to no purpose. The head of each opposing column that advanced to stem the awful torrent, melted away; and on, on swept the unbroken line-over abandoned guns, caissons, everything until the field was won, and the enemy borne back nearly a mile. But while this victory was being gained on our left, Polk and Hill had thrown themselves with such resistless impetuosity on the center, that, though fighting manfully to hold its ground, it was forced back, and the rout was fast becoming complete, when Davis came up from the right, and stopped the progress of the enemy. It was but for a moment, however. Rapidly accumulating fresh troops on the weakened point, the rebel Generals threw them forward with resistless intrepidity. Hurling Davis to the right, and Van Cleve to |