sulted seem to warrant, that the possibility of success amounts to a reasonable degree of probability, and also that the attempt to provision is to include an attempt to reinforce, for it seems to be generally agreed that provisioning without reinforcements, notwithstanding hostile resistance, will accomplish no substantially beneficial purpose.

The probable political effects of the measure allow room for much fair difference of opinion; and I have not reached my own conclusion without serious difficulty.

If the attempt will so inflame civil war as to involve an immediate necessity for the enlistment of armies and the expenditure of millions, I cannot advise it in the existing circumstances of the country and in the present condition of the national finances.

But it seems to me highly improbable that the attempt, especially if accompanied or immediately followed by a proclamation setting forth a liberal and generous yet firm policy toward the disaffected States, in harmony with the principles of the inaugural address, will produce such consequences; while it cannot be doubted that in maintaining a port belonging to the United States and in supporting the officers and men engaged in the regular course of service in its defense, the Federal Government exercises a clear right and, under all ordinary circumstances, performs a plain duty.

I return, therefore, an affirmative answer to the question submitted to me, And have the honor to be, With the highest respect, Your obedient servant,

TO THE PRESIDENT.

S. P. CHASE.

Opinion on Fort Sumter from the Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 16, 1861.

Sir In reply to the letter of inquiry, addressed to me by the President, whether, "assuming it to be possible now to provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it?" I beg leave to say that it has received the careful consideration, in the limited time I could bestow upon it, which its very grave importance demands, and that my mind has been most reluctantly forced to the conclusion that it would be unwise now to make such an attempt.

In coming to this conclusion, I am free to say I am greatly influenced by the opinions of the army officers who have expressed themselves on the subject, and who seem to concur that it is, perhaps, now impossible to succor that fort substantially, if at all, without capturing, by means of a large expedition of ships of war and troops, all the opposing batteries of South Carolina. All the officers within Fort Sumter, together with Generals Scott and Totten, express this opinion, and it would seem to me that the President would not be justified to disregard such high authority without overruling considerations of public policy.

Major Anderson, in his report of the 28th ultimo, says: "I confess that I would not be willing to risk my reputation on an attempt to throw reinforcements into this harbor within the time for our relief, rendered necessary by the limited supply of our provisions, and with a view of holding possession of the same, with a force of less than twenty thousand good and well-disciplined men."

In this opinion Major Anderson is substantially sustained by the reports of all the other officers within the fort, one of whom, Captain Seymour, speaks thus emphatically on the subject: "It is not more than possible to supply this fort by ruse with a few men or a small amount

of provisions, such is the unceasing vigilance employed to prevent it. To do so openly by vessels alone, unless they are shot-proof, is virtually impossible, so numerous and powerful are the opposing batteries. No vessel can lay near the fort without being exposed to continual fire, and the harbor could, and probably would, whenever necessary, be effectually closed, as one channel has already been. A projected attack in large force would draw to this harbor all the available resources in men and material of the contiguous States. Batteries of guns of heavy caliber would be multiplied rapidly and indefinitely; at least twenty thousand men, good marksmen and trained for months past with a view to this very contingency, would be concentrated here before the attacking force could leave Northern ports. The harbor would be closed; a landing must be effected at some distance from our guns, which could give no aid. Charleston harbor would be a Sebastopol in such a conflict, and unlimited means would probably be required to insure success, before which time the garrison at Fort Sumter would be starved out."

General Scott, in his reply to the question addressed to him by the President on the 12th instant, what amount of means, and of what description, in addition to those already at command, would be required to supply and reinforce the fort, says, "I should need a fleet of war vessels and transports, which, in the scattered disposition of the navy (as understood), could not be collected in less than four months; five thousand additional regular troops, and twenty thousand volunteers-that is, a force sufficient to take all the batteries, both in the harbor (including Fort Moultrie) as well as in the approach or outer bay. To raise, organize, and discipline such an army (not to speak of necessary legislation by Congress, not now in session) would require from six to eight months. As a practical military question, the time for succoring Fort Sumter with any means at hand had passed away nearly a month ago. Since then, a surrender under assault or from starvation has been merely a question of time."

It is true there are those whose opinions are entitled to respectful consideration, who entertain the belief that Fort Sumter could yet be succored to a limited extent without the employment of the large army and naval forces believed to be necessary by the army officers whose opinions I have already quoted. Captain Ward of the navy, an officer of acknowledged merit, a month ago believed it to be practicable to supply the fort with men and provisions to a limited extent, without the employment of any very large military or naval force. He then proposed to employ four or more small steamers belonging to the Coast Survey to accomplish the purpose, and we have the opinion of General Scott that he has no doubt that Captain Ward, at that time, would have succeeded with his proposed expedition, but was not allowed by the late President to attempt the execution of his plan. Now it is pronounced, from the change of circumstances, impracticable by Major Anderson and all the other officers of the fort, as well as by Generals Scott and Totten; and in this opinion Captain Ward, after full consultation with the latter named officers and the superintendent of the Coast Survey, I understand now reluctantly concurs.

Mr. Fox, another gentleman of experience as a seaman, who, having formerly been engaged on the Coast Survey, is familiar with the waters of Charleston Harbor, has proposed to make the attempt to supply the fort by the aid of cutters of light draught and large dimensions, and his proposal has, in a measure, been approved by Commodore Stringham; but he does not suppose, or propose, or profess to believe that provisions for more than one or two months could be furnished at a time.

There is no doubt whatever in my mind that when Major Anderson first took possession of Fort Sumter he could have been easily supplied with men and provisions, and that when Captain Ward, with the concurrence

of General Scott, a month ago, proposed his expedition, he would have
succeeded had he been allowed to attempt it, as I think he should have
been. A different state of things, however, now exists. Fort Moultrie
is now re-armed and strengthened in every way; many new hand bat-
teries have been constructed, the principal channel has been obstructed
in short, the difficulty of reinforcing the fort has been increased ten, if
not twenty, fold. Whatever might have been done as late as a month
ago, it is too sadly evident that it cannot now be done without the sacri-
fice of life and treasure not at all commensurate with the object to be
attained; and as the abandonment of the fort in a few weeks, sooner or
later, appears to be an inevitable necessity, it seems to me that the sooner
it be done the better.

The proposition presented by Mr. Fox, so sincerely entertained and ably advocated, would be entitled to my favorable consideration if, with all the lights before me, and in the face of so many distinguished military authorities on the other side, I did not believe the attempt to carry it into effect would initiate a bloody and protracted conflict. Should he succeed in relieving Fort Sumter, which is doubted by many of our most experienced soldiers and seamen, would that enable us to maintain our authority against the troops and fortifications of South Carolina? Sumter could not now contend against these formidable adversaries if filled with provisions and men. That fortress was intended, as her position on the map will show, rather to repel an invading foe. It is equally clear, from repeated investigations and trials, that the range of her guns is too limited to reach the city of Charleston, if that were desirable. No practical benefit will result to the country or the government by accepting the proposal alluded to; and I am, therefore, of the opinion that the cause of humanity, and the highest obligations to the public interest, would be best promoted by adopting the counsels of those brave and experienced men whose suggestions I have laid before you.

I have, sir, the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
SIMON CAMERON.

Opinion on Fort Sumter from the Secretary of the Navy.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, March 15, 1861.

Sir: In answer to your inquiry of this date, I take it for granted that Fort Sumter cannot be provisioned except by force, and assuming that it is possible to be done by force, is it wise to make the attempt?

The question has two aspects-one military, the other political. The military gentlemen who have been consulted, as well as the officers at the fort, represent that it would be unwise to attempt to succor the garrison under existing circumstances, and I am not disposed to controvert their opinions.

But a plan has been submitted by a gentleman of undoubted courage and intelligence,-not of the army or navy,-to run in supplies by steamtugs, to be chartered in New York. It is admitted to be a hazardous scheme, which, if successful, is likely to be attended with some loss of life and the total destruction of the boats. The force which would constitute the expedition, if undertaken, as well as the officer in command, would not, if I rightly understand the proposition, be of the army or navy. It is proposed to aid and carry out the enterprise by an armed ship at the mouth of the harbor and beyond the range of the shore batteries, which is to drive in the armed boats of the enemy beyond Fort Sumter. But suppose these armed boats of the enemy refuse to go into the inner haror, as I think they will refuse, and shall station themselves between VOL. II.-2.

Sumter and the ship for the express purpose of intercepting your boats, how can you prevent them from taking that station and capturing the tugs? There can be but one way, and that is by opening a fire upon them from Sumter, or the ship, or perhaps both. If this is done, will it not be claimed that aggressive war has been commenced by us upon the State and its citizens in their own harbor? It may be possible to provision Fort Sumter by the volunteer expedition, aided by the guns of Sumter and the ship-the military gentlemen admit its possibility, but they question the wisdom of the enterprise in its military aspect, and I would not impeach their conclusion.

In a political view I entertain doubts of the wisdom of the measure, when the condition of the public mind in different sections of the country, and the peculiar exigency of affairs, are considered. Notwithstanding the hostile attitude of South Carolina, and her long and expensive preparations, there is a prevailing belief that there will be no actual collision. An impression has gone abroad that Sumter is to be evacuated, and the shock caused by that announcement has done its work. The public mind is becoming tranquilized under it, and will become fully reconciled to it when the causes which have led to that necessity shall have been made public, and are rightly understood. They are attributable to no act of those who now administer the government.

By sending or attempting to send provisions into Sumter, will not war be precipitated? It may be impossible to escape it under any course of policy that may be pursued, but I am not prepared to advise a course that would provoke hostilities. It does not appear to me that the dignity, strength, or character of the government will be promoted by an attempt to provision Sumter in the manner proposed, even should it succeed, while a failure would be attended with untold disaster.

I do not, therefore, under all the circumstances, think it wise to attempt to provision Fort Sumter. I am, very respectfully,

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

GIDEON WELLES.

Opinion on Fort Sumter from the Secretary of the Interior.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, March 16, 1861.

PRESIDENT UNITED STATES.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of yesterday, requesting my opinion in writing upon the question whether, assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it?"

After a careful consideration of the opinions of Generals Scott and Totten, and also those of Commodore Stringham and Mr. Fox, as presented to the President and his cabinet on yesterday, I have arrived at the conclusion that the probabilities are in favor of the success of the proposed enterprise so far as to secure the landing of the vessels at the fort, but there would be great danger of their destruction and the loss of many lives before their cargoes could be secured within the fort.

It would be impossible, in my judgment, to fit out and conduct the expedition with such secrecy as to keep those who have control of the harbor of Charleston in ignorance of their object, and of the mode and time of their approach. I do not therefore attach any importance to the proposition to approach the fort under the cover of night, but I should expect the expedition to meet with all the resistance which the authorities of South Carolina may be able to command.

The landing of supplies at Fort Sumter, if successfully accomplished,

would of itself be of no practical value, as it is quite clear that Major Anderson, with his present inadequate force, could not long maintain the fort against the means of attack now concentrated there.

As the attempt to supply the fort with provisions without the consent of the authorities of South Carolina would doubtless induce an attack by them, the effect of such an attempt, whether successful or not, would be the early loss of the fort and the destruction or capture of Major Anderson's command. It would therefore, in my judgment, be unwise to attempt to supply the fort with provisions, unless they were sent with such a force as would place beyond all doubt or contingency the success of the enterprise, and also with such reinforcements of men as would insure a successful defense of the fort against any attack which could be made upon it. The occupation of Fort Sumter is not essential to the performance of any of the duties imposed upon the government. It cannot be used as a means of enforcing the laws, or of compelling the people of South Carolina to perform the duties they owe to the Federal Government. Viewing the question only as a military one, I cannot doubt that it would be expedient to abandon a position which can only be held at a great expense of life and money, and which, when held, cannot be used as a means of aiding the government in the performance of its duties.

But the most important question connected with this subject is one of a political character. The State of South Carolina is in open rebellion against the government. Her authorities have seized the public property, have wholly disregarded the laws of the United States, and have openly defied the government.

If the evacuation of Fort Sumter could be justly regarded as a measure which would even by implication sanction the lawless acts of the authorities of that State, or indicate an intention on the part of the government to surrender its constitutional authority over them, or if it could be regarded as an acknowledgment by the government of its inability to enforce the laws, I should without hesitation advise that it should be held without regard to the sacrifices which its retention might impose. I do not believe, however, that the abandonment of the fort would imply such an acknowledgment on the part of the government. There are other means by which the power and the honor of the government may be vindicated, and which would, in my judgment, be much more effective to compel the people of South Carolina to render obedience to the laws, and which would at the same time avoid the sacrifice of life which must result from a conflict under the walls of the fort.

The commencement of a civil war would be a calamity greatly to be deplored, and should be avoided if the just authority of the government may be maintained without it. If such a conflict should become inevitable, it is much better that it should commence by the resistance of the authorities or the people of South Carolina to the legal action of the government in enforcing the laws of the United States.

The public sentiment of the North would then be united in the support of the government, and the whole power of the country would be brought to its aid.

If a conflict should be provoked by the attempt to reinforce Fort Sumter, a divided sentiment in the North would paralyze the arm of the government, while treason in the Southern States would be openly encouraged in the North. It is well known that this question has already been much discussed throughout the country, and that even among the friends of the administration, many of those who demand that the laws shall be enforced urge the propriety of the withdrawal of our troops from Fort Sumter, believing that the retention of that fort is not essential to the honor of the government, or its power to enforce the laws.