Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions, Pages 1-75; Pages 177-225Because of the redistributive nature of institutions and the availability of implementable alternatives with different distributive consequences, the desire of federation members to change institutional specifics in their favor is a permanent feature of the federal political process. This is so for two reasons. First, states or their equivalents in democratic federations usually can succeed in renegotiating the rules if they feel sufficiently motivated to do so. Second, in the case of a federation it is more or less clear who stands to benefit from any change in institutions. Thus, the existence of an equilibrium of constitutional legitimacy at the popular and elite levels cannot be taken for granted. The authors show that the presence in the political process of agents who are 'naturally committed' to the status-quo institutional arrangement can suffice to coordinate voters to act as if they support existing constitutional arrangements. |
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Contents
Federations and the Theoretical Problem | 1 |
12 Definitions | 5 |
13 The Long Search for Stability | 16 |
14 The Fundamental Problem of Stability | 26 |
15 j Basic Premises and Conclusions | 33 |
Federal Bargaining | 42 |
21 Alliances versus Federations | 44 |
22 The Private Character of Public Goods | 50 |
54 Voters versus Elites | 161 |
55 Desirable Imperfection and a Democratic AsIf Principle | 169 |
Political Parties in a Federal State | 177 |
62 Parties in a Democracy | 182 |
63 The Idealized Party System | 186 |
64 Integrated Parties | 190 |
65 Integration outside the United States | 196 |
66 India | 213 |
23 Equilibrium Selection and Redistribution | 52 |
24 The Federal Problem | 55 |
25 Bargaining for Control of the Center | 61 |
26 Allocating Jurisdictions | 68 |
27 Three Levels of Institutional Design | 71 |
Two Cases of Uninstitutionalized Bargaining | 76 |
31 The Czechoslovak Dissolution | 79 |
32 The Soviet Disintegration | 88 |
33 The Feasibility of Success in Initial Bargaining | 101 |
The Special Road to Renegotiation | 104 |
Representation | 111 |
42 A National Venue for Bargaining | 116 |
43 Within versus Without | 119 |
44 Direct versus Delegated Representation | 125 |
45 Other Parameters of Design | 127 |
46 Bilateral Decision Making and the Case of Russia | 131 |
Incentives | 142 |
52 The Court | 151 |
53 Some Simple Rules of Constitutional Design | 157 |
Institutional Sources of Federal Stability I | 226 |
72 Level 2 and The Federalist Papers | 229 |
73 Level 3 Institutions | 236 |
74 Australia Canada Germany and India Revisited | 241 |
75 Local and Regional Design Parameters | 252 |
Institutional Sources of Federal Stability II | 259 |
81 Electoral Mechanisms and Societal Structures | 260 |
82 Level 2 Again and a Proper Federal Structure | 268 |
83 Level 1 and the Scope of the Federal Mandate | 289 |
84 Level o Things beyond Design | 294 |
Designing Federalism | 299 |
92 Russia | 301 |
93 The European Union | 315 |
94 Conclusion | 331 |
337 | |
367 | |
374 | |
Common terms and phrases
actions alliance allocation argue argument authority autonomy benefits bicameralism Bundesrat Bundestag campaign Canada candidates cantons central choice coalition competition conflict Congress constraints cooperation coordinate Czechoslovakia decentralization decision democracy democratic economic elections electoral encourage enforcement entities equilibrium ethnic European European Union example executive fact federal bargaining federal center federal constitution federal design federal government federal stability federal subjects Federalist Federalist Papers formal governors impact incentives institutional design institutional parameters integrated party interests issues label legislative Level motives national government national legislature national party negotiation outcomes parliament parliamentary party system party-list proportional representation party's percent player political elites political parties politicians preferences president presidential presidential systems problem provincial provisions redistributive reform regional renegotiation representation representatives republics requires Riker role rules Russia seats secession self-interest Slovak Slovakia social Soviet specific Tatarstan tion tional treaties U.S. Constitution union unitary United USSR versus vote voters
References to this book
Political Competition and Economic Regulation Peter Bernholz,Roland Vaubel,Egon-Sohmen-Foundation No preview available - 2007 |
Federalism: Political Identity and Tragic Compromise Malcolm Feeley,Edward Rubin Limited preview - 2009 |