But vain the bold, undaunted band
In close and furious contest stand;
Against the column's solid force,
In vain impel their scattered horse,
And wake anew, by deeds of fame,
The ancient glories of their name-
Foiled, slain, dispersed, the routed train
In wild confusion quit the plain.

But lo! the ever-varying queen,
Delusive Fortune, shifts the scene:
To crush the towering pride of France,
Behold brave Nelson firm advance!
Beneath his rule, in close array,
The Britons plough the watery way;
To famed Rosetta bends his course,

Where, deemed secure from hostile force,
The fleet superior of the foe

A lengthened line of battle show.
Lo! from the west, the setting ray
Slopes the long shades of parting day!
The fight begins;-the cannon's roar
In doubling echoes rends the shore;
Wide o'er the scene blue clouds arise,
And curl in volumes to the skies,
While momentary flashes spread
Their fleecy folds with fiery red.
More desperate still the battle glows
As night around its horrors throws.

But when the morning's golden eye
Beheld the dusky shadows fly,
Wild Havoc, frowning o'er the flood,
His giant form exulting showed;
The Gallic navy foiled and torn,
With pale discomfiture forlorn,
Wide scattered o'er Rosetta's bay,
In prostrate ruin helpless lay;
Two shattered fly; the rest remain
To wear the valiant victor's chain;
While o'er the wreck-obstructed tide
The British ships in triumph ride.
All-anxious, from Abucar's height,
The Gallic leaders view the fight,
And desperate see their fleet compelled
To force inferior far to yield.

So when, by night, o'er Memphis trod
The avenging minister of God,

At morn pale Egypt viewed with dread,
Her first-born numbered with the dead.

Ambitious Chief! in dust laid low,
Behold the honors of thy brow,
The laurels culled on Egypt's shore
Shall wither ere the day be o'er;
Thy armies thinned, reduced thy force,
Fell Ruin waits thy onward course,
While of thy country's aid bereft,
No safety but in flight is left,
And victory's self but seals thy doom,
And brings thee nearer to the tomb.
I see destruction wing her way,
I see the eagles mark their prey,
Where pent in Cairo's putrid wall,
In heaps thy dying soldiers fall;
Or, mid the desert's burning waste,
Smote by the Samiel's fiery blast;
Or pressed by fierce Arabian bands,
With thirst they perish on the sands.
While Bonaparte's dreaded name
Shall shine a beacon's warning flame,
To point to times of future date
Unprincipled ambition's fate.

James Madison.

BORN in King George Co., Va., 1751. DIED at Montpellier, Va., 1836.

ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ADOPTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

GIVE

[From a Speech in the Virginia Convention, June, 1788.]

IVE me leave to say something of the nature of the government, and to show that it is perfectly safe and just, to vest it with the power of taxation. There are a number of opinions; but the principal question is, whether it be a federal or a consolidated government. In order to judge properly of the question before us, we must consider it minutely, in its principal parts. I myself conceive, that it is of a mixed nature; it is, in a manner, unprecedented. We cannot find one express prototype in the experience of the world: it stands by itself. In some respects, it is a government of a federal nature: in others, it is of a consolidated nature. Even if we attend to the manner in which the constitution is investigated, ratified and made the act of the people of America, I can say, notwithstanding what the honorable gentleman has alleged, that this government is not completely consolidated; nor is it entirely

federal. Who are the parties to it? The people—not the people as composing one great body, but the people as composing thirteen sovereignties. Were it, as the gentleman asserts, a consolidated government, the assent of a majority of the people would be sufficient for its establishment, and as a majority have adopted it already, the remaining States would be bound by the act of the majority, even if they unanimously reprobated it. Were it such a government as is suggested, it would be now binding on the people of this State, without having had the privilege of deliberating upon it; but, sir, no State is bound by it, as it is, without its own consent. Should all the States adopt it, it will be then a government established by the thirteen States of America, not through the intervention of the legislatures, but by the people at large. In this particular respect, the distinction between the existing and proposed governments, is very material. The existing system has been derived from the dependent, derivative authority of the legislatures of the States; whereas this is derived from the superior power of the people. If we look at the manner in which alterations are to be made in it, the same idea is in some degree attended to. By the new system, a majority of the States cannot introduce amendments; nor are all the States required for that purpose; three-fourths of them must concur in alterations; in this there is a departure from the federal idea. The members to the national House of Representatives are to be chosen by the people at large, in proportion to the numbers in the respective districts. When we come to the Senate, its members are elected by the States in their equal and political capacity; but had the government been completely consolidated, the Senate would have been chosen by the people, in their individual capacity, in the same manner as the members of the other House. Thus it is of a complicated nature, and this complication, I trust, will be found to exclude the evils of absolute consolidation, as well as of a mere confederacy. If Virginia was separated from all the States, her power and authority would extend to all cases; in like manner, were all powers vested in the general government, it would be a consolidated government: but the powers of the federal government are enumerated; it can only operate in certain cases: it has legislative powers on defined and limited objects, beyond which it cannot extend its jurisdiction.

But the honorable member has satirized, with peculiar acrimony, the powers given to the general government by this constitution. I conceive that the first question on this subject is, whether these powers be necessary; if they be, we are reduced to the dilemma of either submitting to the inconvenience, or losing the Union. Let us consider the most important of these reprobated powers; that of direct taxation is most generally objected to. With respect to the exigencies of government, there is no question but the most easy mode of providing for them will