As soon as the rebels in Portsmouth, on the opposite side of Elizabethi River from Norfolk, ascertained that the National troops were advancing in force which could not be resisted, incendiaries, torch in hand, proceeded to set fire to all public and private property which could be of any avail to the victors. During the whole of Saturday night the heavens were lighted up with the glare of the conflagration. All the combustibles in the Navy Yard were committed to the flames. The dry dock, a magnificent work, built at an outlay of a million of dollars, was mined, and as far as possible destroyed. The incendiaries could be distinctly seen across the bay and at the Navy Yard, with flambeaux of pitch-pine, gliding about like so many fiends engaged in their congenial work of destruction. The immense volumes of flame flashing to the skies reminded one of the description of the burning of Moscow, and presented indeed a spectacle of terrific grandeur.

The evacuation of Norfolk by the rebels compelled them to abandon the batteries at Craney Island and at Sewall's Point. The rebel iron-clad steamer the Merrimac, which they had named the Virginia, and which, for several weeks since its conflict with the Monitor, had been lurking behind these tremendous batteries, was now in a trap from which she could not escape. There was not depth of water for her to ascend the James River to Richmond; she must, consequently, either be destroyed or captured. It would have been heroic in her commander to have plunged into the midst of our wooden fleet, regardless of the mailed Monitor, and have fought to the last. But Commodore Tatnall was not the man for such a deed. Treason seldom inspires true heroism. He steamed out to the vicinity of Craney Island, prepared a slow match to communicate to the magazine, set fire to the train, and hastened on shore with his men. The ship burned fiercely for an hour, when, at five o'clock on the morning of Tuesday, the 11th of May, there was a terrific explosion, and, as the smoke disappeared, not even a fragment of the ship could be seen. Its broken iron mass was in the bottom of the

sea.

The destruction of the Merrimac, the necessary consequence of the capture of Norfolk, opened to the National gunboats and transports the navigation of the James River almost to the gates of Richmond. General McClellan's troops, while on the march from West Point to White House, heard the tidings of the events we have above described. But the intelligence was not in all respects gratifying. The rebels, by withdrawing their garrisons from the various fortresses around Norfolk, were enabled to add eighteen thousand men to the large army now rallied to the defence of Richmond. Our three iron-clads, the Monitor, Naugatuck, and Galena, which had been stationed in Hampton Roads to watch the Merrimac, immediately ran up the James River to within seven miles of the city. There they encountered batteries and obstructions at Fort Darling, which, after a severe conflict, it was found impossible to pass. They, however, swept the river clear of all the batteries below.

As we have mentioned, fear of the Merrimac compelled our army to turn from the direct approach to Richmond by the James River, and to take the circuitous route by the York and the Pamunkey. A march of

twenty-five miles would have taken our troops across the Peninsula, from the Pamunkey to the James, where they could avail themselves of the most efficient co-operation of the gunboats in all subsequent movements. Such a movement could then have been accomplished by a vigorous march of two days, with no foes to oppose. Those who were carefully studying the progress of the campaign, supposed that this change of base. would immediately be made. But that dilatoriness, which had thus far proved the great vice of the Army of the Potomac, continued its sway, and the movement was not attempted until it became an absolute necessity, and was finally achieved in the midst of the most awful disaster and ruin.

The army remained three days at Cumberland. At three o'clock on Monday morning, May 19th, it resumed its march across the Peninsula to Richmond. By this time White House, on the solitary Pamunkey, had become a port, which, in extent of business and bustle, rivalled New York. Every thing requisite for an army of one hundred thousand men was transported by the tortuous river to that point. Vessels of every kind were continually ascending and descending the stream, while an innumerable company of contrabands, with glee irrepressible, and shouts which made the welkin ring, were unloading and transferring the army stores.

The troops commenced their march in three columns, following the railroad track and parallel roads. An advance guard explored the distant woods, searching for masked batteries, and penetrating every place in which a foe might lurk. Generals Heintzelman and Keyes, with forty thousand men, marched for Bottom's Bridge, on the Chickahominy, a few miles below where the railroad crosses that stream. This point was thirteen miles from White House and ten from Richmond. General McClellan, with the main body of the army, followed the line of the railroad, and advanced the first day six miles, to Tunstall's Station. The road led through a very picturesque country, with occasional elevations, most of the region being covered with forest. General Stoneman in the advance, by a more rapid march, proceeded eight miles farther, and reached the railroad bridge on the Chickahominy that afternoon.

The rebels had destroyed the bridge. They were not, however, there in force, and General Stoneman, without difficulty, took possession of the ruins, which he immediately proceeded to repair. Having thus made arrangements for the passage of the stream by the main body of the army, he marched six miles up the river to a little hamlet called Cold Harboi which was the appointed rendezvous for the right wing of the army. Here a strong force of the rebels was found. General Stoneman assailed them impetuously, drove them before him, and encamped there for the night. The average distance from the Pamunkey to the Chickahominy was twelve miles. There was no enemy to oppose our march, no rivers to ford, no mountains to climb. Still it was found so difficult, in our inexperience, to move a large army, that a whole week was occupied in transporting the troops this distance. The rain had fallen in unusual profusion, and the roads were exceedingly bad.

The troops commenced their march from the concentrated camp

at Cumberland, on the Pamunkey, and spread out in diverging lines as they approached the sluggish waters and extended marshes of the Chickahominy. By Sunday evening, May 25th, our troops were encamped on both sides of the stream, in a line extending more than twenty miles. The narrow river was spanned, along the line of the army, by six or seven dilapidated bridges, and two or three new ones were immediately commenced. As the roads were bad, and dense forests and pathless morasses were spread around, it was manifest that this position of the army exposed any portion of it to be assailed by a concentrated force of the rebels, and to be crushed before reënforcements could be sent to their aid. As it had been invariably the practice of the rebels to combine their whole force in an overwhelming assault upon some unprotected division of the National troops, the greatest anxiety was felt in the North as soon as the disposition of our army was known. The Northern community, familiar also in their reading with the rapid campaigns and long daily marches of European troops, could not restrain the utterance of their inpatience, in view of the continued slowness of our advance. They knew that every day's delay diminished our army, and increased that of the foe.

Two months had now elapsed since the National troops, aided by an immense fleet of transports and gunboats, had landed on the Peninsula. It was forty-five miles from Williamsburg to the Chickahominy. Twenty days had been occupied in the march. The enemy had been all this time rapidly gathering recruits. Thousands of slaves were driven, day and night, to work upon their intrenchments around Richmond. From our advanced posts we could see the spires of the city, and, in the silence of the night, could hear the tolling of its bells. It became evident that we were outnumbered by the rebels. Moreover, they were stationed behind formidable defences. Those ramparts must be stormed before the patriots could enter Richmond. Our opportunity was lost. It was but sixty

miles from Fortress Monroe to Richmond. Could we have passed over that space in eight days, instead of eight weeks, the rebel capital could easily have been taken.

It was now too late. Our army was entangled in the marshes of the Chickahominy. The sultry heat was beating down upon the heads of the fainting soldiers. The malaria arising from those swamps was filling the hospitals with the sick. General McClellan continued to send to Washington for reënforcements; but "Stonewall" Jackson, the most bold and daring fighter of the rebels, was thundering down the Valley of the Shenandoah, and there was not a man to be spared from the defenceless capital. Under these circumstances, anxiety oppressed every thoughtful man in the army and in the Nation. We had marched our troops into the heart of the enemy's country, had entangled them amidst marshes in the presence of an outnumbering foe, and now the whole army was in imminent danger of destruction. Here we must leave them for a short season, while we describe the raid of "Stonewall" Jackson down the Valley of the Shenandoah to the banks of the Potomac.

CHAPTER VI.

THE PERIL OF WASHINGTON; JACKSON'S RAID

(From May 20th to May 27th, 1862.)

ANXIETY OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN.-MCDOWELL'S CORPS.-THE MOUNTAIN DEPARTMENT. —JACKSON'S DASH UPON BANKS.-NOBLE LETTER OF GENERAL MCDOWELL.-PANIC IN WASHINGTON.-ENERGETIC ACTION OF GENERAL FREMONT.-RUNNING BATTLE.-SUCCESS OF JACKSON'S RAID. BATTLE OF HANOVER COURT-HOUSE.

ON the 17th of May, the War Department, at Washington, sent the following dispatch to General McClellan :

"Your dispatch to the President, asking for reënforcements, has been received and carefully considered. The President is not willing to uncover the Capital entirely, and it is believed that, even if this were prudent, it would require more time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock, by the way of the Potomac and York Rivers, than by the land march.

"In order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond, at the earliest possible moment, General McDowell has been ordered to march upon the city by the shortest route. He is orderedkeeping himself always in position to cover the Capital from all possible attack-so to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your right, and you are instructed to co-operate, so as to establish this communication as soon as possible. By extending your right wing to the north of Richmond, it is believed that the communication can be safely established, either north or south of the Pamunkey River. In any event, you will be able to prevent the main body of the enemy's forces from leaving Richmond and falling in overwhelming force pon General McDowell. He will move with between thirty-five and forty thousand men.

"A copy of the instructions to Major-General McDowell is with this. The specific task assigned to his command, has been to provide against any danger to the Capital of the Nation. At your earnest call for reënforcements, he is sent forward to co-operate in the reduction of Richmond, but charged, in attempting this, not to uncover the City of Washington; and you will give no orders, either before or after your junction, which can keep him out of position to cover this city. You and he will communicate with each other, by telegraph or otherwise, as frequently as may be necessary for efficient co-operation.

"The President directs that General McDowell retain the command of the Department of the Rappahannock, and of the forces with which he moves forward. By order of the President.

"EDWIN M. STANTON, Sec. of War."

Could this union, thus ordered, of General McDowell's force of thirtyfive thousand men with General McClellan's army have then been effected, it is not improbable that Richmond might have fallen. General McClellan, in his testimony on the 10th of December, before a court-martial in Washington, where General McDowell was triumphantly acquitted of all the charges brought against him, said:

"I have no doubt that the Army of the Potomac would have taken Richmond had not the corps of Gèneral McDowell been separated from it. It is also my opinion, that had the command of General McDowell joined the Army of the Potomac in the month of May, by way of Hanover CourtHouse, from Fredericksburg, we should have had Richmond in a week after the junction. I do not hold General McDowell responsible for a failure to join me on that occasion."

General McDowell was as anxious as General McClellan to have this junction effected, but was prevented by the events which we must turn aside for a moment to describe. It will be remembered that the majestic Army of the Potomac, numbering over two hundred thousandmen, which for eight months had been reposing in the vicinity of Manassas, when pushed by the order of the President into action, was divided into several corps d'armée. General McClellan took over one hundred and fifty thousand men to move upon Richmond by the Peninsular route, which he chose contrary to the judgment of the President. As this exposed Washington to attack, by a sudden raid through Fredericksburg, or through the valley of the Shenandoah, General McDowell was sent to guard the Fredericksburg route, with about thirty thousand men; and General Banks was sent with a small force of five or eight thousand men into the valley, to watch against any raid upon Washington in that direction. He entered the valley at Harper's Ferry, and, passing through the towns of Winchester, Strasburg, Woodstock, New Market, and Harrisonsburg, took position at Staunton. At Winchester a portion of this force, under General Shields,* met a large body of the rebels on the 23d of March, and completely routed them in one of the most hotly contested battles of the war. The rebels, under General T. J. Jackson, were driven to Strasburg. They left eightyfive dead on the field. They retreated with ten wagons of dead and wounded in their train.

In addition to these movements, an order was issued by the President on the 11th of March, creating the Mountain Department. General

* Major-General James Shields was born in Tyrone County, Ireland, in 1810. When sixteen years of age he emigrated to America, and settled in Kaskaskia, Illinois. He studied law, entered upon successful practice, and in 1843 was appointed Judge of the Supreme Court of the State. Upon the opening of the Mexican war he was appointed Brigadier-General of Volunteers. At Vera Cruz and Cerro Gordo he distinguished himself for his gallantry. At the latter battle he was severely wounded by a copper ball, which passed through his body and lungs. His life was saved by the skill of a Mexican surgeon, after the regular surgeons of the army had given over his case as hopeless. He was again wounded at Chapultepec, and was made Major-General. Returning from the war, he was elected to the National House of Representatives in 1849. Afterwards removing to Minnesota, he was elected to the United States Senate. Subsequently he removed to California, and resumed the profession of the law. Upon the breaking out of the rebellion, he again, with ardent patriotism, took up arms in defence of his imperilled adopted country.